Economic survey of Latin America 1981 by NU. CEPAL
ISSN 0252 - 2217 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 
OF LATIN AMERICA 
1981 
UNITED NATIONS 




Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a 
symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. 
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression 
of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. 
UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION 
Sales N a E.83.II.G.2 
C O N T E N T 
Part one 
TRENDS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY IN 1981 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING 1 
1. Main trends 1 
2. Stabilization policies and the slowdown of the world economy . . . 10 
3. The developing countries 12 
II. MAIN TRENDS 15 
III. ECONOMIC GROWTH 18 
1. The growth rate 18 
2. Total supply and demand 23 
IV. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 24 
V. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 31 
1. Foreign trade 31 
2. The balance of payments 42 
3. The external debt 50 
VI. PRICES AND WAGES 55 
1. Prices 55 
2. Wages and salaries 59 
Part Two 
THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES 














TRENDS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN 
ECONOMY IN 1981 
Ecuador 365 












Dominican Republic 691 
Suriname 709 




A. Methodological note 793 
B. Statistical Series 797 
C. Figures 797 
Notes and explanation of symbols 
The following symbols have been used in the tables in this Survey: 
Three dots (...) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. 
A dash (—) indicates that the amounts is nil or negligible. 
A blank space in a table means that the item in question is not aplicable. 
A minus sign (-) indicates a deficit or decrease, unless otherwise indicated. 
A full stop (.) is used to indicate decimals. 
A slash (/) indicates a crop year or fiscal year, e.g., 1969/1970. 
Use of a hyphen (-) between years, e.g., 1960-1970, signifies an annual average for the calendar years involved, including 
the beginning and the end years. 
References to "tons" mean metric tons, and to "dollars" United States dollars, unless otherwise stated. 
Unless otherwise stated, references to annual growth rates or rates of variation mean cumulative annual rates. 
Part one 
TRENDS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY IN 1981 
TRENDS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY IN 1981 
Despite Latin America's impressive growth since the end of World War II, its development is still 
strongly conditioned by events outside the region. Indeed, the trade and capital flows which tie it to 
the industrialized countries have grown in relative importance since the oil crisis of 1973, so that it 
is difficult for the region to deviate for long from basic trends in the international economy. 
Yet, one of the most striking features of the 1970s was that the Latin American economies 
—even the non-oil-exporting ones— proved able to maintain vigorous growth despite the oil 
price hikes of 1973 and 1979 and the centre's subsequent recession in 1974/1975 and slowdown in 
1980. Somehow the region seemed to be successfully defying its external conditioning. In 1981, 
however, the force of external events was reaffirmed, and the Latin American economies were 
brought into line once again, with growth decelerating sharply from 5.9% in 1980 to 1.7%, the 
region's slowest growth rate in 40 years, and not very much different from that of the OECD 
countries. Thus, in 1981 the evolution of the Latin American economies was again largely 
governed by economic events and forces from outside the region and was therefore more closely 
patterned on the evolution of the centre, to which it is inexplicably tied. In view of this growing 
interdependence, it seems appropriate to review briefly the major developments in the world 
economy which, in 1981, conditioned more forcefully than at any time in the recent past the 
economic evolution of Latin America. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING 
1. Main trends 
Four salient facts stand out in the evolution of the international economy in 1981: (a) the 
continued slow growth; (b) the decline in the value of world trade for the first time in almost 25 
years; (c) the extraordinarily high real rates of interest: the highest since the Great Depression; 
and (d) the appreciation of over 12% in the US dollar. Each of these can be shown to be a 
consequence, at least in the short run, of the restrictive demand policies adopted in several of the 
principal industrial countries, which gave top priority in 1981 to lowering the high, and stubbornly 
persistent inflation besetting them. Taken together these features account for the poor 
performance of the international economy in 1981. 
(a) The widespread slowdown of economic growth 
The growth of world output decelerated once again in 1981, for the third consecutive year. 
Preliminary estimates indicate that GDP grew by only 1.2%, a rate well below the 4-5% averaged 
over the last 20 years. Indeed, this was the second lowest growth rate since 1958, only the recession 
of 1975 having affected production more adversely during the period. 
What made 1981 particularly serious, however, is that unlike what happened in 1974-1975, 
when the recession especially affected the developed countries, in 1981 the slowdown was 
widespread, affecting market as well as centrally planned economies, developed as well as 
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developing countries (see table 1). Slow* growth persisted in the market economies, but at a rate 
above that of the recession of 1974-1975. The centrally planned economies, whose evolution had 
heretofore been quite unrelated to that of the rest of the world, also experienced markedly low 
growth. Yet the sharpest deceleration in 1981 took place precisely in the growth rates of the 
developing countries. Output actually fell 10% in the capital surplus developing countries,1 though 
this was largely the result of the war between Iraq and Iran. More significantly, growth in the 
non-oil-exporting developing countries slowed from an average of over 4% in 1979/1980 to only a 
over 1% in 1981, implying a sizeable fall in per capita income. Only the developing countries of 
South and East Asia deviated from these trends, registering a remarkable growth rate of over 6% 
which far outdistanced not only other developing regions but the developed economies as well (see 
table 2). 
Table 1 
WORLD: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Growth rates) 
World 
Developed market economies 
Developing countries' 
Capital surplus countries 
Other energy exporters 
Energy importers 


















































Source: United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, on the basis of official national and 
international sources. 
"Preliminary figures. 
North America, southern and western Europe (excluding Cyprus, Marta and Yugoslavia), Australia, Japan, New Zealand 
and South Africa. 
c
 Latin America and the Caribbean area, Africa (other than South Africa), Asia (excluding Japan) and Cyprus, Malta and 
Yugoslavia. 
^Brunei, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. 
cData measured by net material product concept. Countries comprise China, Eastern Europe and Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. 
Table 2 






































Source: United Nations, Department of International Economic and social Affairs, on the basis of official national and 
international sources, and CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Brunei, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Jamahiriya Arab Libya, Qatar, South Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
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Table 3 























































































Source: GATT, Press Release NQ 1313, 23 March 1982, and IMF, International Financial Statistics, (several issues). 
"Figures for 1981 are based on incomplete returns and are subject to revision. 
The trade balance for the world does not add up to zero, as it should, because of errors and omissions in the different 
accounts. 
'Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates and Venezuela. 
''FOB. 
(b) The decline in world trade 
World trade, which had been playing a dynamic role in growth over the previous 30 years by 
expanding at a significantly faster rate than overall output, actually declined by 1% in 1981. This 
was the first such decline in the current value of trade since 1958, and marked an especially sharp 
deceleration from the previous two years' growth rates of over 20% per year. As in the case of the 
slower GDP growth, the deceleration of trade was also general, though the value of the developing 
countries' trade, and especially that of the non-oil-exporting developing economies did neverthe-
less manage to expand (see table 3). 
The decline in world trade reflected the stagnation in the volume of exports (down from 
1.5% in 1980) and a decline in the dollar value of most export items, with the notable exception of 
oil. The slowdown in the volume of trade was mainly due to the large (14%) drop in the volume of 
petroleum exports, which, coming after an earlier decline of 12% in 1980, left the quantum of 
petroleum exports at its lowest level since 1970. The pronounced downturn in the rate of growth 
of economic activity in the industrialized countries, coupled with the progressive spread of 
conservation measures after the second oil price hike, were the main causes of this reduction in the 
volume of oil exports. If crude oil is excluded, however, the volume of world trade grew by 2.5% in 
1981, although this was still markedly lower than the 4.5% increase in 1980. 
As for export prices, a combined index for the basic commodities (except petroleum) 
exported by developing countries registered a decline of nearly 16%, as against increases of the 
order of 15% in each of the previous two years (see table 4). Moreover, this decline was quite 
general, covering all basic commodities. Indeed, even the prices of the manufactured exports of 
developed countries decreased, by some 5%. 
This generalized decline in export prices (except those of petroleum, which increased by 
10-15% in 1981), was largely due to the 13% appreciation of the US dollar against the world's 
major currencies. This meant that in the main it was the terms of trade only of the oil-exporting 
countries and of the United States which improved in the course of 1981. The terms of trade of the 
rest of the world declined, especially those of the non-oil-exporting developing countries, which 
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fell by 10-15% in 1981. This decline in the terms of trade of the non-oil-exporting developing 
economies was comparable in severity only to that experienced in 1974-1975 (see figure 1). 
Nevertheless, the export volume of all but the OPEC countries increased in 1981 by 2.5% in 
the case of the developed countries and 3-4% in that of the non-oil-exporting developing 
countries, with Latin America proving especiallly dynamic under the circumstances. This was in 
marked contrast to the experience of 1974-1975, when not only did the terms of trade of the 
non-oil-exporting countries worsen but the quantum of their exports stagnated or declined too. 
Thus, unlike 1974-1975, the severity of the sharp decline in export prices in 1981 was attenuated 
by this expansion in the volume of the non-petroleum exports. 
(c) High real interest rates 
In 1981 real interest rates in international markets (LIBOR) reached unprecedented levels, of 
the order of 6% on average for the year. It is true that nominal interest rates had been creeping up 
systematically over the last years and had consistently exceeded 10% since 1979 (see table 5), but 
Table 4 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MARKET PRICES OF PRINCIPAL 
COMMODITY EXPORTS" 
(Annual rates of change) 
Food and tropical beverages 
Vegetable oilseeds and oils 
Agricultural raw materials 

































Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, vol. II, N° 1, January 1982, and CEPAL calculations. 
"Free market prices (excluding sales under long-term contracts or at preferential prices), in current dollars. 
Weighted according to the relative importance of each group in the value of exports of developing countries in 1975-
1977. 
Table 5 
N O M I N A L INTEREST RATES I N SELECTED INDUSTRIALIZED 
COUNTRIES A N D LIBOR 
(Annual averages) 






































































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, (various issues). 
"Call money rate. 
Treasury funds rate. 
'Federal funds rate. 
London Eurodollar rate for tree-month deposits. 
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Figure 1 
TERMS OF TRADE OF NON-OIL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues). 
aFirst quartet 
5 
then so had the rate of inflation. Thus, in real terms the interest rate had not been above 1-2% per 
year during the decade, and indeed, in several of these years it had been zero or negative. In 1981, 
however, because of the general pursuit in the major industrial countries of restrictive policies 
aimed at decelerating price increases, the rate of inflation began to decelerate, from 12.9% in 1980 
to 10.8% in 1981 (see table 6), whereas LIBOR continued to rise, from 14.4% in 1980 to 17% in 
1981. These opposite trends of nominal interest rates and inflation thereby raised real interest 
rates to double their historical average: a level not experienced in the countries of the OECD 
(suggestively enough) since the Great Depression. 
The unintentional consequences of these stabilization policies and the resulting high interest 
rates were stagnation in the central countries, especially in sectors particularly sensitive to the 
interest rate such as construction and consumer durables, and a consequent slowdown in the 
centre's demand for the developing countries' exports. These high interest rates hurt the develop-
ing countries in three other ways as well; however: (1) the industrial countries' desire to maintain 
large commodity inventories diminished because of the high interest rates and the decline of 
inflationary expectations, thus further depressing the prices and volumes of the periphery's 
exports, especially those (such as lead, copper and rubber) which are important inputs to the 
interest-sensitive depressed sectors of the centre; (2) greater net capital inflows to the periphery 
were discouraged; and (3) interest charges on past debt incurred at variable interest rates increased 
substantially. 
Given that in 1981 the developing countries' indebtedness (exclusive of short-run debt) was 
of the order of US$ 500 billion (see table 7) and interest payments alone equalled some 80% of 
their overall trade deficit, it is clear that the developing countries' balance of payments was quite 
sensitive to interest rate increases. Furthermore, this is all the more serious when, as in 1981, the 
price of their exports not only did not rise in step with world inflation, but actually declined. Thus, 
in sharp contrast with 1974-1975, when the terms of trade of the non-oil-exporting developing 
Table 6 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: CONSUMER PRICES 
(Percentage annual average changes) 
Total OECD 































































Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, N° 30, December, 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Correspond to the years 1973, 1974 and 1975. 
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Table 7 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MEDIUM-AND LONG-TERM 





































































































Disbursed outstanding debt 
Official sources 
Private sources 62.0 97.9 123.6 158.0 203.4 235.7 269.4 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, December 1981. 
Figures include the public and state-guaranteed debt of 98 developing economies (Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq are 
excluded), plus estimates of private non-guaranteed debt. No data for the People's Republic of China are abailable, but 
data for Taiwan are included. 
CEPAL, estimate on the basis of the net capital flow in 1981 over 1980, shown in table 11. 
nations fell but real interest rates were low or negative, in 1981 the decline in the terms of trade 
was exacerbated by the surge in real interest rates. 
(d) The appreciation of the dollar 
From its low in the third quarter of 1980 to its peak in the third quarter of 1981, the US dollar 
appreciated almost 2 1 % (see figure 2). This represented an average appreciation of 12.6% for the 
whole of 1981 in respect of 1980 against a weighted composite of the 17 major currencies of the 
world. Thus 1981 saw a dramatic reversal of the previous 10 years' steady depreciation of the 
dollar, whose value had eroded by over 20% since 1970. This sharp strengthening of the US dollar 
reflected not so much a sudden improvement in the current account surplus of the United States as 
the sharp rise in nominal (and real) United States interest rates registered as of mid-1980 (see 
figure 3). These rates were above those of all other major currencies not only in nominal terms but 
also after taking into account the likely differences in their inflation rates for the forthcoming year. 
Consequently, the high interest rates resulting from the United States' relatively tight monetary 
policy strongly attracted short-term capital and raised the value of the dollar. 
A 13 % appreciation of the US dollar should have led to a significant increase in the quantum 
of that country's imports, given the increased competitiveness of foreign goods this implied. This 
would have served to compensate, at least in part, for the negative effect on the prices of the 
periphery's exports caused by the dollar appreciation. Unfortunately, the same high interest rates 
which caused the dollar to appreciate slowed down the United States economy as of the second 
quarter of 1981, so that any increase in the quantum of imports induced by the lower prices of the 




EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES3 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues). 
aIndices calculated by combining the exchange rate of the currency in question with those 
of 17 other major currencies, using weights derived from the IMF model (MERM). 
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Figure 3 
COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING RATES TO PRIME BORROWERS IN SELECTED 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND LIBOR 
(Percentages) 
United States 
i i ' i I 1 I I I I I I X. I i I i ' I I i i i ' I ' I 
S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D 
/ s
 v ' N v ' 
1979 1980 1981 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World Financial Markets: (various issues). 
aSix-month Eurodollar deposit rates at prime banks' bids in London. 
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2. Stabilization policies and the slowdown of the world economy 
The widespread emphasis placed on price stabilization policies, notably in several of the major 
industrial countries, but in many of the developing countries as well, accounted in no small 
measure for the poor performance of the world economy in 1981. To be sure, stabilization policies 
were only one of several determinants of this slowdown. Since stagnation, unwanted however, all 
too frequently accompanies stabilization policies, it would have been very surprising if a wides-
pread move towards restrictive policies had not led to a slowdown, if not a downturn, in the world 
economy. It is therefore worth considering why the fight against inflation came to acquire top 
priority in many countries' policies. 
The monetary policy followed by the United States in the late 1960s, designed to cover that 
country's excessive deficits, by consequently expanding money supply well beyond the center's 
needs of dollar reserves, finally led to the abandonment of the fixed dollar parity with gold and a 
movement away from the dollar towards other currencies and goods, resulting in the depreciation 
of the dollar (throughout the 1970s) and the commodity boom of 1972-1973. This sequence of 
events together with the quadrupling of oil prices late in 1973, raised the rate of inflation 
throughout the world, and most notabley in the OECD countries, to double digit levels (see table 6). 
Had the surge in inflation been a once and for all phenomenon, it would not have been as serious. 
The problem, however, was its persistence. Five years after the firts hike in oil prices, inflation in 
the industrial countries had not yet been brought down under 7%, thus leaving it at almost double 
the rate which prevailed during the 1960s. The fact that inflation persisted at such high levels in 
spite of the important recession experienced by the OECD countries in 1974-1975 made the 
situation all the more distressing (see table 8). Another puzzling feature was that although by 
1978 the OECD economies had largely recovered their former dynamism, unemployment rates 
were proving difficult to budge and hovered around 5%, well above their typical pre-recession 
levels (see table 9). 
Table 8 












































Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, N°, December, 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Correspond to the years 1973, 1974 and 1975. 
'Gross National Product. 
1962-
1972 
Total OECD 5.0 
Federal Republic of Germany1 4.4 
France 5.6 
Japanc 9.6 
United Kingdom 2.7 
United States" 4.2 
10 
Table 9 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES 
(Percentage rates) 































































Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, NQ 30, December, 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Correspond to the years 1973, 1974 and 1975. 
'Italy and Canada are added to the countries mentioned above. 
Then in 1979, even before the second oil price hike, inflation began to accelerate in the OECD, 
reaching a rate of almost 10% in 1979 and, after the doubling of oil prices, almost 13% in 1980. 
The fear that high inflation expectations were becoming permanently built into the OECD 
economies and so could make stabilization policies ever more costly to pursue led several countries 
to give the fight against inflation their top priority, notwithstanding the unusually high rates of 
unemployment then present. What is perhaps equally significant is that priorities shifted not only 
towards stabilization policies, but towards monetary instruments in particular. Especially in the 
United Kingdom and later in the United States, reliance was placed on restrictive monetary 
policies as the principal, if not the sole, stabilization instrument. 
Exclusive reliance on restrictive monetary policies regardless of the effect on interest rates 
—the announced intention of the US Federal Reserve Bank as of late 1979— meant that interest 
rate;, would rise sharply and be more volatile, as indeed was the case throughtout 1980 and 1981. 
This in turn meant that the brunt of the deceleration in nominal demand would be borne in the 
first instance by sectors sensitive to interest rates, such as consumer durables and construction, 
rather than by the economy as a whole. This, together with the disregard of instruments such as 
income and fiscal policies for guiding expectations and/or spreading the burden of reduced 
expenditure more widely, made it all the more likely that much of the effect of the stabilization 
policy would fall on output rather than on prices. 
It is true that restrictive monetary growth did succeed in slowing inflation, from 12.9% in 
1980 to 10.8% in 1981. But not surprisingly —given the almost exclusive reliance on this one 
instrument— success was achieved at the cost of stagnation or recession in most of the OECD 
countries, with growth deceleration from 3.3% in 1979 to little over 1% in both 1980 and 1981 
(see table 8). A further result was that unemployment rose to 6.5%: almost double its historical 
rate and higher than that which prevailed in the recession of 1974-1975. Even countries such as 
France and Germany, typically characterized by very low unemployment, reached rates of over 5 % 
in 1981. 
Thus, while inflation was clearly continuing to give way in several of the OECD countries, 
especially the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan, output was virtually stagnant in 
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1981, with hopes for recovery limited so long as real interest rates remained high. How these could 
be brought down became the subject of much public debate: whether there should be a less 
restrictive monetary policy, or a smaller United States public deficit, or less volatility in monetary 
expansion. All schools of thought, however, concurred that recovery would be stymied unless 
interest rates came down, but these remained high, notwithstanding the significantly lower rates 
of inflation universally forecast for 1982. The contrasting proposals put forward reflected the 
quandary in which policymakers found themselves, all of which raised the extra premium to cover 
the uncertainty which characterized the market at this time, and which did little to overcome the 
inertia bogging down the economy. 
3- The developing countries 
The developing economies today no longer merely respond to, or simply reflect, events in the 
developed world. This is certainly the case of the oil-exporting countries, but to a greater or lesser 
extent it is true of other developing countries as well. As noted earlier, on the positive side, the 
developing regions of South and East Asia grew rapidly in 1980 and 1981. On the negative side, 
there were other cases where internal events weighed far more heavily: countries at war (Iran and 
Iraq) or enduring serious civil strife (e.g. Afghanistan and El Salvador); or countries racked by 
their own peculiar disequilibria (e.g. the struggle of Brazil and Argentina against triple-digit 
inflation). Yet, on balance, the evolution of most non-oil-exporting developing nations was 
heavily conditioned by the sluggish performance of the central economies. 
In particular, it was the stagnation induced by the stabilization policies of the central countries 
which largely accounted for the principal events shaping the performance of the developing 
economies in 1981. The centre's stagnation slowed down the rise in the value of the periphery's 
non-oil exports to 8% in 1981 down from 25% or more in 1979 and 1980 (see table 3). Since the 
periphery's imports grew quite strongly and, even more importantly, interest payments ballooned, 
the current account deficit of the non-oil-exporting countries grew dramatically for the fourth 
consecutive year, topping US$ 100 billion in 1981, or the equivalent of over 30% of their 
merchandise exports (see table 10). The combination of relatively sluggish demand in the centre, 
high interest rates and the appreciation of the dollar resulted in a sharp decline in the prices of the 
periphery's main exports. It is true that the dollar prices of European export manufactures also 
declined, but this drop was less sharp, so that the non-oil-exporting countries suffered a deteriora-
tion of their terms of trade of the order of 10-15 %. Thus, the growth in the gross domestic product 
of the non-oil-exporting countries, once adjusted for the deterioration in their terms of trade, must 
Table 10 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CURRENT ACCOUNT SITUATIONS" 
(Millions of dollars) 





Non-oil exporting developing 
countries'^ 
Source: IMF, on the basis of official figures. 
'On goods, services and private transfers. 
Includes errors, omissions and balance of listed groups with other countries mainly centrally-planned economies. 






































actually have been negative in 1981. Moreover, complicating matters further, the burden of 
servicing the developing countries' debt rose sharply in 1981 due to both higher levels of 
indebtedness and the marked rise in real interest rates. 
Even though it is tempting to ascribe the developing countries' marked deceleration in 
growth in 1981 to the stagnation in the central countries, the deterioration in the terms of trade 
and the rise in interest rates, this argument is not fully convincing, for however sluggish the 
centre's economic activity was in 1980-1981, it nevertheless did expand, and certainly far more 
than during the recession of 1974-1975, when its output actually fell. Yet in the face of that 
recession, the developing countries grew by nearly 6% and 4% in those two years, well above their 
1981 growth of 0.6% or even the 1.4% growth rate of the non-oil-exporting developing 
economies (see table 1). 
Nor was the deterioration in the terms of trade of the periphery in 1981 unique, for it had 
been equally strong in 1975 (see figure 1). True, real interest rates to the developing countries 
were low or negative in 1974-1975 whereas in 1981 they were quite high. Yet this latter effect 
should have been compensated by the fact that the quantum of the non-oil-exporting countries' 
exports grew significantly in 1981, whereas it actually fell in 1974-1975. 
There would seem to be three critical variables which explain how the developing countries 
—even the non-oil-exporting ones— were able to maintain acceptable growth rates in 1974 and 
1975 despite the deterioration of the central economies, whereas in 1981 their economies 
stagnated notwithstanding the less depressed conditions besetting the centre. 
In the first place, and most importantly, capital flows to the periphery were relatively 
stronger after the oil price hike of 1973 than after 1979- Though the current account deficit of the 
non-oil-exporting developing countries increased by a substantial 75% between 1979 and 1981, 
this was far less than the quadrupling in the current account deficit which took place between 1973 
and 1975, financed almost in its entirety, in both instances, by external capital (see table 11). Put 
differently, net capital flows to the periphery (approximately measured by the current account 
deficit) reached 31% of the value of their exports in 1981, well below the 41% reached in 1975. 
What is more, this ratio of capital inflows to exports increased by only 7 percentage points from 
1979 to 1981, whereas it increased by 27 percentage points in 1973-1975 (from 14% in 1973 to 
Table 11 
NON-OIL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CURRENT ACCOUNT 
DEFICIT AND ITS FINANCING 
Current account deficit 
a) Billions of dollars 
b) As percentage of exports 
Source of financing 
(Billions of dollars) 
a) Net capital flows 
b) Net borrowing0 
c) Net direct investment and others 































































Source: IMF, on the basis of official figures, and GATT, Press Release N a 1313, 23 March 1982. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Exports are taken from IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues. These figures are generally larger than 
those given by GATT, so that there may be divergences with respect to table 3. The series is comparable over time, 
however, which is what matters most in this case. 
'Includes residual errors and omissions. 
Includes net unrequited transfers, SDR allocations, valuation adjustments, and monetization of gold. 
13 
41% in 1975). Thus the voluminous capital flows made available to the developing countries in 
1974-1975 provided them with the wherewithal to sustain expansive domestic product policies in 
the face of a deteriorating external situation and won them time till their exports could grow to 
close the gap. After 1979, similar capital flows were harder to come by for two reasons: 
(1) The level of the non-oil-exporting developing countries' foreign debt (especially of the 
middle-income ones with greater access to private capital) was much higher. Consequently, 
interest payments —especially those arising from the fast-growing variable interest loans from 
private sources— expanded very rapidly (see table 7) and so raised the perceived risk for lenders, 
discouraging sharp increments in credit availability; 
(2) On the debtor's side, high interest rates served to discourage further borrowing. Thus, 
capital was far less freely available in 1981 to help developing economies tide over the poor 
international situation, and many developing countries were therefore obliged to pursue restric-
tive policies of their own, rather than expansive ones as in 1974-1975, in order to adjust to external 
disequilibria. 
Secondly, the expansive policies pursued by many developing nations in the face of the 
deteriorating external situation in 1974-1975 sustained growth, but at the cost of much higher 
inflation. Thus, by 1979 rates of inflation in many non-oil-exporting developing areas averaged 
nearly 25%, easily three times their pre-1973 levels (see table 12). The second oil price hike of 
1979 exacerbated inflation further, so that by 1980 many developing countries faced disequilibria 
on both the external front (balance of payments restrictions) as well as internally (rampant 
inflation). Thus there was far less scope for expansive policies to cope with external disequilibria 
in 1980-1981 than in 1974-1975. Indeed, several developing countries had little choice in 1981 but 
to pursue restrictive policies lest inflation get completely out of hand. Such policies barely 
managed to hold inflation at its 1980 levels, so that it is to be feared that further emphasis will need 
be given to price stabilization policies in many developing countries, suggesting that strong 
economic growth is still off in the future. 
Table 12 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CONSUMER PRICES 
(Percentage annual average changes) 
Oil-exporting developing 
countries" 




































































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, (various issues). 
"Comprise Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Saire and Zambia. 
'Bangladesh, Burma, People's Republic of China, India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, 
Sri Lanka and Thailand. 
Greece, Portugal, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
'Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen Arab Republic. 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. 
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Finally, While the deterioration in the terms of trade of the non-oil-exporting developing 
economies in 1981 was no worse than in 1975, still 1981 marked the fourth such fall in a row, 
representing a decline of over 20% since 1977 (see figure 1). 
In contrast, the decline in the terms of trade was only the second consecutive fall and it came 
after the commodity boom of 1972-1973. Moreover, even at their lowest the terms of trade in 1975 
were still 11% above their 1981 level. Thus, 1981 must be distinguished from the 1974-1975 
experience in both the severity and the duration of the worsened terms of trade. 
The convergence of these three sets of forces in one year —considerably less abundant capital 
flows, the greater need to pursue domestic anti-inflationary policies, and the severity and duration 
of the worsened terms of trade— would seem to explain why developing countries' growth was 
much more severely hampered by the stagnation of the central countries in 1981 than it had been 
by the centre's harsher recession of 1974-1975. 
II. MAIN TRENDS 
Because of the deterioration in the terms of trade and the sharp increase in the service of the 
external debt, as well as the restrictive policies applied by many countries to reduce the external 
disequilibrium and the severity of inflationary processes, the evolution of the Latin American 
economy was much more negative in 1981 than in previous years. 
Thus, the economic growth rate, which during the period 1979-1980 had averaged over 6% 
and had even surpassed the growth rates of the industrialized countries, the centrally planned 
economies and all the other main regions of the developing world, dropped to only 1.7% in 1981. 
This was the lowest rate recorded for Latin America over the entire postwar period; in addition, 
the per capita product declined slightly in 1981, a phenomenon which had not occurred in any of 
the preceding 21 years. 
As a result of this slowdown, and especially because of the stagnation of the manufacturing 
industry and the decline, for the second year in a row, of construction activity, the unemployment 
rate rose from 5.9% in 1980 to 6.5 % in the main urban centres of the region, thus interrupting the 
steady reduction of the unemployment rate which had been taking place since 1976.2 
Despite the loss of vigour of the economy and the rise of unemployment, and also despite the 
reduction of external inflationary pressures, during 1981 the high rate of increase in consumer 
prices of the two preceding years was maintained (see table 13 and figure 4). 
In the external sector, there was a marked reduction in the rate of increase of the value of 
exports and imports after the extraordinary growth of the two preceding years, when the value of 
Latin American foreign trade rose by almost 70%. 
The decline in the rate of increase of the value of exports of goods, from almost 30% in 1980 
to 7% in 1981, was entirely due, however, to the dramatic change which took place in the unit value 
of exported goods. In effect, after rising by around 23% in 1980, it dropped by almost 3% in 1981, 
primarily as a result of the overall drop in prices of the main commodities exported by the region. 
On the other hand, the volume of external sales of goods expanded at the exceptional rate of 10%, 
thanks especially to the remarkable growth of such sales in the non-oil-exporting countries, which 
managed to increase the volume of their exports by 12.5%. This performance was particularly 
commendable considering that, as a result of the recession affecting the industrialized countries 
and the resurgence in many of them of protectionist practices, the volume of world trade did not 
change during 1981, whereas the value declined slightly. Consequently, in 1981, Latin America 
2These rates refer to the weighted average of the unemployment rates of the four main cities of Argentina and 
Colombia, the six largest cities of Brazil, the three largest cities of Mexico, and the capitals of Costa Rica, Chile, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. If the Brazilian cities on which unemployment statistics are available only as from 1980 are excluded, the 
level of and the increase in unemployment Vates will be lower. 
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Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS" 
Basic economic indicators 
Domestic product at market 
prices (billions of dollars at 
1970 prices) 
Population (millions) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198f 
219 237 254 264 278 292 307 327 346 351 
280 288 295 303 311 319 327 335 343 352 
782 825 861 871 896 915 939 975 1 008 998 
Short-term economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Urban unemployment ratec 
Consumer prices 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 



































































Exports of goods and services 
Imports of goods and services 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance-of-payments position 
Official international reserves* 
Balance of disbursed external debt 
Public external debt 
Gross global external debt' 
Net global external debt' 
Billions of dollars 
22.0 30.5 46.4 44.2 50.3 59.1 65.1 86.4 111.4 120.2 

















































104.6 133.4 167.3 









Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
"The figures for the product, population and income relate to the group of 21 countries included in table 14, except Cuba 
and Jamaica. The figures for prices relate to the group of countries made up of those 19 countries plus Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The figures for the external sector refer to those 23 countries plus Suriname, except in 
the case of the data on the global and external debt, which exclude Barbados, Bahamas and Panama. 
Preliminary figures. 
' Percentages. 
''Weighted average rate for Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, Rosario; Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín, Cali; Mexico City, 
Guadalajara, Monterrey; San José, Costa Rica; Santiago, Chile; Asunción, Paraguay; Lima, Peru; Montevideo, Uruguay. 
'Weighted average rate for the cities mentioned in d plus Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, 
Salvador and Recife. 
^Variation from December to December. 
8
 Plus monetary gold valued at fine ounce prices in London less the use of International Monetary Fund credit. 
h
 External debt with a term of more than one year corresponding to public bodies or guaranteed by them. 
'Disbursed public external debt plus non-guaranteed debt with financial institutions reporting data to the Bank for 
International Settlements. 
'Gross globalexternal debt less official international reserves. 
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Figure 4 
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Gross domestic product* 
bn 
i i i i 
Consumer prices" 
Public external debte 
I 
_L _L J_ _L _L J_ 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. aAnnual growth rates. "Annual average 
weighted rate in Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, Rosario; Bogotá, Barranquilla, Mede-
11 ín, Cali; Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey; San José (Costa Rica); Santiago (Chile); 
Asunción (Paraguay); Lima (Peru); Montevideo (Uruguay). cAverage annual weighted 
rate for cities referred to in footnote b plus Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, 
Puerto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. "Weighted December-December percentage varia-
tion. eBillions of US dollars. 
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again increased its share in world trade, as it had already done during the five preceding years, and 
thus continued to recover part of the ground it had lost during the period 1965-1975.3 
Despite the above, and also despite the efforts made by many countries to control the growth 
of imports, the volume of which only rose by a little over 2% after having risen by nearly 13% in 
1980, the deficit on the balance-of-payments current account increased by US$ 10 billion and rose 
to nearly US$ 39 billion, thus doubling the amount of only two years before. In such circumstances, 
there was also a marked rise in the ratio between the current account deficit and the value of 
exports of goods and services. This ratio, which during the previous five-year period had ranged 
from 20% to 28%, rose to 33% in 1981, thus slightly exceeding the record set in 1975, at the 
culmination of the international crisis of the mid-1970s. The coefficient was, of course, much 
higher (46%) in the non-oil-exporting countries, in which it was equivalent to the average for 
1974-1975, when they had had to deal with the effects of the first sharp rise in the international 
price of hydrocarbons. 
The main cause for this accentuation of the external disequilibrium was the enormous 
increase in net payments for profits and interest, which rose from US$ 18 to 27 billion, as a result 
of the increase in the external debt and the increase in the interest rate on the international 
financial markets. 
Nevertheless, contrary to what happened in 1980, when net capital income was lower than the 
negative current account balance and the balance of payments closed with a deficit, in 1981 the 
region had a slight surplus of US$ 450 million on the balance of payments. This turnaround was 
entirely due to the remarkable increase in the net flow of loans and investments to Latin America, 
which rose from US$ 27 billion in 1980 to 39 billion in 1981. 
Naturally, this greater attraction of financial resources went hand in hand with a rise in the 
external indebtedness. The gross global disbursed external debt of Latin America rose from 205 
billion dollars at the end of 1980 to 257 billion at the end of 1981. Thus, the debt almost doubled 
over the last three years, as it had as well during the triennium 1975-1981 (see table 13). 
In addition, contrary to what happened in both 1979 and 1980, in 1981 the rate of growth of 
the external debt was considerably higher than that of the value of exports of goods and services. 
Hence, the ratio between the debt and exports, after declining in the two previous years, rose 
sharply in 1981, to an unprecedented figure of nearly 2.2. This rise was particularly serious during a 
period when the average term of the external debt was shortening and the interest rates were 
rising considerably on the international market.4 
III. ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. The growth rate 
As has been mentioned above, in 1981 the economic growth rate of Latin America dropped 
sharply. After rising from 6.5% in 1979 and almost 6% in 1980, the gross domestic product only 
rose by 1.7% in 1981 (see table 14). In addition to being the lowest recorded since 1945, this rate 
was also lower than the population growth rate. Consequently, the per capita gross domestic 
product declined slightly in 1981; this had not happened since 1959. 
'During this period, the share of world exports represented by external sales of Latin America declined from 7.4% in 
1961 to only 4.2% in 1975. Thanks to the subsequent recovery, this share rose to almost 5.5% in 1981. 
••Although the value of exports is only one partial indicator of an economy's purchasing power, since, among other 
things, this is greater in countries where the export coefficient is lower, a debt-export coefficient as high as the one recorded 
in Latin America in 1981 gives rise to concern. If, for example, it is assumed: ( a) that the external debt is twice as high as the 
value of exports; (b) that the average term of the debt is 10 years, and (c) that the average interest rate is 15%, amortization 
payments will absorb 20% of exports, whereas interest payments will represent an additional 30% of exports. In other 
words, given the assumed values -which appear reasonable in the light of recent experience in the region- the service of the 
external debt alone would absorb half the value of exports. 
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Table 14 

















































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary estimates. 
Average, excluding Cuba and Jamaica. 
'Growth refers to the growth of the material product, which is equivalent to the gross value of agricultural production, 
mining, manufacturing, construction and electric power. 
d
 1971-1974. 
In addition to being pronounced, the loss of economic dynamism was a generalized pheno-
menon. The growth rate of the gross domestic product dropped in 16 of the 20 countries under 
consideration, whereas the per capita product dropped in absolute terms in 10 of them (see 
table 15). 
Because of the relative importance of Argentina and even more so of Brazil on the total 
product of Latin America, the slowdown of economic activity in these two countries had a 
considerable effect on the decline in the growth rate of the region. 
In Brazil, which by itself generates around one-third of the total product of Latin America, 
economic activity declined by almost 2%, after having increased by 8% in 1980. This decline, the 
first to occur in Brazil in the last 40 years, was basically a reflection of the drop of around 6.5% in 
manufacturing, which was in turn affected by the restrictive measures adopted in late 1980 for the 
twofold purpose of reducing both the heavy deficit on the balance-of-payments current account 
and the sharp inflationary process recorded during that year. As was to be expected, the decline in 
economic activity was also particularly evident with respect to gross fixed capital formation, which 
dropped by 7.5%, and construction, which dropped by over 4%. 
The contraction of economic activity was much more pronounced (-6%) in Argentina, where 
over one-tenth of the overall production of the region originates. As in Brazil, the sectors suffering 
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the most serious declines were construction, which dropped by 6% ; trade, which dropped by 9.5 %; 
and, above all, the manufacturing industry, which suffered a decline of 16%. Industrial production 
thus dropped below the level attained at the beginning of the 1970s. As a result of the decrease in 
the product in 1981 and of the slow and irregular evolution of the Argentine economy during the 
second half of the 1970s, the per capita product decreased to a level similar to that of 1972. 
During 1981, the rate of economic growth also declined in all the Central American countries, 
in most of which social conflicts and political tensions continued or increased, with the resulting 
accentuation of economic uncertainty. 
The deterioration was especially marked in El Salvador, where the gross domestic product 
declined by 9-5%, after havig dropped by 9% in 1980. Because of these drops and of the slight 
decline of overall economic activity in 1979, the per capita product was 25 % lower in 1981 than in 
1978 and was also lower than it had been 20 years earlier. 
Economic activity also declined, although to a much lesser extent, in Costa Rica (-3.6%) and 
Honduras (-0.4%) and virtually came to a standstill in Guatemala; thus, the per capita product 
decreased in the three countries. In the case of Costa Rica, the economic contraction was also 
accompanied by a marked deterioration of the terms of trade, a very violent acceleration of the 
inflationary process, a considerable drop in real salaries and a large increase in the unemployment 
rate, all of which worked together to create the most serious crisis suffered by the economy of that 
country since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Thus, of the Central American countries, only Nicaragua experienced a considerable increase 
of economic activity, with the product rising by 9%, after having risen by 10% in 1980. However, 
Table 15 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE PER CAPITA GROSS 



































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official information. 
"Preliminary estimates. 
20 
because of the large decline of around 33 % in economic activity during the biennium 1978-1979 as 
a result of the destruction and upset caused by the civil conflict which ended in mid-1979, the level 
of the gross domestic product was still almost 20% lower in 1981 than in 1977. 
Moreover, in 1981 the loss of dynamism which had been noted since 1975 in the Bolivian 
economy was accentuated, the stagnation of the Venezuelan economy continued for the third year 
in a row, and the domestic product of Uruguay dropped slightly. 
In Uruguay, where economic growth had been very rapid in both 1978 and 1979, but where 
the growth rate had already slowed down considerably in 1980, the drop in the product in 1981 was 
due partly to the negative impact of external factors (such as the deterioration in the terms of trade 
and the slowdown of economic activity in Argentina and Brazil, which play a key role in the foreign 
trade and tourism income of Uruguay and whose currencies were sharply devalued in 1981), and 
partly to the effect of the overvaluation of the peso, the real contraction of the amount of money 
and the high interest rates brought about by the stabilization policy. 
The measures taken to reduce the rate of increase of prices also had a decisive influence on the 
very weak growth of economic activity in Venezuela. Because of the large deficit on the balance-of-
payments current account in 1978 and the sharp acceleration of the inflationary process which 
occurred in 1979, the economic authorities began in 1980 to apply certain restrictive policies, both 
in the monetary field and in the fiscal sector. While these measures did gradually attenuate the rate 
of increase of prices, they also contributed to a reduction in the growth rate of the manufacturing 
industry and caused sharp drops in the construction sector and in commercial activity (see 
table 16). As a result of this and of the decline in oil production brought about by compliance with 
OPEC agreements, the gross domestic product, after having stagnated during the biennium 
1979-1980, rose by only 0.6% in 1981. This increase was not sufficient, however, to prevent the 
per capita product from dropping, as it had during the three preceding years; consequently, the per 
capita product was almost 10% lower in 1981 than in 1977. 
Among the countries whose growth rate was higher than the regional average were Colom-
bia, where economic activity increased by 2.5%; Panama and the Dominican Republic, where it 
rose by about 3.5%; Peru, 4%; and Ecuador, where it was slightly over 4%, and Chile, 5.3%. 
In Ecuador and especially in Colombia, the growth rates reached in 1981 represented a 
continuation of a slowdown which had begun to be evident in 1979- In both countries, the growth 
of economic activity in 1981 was also the lowest recorded in many years —15 years in the case of 
Ecuador and a quarter of a century in the case of Colombia. Finally, since in both countries the 
decline in the growth rate went hand in hand with a deterioration of the terms of trade, per capita 
income was reduced in absolute terms, after having risen sharply in Colombia during the boom in 
international coffee prices from 1976 to 1979, and after having risen even more sharply and 
steadily in Ecuador, as a result of the rapid growth of economic activity and the sharp rises in the 
international price of oil throughout the 1970s. 
The increase of somewhat over 5% in the gross domestic product of Chile in 1981 also 
represented a considerable reduction with respect to the economic growth rate achieved in 
previous years. After having recovered in 1977 the level attained before the drastic contraction of 
1975, economic activity had grown at an average rate of around 8% during the ensuing three years. 
This impetus continued, although with less force, up to the first half of 1981, but the trend was 
drastically reversed during the second half of the year, when industrial production began to drop, 
construction starts were virtually at a standstill and the unemployment rate rose abruptly. 
In Peru, on the other hand, the 4% increase in economic activity represented the continuation 
of the moderate growth rate which had begun in 1979, after the recession suffered by the economy 
between 1976 and 1978. This growth was stimulated by the notable rise in fixed capital formation 
—which increased by 18% in 1981, after having risen by 45% in 1980—and was supported by the 
heavy expansion (11 %) of the agricultural sector and the marked dynamism shown for the second 
year in a row by the construction industry (see table 16). Nevertheless, because of the effect of the 
economic contraction of 1976-1978 and the rapid growth of the population, the per capita product 
did not recover even in 1981 the level achieved in 1975. 
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Table 16 



















































































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes agriculture, mining and quarrying, manufacturing and construction. 
'Includes electricity, gas and water, and transport and communications. 
''includes commerce, restaurants and hotels; financial establishments, insurance and real estate, community, social and 
personal services. 
'Mining and quarrying are included in manufacturing. 
Thus, of the 20 countries included in table 14, the economic growth rate was very high only in 
Cuba, Mexico and Paraguay. 
In Mexico, the gross domestic product rose by somewhat over 8%, thus extending for the 
fourth year in a row the phase of great dynamism which began in 1978. As in the three preceding 
years, the main cause of the ecoomic growth was the vigorous growth of oil production and 
exports. Whereas drilling for crude oil rose by 19%, doubling the volume of nearly three years 
before, physical exports of oil rose by 33%, tripling over the brief period of three years, and the 
value of exports of hydrocarbons rose by 40%, to a total of around US$ 14 500 million, a figure 
which is 700% higher than that recorded in 1978. The remarkable growth of the petroleum sector 
was accompanied by a considerable expansion of practically all other activities. Nevertheless, as 
had been the case in previous years, the rise of domestic demand was much higher than that of the 
product, and thus led to a very sharp increase in the volume of imports, a considerable deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account and a sharpening of inflationary pressures. 
In Paraguay —which since the mid-1970s has had the most dynamic economy of the region— 
the domestic product increased by 8.5 %. This rate, although much lower than that achieved during 
the previous four-year period —when the product rose at an exceptional rate of nearly 11.5% per 
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year— was close to the rate of somewhat over 9% recorded throughout the period of strong 
growth which began in 1973- As in previous years, the main factor behind this dynamic growth 
was the construction sector, although the 16% increase in this industry in 1981 was equivalent to 
only half the average growth rate for the preceding four years. As a result of the rapid growth of 
the construction sector and despite the fact that in 1981, investment in machinery and equipment 
declined by 5%, gross fixed capital formation rose by somewhat over 9% and represented almost 
35% of the product. 
Finally, in 1981 there was a rapid growth of economic activity in Cuba. The material product5 
rose by around 12%, after having increased slowly in 1980. Although practically all sectors grew 
rapidly, this acceleration of the growth rate was particularly due to the considerable growth of 
sugar cane agriculture (14%) and construction (16%) —both of which had contracted slightly in 
1980— and the considerable growth of the manufacturing industry (12%). The most important 
general cause of this growth was the notable improvement in the organization and efficiency of 
many economic activities, which led to a marked increase in productivity. 
2. Total supply and demand 
After having risen at an average rate of nearly 5.5% in 1977 and 1978 and having expanded at a 
rate of nearly 7% in 1979 and 1980, the total supply increased by less than 2% in 1981. This abrupt 
decline in the growth rate of the total supply reflected the much slower growth in 1981 of the gross 
domestic product and the even sharper reduction of the increase in the volume of imports. The 
latter, which between 1977 and 1978 rose at a very high rate of nearly 10% and in 1980 rose by 
13.5 %, increased by only a little over 3% in 1981 (see table 17). This slowing of the increase in the 
volume of imports was due especially to the adjustment policies implemented in 1981 in many 
non-oil-exporting countries, as a result of which real imports of goods and services declined by 
almost 6% in such countries. This decline contrasted sharply with the trend as regards the volume 
of imports in the two preceding years, when they increased at an average rate of over 13%. 
Nevertheless, since the rate of increase of the volume of imports was once again higher than that 
Table 17 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
(Growth rates)" 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product. 




Gross fxed investment 
Total consumption1 











































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official statistics. 
"Estimated on the basis of constant values of 1970 prices. 
Preliminary figures. 
c
 Includes change in stocks. 
'This is equivalent to the sum of the values of gross production of the agricultural, mining, manufacturing, 
construction and electric power sectors. 
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of the product, the import coefficient rose for the fifth year in a row, reaching the highest levels 
since I960 (see table 18). 
By contrast with the much slower increase in 1981 of the volume of imports, the volume of 
exports rose by 8.5%, thus amply surpassing the growth of the previous year. Thus, the intense 
and sustained growth of real exports continued for the sixth year in a row and the upward trend in 
the export coefficient which had begun in 1976 also continued. 
As in the case of imports, the acceleration of the growth of exports was heavily influenced by 
the evolution of external sales of the non-oil-exporting countries. The volume of such sales rose at 
the unprecedented rate of 11.5%, thanks especially to the particularly sharp growth, for the fourth 
year in a row, of the volume of exports from Brazil and to their recovery in Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. 
On the other hand, there was an almost total stagnation of gross fixed capital formation in 
1981, after three years of satisfactory growth. The same thing happened, although more moder-
ately, with respect to consumption, which after having grown at an average rate of over 6.5% 
during the two preceding years, rose barely over 1% in 1981. Thus, per capita consumption 
dropped for the first time since 1975. 
IV. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
In general, the unfavourable evolution of the majority of Latin American economies in 1981 had a 
negative impact on the employment situation. However, owing to the substantial differences in 
the structure and growth rate of the labour force and in the facilities of the labour markets, the 
effects on the employment situation varied considerably in the different countries.6 
Of the ten countries for which statistical series on urban development are available,7 four 
—Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Venezuela— showed deterioration in 1981 to judge by the 
increase in their respective rates of unemployment. Moreover, although on average unemploy-
ment was lower in Chile and Uruguay in 1981 than in 1980, the curve followed by the rate of 
unemployment during the year showed a decline in both countries in the first half of the year and a 
sharp rise in the second. The rate of unemployment also fell slightly in Peru and more markedly in 
Colombia, dropping to very low levels in Mexico and, especially, in Paraguay (see table 19). 
In comparative terms, the employment situation deteriorated very markedly in Argentina in 
that the rate of open unemployment in the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires doubled, 
rising from an average of 2.2% in 1980 to one of 4.4% in 1981, the rate rising to nearly 5% at the 
end of the year. The increase in unemployment was even more intense in the main cities in the 
interior, especially Rosario and Mendoza (see figure 6). Nevertheless, the percentage of the 
6Before analysing the evolution of the employment situation in 1981, it is necessary to bear in mind some structural 
aspects which, in spite of the differences, are to a greater or lesser extent, characteristic of the employment situation in the 
region. In the first place, it is important to note that although manpower in Latin'America has grown during the past 
decade at an unprecedented rate, enough jobs have been created in the various sectors to avoid sizeable increases in the rate 
of open unemployment (see figure 5). On the other hand, this has been possible partly because labour has been absorbed 
—to a significant degree in many cases— by both the urban and the rural informal sectors, one of the dominant 
characteristics of which is the low productivity and small income of the employed labour force. Consequently, in order to 
evaluate the magnitude of the total under-utilization of labour, consideration must be given not only to open unemploy-
ment but also to the existence of significant degrees of underemployment in many Latin American economies. Thus, 
according to studies made by PREALC, at the beginning of this decade, the under-utilized labour in the region amounted to 
23 million integrally under-utilized labourers, 80% of whom fell into the various categories of underemployment while 
only 20% were in the open-unemployment category. 
'Unfortunately, in the majority of the countries of the region, no statistical records are kept on unemployment and 
underemployment in the rural areas or even in the different cities, and, in general, there are no reliable series on the 
short-term evolution of the absolute level of employment either. These drawbacks are of course extremely prejudicial to the 
analysis of changes in the employment situation. 
24 
Figure 5 
















Source: Table 19. 




unemployed in the labour force was still very low by comparison with that in the other Latin 
American countries (for which the rate of unemployment was lower in 1981 only in Paraguay), 
and also in the seven leading OECD economies, in which the rate of open unemployment was, in all 
cases save Japan, higher than in Argentina. 
The unfavourable evolution of the Argentine employment situation reflected to a large 
extent the negative progress made in 1981 by the basic urban sectors, such as manufacturing, trade 
and construction, whose levels of activity fell by 16%, 9.5% and6%, respectively. The substantial 
drop in industrial production (which came on the heals of a decline of nearly 4% in 1980) resulted 
in a decrease of nearly 13% in the number of workers employed in the manufacturing sector in 
1981 by comparison with the average for 1980. In addition, since industrial employment had 
already declined appreciably in past years, its average level in 1981 was nearly 23% lower than in 
1970 and 35% lower than in 1975. 
In Brazil, a country where, as has already been pointed out, the gross domestic product 
suffered from a moderate decrease, unemployment rose very slightly, but starting from much 
higher levels. According to the monthly survey of employment carried out in the six main 
metropolitan regions of the country,8 the rate of open unemployment rose from an average of 
6.3% in 1980 to 7.9% in 1981, bringing the total number of unemployed in those six regions to 
over 800 000. Very high rates of unemployment were recorded in Belo Horizonte and Salvador 
(for which the average annual rate of unemployment was 9%) and in Rio de Janeiro and Recife, 
where it reached 8.6%. On the other hand, the rate of unemployment was much lower (5.8%) in 
Porto Alegre and less than 8% in Sao Paulo (see table 20). As in Argentina, the increase in 
unemployment in Brazil was related to the unfavourable performance of urban activities in 1981. 
Thus, the drop of over 6% in the product of the manufacturing sector was accompanied by a 
somewhat larger decrease in industrial employment, whose level during the last quarter of the year 
was nearly 13% lower than during the same period in 1980 and 10% lower than for the final 
quarter in 1979. 
The evolution of the employment situation was even more negative during 1981 in Costa 
Rica, a country which up to 1979 had managed to absorb the very rapid expansion of its labour 
force thanks to vigorous and sustained economic growth and to the extraordinary increase in 
employment in the public sector.9 However, when economic activity stagnated in 1980 and fell by 
nearly 4% in 1981, the average rate of unemployment rose sharply from somewhat less than 5% 
in 1979 to slightly over 9% in 1981. This increase was even more pronounced in San José, a city 
where the rate of unemployment, after falling to a historic minimum of 2.8% in November 1979, 
rose persistently in the following two years, attaining the unprecedented figure of 11.7% in 
November 1981 (see tables 19 and 20 and figure 6). 
During 1981 the employment situation in Venezuela also continued to deteriorate although 
much more gently. Actually, owing to the nearly total stagnation of the gross domestic product 
since 1979 and the drop of over 25% in the construction sector during the past three years, the rate 
of open unemployment in the urban centres rose from 5.1% in 1978 to 6.8% in 1981, the highest 
rate recorded in the past five years. 
The evolution of the employment situation was in Chile and Uruguay only seemingly more 
favourable than in the countries mentioned above; actually, in both countries, the average rate of 
unemployment continued to decline in 1981, as it had already done in the two preceding years in 
Chile and since 1977 in Uruguay, but this downward trend was unusually vigorous during the 
second half of the year (see figure 6). 
This downturn was particularly notable in Chile. During the first half of the year the rate of 
open unemployment in Greater Santiago continued on the downward trend begun at the begin-
8The monthly survey of employment carried out by the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute provides data 
only after 1980. 
'During the 1970s, the growth rate of the labour force was close to 4% while the gross domestic product grew at an 
average annual rate of 6.2%. As for employment in the public sector, between 1973 and 1979 it grew at the exceptionally 
high average annual rate of 13%. 
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Table 18 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATIVE SHARES OF THE COMPONENTS 
OF EXPENDITURE AND OF IMPORTS IN THE 




































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official statistics. 
"Includes changes in stocks. 
Preliminary figures. 
Table 19 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 




































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Capital and Greater Buenos Aires. 
Average rate for Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. 
'Average for Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellin and Cali. 
''Urban total. 
"Greater Santiago. 
Average rate in the metropolitan areas and Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey. 
sRate for Asunción, Luque, San Lorenzo and neighbouring towns. 
First semester. 
'Metropolitan Lima, annual averages according to data available each year. 
•'Montevideo. 
* Urban Total. 
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Figure 6 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN LARGEST CITIES (1977-1981) 
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Table 20 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
IN MAJOR CITIES 
Argentina" 
Capital and 










































































































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Figures for April and October. 
Quarterly averages. 
c
 Figures for March, June, September and December. 
Average for the first three quarters. 
"Figures for March, July and November. 
'Figures for March, June, September and December. 
11977, March-June average. 1978, July-August average. 
Half-yearly averages. 
'Average for the first two quarters. 
1979, September. 1980, april. 1981, June. 
ning of 1979 when economic activity reached the peak of the recovery from its dramatic slump in 
1975 and embarked on a stage of strong growth, especially in the construction sector. Because of 
this, the rate of unemployment in the capital fell from 16.5% in March 1979 to 9% in June 1981, 
the lowest figure recorded since the beginning of 1974. During the first half of the year there was 
also a decline in the number of people enrolled in the minimum employment plan, the programme 
created in 1975 to soften some of the effects of the massive unemployment which the depression of 
that year had generated. However, when the growth of the economy fell markedly in the middle of 
1981 and especially when the construction of nearly all the new buildinds begun in the second half 
of the year was paralyzed, the rate of unemployment in Greater Santiago rose to 10.5% in 
September and to 13.5% in December. The downturn was even more marked in the cities located 
immediately south of the capital, where open unemployment was already close to 15% in 
September, and especially in the urban centres of the central provinces, where 19% of the labour 
force was out of work that same month. 
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Although the break in the downward trend of unemployment during the second half of the 
year was less violent in Uruguay than in Chile, it was noteworthy. Thus, in Montevideo, a city 
where close to 45% of the country's population is concentrated, the rate of unemployment fell in 
the first half of 1981 to 5.8%, which is the lowest average since reliable statistical registers began 
to be kept and represents less than half the rate of nearly 13% recorded at the beginning of 1977. 
Nevertheless, the downward trend which the rate of unemployment had followed since then was 
reversed in the second half of the year, during which economic activity and especially the 
production of manufactures and construction, began to decline.10 As a result of this, the rate of 
unemployment rose to 7.5% in the second half of the year, thereby exceeding both the figure 
recorded in the first half of 1981 and the rate of 7% shown a year previously. 
During 1981 the average rates of urban unemployment in Colombia and Peru also fell. In 
Colombia, the rate of unemployment for all four of the largest cities in the country, which had 
shown a persistent decline between 1974 and 1978 but a slight rise in the following two years, fell 
to 8.2% —the lowest rate recorded in the past eight years— in 1981. Although unemployment 
also fell in Medellin and Cali, it decreased especially markedly in Bogotá, where it dropped from 
8% in 1980 to 5.5% in 1981. Barranquilla, on the contrary, was the only main urban centre where 
the percentage of the labour force which was out of work rose (see table 20). To some extent, the 
decline in the rates of unemployment was surprising, in that during 1981 the growth rate of the 
economy fell and industrial production declined slightly. It is, however, possible that the effects of 
this decline on unemployment were partially outweighed by the impact of the sharp growth in 
construction for the second year running, by the probable increase in civil service personnel and, 
above all, by the drop in the rates of participation, which fell markedly in Bogotá, Cali and Medellin 
—the very three cities in which the drop in unemployment was concentrated, whereas the rate of 
participation rose in Barranquilla, which, as has been pointed out above, was the only main urban 
centre in which unemployment was higher. 
The decline in open unemployment was considerably less substantial in Peru, for which data 
are available only for Lima. In this city, the rate of unemployment fell slightly —from 7.1 % in the 
first half of 1980 to 6.8% in the corresponding period of 1981. This advance, which is to some 
extent attributable to the rapid growth which the construction sector showed, as it had in 1980, was 
partly counterbalanced by a marginal increase in underemployment. Thus, the share of Lima's 
labour force which was adequately employed in 1981 remained without variation, at about 
two-thirds of that shown the preceding year. 
Thus, during 1981 the employment situation improved notably only in Mexico and Paraguay, 
the two economies of the region which achieved the highest and most sustained economic growth 
in Latin America in the past four years. 
It is estimated that in 1981 employment increased by over 5% in Mexico, after having risen 
by somewhat more than 6% during the preceding year. This meant that in 1981 about one million 
new jobs were created, of which close to one third were generated in the services; 24%, in 
agriculture; 20%, in construction and close to 13%, in manufacturing. As a result of the notable 
expansion of employment, the average rate of open unemployment in the metropolitan areas of 
Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, which had fallen persistently from a figure of 8% in 1977 
to 4.5% in 1980, dropped to 4.2% in 1981. The rapid growth of employment generated by the 
vigorous expansion of virtually all the sectors was also reflected in an increase in the imbalances 
which have occurred in past years between the labour supply and demand structures at various 
levels of skills. Thus, during 1981 the more pressing need for certain types of specialized labour 
resulting from the rapid expansion of some modern sector activities could not be easily met with 
adequately skilled manpower. 
However, the most significant advance in employment during 1981 occurred in Paraguay. 
The rate of open unemployment in Greater Asunción11 fell from 4.6% in the first half of 1980 to 
10They fell by 7% and 5%, respectively, in the second half of 1981. 
"Including, in addition to Asunción, the cities of Luque and San Lorenzo and the towns of Fernando de la Mora and 
Lambaré. 
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2.2% in the same period of 1981. The nearly full employment which prevailed in 1981 was 
reflected in particular in the very low level (0.6%) to which the rate of unemployment of people 
over 25 years of age fell and also in the shortage of labour in the rural sector during the harvest 
seasons. This employment situation was due to the continuation of the persistent downward trend 
shown by the rate of unemployment during the second half of the past decade, as a result primarily 
of the sustained growth rate shown during this period by all the economic activities and in 
p'articular by the construction sector.12 
V. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
1. Foreign trade 
After showing extraordinary growth in the previous two years, during which it rose at an average 
rate of 30%, the value of the foreign trade of Latin America increased by 8% in 1981. This meant 
that for the first time it exceeded US$ 250 billion, more than doubling the value recorded four 
years previously, which, in turn, had been double the figure shown in 1973. 
(a) Exports of goods 
In 1981 the external sales of goods of Latin America amounted to somewhat more than 
US$ 98 billion, exceeding the figure recorded in 1980 by nearly 7% (see table 21). This growth 
rate, although very much lower than the average rate of close to 32% achieved during the 
preceding two years, was again much higher than the growth rate of world trade, whose value, as 
already indicated, fell by 1 % in 1980. This came as a continuation of the upward trend in the share 
of Latin American exports in world exports begun in the middle of the past decade. 
However, by contrast with what had happened in 1980, when the increase in exports reflected 
the widespread progress they made in the large majority of the countries of the region, in 1981 
their growth was due primarily to the very rapid expansion of the external sales of Mexico (22%), 
Brazil (16%) and Argentina (14%), countries which together generated close to half the Latin 
American exports of goods. During 1981, the exports of the Dominican Republic also continued to 
grow intensively, their value rising by 23.5% after having increased by over 40% in the preceding 
two years, and the same was true of the external sales of Uruguay, which rose by 15 % after having 
increased by close to 55% in the period 1979 and 1980 (see table 22). 
Conversely, the value of the exports of 13 of the 24 countries considered here declined, which 
had happened only in El Salvador and Nicaragua the preceding year. The drop in external sales was 
also particularly marked in Colombia (-24%), Haiti (-20%), El Salvador and Peru (-18%), Chile 
(-16%), Guatemala (-14%) and Guyana (-11%). 
Moreover, the decline in the growth rate of the value of exports occurred in spite of the fact 
that in 1981 their volume increased sharply. In actual fact, the 10% increase in this variable was 
not only much higher than the increase in 1980 but was the highest recorded in the past 44 years, 
with the exception of the slightly higher volumes attained in 1959 and in the 1978-1979 biennium. 
This increase (which is all the more striking in that it occurred during a year of total 
stagnation in the volume of world trade in merchandise) was, however, partially offset by the 
unfavourable growth in the unit value of exports, which declined by close to 3 %, after having risen 
at a very high average rate of close to 21% during the two preceding years (see table 21). 
As has already happened in 1980, although to a lesser extent, both the intensity of the growth 
of external sales and the factors determining their growth were different in the group made up of 
the six petroleum-exporting countries and in the other economies of the region. While the value of 
exports in the former countries rose by 8.6%, thanks to equal rises in their volume and unit value, 
12Between 1975 and 1980, the gross domestic product increased at an average annual rate of somewhat more than 
10%, while the construction sector grew at the phenomenal rate of 28% per annum. This latter figure means that in barely 
five years, the construction product increased by a coefficient of 3.4. 
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Table 21 













































































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Up to 1975, includes Bolivia, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela; from 1976 on, Mexico and Peru are also 
included. 
cFrom 1976 on, Mexico and Peru are excluded. 
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in the latter countries the value of exports rose by only slightly more than 5% in spite of the fact 
that their volume grew at an unprecedented rate of 12.5%. 
The main cause of the reduction in the growth rate of the value of external sales of the non-
oil-exporting contries was, in the last analysis, the drop in the unit value of their exports, which fell 
by 6.5% after having shown rapid growth in four of the five preceding years. This decline was, in 
turn, the result of the marked decreases shown in 1981 in the international quotations on nearly all 
the main commodities exported by this group of countries. As may be seen in table 2 3 and in figure 
7, in 1981 the international prices of the majority of these goods declined throughout practically all 
of the year, after rising significantly in 1979 and 1980. Although the declines were particularly 
marked in the prices of sugar (41 %), coffee, cocoa, copper and lead (close to 20%) and maize, beef, 
iron ore and tin (between 10% and 16%), the prices of fish meal, cotton, wool and soybeans also 
fell. 
(b) Imports of goods 
As in the case of exports, in 1981 the growth rate of the value of imports declined; however, 
the drop in the value of imports was more marked. Thus, after rising at an average rate of close to 
Table 22 

























































































































































































































































































































































































LATIN AMERICA: PRICES OF THE MAIN EXPORT COMMODITIES 
(Dollars at current prices) 
Annual averages Growth rates 






































































































































































































































Source: UNCTAD, Monthly bulletin of basic commodity prices, 1960-1980 supplement and July 1982. International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 1981 and 1982 Yearbooks. 
"US cents per pound. 
Dollars per metric ton. 
cDollars per pound. 
Dollars per barrel. 
29% in the two preceding years, the value of imports of merchandise rose by little more than 6% 
in 1981. One of the factors responsible for this more gradual growth was the much lower rise in the 
unit value of imports in 1981 and, above all, the dramatic decline in the growth rate of their volume 
—from 12.6% in 1980 to somewhat more than 2 % in 1981 (see table 21). Similarly, unlike what 
happened in 1980, when the growth of imports was very similar in the oil-exporting and 
non-oil-exporting countries, in 1981 it differed widely in the two groups of countries. 
The growth rate of the value of imports remained very high (17%) in the oil-exporting 
countries, although it was much lower than in 1980, when purchases abroad rose by nearly 33%. In 
addition, this deceleration was almost totally due to the considerable moderation in the unit value 
of their imports in 1981. Conversely, the volume of external purchases rose at a very high rate of 
over 11 % —only slightly lower than the exceptionally high rate achieved in 1980. The marked and 
persistent dynamism of the imports of these countries was also shown in the fact that during the 
past few years their value rose by 150% while their volume rose by 65%. 
However, this vigorous expansion in the volume of imports of the petroleum-exporting 
economies in 1981 was entirely due to the growth in external purchases of merchandise by Mexico 
and Peru, in both of which the volume of imports rose by close to 24%. In the case of Mexico, this 
meant that in just four years the imports of goods trebled in real terms while their value more than 
quadrupled (see table 24). 
The growth of the volume of imports during this period was much less dynamic in Peru, in 
spite of the fact that in 1981 the external purchases of that country expanded much more rapidly 
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Figure 7 
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Source: UNCTAD, Monthly commodity price bulletin, November 1981. 
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Figure 7 (continued 1) 
WHEAT MAIZE 
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Source: UNCTAH Monthly commodity price bulletin, November 1981. 
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36 
Figure 7 (continued 2) 
COPPER TIN 
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Source: UNCTAD, Monthly commodity price bulletin, November 1981. 
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Source: UNCTAD, Monthly commodity price bulletin, November 1981. Petroleum, IMF, International 
Financial Statistics, December 1981. 
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than those of Mexico for the second year running. Because of the sharp contraction in the volume 
of Peruvian imports in the period 1976-1978, their rapid growth in the following three years 
basically represented a return to the real levels already achieved in the middle of the past decade, 
which were not exceeded until as recently as 1981. 
By contrast with the intense expansion of the real imports of Mexico and the recuperation of 
those of Peru, real imports stagnated or declined slightly in the other eight petroleum-exporting 
economies. 
However, the most profound change occurred in the non-oil-exporting countries, where the 
evolution of imports slowed down markedly in 1981 when, after two years in which their value 
increased at an annual rate of nearly 32.5 %, it decreased slightly in absolute terms. This downturn 
was partly attributable to the considerably smaller rise in the unit value of their exports in 1981 as a 
consequence of the drop in the inflation in the industrialized countries and the much more 
moderate rise in the international price of petroleum. Its main cause, however, was the sudden 
reversal in the evolution of the volume of imports, which fell by 6.5 % in 1981 after having grown 
at an average rate of 11% in the two preceding years (see table 21). 
This downward trend in the volume of imports was due in particular to their evolution in 
Argentina and Brazil, which together were responsible for nearly 60% of the total imports of 
Table 24 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATION IN IMPORTS OF GOODS FOB 
(Growth rates) 
Value Volume Unit value 




















































































































































































































































































LATIN AMERICA OIL IMPORTING COUNTRIES: IMPORTS 
OF CRUDE PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS" 
Million of dollars CIF As a percentage of total imports CIF 
















































































































































































































































































Source: 1970 to 1979: United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1980 and 1981; International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics; Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"The series comprises the items coming under S1TC (Rev. 1) and therefore excludes natural gas (Division 34). 
goods by non-petroleum-exporting countries in 1980. In Argentina, where the volume of imports 
had more than doubled during the two preceding years alone, it fell by 15% in 1981 as a result 
primarily of the contraction of domestic economic activity and of the sharp and continuous 
devaluations of the peso. The decline in the national product and all the measures adopted to 
alleviate the external imbalance were also important causes for the drop of 13% shown in 1981 in 
the volume of imports of Brazil, which had already fallen slightly in 1980, 
In relative terms, however, the most marked drops in the volume of external purchases 
occurred in Costa Rica and Uruguay, in Costa Rica this variable fell by nearly 25% owing to the 
decline in domestic economic activity and to the fact that the effective real exchange rate nearly 
doubled in 1981. In Uruguay, imports of goods fell by 21% in real terms as a consequence of the 
decline in the domestic demand and of the sizeable inventories of imported merchandise which 
had accumulated over the two preceding years. Slower economic growth and difficulties in making 
external payments were also responsible for the decrease in the volume of imports in the other 
Central American countries, while slackness in economic activity caused a drastic decline in the 
growth rate of the volume of imports in Colombia. 
Thus, in 1981, the volume of imports of goods grew rapidly only in Chile (18%) and in 
Jamaica. In the former country, their expansion was stimulated primarily by the maintenance of an 
extraordinarily low exchange rate and to a lesser extent by the rapid expansion of economic 
activity during the first half of the year. Jamaica, for its part, managed to increase the volume of its 
external purchases by 20% because it was able to rely in a much more abundant supply of external 
financing than in previous years. 
In addition, because of the much smaller rise in the international price of hydrocarbons in 
1981 and also as a result of the measures adopted in many non-oil-exporting countries to contain 
the increase in imports and of the loss of economic dynamism felt in the majority of them, the 
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growth rate of imports of crude oil and petroleum products also plunged. Their value, which had 
more than doubled in the two preceding years, grew by barely 8.5% in 1981. Moreover, in seven of 
the 17 countries considered here, the value of purchases of hydrocarbons declined. However, the 
share of hydrocarbons in the total value of imports continued to increase in 11 of these countries, 
reaching extraordinarily high levels of between 20% and 25% in Nicaragua, Guatemala and 
Panama; close to 33% in Guyana, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic and Uruguay and almost 
50% in Brazil (see table 25). 
(c) The purchasing power of exports and the terms of trade 
After demonstrating notable and persistent growth between 1976 and 1980, a period during 
which the purchasing power of exports of goods and services rose by 62%, this variable showed 
almost total stagnation in 1981 (see table 26). This happened in spite of the fact that during this 
year, as noted above, the volume of exports of goods grew by 10% thereby greatly surpassing their 
growth the preceding year. Thus, the sole cause for the unsatisfactory growth of the purchasing 
power of exports in 1981 was the deterioration of 7% in the terms of trade. 
Unlike what had occurred in the two preceding years (during which the terms of trade 
improved markedly in the petroleum-exporting countries while deteriorating in the other econo-
mies of the region), in 1981 they deteriorated in both groups of countries. 
However, the drop was much less substantial in the petroleum-exporting economies (-1%) 
than in the others (-12%) (see table 27). 
In the latter group, the terms of trade deteriorated in all the countries with the sole exceptions. 
of Guyana, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Suriname, and this deterioration came on the heals 
of the drops already recorded in the three preceding years. This meant that the total deterioration 
in the terms of trade since 1977 amounted to 30%, bringing this index down to the lowest level 
ever recorded. In actual fact, the terms of trade of this group of countries was such that the average 
performance of this indicator during the 3-year period 1979-1981 was the same as that recorded 
during the 1931-1933 triennium, at the height of the Great Depression. 
Table 26 
LATIN AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
(1970 = 100) 































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"From 1970 to 1975, includes Bolivia, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela; from 1976 on, includes also Mexico 
and Peru. 
From 1976 on, excludes Mexico and Peru. 
'Preliminary figures. 
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On the other hand, in the oil-exporting countries, the terms-of-trade index reached a very 
high level (only in 1980 was it slightly higher), which was five times as high as the level reached by 
the other economies of the region (see table 27). 
As a consequence of the drop in the terms of trade and in spite of the impressive growth in 
the volume of their exports, the purchasing power of the exports of the non-petroleum-exporting 
countries fell for the first time since 1975. In the petroleum-exporting countries, on the other 
hand, the purchasing power of external purchases increased slightly. However, not only was this 
the smaller increase in the past six years but it was due primarily to the substantial growth shown 
by the purchasing power of exports of Mexico. In the other five countries in this group, this 
variable fell by between 5% in Ecuador and Venezuela and 25% in Peru. 
2. The balance of payments 
(a) The current account 
As a result of the slightly bigger increase in the value of exports of goods (6.9%) than in the 
value of imports (6.2%), the deficit in merchandise trade showed a moderate drop in 1980. 
However, since at the same time net payments for non-factor services rose by close to 20%, Latin 
America's trade deficit rose again, from US$ 10 750 million in 1980 to US$ 11 900 million in 1981 
(see table 28). 
As in past years, these global changes were due to the conflicting trends in the growth of the 
foreign trade of the six petroleum-exporting countries and that of the other economies of the 
region. 
In the non-petroleum-exporting countries, the negative balance of trade in goods was reduced 
by 35 % because of the determined efforts they made to contain the growth of their imports (which 
declined by 1% in value and 6.5% in volume) and to increase their exports, whose value rose by 
5% thanks to the exceptional expansion of 12% in their volume and in spite of the decline in the 
prices of nearly all the export commodities. Since at the same time the non-petroleum-exporting 
Table 27 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE (GOODS) 


































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"From 1970 to 1975, includes, Bolivia, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela; from 1976on, includes also Mexico 
and Peru. 




L A T I N AMERICA: T R A D E B A L A N C E 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on che basis of official daca. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Excluding nee payments of profits and interest. 
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è Table 29 
L A T I N AMERICA: B A L A N C E O F P A Y M E N T S 
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Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
''Including net private tranfers payments. 
'Including long- and short-term capital, official transfer payments and errors or omissions. 
^Corresponds to variation in international reserves, including counterpart items. 
countries managed to reduce their net payments for services slightly, their trade deficit was 
reduced from nearly US$ 14.2 billion in 1980 to US$ 10.8 billion in 1981. 
In the petroleum-exporting countries, the balance of trade showed a very different pattern of 
growth in that the surplus of US$ 3.4 billion generated in 1980 was replaced in 1981 by a negative 
balance of somewhat more than US$ 1 billion. This downturn was due partly to the much more 
rapid expansion in this group of countries in the value of imports of merchandise (17%) than in 
exports (9%) and also to the considerable increase also shown in net payments for services. 
As in 1980, the increase in Latin America's trade deficit was accompanied by the very 
intensive growth of net payments of profits and interests. Mainly as a consequence of the 
appreciable rise in the interest rates in the international financial markets for the fourth year 
running and the increase in the external debt of Latin America, these disbursements, which had 
already risen by US$ 4 billion in 1980, increased by US$ 9 billion in 1981. Thus, they reached the 
unprecedented amount of US$ 27.3 billion, nearly double the amount recorded only two years 
previously and well over double the value of the deficit in trade in goods and services recorded in 
1981 (see table 29). 
In the non-oil-exporting countries, where these financial remittances grew with particular 
intensity, their total more than offset the effects of the adjustment made in the real sphere by 
expanding exports and containing imports. Because of this, the deficit in the balance of payments 
on current account rose from close to US$ 24.7 billion in 1980 to US$ 27.3 billion in 1981. 
As for the petroleum-exporting economies, the fact that their payments of profits and 
interests were higher reinforced the consequences of the downturn shown in trade in goods and 
services, with the result that the negative balance on current account nearly trebled, rising from 
US$ 4 billion in 1980 to US$ 11.5 billion in 1981. 
As a result of these changes and in spite of the big efforts made by many of the non-oil-
exporting countries to reduce the imbalance in their foreign trade, Latin America's deficit on 
current account showed an unprecedented increase, which brought it to a historic maximum of 
US$ 39 billion —35% higher than the negative balance in 1980. 
Because of this enormous growth in the deficit on current account, in 1981 there was also a 
marked increase in the difference between this deficit and the value of exports of goods and 
services. This coefficient, which fluctuated between 20% and 28% between 1976 and 1978, rose to 
nearly 33% in 1981 thereby slightly exceeding the level recorded in 1975 at the end of the 
international recession in the middle of the past decade (see table 30). 
In absolute terms the largest deficit was that of Mexico. This deficit, which was caused by the 
doubling of the negative external trade balance and by the marked increase in net payments of 
interests and profits, rose to US$ 13 billion, thereby exceeding the deficit recorded in 1980 by 68%. 
On the other hand, the negative balance of Brazil's transactions, which had been the highest in 
Latin America the preceding year, fell from US$ 12.8 billion in 1980 to US$ 11.7 billion in 1981. 
This change came as a result, primarily, of the upturn in the balance of trade in goods, which, after 
showing a deficit of US$ 2.8 billion in 1980, generated a surplus of US$ 1.2 billion in 1981. The 
same thing happened in Argentina, where the replacement of a negative balance of trade in 
merchandise of close to US$ 1.4 billion in 1980 by a surplus of over US$ 950 million in 1981 
reduced the deficit on current account by US$ 700 million, in spite of the fact that at the same time 
net payments of interests and profits more than doubled (see table 29). 
By comparison with the value of exports of goods and services, the most negative results 
were, however, recorded by Nicaragua, Chile, Haiti and Paraguay. In the first of these countries, 
the deficit on current account exceeded the total value of exports for the second year running, while 
in Chile it amounted to nearly 90% of the external sales of goods and services and was over twice as 
high as the deficit recorded the preceding year. 
The relative magnitude of the deficit on current account was also high, although considerably 
lower, in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Peru, countries in all of which it was the equivalent of close 
to 46% of the value of exports. However, whereas in Brazil this figure was much lower than that 
recorded the preceding year, in Mexico and, above all, in Colombia and Peru, it was considerably 
higher (see table 30). 
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The general trend in the direction of a greater external imbalance was also reflected in the fact 
that in 1981 the deficit on current account was not lower than 20% of the value of the exports of 
any economy of the region, with the sole exception of Barbados (15%) and Venezuela and 
Trinidad and Tobago, which, as in 1980, were the only countries which achieved surpluses in their 
current transactions. 
(b) The capital account 
In 1980 the net inflow of capital in Latin America stepped up vigorously. Having increased 
strongly and persistently throughout the 1970s but having risen by only somewhat more than 3% 
in 1980, it grew by 45% in 1981, reaching the unprecedented amount of over US$ 39.2 billion. Not 
only was the increase in the inflow of loans and investments intense, it was also generalized, 
occurring in two-thirds of the countries under consideration and in the petroleum-exporting 
economies as well as in the other countries of the region (see table 29*). 
The largest amount of net external resources was received by Mexico, which in 1981 captured 
funds valued at nearly US$ 14.1 billion. Not only was this 63% morethan the amount received the 
Table 30 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS DEFICIT ON CURRENT ACCOUNT AND THE VALUE 
OF EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES" 
(Percentages) 







































































































































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
"Negative figures indicate balance-of-payments surplus on current account. 
Preliminary figures. 
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preceding year, it was also higher than the close to US$ 12.4 billion received in 1981 by Brazil, 
which up to the preceding year, had been the economy towards which the heaviest flow of Joans 
and investments had normally been directed. The net inflow of capital also increased very 
intensively in Chile, Colombia and Peru. In the first of those countries, capital resources rose for 
the second year running by 50%, amounting to over US$ 5 billion. The relative increase in the net 
inflow of capital was similar in Peru, although its absolute value (US$ 1.1 billion) was much lower 
than in Chile. Although the inflow showed somewhat slower growth in Colombia, it was still very 
high*(40%), the net amount of the loans and investments received coming close to US$ 2.4 billion. 
On the other hand, the flow of external resources declined by nearly 30% in Ecuador, by over 
40% in Uruguay and by close to 60% in Costa Rica and Argentina, the latter two countries having 
suffered large-scale recessions in 1981. 
As a consequence of the much greater volume of external financing received and in spite of 
the marked increase recorded in the deficit on current account, the balance of payments for the 
region as a whole experienced a downturn of US$ 2 billion. After having closed in 1980 with a 
deficit of close to US$ 1 550 million, a small surplus of US$ 450 million was generated in 1981. 
This surplus was, however, much smaller than the surpluses yielded throughout the 1970s and was 
even smaller than the surplus of US$ 600 million achieved in 1975 at the end of the previous 
recession in the world economy. 
Moreover, the transition from a deficit situation in 1980 to a surplus in 1981 was first and 
foremost due to the profound changes in the results of the balance of payments in Venezuela and 
Brazil. In the latter country, the negative balance of close to US$ 3.5 billion recorded in 1980 was 
converted into a surplus of somewhat more than US$ 600 million in 1981 as a result of the 
aforementioned reversal in trade in goods and of the fact that many more foreign resources were 
captured. Venezuela, whose balance of payments had closed with a small deficit in 1980 because of 
a very substantial net outflow of capital, achieved a surplus in 1981 amounting to close to US$2.5 
billion. During 1981, Bolivia and Nicaragua also managed to effect a reversal in their negative 
balances of the previous year^ and Mexico, Barbados, Panama and the Dominican Republic 
increased their surpluses slightly (see table 29). 
However, in the majority of the economies of the region, the year 1981 was one in which the 
balance-of-payments situation deteriorated. This deterioration was especially marked in Peru, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Argentina. In the first of these countries, the surplus of US$ 650 
million achieved in 1980 was converted into a deficit of nearly US$ 700 million, owing to the 
combined effect of the sharp drop in the value of exports (-18%) and of another and even greater 
increase in the value of imports (26 % ). For its part, Chile, which in 1980 had obtained the highest 
surplus in the balance of payments in the region, saw that surplus decline from over US$ 1.3 
billion in that year to only US$ 140 million in 1981, owing primarily to the sharp rise in imports 
and to the marked growth of net payments of interest. For its part, Colombia, whose balance-of-
payments surplus of over US$ 1 billion was the second highest in the region in 1980, achieved a 
surplus of little more thanUS$ 400 million in 1981. As in Chile, this reduction occurred in spite of 
the fact that in 1981 the net inflow of capital rose considerably and was due primarily to the 
marked drop in the value of exports (-24%). The worsening in the balance-of-payments situation 
was even more notable in Ecuador, whose international transactions resulted in a deficit for the 
first time since 1975, in an amount which, moreover, was very high, and in Argentina, where the 
dramatic fall in the net intake of external resources resulted in an increase in the balance-of-
payments deficit, which rose from US$ 2.6 billion in 1980 to nearly US$ 3.2 billion in 1981. 
During 1981, large balance-of-payments deficits in addition to those recorded in Argentina, 
Peru and Ecuador, were reported by Guatemala (in the unprecedented amount of over US$ 400 
million), Jamaica, which had obtained a small surplus in 1980, and Honduras, which for the second 
year running had a negative balance of close to US$ 80 million. 
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(c) International reserves 
Despite the fact that, as has been mentioned above, the year closed with a small surplus on 
Latin America's balance of payments, the value of official international reserves dropped by 9% in 
1981. This decline, which may be attributed mainly to the decline that year of the international 
price of gold, also affected the great majority of the economies of the region. Only the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago 
managed to increase their reserves in 1981, whereas reserves declined in all the other Latin 
American countries (see table 31). 
The decline especially marked in the Central American countries, in most of which official 
reserves at the end of 1981 were not sufficient to finance even one month's worth of imports of 
goods and services. The decline was also very sharp in Argentina —where reserves dropped for the 
second year in a row— and in Peru and Ecuador. Nevertheless, because Argentina had accumulated 
a substantial amount of reserves between 1977 and 1979, at the end of 1981 it had enough to pay 
for almost six months' worth of imports. This ratio was surpassed only by Trinidad and Tobago, 
Table 31 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES" 





























































































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, August 1982. 
"Plus monetary golds valued at London prices per refined ounce minus the use of IMF credit. 
Prices at end of June. 
'Variation from June 1980. 
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Table 32 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL 



































































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of table 29 and official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
which had sufficient reserves to finance almost 17 months' worth of imports: Colombia and 
Uruguay, which had reserves equivalent to one year's worth of imports; and Paraguay and 
Venezuela, whose monetary authorities had international assets enough to cover 90% and 80% 
respectively of their imports (see table 32). 
For the region as a whole, the ratio between total international reserves and the value of 
imports decreased for the second year in a row and dropped in 1981 to 38%, a figure which is even 
lower than the one recorded in 1975, when the international crisis of the mid-1970s reached its 
peak. The coefficient was even lower in the two largest economies of the region: in Brazil it was 
only 28%, whereas in Mexico it was only 15%, which meant that at the end of 1981 Mexico's 
reserves would not finance two months' worth of imports. 
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3. The external debt13 
In 1981, the increased disequilibrium in the balance-of-payments current account was accompan-
ied by an acceleration of the rate of external indebtedness. Indeed, the public external debt14 
increased by somewhat over 21%, after its growth rate had declined from 30% in 1978 to 18% in 
1979 and 12% in 1980. Thus, the total public external debt was almost US$ 150 million at the end 
of the year (see table 33). 
Table 33 












































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of World Bank, External medium- and long-term public debt: Past and projected amounts 
outstanding, transactions and payments, 1956-1976, 4 December 1967; World debt tables, 20 October 1978, 
Vol. I; "External public debt of developing countries and territories", World debt tables, December 1981; Inter-
American Development Bank, External public debt of the Latin American countries, July 1981. 
"The disbursed external public debt consists of all the commitments actually drawn by public entities or guaranteed by 
them, payable to non-residents in foreign currency and having an original or subsequently extended term of more than 
one year. 
CEPAL, provisional estimates. 
"Because of the diversity of sources of information used, the figures on external indebtedness considered in this 
section will not necessarily coincide with those appearing in the chapters on the economic evolution of individual countries 
in the second part of this Survey. 
l4This includes the public external debt itself and State-guaranteed private debt. 
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Table 34 














































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of World Bank, "External public debt of developing countries", World Debt Tables, 15 de 
November 1980, Vol. 1 and World Debt Tables, December 1981; Bank for International Settlements, Press 
review, NQ 39, July 1976 and NQ 79, April 1977; The maturity distribution of international bank lending, July 
1978, July 1979, July 1980 (revised versions), July 1981 and July 1982. 
"Excludes Bahamas, Barbados and Panama because they are international financial centres. 
6In addition to public and State-guaranteed private external debt, includes unguaranteed long- and short-term debt with 
financial institutions supplying data to the Bank for International Settlements. Does not include suppliers' credit without 
official guarantees or the debt with the International Monetary Fund. 
'Provisional estimates by CEPAL. 
JData From the Bank for International Settlements for 1975, is not covered as fully as for 1978, 1980 and 1981 
'Outstanding claims by commercial banks against the region which cannot be classified by country 
As in the two preceding years, the relative increase in the non-guaranteed debt was even 
sharper, so that the gross global external debt disbursed increased more rapidly (25%) than the 
public external debt. Thus, for the fourth year in a row, gross indebtedness increased by more than 
20% and, by the end of 1981, amounted to approximately US$ 257 billion, almost double the total 
recorded only three years before (see table 34). 
Moreover, and contrary to what happened in 1979 and 1980, in 1981 the rate of growth of 
gross indebtedness was considerably higher than the value of exports of goods and services. 
Consequently, the ratio between debts and exports rose heavily, to a record of almost 2.2, a 
coefficient that is 50% higher than it was in 1973, the year preceding the first oil crisis15 (see 
table 35). Moreover, since Latin America's international reserves dropped in 1981, the net global 
"This refers to gross global external debt less official international reserves. 
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Table 35 
LATIN AMERICA": RELATION BETWEEN GROSS GLOBAL DISBURSED EXTERNAL DEBT 


































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Excludes Bahamas, Barbados and Panama because they are international financial centres. 
Provisional estimates by CEPAL. 
'The total debt includes unclaimed settlements of commercial banks against the region which cannot be classified by 
country, especially for the period 1973-1976. 
The indexes prior to 1976 are not given since Mexico and Peru did not become petroleum exporters until 1976. 
external debt disbursed increased at the exceptionally high rate of over 38%, which is well over the 
already high rate of the two preceding years (see table 36). 
In 1981, on the other hand, the growth of short-term indebtedness with commercial banks 
slowed down somewhat after having increased at an unusually high rate of around 50% in both 
1979 and 1980. In relative terms, however, the increase (26%) was even higher; as a result of this 
and of the sharp increase in both 1979 and 1980, such indebtedness almost tripled over the last 
three-year period (see table 37). 
Naturally, these overall trends in the indebtedness of the region as a whole were the result of 
the widely varying trends in the value and structure of the debt in the different countries. Thus, 
while the rate of growth of gross external indebtedness of the oil-exporting countries was quite 
high, that of the remaining economies of the region declined slightly, as had been the case in 1980. 
The difference between the two groups of countries was particularly evident in the area of 
short-term indebtedness with commercial banks, which rose by almost 35% in the six oil-
exporting countries and by only 15% in the other economies taken together. 
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Table 36 


































































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International financial statistics, August 1982; CEPAL, on the basis of World 
Bank, "External public debt of developing countries", World Debt Tables, Vol. I November 1980, and World 
Debt Tables, December 1981. 
"Excludes Bahamas, Barbados and Panama, because they are international financial centres. 
Gross global disbursed external debt minus official international reserves. 
'Provisional estimates by CEPAL. 
Includes unclaimed settlements by commercial banks against the region which cannot be classified by country. 
Thus, contrary to what happened during the biennium 1974-1975, wTien the gross global 
indebtedness of the non-oil-exporting countries rose at a much higher rate (68%) than that of the 
oil-exporting countries (26%), during the period 1980-1981, the debt of the latter grew more 
rapidly (62%) than that of the former (47%).16 This meant that, as an adjustment mechanism, 
indebtedness was much more available to the non-oil-exporting countries during the international 
crisis of the mid-1970s than at present, a fact which helps in part to explain the slower growth of 
these countries during this recent period. 
Nevertheless, even within the two groups, there were marked differences in the evolution of 
indebtedness. For example, the considerable increase in the debt of the oil-exporting countries 
during the last two years was to a large extent due to the increased credit granted to Ecuador and, 
especially, to Mexico. In Mexico, the gross global external debt rose by 47% in 1981, after having 
risen by 33% during 1980; consequently, it almost doubled in only two years. The most important 
16This pattern confirms the fact that external indebtedness is a process which depends on the financial needs of the 
debtor as well as on his payment capacity and, above all, on the opinion of creditor agencies regarding such payment 
capacity. 
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cause for this exceptional increase was the increase in short-term indebtedness with commercial 
banks, which rose very sharply, increasing more than fivefold between 1978 and 1981 (see tables 
34 and 37). 
In Ecuador —the Latin American country whose external indebtedness increased most 
rapidly between 1973 and 1981— the gross global debt rose by one-third in 1981 alone. As a result 
of this increase and of the meagre 3% increase in 1981 in the value of external sales, the 
debt-export coefficient rose sharply, from 1.7 in 1980 to 2.2 in 1981. 
The gross external debt also grew rapidly, for the third year in a row, in Trinidad and Tobago. 
Consequently, the debt-export coefficient doubled in only one year;°even so, it continued to be the 
lowest of rhe region, with the sole exception of that of Suriname. 
This was in sharp contrast to the situation of Bolivia, where the gross debt rose by 15% in 
1981, but where the debt-export coefficient rose to 2.8, a ratio exceeded only by those of Nicaragua 
and Argentina. 
Table 37 
LATIN AMERICA": SHORT-TERM EXTERNAL DEBT 
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Source: CEPAL, on the basis of Bank for International settlements, The maturity distribution of international bank 
lending, July 1978, July 1979, July 1980 (revised versions), July 1981 and July 1982. 
"Excludes, Bahamas, Barbados and Panama, because they are international financial centres. 
Refers to the debt having an original term of less than one year with commercial banks supplying data to the Bank for 
International settlements. Does not therefore include the short-term debt with suppliers or the debt with other 
commercial banks. 
'Provisional estimates by CEPAL. 
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In Venezuela and Peru, on the other hand, global external indebtedness rose very slowly, as it 
had in Peru during the previous two years and in Venezuela in 1980. Nevertheless, as a result of the 
sharp drop in the value of Peruvian exports, the debt-export coefficient rose sharply in that 
country, after having dropped considerably for two years (see table 33). 
With regard to the non-oil-exporting countries, external indebtedness grew substantially in 
Chile, Nicaragua and Uruguay. 
In 1981, the growth rate of the gross external debt in Uruguay (45%) was exceeded only by 
that of Mexico, which was slightly higher (47 % ). Nevertheless, partly as a result of the relatively 
moderate growth of Uruguay's external indebtedness during the second half of the 1970s and 
partly because of the steady and marked increase in its exports, the countries' debt-export 
coefficient remained one of the lowest in the region. This relatively favourable position was also 
reflected in the fact that, along with Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname, Uruguay was one of the 
few Latin American countries which had a negative net external debt in 1981. 
Nicaragua, on the other hand, had the highest debt-export ratio of Latin America (3.94). This 
country's gross external debt rose by one-third in 1981, while its exports declined sharply over the 
last two years. 
Gross external indebtedness also rose by nearly 30% in Chile, more than doubling over the 
last three years. Moreover, contrary to the case in 1979 and 1980, when exports grew more rapidly 
than the debt, in 1981 the increase in the debt was accompanied by a considerable decrease in the 
value of exports. Consequently, after having dropped sharply in 1979 and slightly in 1980, the 
debt-export coefficient rose substantially in 1981, to 2.3, and was exceeded only by those of 
Nicaragua, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico. The contrast with the evolution with regard to 
the two preceding years was even more marked in the case of the net external debt, which rose very 
slowly between 1975 and 1980, but increased by 53% in 1981 (see tables 34, 35 and 36). 
By contrast with the three economies just discussed, Brazil, which up to 1980 had had the 
highest external debt of the region, increased its external indebtedness at a fairly low rate (19%), 
which was only slightly higher than the growth rate of its exports. Because of this, the country's 
debt-export coefficient remained almost stable, after having declined sharply during the two 
preceding years. Neverthejess, it is still one of the highest in the region. 
Argentina, whose external debt rose extraordinarily between 1975 and 1980, from under 
US$ 6 billion to over 24.5 billion, saw its gross external indebtedness rise by 25% in 1981; 
although this rate is much lower than those of the two preceding years, it was still one of the 
highest recorded in Latin America. Since this increase was much higher than the increase in 
exports, the debt-export coefficient rose sharply for the fourth year in a row and was exceeded only 
by that of Nicaragua. Moreover, since during 1981 its official international reserves dropped by 
almost 44%, its net external debt, which had already doubled in 1980, rose by more than 68% in 
1981, thus tripling over the last two years. 
VI. PRICES AND WAGES 
1. Prices 
In 1981, Latin America's inflation rate rose for the fourth year in a row. For the region as a whole, 
the weighted average variation in consumer prices was somewhat over 57%, thus exceeding 
slightly the increases recorded in the two preceding years.17 Moreover, and although to a lesser 
extent than in 1980 and especially than in 1979, the inflationary process was widespread, inasmuch 
as of the 23 countries for which data were available, only 6 succeeded in limiting their rates of price 
increases to less than 10%18 (see table 38). 
''Because, on the one hand, the weighting factor used to calculate the regional average is the population of each 
country, and, on the other, the rate at which prices increased was generally much higher in the larger countries, thesimple 
average of regional inflation was equivalent to half (28.8%) the weighted average (56.2%). Nevertheless, like the 
weighted average, the simple average was also slightly higher in 1981 than in 1980 (27.5%). 
'"In 1980, four countries were in this position and in 1979, only one. 
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Table 38 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICES 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and official data supplied by the countries. 
"The totals for Latin America and the partial figures for the two groups of countries shown correspond to the price 
variations for the countries weighted by their respective population in each year. 
For the period 1970-1979, the rates correspond to Rio de Janeiro. For 1980 and 1981 they correspond to the whole 
country. 
"Variation between September 1980 and September 1981. 
Variation between November 1980 and November 1981. 
Moreover, during 1981 there were greater differences among the inflationary processes in the 
different countries and, for the second year in a row, there was a widening of the gap between the 
average rates of price increase of the group of countries which have traditionally had high inflation 
rates and of the group of economies in which price increases have usually been more moderate. 
Whereas in the former, the average rate of inflation rose from 62% in 1979 to 6 8 % in 1981, in the 
latter it declined from 22% to 15% between those two years. 
In the first group of countries, which include most of the larger and more diversified 
economies of the region, inflation was particularly sharp in Brazil and Peru, and especially so in 
Argentina. 
In Argentina, the annual rate of increase in consumer prices, after having dropped almost 
steadily during 1980, began to rise sharply in April 1981 and by the end of the year was 130%. This 
change, which is clearly evident in figure 8, was principally due to the sharp rises in the exchange 
rate which had been introduced in February in an effort to correct both the serious disequilibrium 
in the balance-of-payments current account and the considerable distortions of the price system. 
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As a result of this phenomenon, the growth of inflation in 1981 went hand in hand with marked 
changes in the relative prices of tradeable and non-tradeable goods. Thus, the increases in the 
prices of imported goods (238%) and of agricultural commodities (213%) were way over the 
variation in the prices of domestically produced industrial goods (167%) and especially of the 
services component of the consumer price index (109%). 
Inflation followed a different course in Brazil, although it remained higher than 90% for the 
second year in a row. After having followed an upward trend during the first months of the year, 
reaching a record 120% in March, the rate of inflation declined systematically after that. This 
trend was to a large extent brought about by the changes introduced in the price policy and the 
more restrictive nature of the monetary and fiscal policy in 1981. During the early months of the 
year, there was a significant increase in prices and rates of public enterprises and in prices of 
petroleum by-products and controls on the prices of numerous commodities were relaxed. As a 
result of these measures, the inflation rate accelerated initially, but the improvement in the 
financial position of the public enterprises thus achieved made it possible to reduce the transfers 
and subsidies which these enterprises were receiving from the Central Bank, thus attenuating one 
source of monetary expansion. At the same time, the Government exercised stricter control over 
public expenditure. As a result of this, as well as of the gradual slowdown of economic activity, the 
inflation rate was more moderate throughout the year. It was still very high, however, mostly 
because of the widespread practice of indexing key variables, such as wages, exchange rates and the 
assets and liabilities of the financial system. 
Although it was somewhat lower than in Brazil, the rate of inflation was similar in Peru. As 
may be seen in figure 8, the average annual rate of increase in consumer prices in Peru accelerated 
markedly during the early part of the year, mainly as a result of the elimination or reduction of 
subsidies and controls which had up to then influenced the prices of a series of basic goods and 
services. Nevertheless, after the initial increases brought about by the liberalization policy, the 
intensity of the inflationary process declined gradually, although, as in the case of Brazil, it was still 
very high because of the effect on costs of a mixture of quarterly wage adjustments, the frequently 
rising exchange rate and higher interest rates. 
The strong fluctuations and the extraordinarily high level of inflation in Argentina, Brazil 
and Peru were in contrast with the evolution of prices in Colombia and Mexico. In these two 
countries, consumer prices rose by 27% and 29% respectively, i.e., at rates practically equal to 
those of the preceding year. Moreover, the fluctuations in the rates of inflation throughout the year 
were minimal in both countries. Nevertheless, in 1981 Mexico's inflation was the second highest 
of the last 30 years and did not fully reflect the accentuation of certain basic macroeconomic 
disequilibria such as the finances of the central government, whose deficit tripled because of an 
almost 100% increase in total expenditures. The inflationary pressures implicit in the unusual 
growth of both public outlay and total demand were partly offset by the also exceptional increase in 
the trade deficit, which more than doubled, and by the marked overvaluation of the peso. 
The rate of inflation fell markedly, however, in Uruguay and Chile in 1981. In Uruguay, the 
rate of increase in consumer prices, which had already dropped from 83% to 43% between 1979 
and 1980, continued to drop systematically in 1981, to less than 30% by the end of the year, thus 
reaching its lowest level since 1971. The slowdown in the growth rate of the wholesale price index, 
in which tradeable goods have the highest weight, was even more marked, inasmuch as it dropped 
from 77% in 1979 to 29% in 1980 and to only 15% in 1981. 
The trend and the factors influencing the inflationary process were very similar in Chile, 
where the rate of increase of consumer prices, after having dropped from 39% in 1979 to 31% in 
1980, fell to 9.5% in 1981, while wholesale prices underwent an absolute reduction of 4%, after 
having risen by 58% in 1979 and 28% in 1980. As in the case of Uruguay, but in a more definite 
way, the principal causes of this abrupt and steady deceleration of the inflationary process with 
regard to prices were the exchange policy and the liberalization of imports. During 1981, the 
exchange parity was maintained at the level of 39 pesos per dollar, a rate which had been fixed in 
June 1979; thus, the real effective exchange rate continued to decline so that it was approximately 
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Figure 8 
TWELVE-MONTH VARIATIONS IN THE CONSUMER PRICE 
INDEX IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
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10% lower than in 1980. Under such circumstances, and because of the total openness of the 
commercial account, there was a new and substantial increase in imports, which meant that the 
rate of increase of domestic prices converged with that of external inflation. This trend was 
reinforced, moreover, by the substantial drop in the unit value of exports and by the abrupt 
reduction of domestic demand which occurred during the second half of the year, as a result of 
which both the unemployment rate and the level of inventory rose sharply. 
In the countries that have traditionally had a moderate inflation, where the rate of price 
increase tends to follow the trend of international inflation, the intensity of the inflationary 
process declined slightly in 1981 for the second year in a row. Even so, the weighted average 
increase of consumer prices (15%) was still high in historic terms as it was lower only than the 
figures recorded during the biennia 1972-1974 and 1979-1980 —the two periods of increases in the 
international price of oil and of acceleration of inflation in the industrialized countries (see 
table 38). 
The attenuation of the inflation rate was accompanied, however, by greater disparities in the 
rates of price increases in the different economies. These ranged from a minimum of somewhat 
under 5% in Jamaica and Panama to a maximum of 65% in Costa Rica. 
In Costa Rica, where the inflationary process had been accelerating slowly but steadily over 
the preceding four years, there was a virtual inflationary explosion in 1981. As a result mainly of 
the abrupt devaluation of the colón in late 1980,19 the rate of increase of consumer prices 
accelerated sharply from under 18% in December 1980 to 65% in late 1981, while wholesale 
prices increased even more pronouncedly, from 19% in 1980 to 117% in 1981. 
Inflation also increased heavily, although to a much lesser extent than in Costa Rica, in 
Guyana, where consumer prices, after having risen only 8.5% in 1980, rose by more than 29% in 
1981. As in the case of Costa Rica, this acceleration of the inflationary process was largely due to 
the 18% increase in the exchange rate decreed in early June. 
The rate of increase of prices dropped noticeably in 1981 in Venezuela and, particularly, in 
Jamaica. In Venezuela, inflation decreased to a little under 11%, after two years during which it 
had reached rates of somewhat over 20%. This attenuation of the inflationary process was 
basically a result of restrictive monetary and fiscal policies adopted by the economic authorities. In 
1981, these policies were reflected in a drastic reduction of the deficit of the central government 
and a very moderate increase in the quantity of money. However, the reduction of inflation was 
also influenced by direct price controls introduced in April and by the stagnation of real wages. 
The even more marked fall in the inflation rate in Jamaica, from 27% in 1980 to less than 5% 
in 1981, was also due to a variety of causes. In this respect, special note should be taken of the rigid 
policies adopted in the fiscal and monetary field, which contributed to a substantial reduction of 
inflationary pressures from the demand side, and the strict controls adopted as regards wages and 
prices, which helped to mitigate rises on the cost side. These rises were also weakened by the 
marked reduction in the rate of increase of prices of imported goods, which rose by less than 5 % in 
1981, after having increased by around 30% in 1980, and by the greater supply of basic consumer 
goods. 
2. Wages and salaries 
In 1981 the evolution of average real wages and salaries was very diverse in the Latin American 
countries for which statistical information is available. As may be seen in table 39 and figure 9, 
while real wages increased sharply in Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay and Uruguay, they 
decreased considerably in Argentina, Bolivia and Costa Rica, dropped slightly in Peru and 
remained stable in Colombia.20 
"During the last days of 1980, the exchange rate rose from 8.1 to almost 40 colones per dollar. 
20The statistics on wages and salaries were gathered from the payrolls of sample establishments or from social security 
statistics. The coverage of information may refer to various sectors of production or to all activities. Table 39 includes the 
indicators of greatest coverage for urban activities; when this information is not available, the average wages and salaries 
from manufacturing have been incorporated. 
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In general, wages and salaries tended to decline in those countries where per capita income 
decreased, the inflationary process accelerated and the employment situation worsened. They rose, 
however, in the economies where the rate of increase in prices fell and unemployment dropped. 
But the evolution of real wages and salaries was also strongly influenced by the legal mechanisms 
established to determine the form, periodicity and amount by which nominal wages and salaries 
were readjusted in the various countries. 
Of the three countries where average real wages and salaries suffered a considerable setback, 
the most pronounced was in Bolivia. In that country, average real wage of workers in non-
agricultural activities dropped by 24%. As it had already fallen slightly in 1979 and by more than 
8% in 1980, its 1981 level was more than 30% lower than that of three years before. Although 
during this period the per capita product also continued to decrease, the main cause of the 
accentuated drop in the 1981 real wage was the wage policy which kept nominal wages frozen 
during the entire year despite the fact that during the year consumer prices rose by an average of 
32%. 
Table 39 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE REAL VALUE 










































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Wages of labourers in the manufacturing industry in the metropolitan area. 
Wages and salaries of personnel engaged in non-agricultural activities at national level. 
'Average wages in industry in general, deflated by the consumer price index for Rio de Janeiro. 
Wages of labourers in the manufacturing industry at national level. 
'Wages and salaries declared by people enrolled in the social security system. 
Wages and salaries of labourers and employees in the non-agricultural sectors, with the exception of large-scale copper 
mining and the cellulose and paper industries. 
'Wages and salaries declared by people enrolled in the social security system. 
Wages of labourers in general for Asunción. 
1
 Wages of labourers in the private sector in the metropolitan area of Lima. 
' Wages and salaries in the public and private sectors in Montevideo and the interior. 
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The drop in real wages was also considerable (-11%) in Argentina, where they had increased 
nearly 27 % in the two previous years as a result of the recovery of economic activity and a gradual 
decline in the inflation rate. However, since that increase occurred after four years in which the 
buying power of wages was continually being reduced, in 1981 the real level of the latter was equal 
to only 70% of that of 1974. The decrease in real wages which took place in 1981 was due, on the 
one hand, to the sharp contraction of economic activity and employment and, on the other, to the 
acceleration of the inflationary process. As mentioned above, after the devaluation of the peso at 
the beginning of the year, the rate of increase in consumer prices persistently rose, reaching more 
than 130% in December. The economic authorities, however, did not establish obligatory stand-
ards for the adjustment of wages and salaries, except for minimum wages and basic contract wages. 
For this reason, and because at the same time the job situation was deteriorating, the nominal 
increases in average wages and salaries were much lower than those of prices. 
According to the information available for the first half of 1981, real wages and salaries fell 
nearly 5 % in Costa Rica. It is probably true, however, that this drop was even greater during the 
rest of the year due to the marked acceleration of the inflationary process during this period.21 As 
in the case of Argentina, the decrease in real wages and salaries was influenced by the drop of more 
than 14% in the national per capita income in 1981, the sharp increase in unemployment —which 
rose from an average of 5.3% in 1980 to an average of 8.3% in 1981— and, especially, the 
enormous increase in inflation, which rose from less than 18% in 1980 to 65% in 1981. The 
worsening of the inflationary process not only helped directly erode the buying power of wages 
and salaries in the private sector, but also led the economic authorities to apply a very severe policy 
on readjusting wages and salaries in the public sector in order to reduce the considerable fiscal 
deficit. As a result of this policy, real wages and salaries declined in the central government 
considerably more than in private activity, and they fell even below their 1973 level. 
The buying power of wages also decreased, although more slightly (-2%), in Peru, another 
country where in 1981 the inflationary process accelerated. The rate of growth in consumer prices 
rose sharply in the first months of the year due to the lifting of a series of controls which previously 
had limited the rise in prices of certain basic articles. Although the inflation rate later slowed 
down, the increase in consumer prices in the year was 73% and thus largely exceeded the 61% 
recorded in 1980. The negative effects which this phenomenon would normally have produced on 
the buying power of wages and salaries, however, were partly neutralized by two important 
modifications in the wage policy. The first was the granting of quarterly increases equivalent to the 
anticipated rise in the consumer price index to workers in the public sector and those in the private 
sector who were not subject to collective bargaining; the second was the obligatory inclusion of 
readjustment clauses in the collective factors. Due to the application of these provisions, and also 
due to the slight decline in unemployment in Lima and the small increase in per capita income for 
the second consecutive year, the decrease in real wages and salaries was relatively insignificant. 
Since the latter had fallen almost continually from 1973 to 1979, their 1981 level was almost 30% 
lower than in 1973. 
In Colombia, on the other hand, the real wage of industrial workers increased almost 1%, as 
had occurred the previous year. This small increase, much lower than those of 1978 and 1979, 
basically reflected the economy's progressive loss of dynamism in the last two years, especially in 
the manufacturing sector. However, the virtual stability of the industrial wage as well as the minor 
changes in real minimum wages and agricultural day wages were also partly an effect of the fairly 
widespread indexing of wages and salaries and the noteworthy stability of the inflation rate, which 
during the last two years fluctuated very slightly around 27%. 
The impact of the trend in prices on the evolution of real wages and salaries was also reflected 
in the five countries in which the latter increased considerably in 1981, since in all of them, with 
the sole exception of Paraguay, inflationary processes decelerated.22 
21WhiJe in the first six months consumer prices rose by 22%, in the second six months they rose by 35%. 
"Although in Paraguay the increase in consumer prices from December to December was greater in 1981 than in 
1980, the average increase (13%) was much lower in 1981 than in 1980 (22.4%). 
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Figure 9 
LATIN AMERICA. EVOLUTION OF REAL AVERAGE SALARIES AND WAGES 
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Source: Table 39. 
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The incidence of inflation and the legal norms referring to wage readjustments were 
especially noteworthy in Chile. On the one hand, the rate of growth of consumer prices declined 
continually and markedly from 39% at the end of 1979 to 9.5% in December 1981, and, on the 
other, during this last year the system of nominal wage readjustments was maintained, by virtue of 
which the latter were to increase by a minimal percentage equivalent to that of the increase in the 
consumer price index in the previous period. Under these circumstances, real wages increased for 
the second consecutive year by 9% and thus continued to recover from their drop during the period 
1972-1974. Due, however, to the enormous size (-47%) of the setback which these wages suffered 
during that period, their increase during the past five years only enabled their 1981 level to 
approximate their 1970 level (see table 39). 
The sharp drop in inflation, from 43% in 1980 to slightly less than 30% in 1981, and the 
continuation until the first half of that year of the declining trend in unemployment, also 
contributed to the increase of 7.5% in average real wages and salaries in Uruguay. However, in 
contrast to what occurred in Chile, this increase was the first in the past 10 years, a period In which 
the buying power of wages and salaries was reduced by almost half.23 
Real wages and salaries rose by nearly 6% in 1981 in Brazil, despite the fact that during that 
year the level of economic activity decreased slightly and the rate of unemployment in the principal 
urban centres increased. The negative effect of these changes was more than offset, however, by 
the slight decrease in the inflation rate and, especially, by the modifications introduced in the wage 
policy. This policy retained the system of automatic half-year readjustments established in 1979, to 
which was added a standard for redistributive purposes consisting of the following: while wages 
and salaries lower than 3 times the minimum wage were adjusted by 110% of the increase in the 
national consumer price index, and those between 3 and 10 times the minimum wage were raised 
by 100% of this increase, wages and salaries which exceeded 10 times the minimum wage were 
adjusted in decreasing proportions to the increase in consumer prices. During 1981, differentiated 
increases were also established in the current minimum wages in the various regions with a view 
towards gradually reducing the differences between them. The 1981 increase, marked the end of 
eleven consecutive years during which the real wage paid in manufacturing continually rose, a fact 
which, as can be seen in table 39, is a clear exception in the context of the regional experience. 
In 1981 real wages of workers in Asunción increased by around 6%. This increase, attributa-
ble partly to the persistent and high rate of economic growth and the continual drop in the 
unemployment rate and partly to the readjustment of 15% which was established for the 
minimum wage beginning on 1 May, was the second significant one in the past eleven years. 
According to official information, and despite the extraordinary and sustained expansion of the 
Paraguayan economy during this period, the real wage for workers appears to have declined by 
approximately 10% between 1969 and 1981, a fact which is certainly surprising.24 
Finally, in 1981 there was apparently an extraordinary rise of nearly 25% in the real wages of 
social security members in Guatemala. It is probable that this increase, which is not easy to explain 
in view of the meagre growth rate of 1% that year in the Guatemalan economy, was basically a 
delayed effect of the considerable readjustments introduced in 1980 in minimum wages. In the first 
half of that year, the minimum legal agricultural wage, which had remained unchanged since 1973, 
rose from 1.12 quetzales daily to 3-20 quetzales. This increase benefited, in principle, approxi-
mately 600 000 farm workers. Then, in May, the minimum wage applicable in the main industral 
branches rose from 2 to 4 quetzales daily, and in June the minimum wage of workers in trade, 
transport and a wide range of services was readjusted by 46%. These increases were applied 
gradually, but apparently by the end of 1980 they were completed in the majority of enterprises. As 
a result, although in 1981 new readjustments to minimum wages were not conceded, the latter 
were on average much higher than those paid the previous year. 
23It is probable, however, that the series utilized overestimates the drop in wages, especially in more recent years, since 
it considers only legal readjustments. An indication in this direction is provided by the index of real income per worker 
employed in the establishments included in the Quarterly Industrial Survey of the Central Bank. According to this survey, 
the annual average variations during the period 1978-1981 were, respectively, -1.5%, -3.1 %, 3.1 % and 7.8%, figures which 
appear to be more compatible with the evolution of the principal macroeconomic variables during this period. 
24For a tentative explanation of this anomaly, see the section corresponding to the chapter on Paraguay in the second 




THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES 

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Antigua attained political independence on 1 November 1981. The new nation consists of 
three islands: Antigua, the seat of the central government, with an area of 280 km2, Barbuda 
(160 km2) and Redonda, an uninhabited rocky islet of 2.5 km2. The population in mid-1981 was 
estimated at 75 235, with 74 000 residing on Antigua and 1 235 on Barbuda. The crude birth rate is 
16.0 and the death rate 5.1 per 1 000; net population increase is 1.2%. 
The GDP for 1980 was EC$ 143 million,1 with a per capita income of EC$ 1 900 at 1975 prices. 
The annual average growth rate of the GDP during the four years 1976 to 1980 was 6.8% (see 
table l),but the high growth rate of 8.3% recorded in 1979 declined to 3.6% in 1980. Allowing for 
inflation, real growth during 1981 is likely to have been marginal 
Changes in the 1980 GDP for various sectors of the economy show that manufacturing 
increased by 1.9%, mining and quarrying by 8.3%, and transport and communications by 1.2%. 
However, construction registered no growth and electricity and water even declined by 9%. 
Agriculture, fisheries and forestry also declined by 3.3%. The government sector, which has the 
largest share in GDP, showed the highest rate of growth at 19.5% and hotels and restaurants, the 
third largest contributor to GDP, recorded a 6.7% increase (see table 2). 
A full analysis of the performance of the various sectors of the economy during 1981 cannot 
be made at this time due to the inadequate data base. However, significant changes in the relative 
performance of the various sectors are not anticipated. Available information indicates that costs 
and prices increased more slowly in 1981 than in 1980, possibly as a result of more stable oil prices. 
The production sector is expected to show only marginal changes, while the service sectors, in 
particular government services, are expected to maintain average growth in terms of current 
prices. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Growth of the main sectors 
(i) Agriculture. Agricultural GDP (agriculture, fishery, forestry and livestock) at 1975 prices 
was EC$ 11 million in 1980, representing zero growth over the 1979 figure. The contribution of 
the sector to the GDP was 8%. Increased agricultural earnings were expected during 1981 due to 
expansion of local food production and increases in commodity prices. Vegetables, root crops and 
livestock are the mainstay of the agricultural sector in terms of stability, employment and 
contribution to the economy. 
The reactivated sugar industry now makes significant demands on the available land and 
other resources, in particular capital. However, its contribution to the economy is still for the 
future. Fishing is also important but provides relatively little direct employment. 
Agricultural production and levels of productivity are constrained by low, unreliable rainfall 
and factors common to many poorly financed, developing insland economies, viz., insufficient 
machinery, inadequate storage, poorly developed markets, inadequate technical services and the 
inability of large numbers of farmers to qualify for available lines of credit. Most farmers are 
responsible for all steps in the system, from production through marketing, with no storage or 
'The exchange rate of the East Caribbean dollar is EC$ 2.70 = US$ 1.00. 
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Table 1 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
•1977 1978 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at 1975 prices 
(millions of East Caribbean dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
Current value of imports of goods 
Consumer price index 
December-December 
Variation between annual averages 
Rate of unemployment 





























Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Table 2 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 









Electricity and water 
Transport and communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade 
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Source: Economic Affairs Division, Organization of East Caribbean States. 
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ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
holding facilities. Such conditions result in brief gluts and prolonged periods of scarcity during 
which the island is dependent on imports. Efforts have been made to reduce these problems by 
taking measures to improve the purchasing and storage capacity of the national Central Marketing 
Corporation and to expand credit facilities through the National Development Bank. 
Small farmers dominate the agricultural sector, accounting for approximately 7 5 % of locally 
produced vegetable and food crops, virtually all fruits (excepting pineapples), 7 5 % of animal 
products (including all milk), and 50% of cotton and 2 5 % of sugar cane acreage. Government 
agencies and corporations account for 7 5 % of the sugar cane acreage, 50% of the cotton, the 
residue of vegetables, root crops and fruits, and also some cattle. 
The total acreage used for vegetable and food crop production increased from approximately 
530 hectares in 1980 to 610 hectares in 1981, with the volume of output increasing from 
approximately 770 to 1 000 tons. 
The sugar industry was restarted during 1981. The ultimate production target is 5 000 tons of 
raw sugar and 1 million litres of molasses for local consumption from 12 000 hectares of sugar 
cane. During 1981 raw sugar output amounted to 45 tons, with 250 hectares of cane being 
cultivated by the State-owned Sugar Industry Corporation and 80 hectares by small farmers. 
Cotton production declined further to 6 000 kg from 135 hectares during the 1980/1981 
season. Small farmers accounted for 2 870 kg from 50 hectares and Goverment agencies 3 130 kg 
from 85 hectares. Although the current price is US$ 5.50 FOB per kg of clean lint, the outlook is for 
continued low levels of production. The major constraints are insufficient machinery to effect 
timely cultivation, poor pest control, and severe problems with harvesting, which is done by hand. 
Fruit production increased marginally during 1981, the total output being estimated at 
198 000 kg, of which pineapples contributed 132 000 kg, mangoes 35 500 kg, avocados 12 700 kg 
and citrus fruits 15 800 kg; in addition, production of bananas was estimated at 127 000 kg. Except 
for small exports of pineapples and mangoes, the entire production was sold on the local market 
(see table 3). 
Table 3 




























































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Antigua and Barbuda. 
"Data for small farmers only. 
Thousands of pounds. 
^Thousands of gallons. 
Thousands. 
"January-November. 
•^ 3 of 5 factories. 


















The livestock subsector is the main contributor to the agricultural share of the GDP. The 
animal population is estimated at 10 800 cattle, 15 200 sheep, 16 500 goats and 2 000 pigs. 
Animals are kept mainly for meat production: there are no specialized dairy units and milk is 
virtually a by-product of the beef industry. 
Efforts are being made to promote agro-industrial activity linked with local production of 
fruits and vegetables. The Ministry of Agiculture operates a small food processing unit which 
bottles seasonally available material, and a pilot food processing plant is to be commissioned 
during 1982. In addition to the production of raw sugar, there is a State-owned edible oil facility 
which processes locally produced cotton seed and copra imported from the CARICOM region. A 
privately owned milk processing facility reconstitutes imported dried milk and handles small 
quantities of locally produced fresh milk. 
The fishing industry is based on small boats which exploit inshore areas. Although the 
number of boats in operation remained at 250 during 1980 and 1981, and crews increased from 500 
to 550, the fish landed declined from 1 107 tons to 851 tons and lobster from 64 to 38 tons, while 
the value of the fish landed decreased from an estimated EC$ 4.9 million in 1980 to EC$ 3.8 
million in 1981 and the value of the lobster caught went down from EC$ 846 000 to EC$ 509 000. 
It is estimated that 50% of the total catch was exported during 1980 but only 355 tons of fish and 
10 tons of lobster were exported during 1981 (see table 4). 
Although fish and lobster are exported, the island suffers chronic shortages of these products. 
The Government and the Caribbean Food Corporation have therefore financed a fishing venture 
as a part of the Caribbean Food Plan to exploit fish resources beyond the 50 fathom limit. 
Operations are to commence during 1982, and when full output capacity is achieved, the island 
should approach self-sufficiency in fresh fish. 
Most small farmers make only limited use of credit. This may be attributed to poorly 
developed marketing systems, low levels of technology and inadequate support services, which 
result in low yields and a situation of high risk. The Antigua and Barbuda Development Bank is 
now the main source of credit for small farmers. During 1981 it approved some 66 loans for crop 
production, 10 for livestock improvement and 16 for fishing; total disbursements amounted to 
EC$ 550 000. 
(ii) Manufacturing. Although efforts have been made to promote industrial development by 
offering incentives such as rental of factory shells at concessionary rates, tax rebates and opportun-
ities to repatriate profits, this sector remains small, only contributing 7% of the GDP and 
Table 4 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: FISH LANDINGS 
1980 
Number of boats 





Value of fish 































Millions of East Caribbean dollars. 
' Thousands of East Caribbean dollars. 
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Table 5 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: INSTALLED CAPACITY, PRODUCTION 
A N D CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRICITY 
Installed capacity Production Consumption 
(thousands of kW) (millions of kWh) (millions of kWh) 






























































Source: Electricity Department, Public Utilities Authority, Antigua and Barbuda. 
"Estimated. 
providing some 6% of available jobs. It is also relatively weak, as it has not shown significant 
growth or stability in output and development opportunities. 
Enclave and assembly-type operations are dominant, with almost total dependence on 
imported materials and on markets in North America and in the CARICOM area. The product range 
includes rum, garments, beds, stoves, refrigerators, household and office furniture, doors and 
windows. Reactivation of the oil refinery and production of raw sugar will strengthen this sector. 
The enclave industries registered decreases in both output and employment during 1981, 
when the number of employees fell from 1 065 at mid-year to 825 at the end of the year. This 
decline in activities may have been a direct reaction to market conditions in North America. 
(iii) Basic services. The Antigua Public Utilities Authority is the sole supplier of electricity, 
water and internal telephone services to the public. Generation of electricity is based exclusively on 
imported diesel oil. The installed capacity of the public utilities is 15 000 kW and of the industrial 
sector 5 300 kW. Electrical output by the public utilities increased from 53 million kWh in 1980 to 
56 million kWh in 1981, with industrial production constant at 1 million kWh. It is estimated that 
the public utilities consumed 102 thousand barrels of oil equivalent (kboe) in 1980 and some 114 
kboe in 1981. Electrical energy sold to various categories of users during 1981, in millions of kWh, 
was: households 19, commercial enterprises 14, industrial operations 6, municipal lighting 2, and 
others 2 (see table 5). 
Municipal water supplies are derived from surface catchments and subsurface sources, the 
latter being located mainly in the southern part of the island. The demand/supply ratio for water is 
at a critical level and an additional surface reservoir is to be constructed. During 1981, the north 
shore pipeline was installed to improve supplies to that part of the island, where the tourist 
facilities are concentrated. The telephone service is being upgraded and expanded but has yet to 
satisfy the basic needs of population centres. 
(iv) Tourism. The tourist sector continued to dominate the economy in 1980, when it 
contributed 12% of the GDP, at 1975 prices. The value of earnings during 1981 is not yet available. 
The number of stop-over visitors (by air only) declined by 13%, while cruise ship visitors 
increased by 6%, thus giving a net decrease of 3% in total visitors from 1980 levels. It is estimated 
that visitor arrivals on yachts increased marginally from 11 830 in 1980 to approximately 12 000 
during 1981 (see table 6). 
The composition of the tourist market, in particular the air arrivals, has shown a decline in 
numbers from the United States and Canada and an increase from the United Kingdom and other 
destinations. Visitors from Europe registered a 40% increase during 1980 but declined during 
1981 to the 1979 levels. 
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Tourist arrivals show marked seasonal fluctuations. The peak season for arrivals by air is 
January through April and for cruise ship visitors November through April. Concerted efforts are 
being made by the Government and local tourism interests, in co-operation with regional tourism 
associations, to promote the island as a year-round destination and to secure new markets. 
(v) Employment. There are no recent data relating to national employment. The Ministry of 
Labour estimates the total labour force at 29 229with23 159persons employed and an unemploy-
ment rate of 21% (see table 7). 
The public sector is the largest direct employer, with an estimated 2 658 employees in the 
central government civil service, 920 in statutory bodies, plus fluctuating numbers of weekly and 
daily paid workers. Although absolute figures are not available, it is indicated that the tourist and 
service sectors are of greatest importance in terms of direct and indirect employment. Seasonal 
employment is a characteristic of agriculture, the hotel industry and the transportation service. 
Positive indicators as regards employment during 1981 include the reactivation of the sugar 
industry, rehabilitation of the oil refinery, and increased construction activity, particularly by the 
public sector and also in the service sector since independence. However, such gains were offset in 
part by declines in cotton production and in employment by enclave industries. 
3. The external sector 
(a) Merchandise trade 
Balance of payments statements are not available beyond 1979, when the visible trade deficit 
was EC$ 137 million, the current account had a deficit of EC$ 22 million and the overall balance 
showed a deficit of EC$ 6 million. 
The visible trade deficit for the first five months of 1981 was EC$ 94 million, with imports 
valued at EC$ 127 million and exports at EC$ 33 million. Petroleum, foodstuffs, construction 
materials and machinery and equipment for the transport sector continue to dominate the import 
sector, while clothing, rum, fish and lobster are the main exports (see tables 8 and 9). 
4. Prices and wages 
Inflation was approximately 12% in 1981, compared with 19% the year before (see 
table 10). This reduction was due to a combination of circumstances, including the stabilization of 
world petroleum prices, a slowdown in the inflation rate of countries from which most imports are 
purchased, and the relative strength of the US dollar, to which the East Caribbean dollar is linked. 
Table 6 




Number of cruise-ship calls 
Number of yatch calls 
Hotels and guest house beds 
Estimated visitors expenditures' 
Source: Antigua and Barbuda Department of Tourism and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands. 
"Visitors by air only. 
































































ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
Table 7 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PERSONS (WAGE EARNERS 
AND SELF-EMPLOYED) WORKING IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
SECTORS AT 31 DECEMBER 1978 AND 1979 
Agriculture, livestock and fishing 
Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants 
hotels and guest houses 
Transport, storage and communications 
Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services 










































































Source: A Sypnotic Picture of the Employment Situation in the Years 1978 and 1979, by M. Lewis and V. Grosman. 
Ministry of Labour, Antigua and Barbuda, March 1981. 
Table 8 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: EXPORTS OF GOODS 
Total exports 
Food 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials 




































































































Source: Statistical Division, Ministry of Finance and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Provisional figures. 
Data for first five months. 
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The January to January price changes for gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene and LPG were 20,25,29 
and 30% for the 1980-1981 period and 5,9,4 and 8% respectively during the 1981-1982 period. 
This led to smaller changes in the consumer price index for utilities, transportation and housing. 
Food items, clothing and household maintenance, however, showed higher levels of inflation than 
other components of the consumer price index. 
Table 9 
ANTIGUA Y BARBUDA: IMPORTS OF GOODS 
Total imports 
Food 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials 
Minerals, fuels and lubricants 
Animal and vegetables oils 
Chemicals 
Manufactured goods 









































































































Source: Statistical Division, Ministry of Finance and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Provisional figures. 
Data for first five months. 
Table 10 
A N T I G U A A N D BARBUDA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food and beverages 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
Housing 
Utilities 
Clothing and accessories 
Transportation 
Variation b< 











Variation from December to 
Consumer price index 
Food and beverages 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
Housing 
Utilities 
Clothing and accessories 
Transportation 






























































Source: Statistical Division, Ministry of Finance, Antigua and Barbuda. 
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Table 11 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Other current revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
3. Savings on current account ( 1 - 2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit surplus (1 - 5) 



























































































Source: Ministry of Finance, Antigua and Barbuda. 
"Preliminary figures. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
Direct taxes on wages and salaries were abolished in 1976 and a number of indirect taxes 
introduced. The total collected by the Inland Revenue Department increased substantially during 
1981 as the result of a revision of tax structures and measures, greater efficiency in collection, and 
some economic growth. Thus, company tax increased from EC$ 5.4 million in 1980 to EC$ 9.6 
million in 1981; the 20% tax on external telecommunications yielded EC$ 998 700, an increase of 
5 3 % ; foreign currency levies of 1.0% yielded some EC$ 4.0 million, and stamp duties on sales and 
legal transactions amounted to EC$ 2.1 million, an increase of 17%. Licencing categories were 
extended and fees increased during 1981 to yield some EC$ 1.5 million: an increase of 126% over 
1980. Property tax levied on buildings amounted to EC$ 0.9 million. 
In the tourism sector, hotel and guest taxes increased by 12% to EC$ 4.3 million and a 10% 
tax on all airline tickets realized EC$ 0.7 million. Embarkation fees paid by airline passengers 
yielded EC$ 0.68 million —a marginal decrease from the high of EC$ 0.71 million in 1980— while 
the tax on cruise ship passengers had its first full year of operation and yielded EC$ 0.7 million. 
Import duties amounted to EC$ 17.4 million, while the consumption taxes associated with 
these imports yielded EC$ 16.0 million. 
Data relating to commercial banking activities are available only up to the end of September 
1981, at which time demand deposits amounted to EC$ 40 million (an increase of EC$ 8 million 
over the December 1980 figures) time deposits EC$ 69 million (an increase of EC$ 5 million), and 
savings deposits EC$ 67 million (an increase of just over EC$ 7 million). 
Total loans and advances to 31 December 1981 amounted to EC$ 188 million, some EC$ 51 
million over the 1980 full-year figure. Growth in loans considerably exceeded that of savings, 
which showed an increased of EC$ 9 million. 
With regard to public financing, treasury bills held by commercial banks increased from 
EC$ 8.5 million at the end of 1980 to EC$ 8.8 million at 30 September 1981. Loans and advances to 
government and statutory bodies increased from EC$ 29 to EC$ 32 million during the same 
period. Government deposits with commercial banks amounted to EC$ 8 million and the net 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The evolution of the Argentine economy was very unfavourable in 1981. Thus, the gross 
domestic product went down by over 6%, the rate of inflation rose sharply, the unemployment 
rate doubled, the external debt increased considerably, and there was a new and substantial drop in 
the international reserves (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The decline in economic activity was not only marked but also gathered speed in the course of 
the year, to such a point that in the second half the gross domestic product fell by 11 % compared 
with the same period in 1980. In sectoral terms, the biggest drops were in manufacturing, 
construction and commerce. Thus, industrial production up to the end of 1981 was below that 
registered at the beginning of the 1970s. In contrast the agricultural sector increased by a little over 
3 % as a result of favourable weather conditjons and the better financial situation of the production 
units in the pampas areas, which had a better chance than industrial enterprises of clearing up 
their liabilities and hence eliminating restrictions on their production capacity. 
In contrast with the previous year, the 1981 recession was accompanied by a marked drop in 
imports of goods, the value of which went down by 12 % after its spectacular increases of 73 % in 
1979 and 56% in 1980. This, together with an increase of 14% in the total amount of exports, 
brought about a turnaround in merchandise trade, which, after registering a deficit of close to 
US$ 1 400 in 1980, generated a surplus of rather more than US$ 900 million in 1981. Even so, the 
international reserves went down by over US$ 3 400 million. This decline, which considerably 
exceeded that of close to US$ 2 700 million registered the previous year, was mainly due to the 
very substantial increase recorded once again in payments of profits and interest and the sharp 
drop in the net inflow of capital. 
Thus, net remittances of profits and interest more than doubled, rising from US$ 1 500 
million in 1980 to US$ 3 300 million in 1981. In these circumstances, and notwithstanding the 
noteworthy improvement in the trade in goods, the deficit on current account went down by only 
US$ 700 million and was still over US$ 4 billion for the second year running. 
The net-inflow of capital, for its part, went down from nearly US$ 2 200 million in 1980 to 
less than US$.900 million in 1981. This drop occurred in spite of the fact that between these two 
years the net inflow of long-term capital rose dramatically from US$ 4 500 million to US$ 9 500 
million, for this increase was more than offset by the even more spectacular increase in the outflow 
of short-term capital, which more than quadrupled from US$ 2 000 million in 1980 to over 
US$ 8 400 million in 1981. 
The effort to bring the balance of payments into equilibrium led to a sharp currency 
devaluation which reached the exceptional rate of nearly 400% between the end of 1980 and that 
of 1981. The higher cost of foreign exchange, together with the drop in the demand for money due 
to the greater expectations of inflation and a slightly more rapid expansion of the money supply 
than in the year before, helped to send up prices more rapidly .Thus, the consumer price index, 
which in 1980 had increased by less than 100% for the first time since 1974, went up by over 130% 
in 1981, while the growth rate of wholesale prices more than trebled, rising from 58% to 180%. 
The most pronounced increases were in the prices of goods directly connected with foreign trade, 
such as imported products (238%) and agricultural products (212%). 
This acceleration in inflation was accompanied by a considerable decline of nearly 11 % in real 
wages and considerable increases in the unemployment rate in all the main cities of the country. 
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Up to March 1981, the economic policy continued to be based on the programme of financial 
liberalization, reductions in tariffs and convertibility of the national currency at a previously 
announced exchange rate. Although this programme had managed to achieve some reduction in 
the growth rate of prices, the serious difficulties which arose in its application caused it finally to be 
abandoned. 
During 1979 and part of 1980, the disparity between the internal and external interest rates 
and the announced devaluation stimulated the inflow of short-term capital. This external 
indebtedness financed the accumulation of international reserves and greater spending by 
residents, which went mainly on the purchase of non-tradeable and imported goods, to the 
detriment of the situation of local producers exposed to international competition. The 
deterioration in the situation of such producers and of those producing exportable goods not only 
Table 1 
ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (billions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Industrial wagesc 
Rate of unemployment 
Current income of government 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Variation between annual averages. 




gave rise to energetic complaints but also contributed to the financial crisis of April 1980, as a 
result of which the monetary authorities were obliged to restore the total guarantee on bank 
deposits and advance substantial amounts of money to financial institutions. At the same time, the 
higher demand for foreign exchange caused by the substantial current account deficit led to a drop 
in the international reserves. 
Thus, at the end of 1980 the economy was displaying some serious distortions. Heavy external 
debt had been contracted, but it was reflected in an increase in consumption and transfers of 
residents' funds to the exterior, rather than in greater investment. The debts of business with the 
domestic financial system had also grown considerably under the pressure of the high rates of 
interest, and the possibilities for their payment under normal conditions seemed doubtful. The 
structure of relative prices, which was clearly biased in favour of non-tradeable goods, was also 
difficult to sustain. 
In order to correct this latter distortion, two alternative methods were available. The first was 
to trust in the mechanisms of adjustment of the system, through a fixed rate of exchange. This 
meant that there would be a period during which domestic prices would grow less than 
international inflation or would even go down in absolute terms. If this option were adopted, 
however, there would be a risk not only of bringing about a contraction in the rate of activity, which 
had already slackened, but of actually provoking deflation, which would have placed the debtor 
sectors in even grater difficulties. Moreover, the maintenance of the exchange rate would have 
called for strict controls on money issue, whereas the monetary authorities were under pressure to 
expand this in view of the weakness of the financial system and the increase in the fiscal deficit. 
Thus, it appeared more probable that another method, based mainly on adjustment of the 
exchange rate, would be adopted. As a result, the expectations of devaluation (also stimulated by 
the prospect of the change in administration in March 1981) became very intense at the beginning 
of the year and led to a severe loss of reserves. The increase of 10% in the exchange rate decided 
upon in February, however, which altered the previously announced patterns, speeded up the drop 
in reserves rather than checking it, as mistrust in the maintenance of the exchange system became 
generalized. 
In these circumstances, the new government authorities decided on a 30% devaluation in 
April, assuming that the higher price of competing imports would help to restore industrial 
activity and discourage speculation against the peso, so that a recovery could be achieved in the 
international reserves. However, this did not occur. The increase in the exchange rate did indeed 
reduce real liquidity and diminish imports. However, the substitution of locally produced articles 
for imported products did not serve to offset the drop in domestic demand, and industrial firms 
—also affected by persistent financing difficulties and higher costs of inputs— reduced their 
production and their demand for labour. Nor did the pressures on the exchange market disappear 
either. The main causes of the money issue —the need to support the fragile financial system and 
to finance the fiscal deficit— were not corrected even though the authorities tried to restrict the 
money supply through increases in the compulsory bank reserves. Furthermore, the expectations 
of a larger expansion in the money supply tended to reduce the demand for money and thus helped 
to raise the prices of goods and foreign exchange. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the future 
course of economic policy, and perhaps also regarding the possibility of being able to pay the 
external debt commitments, also encouraged the purchase of foreign currency. This situation made 
it necessary to carry out a further devaluation in June, which was accompanied by the division of 
the exchange market into two parts. Nevertheless, the excessive demand for foreign currency 
persisted, except for a few intervals, throughout the year, and although the exchange rates rose 
much more than domestic prices, the Central Bank had to intervene to avoid still greater 
depreciation. 
Towards the end of the year, the situation was still critical. As already noted, the devaluations 
were not sufficient to balance the external accounts, and in addition to this continuing imbalance 
there was the build-up of heavy commitments for 1982 and the following years. The balance-of-
payments problems originating from domestic factors were also compounded by those due to the 
growth in real interest rates on international markets and the deterioration of the terms of trade. 
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Figure 1 
ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
income 
I 1 ' 
Urban unemployment'* 
J I I I L J I I I L 
Consumer prices0 
Current account balance** 
J I I L _ L J I L 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 51 
Source: ECLA, On the basis of official data, 
aAnnual growth rate. 
bAverage annual rate in the Federal Capital and in Greater Buenos Aires. 
cPercentage variation, December- December. 
^Millions of dollars. 
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These conditions made it essential to generate a bigger surplus on the goods and services account 
and tended to drive up the real exchange rate needed to secure a balance on the external accounts. 
At the same time, the rate of inflation had accelerated and real wages were showing a pronounced 
decline. Furthermore, the drop in sales and the high real interest rate on loans to enterprises 
endangered the survival of firms with large debts. 
Economic policy measures in 1981, as already noted, were oriented mainly towards reducing 
the external imbalance. Measures were also proposed to relieve the situation brought about by the 
heavy indebtedness of enterprises, through a system of consolidation and refinancing of bank 
credits for periods of up to seven years. This system was only applied in a partial manner, however. 
Moreover, in December the orientation of economic policy was changed because, after it had been 
decided to unify and float the exchange rate, economic policy objectives were centered on the 
control of inflation by severely reducing public expenditure and the issue of money. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global supply and demand trends 
In 1981 the supply of goods and services went down by almost 7.596 because of the notable 
drop in the product and the significant reduction of close on 18% in the volume of imports of 
goods and services (see table 2). This represented an interruption in the tendency towards 
increased openness of the economy observed over the last five years. 
The components of global demand which suffered the sharpest reductions were gross fixed 
domestic investment and changes in stocks. Expenditure on durable production equipment went 
down by 32% after several years of growth, so that the total volume of investment in this type of 
goods was lower than that registered at the beginning of the 1970s. The same type of decline 
occurred in almost all sectors of activity. Purchases of equipment for the agricultural sector 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic produt at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 






























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values by deflation, using price indexes calculated by ECLA for 
the purpose. 
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remained at the very low level of the year before, while in industry the unfavourable evolution of 
capital formation became generalized and was accompanied by significant idle capacity in almost 
all branches. 
Likewise, construction also markedly reduced its level of activity, especially in connection 
with public sector projects (-10%). Construction of private projects went down only slightly 
(-2%), thanks to a higher level of expenditure in the early months of the year, but in the last 
quarter the drop in this type of construction was very marked (around 15%). Generally speaking, 
construction for the private sector was severely limited by the high interest rates and the lack of 
sources of long-term financing. Activity was concentrated on the completion of projects which had 
already been begun, but there were also delays in such completion and even many cases of projects 
being paralysed. There was a marked fall in the initiation of new construction work. 
Global consumption went down by almost 5 % after two years of steady growth. Despite the 
limitations on the accuracy of the analysis caused by the residual nature of the estimates of this item 
in the national accounts, salient features to be noted are the marked drop in the imported content 
of consumption due to the changes made during the period in exchange policy, the notable decline 
in expenditure on durable goods, and the substantial contraction in purchases of wage goods, 
which was reflected, for example, in the drop of over 21 % in the output of the textiles and clothing 
industry. 
In contrast, there was a marked rise in 1981 in the volume of exports of goods and services, 
which were stimulated by the sharp increase in the real exchange rate. 
Table 3 
ARGENTINA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels' 
Ownership of dwellings 






























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the total were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond exactly 
with the latter. 
'Including financial institutions, insurance, real estate and business services, except ownership of dwellings. 




ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Millions of 1970 pesos Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1981" 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
12 759 13 277 12 491 12 874 1.3 4.1 -5.6 3.1 
6 927 7 364 7 044 7 539 2.9 6.3 -4.3 7.0 
5 336 5 375 5 012 4 954 - 0.7 -6.8 -1.2 
Source: Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes agricultural construction, hunting, forestry, timber extraction and fishing. 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
(i) The agricultural sector. As already noted, in 1981 the agricultural sector was the only 
goods-producing activity which managed to increase its product. This rose by rather more than 3% 
as a result of a 7% rise in crop farming production and a 1% drop in that of the stock-raising 
subsector (see tables 3 and 4). 
The evolution of the crop farming subsector was uneven. Production of cereals, vegetables 
and pulses expanded, whereas that of oilseeds, fruit and industrial crops went down. These 
differences were due not only to weather and market factors, but also to policy changes. 
Thus, the increase in the cereals harvest —which is the main determining factor in the 
increase in the sectoral product— was due not only to the larger areas cultivated both in the 1980-
1981 and the 1981-1982 seasons, but also to the weather conditions, which favoured high yields. An 
important factor in the expansion of the area cultivated was the improvement in cereal prices 
deriving from the increase in the real exchange rate as from March 1981. This adjustment more 
than made up for the drop in international prices, but this was not the case with oilseeds. The 
consequent change in relative prices favoured an increase in the area sown with cereals, to the 
detriment of that devoted to the production of oilseeds (see table 5). Altogether, however, there 
was more stimulus for the production of grains in general because of the improvement in their 
relative prices compared with those in the cattle-raising subsector, which was affected by a process 
of running down stocks which will be described later. 
The modification of exchange policy also stimulated the production of other crops largely 
grown for export (such as beans) or subject to external competition (such as certain kinds of 
vegetables), whose sale on the domestic market was to some extent made more difficult in 
previous years by imports. On the other hand, the adverse weather conditions affected fruit 
production and thus offset the stimulus for the production of export fruit caused by the 
improvement in the exchange rate. 
As regards industrial crops, there were general reductions (in sugar cane, cotton, tobacco and 
tea) associated with the deterioration in prices. Although these products are exported and should 
therefore have benefited from the devaluation, the marked drop in their international prices (in 
the case of cotton and sugar) or the fact that the devaluations of the peso took place when the 
harvest was already over (in the case of tea and tobacco) meant that the effects of the new exchange 
policy did not show themselves in 1981. Furthermore, weather conditions were particularly 
unfavourable in the case of cotton. 
In the stock-raising subsector, wool production went down —a long- standing phenomenon 
associated with the steady reduction in stocks— while that of poultry and eggs remained relatively 
stable and milk production slightly increased. The decisive factor in the variation in the stock-
raising subsector, however, was the drop in meat production. This was due to the continued 
running down of stocks in the cattle-raising subsector, which had begun in the period July 1977-
Gross agricultural product 




June 1978. Between that time and 1 July 1981, stocks were reduced by 5.1 million head (8.6%), 
while between July 1980 and June 1981 the reduction was 1.6 million head (2.9%). The subsequent 
evolution and structure of slaughtering give grounds for assuming that this process continued in 
the second half of 1981 (see table 6). 
Apart from the movement of relative prices which favoured grain production, and also the 
substantial improvement in crop farming productivity compared with that of stock-raising, the 
evolution of the latter subsector was also affected by the differential effect of the high interest 
rates, which are much more unfavourble for stock-raising than for crop farming because in stock-
raising capital is immobilized for a much longer time. Furthermore, the restricted international 
market and the scanty prospects of improvements in the short term (depending on a recovery in 
the industrialized economies), together with the depressed domestic market, did not give rise to 
favourable expectations regarding the immediate future of this branch of activity. 
To sum up, the modifications made in exchange policy in the first part of 1981 began to have 
positive effects on the crop farming subsector, subject to the natural lags due to the markedly 
seasonal nature of such farming activities. In view of conditions on domestic and external markets, 
however, the modifications in exchange policy did not have the same effects for all activities, a 
favourable change in relative prices being observed in the case of pampas products, and within 
these, especially grains. 
It was not possible to expect a much greater response by the end of 1981 to the improvement 
in relative prices and profitability than that which actually took place, since in the previous four 
years there had been a reduction in the capital devoted to agricultural productions (reduction in 
cattle stocks and working capital), because the money in question had been devoted to the payment 
of loans and to investments in other activities, and consequently a certain area of land was under-
utilized. The bringing back of these resources into production would require lasting stimuli —such 
as favourable relative prices— for a sufficiently long period, and the existence of suitable social and 
political conditions for encouraging reinvestment in the sector. 
(ii) Mining. Mining activity remained at much the same level as in 1980 (see table 7). 
Petroleum production, which had grown by 4% the previous year because of the bringing into 
operation of new oilfields, only increased by a little under 1%. The lower growth rate was due to 
the critical financial situation of the State oil company Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales (YPF) 
Table 5 
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Source: National Meat Board; Ministry of Agriculture; and ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"At 30 June of each year. 
Annual slaughtering as a percentage of stocks at 30 June of each year. 
'Annual and quarterly averages. 
dln 1970 pesos. 
' Kilogrammes of wheat per kilogramme of steer. 
Preliminary figures. 
Table 7 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Gross mining product at factor cost 
(millions of 1970 pesos) 
Production of some important 
minerals 
Petroleum (millions of m') 
Marketable coal (thousands of tons) 











































Source: Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Preliminary figures. 
After deduction of imports. 
—which in turn was due to the price and borrowing policy followed in previous periods— and to 
difficulties regarding the production of the enterprises operating under contract, because of the 
deterioration in their profitability. As a result, idle capacity increased and there were delays in 
agreements for increasing the areas operated under concessions. Despite this stagnation of 
production, however, the smaller domestic consumption led to a drop of 4 3 % in oil imports and a 
notable expansion of 120% in the value of exports of crude and petroleum products. 
Natural gas production at the wellhead, for its part, virtually stagnated with respect to the 
previous year for reasons of demand, in spite of the completion of the Centre-West gas pipeline, 
which began to operate in the latter part of the year, thus appreciably increasing transport 
capacity. This performance was in sharp contrast with the considerable increases registered in the 
previous two years (20% in 1979 and 8 % in 1980). 
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Production of metallic minerals went down by a little over 2%. Exports of such minerals 
increased by over 15%, but deliveries for domestic consumption went down. There was also a 
decline in production of non-metallic minerals for construction, in line with the lower level of 
activity in this sector. 
(iii) Manufacturing. During 1981, industrial production went down by 16% in comparison 
with 1980. The volume of activity thus dropped below that of the early 1970s, and the contraction 
in the industrial sector, which had already lasted for ten quarters by the end of 1981, was the 
longest and severest in the last three decades (see table 8 and figure 2). 
In the first part of the year, as in 1980, the activities most seriously affected were those 
exposed to external competition as a result of the tariff and exchange policies tried out since the 
end of 1978. This was the case of the paper, textile and clothing industries. Another factor of 
contraction in this period was the difficulty in exporting caused by the deterioration in the real 
exchange rate and the restrictions on access to markets abroad. This particularly affected the meat 
packing industry, chemicals, iron and steel, and machinery and motor vehicles. 
The economic measures adopted as from the second half of the year (especially the 
devaluation of the peso) favourably influenced the export conditions for industrial goods such as 
meat and meat products, textiles, and iron and steel. They also improved the competitiveness of 
industries producing importable goods. 
These positive factors were offset, however, by the problems caused to enterprises by their 
high level of indebtedness and the persistently high real interest rates. The combination of these 
two factors continued to weigh on the financial situation of firms in spite of the measures adopted 
towards the middle of the year in order to try to solve the financial problems and this considerably 
Table 8 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Gross manufacturing product at 







Basic metal industries 
Machinery and equipment 
Other industries 
Production of some important 
manufactures 
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Source: Central Bank of Argentina; Centro de Industriales Siderúrgicos; Asociación de Fabricantes de Automotores; 
Asociación de Fabricantes de Tractores. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Including sponge iron. 
'Thousands of tons. 
Thousands of units. 
' Units. 




ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Construction permits granted 






Consumption of cement'' 
Public works 
Private works 
Deliveries of reinforcing rods 





































































Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses; Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland; Instituto 
Argentino de Siderurgia. 
"Preliminary fieures. 
First six months. 
'Estimates. 
Thousands of tons. 
restricted their possibilities of production, leading many of them to reduce the level of activity and 
employment, thus giving rise to a contractive spiral which affected real wages and weakened 
demand, especially for wage goods. Furthermore, the high interest rates on consumer credits 
discouraged demand for durable goods. A further contractive factor was the reduction in public 
sector investment. 
As a result, the industrial recession grew worse during the second part of the year. In the third 
quarter, production was almost 24% less than in the same period of the previous year, and in the 
fourth quarter it was 20% lower than a year before. 
The sectors which declined most during the year were the industries producing capital goods 
and consumer durables. The motor vehicle industry, which had turned in a good performance 
during 1980, was perhaps the clearest example of this paralysation of industry, sinking to levels 
comparable to those of the 1960s. This situation was caused by the persistence of high interest 
rates —as already noted— and unsuitable financing conditions, together with the policy of 
increasing sales prices above the general level at a time when demand was shrinking. Naturally, 
this decline in the motor industry also directly influenced the motor components, metal products, 
rubber, paint and steel industries. 
Steelmaking activity declined sharply to a point where barely 60% of the installed capacity 
was being used. During the year, mergers of enterprises took place, with the aim of reducing costs, 
and towards the last quarter of the year activity picked up somewhat due to an increase in exports. 
The paper and pulp industries also declined markedly (-17.5%), although a positive factor 
was the larger production of newsprint, which is subject to special conditions. 
The chemical industry as a whole reduced its activity by over 6% even though new 
petrochemical projects initiated in previous years were put into operation and there was an 
increase in exports of petrochemical products in an effort to offset the drop in domestic 
consumption. The production of pharmaceuticals went down substantially in the second part of 
the year due to the decline in demand. 
Despite the drop in the competitiveness of imported products in the second part of the year 
and the reduction in purchases by Argentine travellers abroad after the April devaluation, the 
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Figure 2 
ARGENTINA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR8 






1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data, 
aThe shaded areas represent period of low activity in which the industrial 
product did not manage to regain its previous maximum. The surface of these 
areas measures the value of the product lost as a result of such contractions. 
Since 1968 there have been only two such "valleys": IV/1974- III/1977, 
when the loss of the product was equivalent to a little over 2/3 of one quar-
ter's production, and III/1977 - IV/1981, when the loss was equal to 2 1/3 
quarters. In the most acute recession in recent decades (1/1972 -1/1963) the 
loss amounted to less than one quarter, a similar amount to the loss in 1981. 
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textile and clothing industry did not manage to register a recovery and its high financial costs led to 
problems of dismissal of personnel and closure of installations. During the year as a whole, activity 
in this industry went down by 21% (see table 8). 
Production of foodstuffs —which went down by a little over 3%— turned in the least 
unfavourable performance in the sector on account of the inelastic nature of demand lor many food 
products and the greater supply of agricultural goods because of better harvests. Although meat 
exports were adversely affected by unfavourable prices abroad, they increased towards the end of 
the year. 
In the last part of the year this contractive situation was compounded by an increase in 
political uncertainty. All this had an unfavourable influence on expectations, and as is usual in 
acute crisis situations there was a paralysation of projects aimed at achieving better utilization of 
existing installed capacity, and also of new investment. 
(iv) The construction sector. During 1980 construction activity as a whole went down by 
around 6%. The decline was more pronounced in the case of public sector construction investment 
(-10%) than in the private sector (-2%). 
The demand for construction materials went down in line with the smaller volume of activity. 
Thus, deliveries of cement dropped by 7% and those of steel products by 26.5%. The area of 
construction projects for which permits were granted in the main cities likewise went down 
markedly (see table 9). 
The objective of reducing the fiscal deficit affected the execution of projects already begun or 
led to the postponement of large-scale new projects, such as the Yacyretá hydroelectric power 
station. It should be noted that many of the projects proposed for execution by private enterprise 
under the system of concessions were also postponed. 
In the private sector, the reduction in housing construction was due, as in 1980, to the high 
interest rates, the lack of suitable financing machinery, and the decline in demand caused by the 
drop in real income. Another negative influence was the reduction in the National Housing Fund 
due to the change in its sources of financing, which mostly consisted of a payroll tax. Non-
residential private construction, for its part, was affected by the drop in industrial sector 
investment. 
The financial situation of construction firms with growing idle capacity became difficult, and 
many firms went out of the market: a process which became more marked towards the end of the 
year. This occurred in spite of the fact that the cost of construction increased less than the general 
level of prices, largely because the labour market situation depressed wages in the sector. 
(v) The electricity sector. The generation of electric power in 1981 went down by nearly 1 %, 
thus marking a departure from the trend observed since the 1960s. 
The installed capacity increased with the bringing into operation of several turbines in the 
Salto Grande power station. Work also considered on the dams at Alicurá and Agua del Toro> but 
the initiation of the highly important Yacyretá project was postponed and initiatives and studies 
for Paraná Medio, Corpus and other less important hydroelectric projects were slowed down. The 
Rio III nuclear power programme was also delayed. 
Electricity demand was reduced because of the lower level of activity and the increase in the 
relative prices of this type of energy. For social reasons, the electricity charges for low-income 
users were frozen towards the end of the year. 
(c) Developments in employment and unemployment 
The decline in economic activity, and especially the abrupt drop in the manufacturing and 
construction sectors, were naturally reflected in the deterioration in the employment situation. 
The average number of workers employed in the industrial sector went down by 12.6% in 
comparison with mid-1980, while in terms of the number of hours worked the decline was even 
greater (-16%). Thus, average employment in this sector in 1981 appears to have been 23% below 
that of 1970 and 35% less than that of 1975 (see table 10). The closing down of factories and the 
dismissal of workers created a delicate social situation which got worse towards the end of the year. 
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The reduction of employment was due in many firms not only to a drop in activity but also to some 
rationalization measures. 
Although there are no organized statistics on the matter, partial data give ground for 
asserting that the drop in employment in the construction sector was even greater, especially in 
the last months of the year. 
This decline in secondary sector employment was more severe than that which had taken 
place in the immediately preceding years, and unlike that period it was reflected in the overall 
unemployment rates, which more than doubled during the year from 2.0% in October 1980 to 
4.9% in October 1981. This increase was also affected by the stagnation of employment in the 
sectors producing financial, personal and government services, which in previous years had largely 
absorbed the unemployment in the secondary sector. This labour situation also manifested itself in 
the form of underemployment and various forms of disguised unemployment not registered as 
such in social surveys. 
3. The external sector 
(a) General evolution and financing of the balance-of-payments deficit 
In contrast with 1980, when the merchandise trade registered a deficit of close to US$ 1 400 
million, in 1981 it generated a surplus of over US$ 900 million. This result would have seemed 
very doubtful in the first quarter, when there was a negative balance of around US$ 600 million on 
the merchandise account, together with a net outflow of over US$ 1 400 million in respect of 
services and another of close to US$ 800 million in respect of movements of capital. This period 
was thus marked by a continuation of the trend observed throughout 1980, as a result of which the 
international reserves —which totalled US$ 10 500 million at the beginning of that year, 
equivalent to one year's imports— had gone down by March 1981 to less than half, i.e., to 
US$ 4 700 million. 
The net outflow of capital in the first part of the year might appear to suggest a reduction in 
external indebtedness. The big outflows of short-term private funds, however, were partly offset 
by the inflow of credits to government bodies. 
In view of the critical situation as regards the loss of reserves and the deterioration in the 
competitiveness of national production, those in charge of economic policy decided in Feruary to 
Table 10 
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Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses and Ministry of the Economy. 
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change what had represented the main instrument of their anti-inflation policy: namely, the 
advance fixing of the exchange rate. 
Thus, the Central Bank ordered a 10% devaluation in the peso vis-à-vis the dollar, while 
announcing at the same time that the advance rate of devaluation would be increased and extended 
to 31 August 1981. 
In March 1981 there was a change in the economic team, coinciding with the replacement of 
the government authorities. The new Cabinet took measures aimed at reversing the deficit 
situation of the balance of payments, mainly through an additional 30% devaluation on top of that 
ordered in February, compensated by an increase in duties on exports of agricultural products. 
This decision was not taken by the economic agents as being final, however, as it was 
considered insufficient in the light of the accumulated overvaluation of the peso and the growth 
rate of prices expected in view of the money issue anticipated through the fiscal deficit and the 
creation of money for the financial support of enterprises and banks. This situation gave rise to a 
continued demand for foreign exchange which impeded the rebuilding of the international 
reserves. 
In view of this, on 1 June the Central Bank ordered a further 30% devaluation, without any 
compensatory mechanisms. At the same time, additional measures were taken aimed on the one 
hand at promoting exports of industrial goods and, on the other, at liberalizing payments of the 
short-term debt. As regards industrial goods, the financing terms were improved and the 
percentages of pre-financing were increased. As regards the capital market, the possibility was 
provided of taking out or renewing loans for 18 months with an exchange rate insurance, on terms 
which made the operation advantageous. 
The measures taken had a rapid positive effect as regards the trade deficit. Thus, after a 
merchandise trade deficit of US$ 625 million and a real services deficit of US$ 680 million had 
been built up in the first three months of the year, the situation changed as from April, with 
successive positive results on the real services and merchandise balances up to the third quarter of 
the year. 
In spite of this improvement, however, there was a continued sustained demand for foreign 
exchange for capital and financial services which neutralized the greater net exports of goods and 
services. The economic agents took this attitude because they expected difficulties in the control of 
inflation and the restructuring of the external debt profile. 
In these circumstances, the authorities divided the exchange market at the end of June, 
introducing a controlled exchange rate for exports and imports and a regulated floating financial 
rate for services and capital movements. These measures were aimed at halting the drop in 
reserves and avoiding an excessively sharp impact on domestic prices. Nevertheless, the pressure 
on the exchange market was maintained and the authorities were obliged to resort to new 
devaluations. 
The decisions taken in June were in contradiction of previous announcements on the planned 
evolution of the exchange rate and thus helped to strengthen expectations of further changes. 
Moreover, the uncertainty about the political future and perhaps also about the possibility of being 
able to cope with the payment of the external debt increased the demand for foreign exchange on 
the financial market. Thus, the gap between the two exchange rates was continually widening. 
This, in turn, encouraged the under-invoicing of exports and the over-invoicing of imports, while 
the impression persisted that the relative prices of internationally tradeable goods had not yet 
reached their final levels. The surpluses registered on the trade in goods therefore steadily 
diminished, until towards the end of the year there was once again a negative balance. 
Furthermore, the Central Bank had been trying to maintain the level of the financial exchange 
rate, which meant a growing loss of reserves and finally led, at the end of October, to the decision to 
stop supporting this market. In that month, the exchange rate was fluctuating around 10 000 pesos 
per dollar, with an accumulated devaluation since the beginning of the year of over 400%. 
In view of the balance-of-payments difficulties, one of the biggest concerns of the authorities 
was to stimulate the inflow of capital. Various measures were taken during the year to this end, 
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especially the obligation (with certain exceptions) to pay for imports in a deferred manner and the 
establishment of exchange insurance, at a rate fixed by the Central Bank, for financial loans. 
In December, there was another change in the government authorities and the exchange 
policy was substantially altered. Thus, the double market was eliminated and the exchange rate was 
unified at the level of the financial market, while the special arrangements for external loans with 
exchange insurance were suspended. 
Over the year as a whole, the balance-of-payments current account registered a deficit of a 
little over US$ 4 billion, i.e., 15% less than in 1980. This was the result of the surplus on 
merchandise trade already referred to, which was however more than offset by a real services 
deficit of almost US$ 1 700 million and by net payments of financial services of US$ 3 300 million 
(see table 11). 
The net inflow of capital was close to US$ 900 million: only about 40% of the 1980 figure and 
barely 20% of the exceptionally high figure registered in 1979- The evolution of capital 
movements was uneven over the course of the year. In the first quarter there was a net outflow of 
nearly US$ 800 million, which was however totally offset by the inflows registered in the second 
quarter as a result of the changes in the direction of economic policy already referred to. After a 
slightly positive result in the third quarter, the net inflow of resources in the last part of the year 
came to about US$ 700 million. The changes in the composition of the inflow of resources already 
registered in 1980 with respect to 1979 continued in 1981. Financial loans to the government and 
government enterprises came to US$ 4 460 million, i.e., 58% more than in 1980, when they 
totalled US$ 2 815 million, and 160% more than in 1979- In contrast with this, the movement of 
credits to the private sector showed a negative balance of close on US$ 3 500 million, if capital 
transactions not otherwise identified in the balance-of-payments statistics are included under this 
heading. In 1980, the net outflow in this respect had been US$ 55 million, and in 1979 there had 
been a net inflow of around US$3 300 million. The results as regards movements of private sector 
funds in 1981 were influenced mainly by the heavy outflow of capital (US$ 3 150 million) which 
took place in the first quarter of the year for the reasons already mentioned. 
The international reserves, which had already gone down by close to US$ 2 700 million in 
1980, went down in 1981 by a further US$ 3 500 million. The registered external debt, for its part, 
amounted in December 1981 to almost US$ 35 700 million, compared with US$ 27 200 million at 
the end of 1980 and US$ 12 500 million in 1978. Thus, it has trebled in only the last three years, 
and moreover at the end of 1981 it had a very unfavourable maturity profile (see table 12). 
(b) External trade 
(i) Exports. In 1981 the value of exports totalled almost US$ 9 150 million, representing an 
increase of 14% with respect to 1980. This increase was achieved exclusively through a larger 
volume of exports, as the unit value went down by a little over 2% (see table 13). 
Exports of goods of agricultural origin most influenced the increase in the volume of 
shipments, with livestock and crop farming products registering increases of 18% and 21.5%, 
respectively. In contrast, the volume of exports of industrial products went down by a little over 
2%. The drop in the prices of agricultural products was likewise a determining factor in the 
contraction of the average price of exports. The decline in the prices of stock-raising 
products (-13 % ) was particularly sharp, while in the case of crop farming products the drop in the 
prices of cereals was partly offset by the rise in oilseed prices. 
By types of products, the most notable increase in physical volume was that of exports of 
cereals, which grew by 78%. Although their prices went down by 6.0% as a result of the 
exceptional harvests obtained by the main exporting countries, the value of cereals sales never-
theless rose by 68% to the record level of over US$ 2 900 million (see table 14). 
The performance of oilseeds was exactly the opposite, for while their prices rose, the volume 
of shipments went down for the second year running. This result was mainly due to the behaviour 
of soya bean sales, shipments of which abroad went down by around 500 000 tons, mainly because 
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Fuente: 1976-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of official 
data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 
monetization or demonetization of gold, allocation or settlement of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to 
revaluation. 
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The main destination of grain sales continued to be the Soviet Union, which absorbed 
approximately 8 3 % of the total exports of cereals and 32% of sales of oilseeds (soya beans). The 
lifting of the cereals embargo imposed by the United States on the Soviet Union did not affect 
Argentina's shipments to this market, which, as already noted, were extremely high. 
As regards meat exports, the drop in international prices cancelled out the increase in the 
volume exported, and the final result was a drop in the value of sales. In the particular case of beef, 
exports amounted to rather more than 280 000 tons, worth US$ 740 million. In this case, not only 
was there a drop in prices but also stagnation of the volume exported because of the greater 
barriers to trade imposed by the European Economic Community (EEC). As a result of this trade 
policy of the European countries, efforts were intensified to diversify the markets for prepared 
meat products, and important agreements were signed with the Soviet Union and Egypt. 
Table 12 
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Source: Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Amount registered as capital and outstanding at 31 December of each year. 
Table 13 
ARGENTINA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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Source: EGA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As regards other livestock products, particularly wool and hides, their marketing displayed 
the same characteristics as in the case of meat and cereals, that is to say, increases in volume (21 % 
and 20%, respectively) and declines in prices (-2% and -11%, respectively). 
With regard to non-traditional industrial products, their contribution to the total value of 
exports remained within the average of recent years (25 %), amounting to US$ 2 320 million. This 
was due to the larger exports of fuels, since the value of sales of the remaining products went down 
(see table 14). The evolution of the volume of exports of these goods during the year may be 
divided into two subperiods. In the first half of the year there was a contraction due to the lack of 
exchange incentives (see table 15). From then on, however, as a result of the exchange and 
financial measures referred to earlier, which led to an increase in the real exchange rate for exports 
of these goods, shipments increased so that finally, taking the year as a whole, they were only 
slightly below those of 1980. It may be noted that in addition to the effect of the devaluation there 
was a reduction in domestic demand which freed goods for export. 
Exports of fuels registered a considerable increase, and in constant values they were double 
those of 1980. The increase is even more striking when compared with 1979, as in thise case the 
increase in volume was over 500%. Outstanding in this category were sales of gas oil and fuel oil, 
the exportable surpluses of which increased as a result of the contraction in domestic demand and, 
in the particular case of fuel oil, its substitution by gas in industrial use. 
As regards the remaining industrial products, there was a drop in the volume exported, 
except in the case of textiles, rubber products and metals, the decline being particularly large in the 
case of food products (-35%) and machinery (-17%). 
(ii) Imports. After the noteworthy growth observed between the years 1978 and 1980, when 
the current value of imports increased at an annual accumulated rate of 66%, purchases from 
abroad went down by rather more than 12% in 1981. This drop was due exclusively to the sharp 
decline in volume (-15%), since the prices increased on average by approximately 3% (see 
table 13). 
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The reduction in the volume of imports was largely due to the changes in the exchange rate 
already referred to, but it was also influenced by the drop in the level of activity and the large stocks 
of imported goods accumulated up to the second half of 1981 as a result of the overvaluation of the 
peso. 
The decline was particularly marked in the case of capital goods and consumer goods. At 
current values, imports of investment goods fell by 25%, while those of consumer goods went 
down by practically 50%. In contrast, the value of imports of intermediate goods increased by 8% 
(see table 16). This behaviour by the different types of imports has been characteristic of periods 
of recession, when imports of capital goods and consumer goods have usually gone down earlier 
than those of intermediate goods. 
For the year as a whole, raw materials and other intermediate goods accounted for almost 
60% of the total value of imports (a considerably higher proportion than in 1980), while 20% 
corresponded to capital goods, 11% to fuels and lubricants and the remaining 10% to consumer 
goods. 
(iii) The terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports. The increase in the physical 
volume of exports in 1981 more than made up for the deterioration of rather more than 5% 
suffered by the terms of trade, so that the purchasing power of exports improved by 8% with 
respect to 1980, rising to a level 68% above that of 1970 and higher than any value recorded since 
then (see table 13). 
This result was due mainly to the significant increase in the volume of exports of agricultural 
products, particularly cereals, as already noted. The behaviour of the prices of these products, 
however, had a decisive influence on the decline in the average price of exports and consequently 
the deterioration in the terms of trade, particularly after the middle of the year. 
Table 15 












































































































































































Fuente: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"All the indexes have as their base fourth quarter of 1978 = 100. 
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Source: Central Bank of Argentina. 
"Preliminary figures. 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices 
Up to the February 1981 devaluation, the anti-inflation policy was based on a system of 
smaller and smaller increases in the exchange rate, so that the rate of increase would have sunk to 
0% by March 1981. It was believed that with the establishment of a fixed parity with respect to the 
dollar, the increase in domestic prices would be equal to international inflation, once the period of 
adjustment was over. This policy did achieve some effect on the prices of internationally tradeable 
goods, which was reflected in the slackening of the growth rate of the wholesale price index from 
100% in 1979 to 58% in 1980 (see table 17). Wages and the prices of goods without any direct 
relation with foreign trade, however, responded much less to this influence, as reflected in the cost 
of living index, which continued to rise at a rate of around 90% during 1980, compared with an 
increase in the price of foreign exchange of only about 20%. As already noted, this pronounced 
change in relative prices finally came to be incompatible with the maintenance of production 
activities in many economic sectors and with the external equilibrium of the economy. 
In 1981, the policies applied were very different. The authorities concentrated on correcting 
the relative prices, making those of importable and exportable products more expensive through 
successive devaluations. This became one of the main causes of the greater growth of prices and 
changes in their structure. Thus, between the end of 1980 and the end of 1981 the prices of 
imported goods and agricultural products increased sharply (238% and 213%, respectively), 
clearly surpassing the variation in the prices of locally produced industrial goods ( 167 %), the cost 
of living index ( 131 %), and especially the services component of this index, which went up by only 
109%, in spite of the fact that the tariffs of public enterprises were raised by 176%. 
Although the authorities maintained the objective of containing inflation once the 
adjustments in the exchange rate (which it was accepted would produce upward pressures on 
prices) had had their effect, their efforts ran into serious difficulties. Because of the pressures 
which the economic policy had to bear as a result of the contraction of economic activity, the 
serious financial situation and the bigger fiscal deficit, it was not possible to present a programme 
capable of containing expectations and setting about the stabilization of prices. 
No price control regulations were established —thus continuing with the system of free 
prices— except for medicines, whose prices were kept controlled. In order to stimulate sales, in the 
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last quarter of the year agreement was reached with the motor vehicle and agricultural machinery 
industries for the fixing of lower prices through the reduction of taxes. 
At the end of the year, the new team responsible for economic policy proposed a different 
type of anti-inflation policy through the reduction of public expenditure (in particular, wages of 
government employees were frozen) and the announcement of stringent monetary restrictions. 
(b) Wages 
The real wages of industrial workers went down by a little under 20% in the course of 1981, so 
that the real average wage was 25% below the maximum annual figure registered in 1975 (see 
table 18). According to partial data, the deterioration seems to have been even greater in the 
smaller enterprises and the less skilled occupations, thus making the situation of workers in the 
lower part of the income distribution scale even more critical. This situation —typical of periods of 
devaluation and hence of increases in the prices of wage goods— became even more critical in 1981 
because of the sharp economic contraction and the unemployment situation, which considerably 
weakened the negotiating power of wage-earners. As an element of costs, the share of wages in the 
value of industrial production, which had increased in 1980, by 17%, went down in 1981 by 10%. 
The real wages of public employees suffered a deterioration of 6% between the fourth quarter 
of 1981 and the same period of 1980 as a result of the policy of containing public expenditure. 
As in the case of prices, the authorities did not take direct action to fix wages, except through 
adjustments in the minimum and agreed basic wages, which in general only had limited effects on 
the wages actually paid. 
Table 17 
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ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Average real wage of an industrial worker 
Variation between annual ,~ -, , ,- , „ , / Q 
averages 
Variation between extremes -37.1 7.4 3.5 22.5 
Average real salary of a public employee 
Variation between annual <• ~ ¿
 1 
averages 
Variation between extremes ... ... 22.1 15.4 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
The rate of creation of money by the Central Bank accelerated sharply in 1981, when there 
was an increase of 120% in the monetary base (65% in 1980). The drop in external assets, 
especially in the first quarter, was an important factor of contraction. It was offset, however, by the 
expansion in financing provided to the official sector (which grew by 226%) and in advances to the 
financial system (170%). The monetary regulation account —which reflects the payments of 
compensatin to financial institutions for the compulsory reserves in respect of interest-bearing 
deposits and the deposits which the institutions have to make in the Central Bank on their current 
account liabilities— was also a source of creation of money, although to a lesser extent. The 
increase in the rate of the compulsory reserves, which gradually rose from 10% in February to 
18% in August, meant that the total amount of monetary resources (money plus quasi-money) 
grew proportionally less than the base (96%). Within that aggregate mass, the higher rate of 
inflation brought about the replacement of money (which expanded by 66%) by interest-bearing 
deposits, which increased by 110% (see table 19). 
Towards the end of 1980, monetary policy was facing a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the 
continual decline in the relative prices of internationally tradeable goods and the lack of confidence 
in the maintenance of the exchange rate announced in advance stimulated the demand for foreign 
exchange. Under the prevailing exchange system, the drop in international reserves imposed 
severe limitations on the growth of domestic credit. At the same time, however, the domestic 
financial situation made it extremely difficult to adopt contractive measures. Many enterprises 
which had a high level of indebtedness and insufficient generation of funds were facing difficulties 
in meeting their commitments. The Central Bank was therefore obliged to advance substantial 
amounts of resources to the financial system, which was affected by the slow recovery of the loans 
it had made. In these circumstances, with credit restriction aimed at balancing external payments, 
there was a risk that interest rates would rise and that the problems of insolvency would get even 
worse. Furthermore, the increase in the fiscal deficit would, if not financed by the Central Bank, 
have forced the public sector to demand more loans, consequently displacing other applicants for 
credit. 
In view of this situation, the authorities continued to expand domestic credit during the first 
quarter of 1981, against the background of a demand for real monetary balances (especially for 
means of payment, but also for interest-bearing deposits) which was going down because of the 






and the lower level of activity of the sectors exposed to external competition forced an adjustment 
in the exchange rate. The devaluations which took place between February and June brought about 
a sharp fall in real liquidity but did not have the desired effect of restoring the Central Bank 
reserves. 
Indeed, the difficulties of the financial system became even more serious. The interest rates 
on loans increased more than the yields on deposits, and there was an increase in the spread 
between the rates applied to different types of enterprises, reflecting the increase in the risk of 
insolvency. The rates charged by banks to prime borrowers were less than the growth rate of 
wholesale prices, but the credits given to other firms were at markedly positive real interest rates, 
so that the payments problems of many of these firms got worse. The Central Bank therefore had 
to make fresh advances to the financial institutions, and together with loans to the government 
this led to a persistent increase in the monetary base. 
Even though the authorities tried to restrict the growth of the amount of money by increasing 
the compulsory reserves, conditions thus existed for continued expansion, and they were probably 
incorporated into the expectations of the public. Anticipation of an acceleration in price increases 
tended to reduce the demand for means of payment. At the same time, the uncertainty regarding 
future policy (especially towards the end of the year) and also, perhaps, the expectations of 
difficulties in the payment of the heavy servicing commitments in respect of the external debt, also 
helped to increase the pressure on the exchange market. Thus, although the exchange rate rose 
sharply, the monetary authorities had to intervene to avoid still greater depreciation. 
As already noted, the volume of the debts of enterprises to the financial system and their slow 
rate of repayment were the subject of concern during 1981. In the middle of the year it was 
proposed to adopt measures for consolidating these debts and extending them for terms of up to 7 
Table 19 
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Source: National Treasury. 
years. There was a long delay in the application of this system, however, and finally it was only 
applied in a very limited manner. Also, towards the end of the year the Central Bank proposed to 
exercise more direct control over interest rates by fixing a reference rate linked to the future 
exchange premium also fixed by the monetary authorities. These measures were only applied for a 
short time, as they were eliminated after the policy changes which took place in December. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
The central government's deficit increased once again in 1981 because of smaller income and 
higher expenditure (see table 20). The decline in economic activity reduced the real value of tax 
revenue, and this was not offset by larger income from other sources. On the expenditure side, staff 
outlays went down in real terms, although the purchasing power of public sector wages did not 
decline to the same extent as that of remunerations in the rest of the economy, as may be seen from 
table 18. In contrast, there was an increase in government purchases of goods and in transfers. 
According to preliminary information, the consolidated public sector deficit (including 
provinces, municipalities and public enterprises) grew to the equivalent of about 6% of the gross 
domestic product, compared with 4% in 1980. The adjustments made in the tariffs of public 
enterprises succeeded in reducing their deficit, but this improvement was more than offset by the 
greater financing needs of the central and local governments. 
The monetary financing of the central government was almost three times greater than in 
1980, and as the net placements of securities were negative, the Central Bank loans actually 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Official GDP estimates have not been published since the preliminary estimates for the years 
1973-19791 were calculated (see table 1). Indicators of economic activity for 1980 and 1981 are very 
incomplete both in scope and coverage, and as a result quantification of changes in the level of 
overall activity has not been possible. However, the indications are that there was real growth 
during 1980, while some growth also appears to have taken place during 1981 but at a significantly 
reduced rate. Increased activity in agriculture and capital inflows into construction made the main 
positive contributions during the latter year. 
The agricultural GDP is estimated to have risen as a result of increases in the livestock 
subsector, particularly poultry production. Fisheries output appeared to have declined but fruit, 
vegetables and rootcrops at least maintained their combined level of output. Significant infrastruc-
tural changes were in progress during 1981 and the various programmes appear already to have 
made a positive impact on the sector. Available data suggest relatively small growth in the 
construction sector during the year, the main contribution being from the erection of new 
manufacturing and commercial structures (including hotels) and government construction 
activities. 
Tourism, which is still the dominant sector in the Bahamian economy, declined after several 
years of increase. The growth rate of this sector had already been declining since 1979 with the 
general economic weakness in the economies of many industrialized countries. Tourism seems to 
be facing several problems but there is an obvious air of confidence that the situation will improve, 
as exemplified by the intensified promotion and hotel construction activities underway. 
Data for recent years are scarce in respect of the productive sectors other than agriculture, but 
it appears that some subsectors such as building materials and quarrying have experienced 
difficulties. The petroleum refinery, an offshore company, continued to make positive contribu-
tions to the economy, but throughput appears to have declined in 1981 because of the reduced 
world market demand for petroleum products. Increases in manufacturing production are 
expected to be achieved during 1982 when establishments under construction during 1981 come 
on stream. Major institutional changes are in progress as part of a programme to further stimulate 
these sectors. 
Double-digit price increases continued during 1981, and at 11% they were only one percen-
tage point below the 1980 level. In the context of current world inflation, however, these levels 
must be considered as moderate. Contributing to lower prices was the relatively modest 5% 
increase in the money supply. Interest rates paid by banks for savings and time deposits have 
increased, apparently providing the stimulus for the growth observed in these deposits. Rates 
charged on loans rose at a slower pace, but loans and advances to private borrowers nevertheless 
did not increase much during 1981. Government transactions must also be considered somewhat 
anti-inflationary in 1981, as a surplus was generated. Government borrowing increased during the 
year, most of the loans coming from external sources, but even so the external debt as of September 
1981 stood at only Bh$ 48 million2 and was thus still quite small compared with the total national 
debt at the same date of Bh$ 285 million. 
'The estimates appearing in the National Accounts Manual published by the Department of Statistics of the Bahamas 
are considered to be very tentative, especially at the sectoral level, and as such should be considered as merely indicative and 
used with appropriate caution. A revision exercise is currently underway. 
2The Bahamas dollar is at par with the U.S. dollar. 
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Table 1 
BAHAMAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at current factor 
cost (millions of Bahamas dollars ) 
Population (thousands of inhabitants) 







960 1 074 
225 224 







































B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at current prices 
Per capita GDP at current prices 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer price index 
December-December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Current income of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government 
Millions of US dollars 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in net international reserves 
(- sing indicates an increase) 
Total international reserves (minus gold) 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, February 1982, and official data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Preliminary figures 
kBh$ 1.00 = USÎ 1.00 
cNew Providence island only 
Percentage. 









































The external sector is predominant in the Bahamas. Over the last five years a balance-of-
payments surplus, though small, has been achieved in all except 1976 and 1978, since the large 
merchandise trade deficits have been offset by large net inflows from tourism and, in some years, 
from foreign capital transactions. The year 1981 was no exception, the only special features being a 
large surge in foreign private capital inflows and a small, though much larger than usual, increase 
in net official inflows. At the end of the year international reserves totalled approximately Bh$ 100 
million. 
No new lines of policy were initiated during 1981 and efforts were concentrated on execution 
of programmes previously outlined. Government programmes were directed towards the streng-
thening and diversification of the economy, the acceleration of economic growth and provision for 
the material needs of all the people. Emphasis continues to be placed on tourism, agriculture, 
construction, manufacturing and petroleum exploration. 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Growth of the main sectors 
(i) Agriculture. Sectoral GDP data are not available after 1978, in which year the contribution 
of agriculture was estimated on a preliminary basis at Bh$ 42 million in current prices, or just over 
4% of total GDP. 
Preliminary information up to 1980 suggests that the share of agriculture may have increased 
since 1978. The performance in 1981, to judge from the available indicators, seems to have been 
mixed. There appears to have been an increase in the sectoral GDP in terms of current values, but 
this resulted mainly from price increases and there was little growth in real terms. 
The fisheries subsector continued to be the most prominent during 1981 but its contribution 
in real terms may have been slightly lower than in 1980, since one of the major indicators —the 
value of total landings of marine products at Nassau (the capital)— declined by about 3 % in terms 
of volume (see table 2). The volume of the high-priced crawfish was affected most, but this was 
partly compensated by price increases of all fish and increases in volume of landings of some 
varieties. No data are available for exports of fish, not all of which are landed at Nassau. 
Table 2 





























































The livestock subsector, the second largest in agriculture, appears to have improved slightly 
in real terms compared with 1980 and to have offset somewhat the lower output of fishing. This 
resulted mainly from increases in cattle slaughtering and poultry production (see table 3) although 
it is reported that the poultry industry, despite its better performance than the year before, was 
affected by dumping of United States poultry products on the local market. 
The fruit and vegetables and forestry subsectors are relatively small, together accounting for 
less than 10% of the sector. Indicators are not available for forestry for recent years, but there are 
some indications that production of fruit and vegetables may have been higher in 1981 than in 
1980. 
The agricultural sector continued to be beset by problems of production and marketing during 
the period under review. In a drive to solve these problems the Government has embarked on a 
programme to establish a Bh$ 125 million industry in 10 years. The objective is to increase foreign 
exchange earnings from agriculture, provide significant employment and develop links between 
agriculture and industry. One of the major initiatives is the establishment of the Agricultural and 
Industrial Corporation. Through this corporation increased credit is to be made available, and the 
Government is prepared to participate in joint-venture arrangements with private companies to 
establish large-scale farming enterprises. 
A number of agricultural projects have been prepared and implementation of some has 
already begun. Among these projects are construction of a modern fishing complex, upgrading of 
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Table 3 
BAHAMAS: ESTIMATED VALUE OF FARM PRODUCTION 
Fruit and vegetables 
Dairy products 
Meat (beef and mutton) 
Poultry products 
Total 












































the government abattoir, construction of a new wholesale produce exchange and the establish-
ment of a sheep project, designed to provide improved technology and expertise to enable the 
traditional sheep-farming areas to increase production. The Government also plans to re-acquire 
lands that had been leased for farming but which are not being effectively used. 
During 1981 an improved produce marketing system was introduced and it appears that more 
fruit, vegetables and rootcrops entered the produce exchange. Better transportation facilities 
—larger and faster ships and increased refrigerated cargo space— have also made a contribution. 
Work on the fishery complex has begun and should be completed by the end of 1982. This modern 
facility is expected to contribute significantly to exploiting the rich fishing areas in the archipelago. 
Preliminary figures indicate that government expenditure on agriculture increased by 8% in 
the period January to September 1981, compared with the corresponding period of the previous 
year. Outstanding loans and advances to the agricultural sector by commercial banks at the end of 
September 1981 still came to a relatively small total, but this was more than double the amount 
outstanding at the end of the same period in 1980. 
(ii) tourism. The tourist industry continued to be the main contributor to the Bahamian 
economy during 1981 despite the decline in total visitor arrivals and expenditure. Visitor arrivals 
have increased every year since 1978 and peaked in 1980 when nearly 1.9 million visitors arrived 
(including 1.3 million "stopover" visitors). Comparison of definitive data for January to September 
1981 with those for the corresponding period in 1980 shows that total tourist arrivals declined by 
5%, while a decrease of 11% was recorded for "stopover" visitors (see table 4). Cruise-ship 
arrivals increased by nearly 10% up to September 1981, but the full-year increase is estimated to 
have been lower than in 1980. For the year as a whole the total number of visitors is estimated to 
have declined by more than 4%. However, tourist expenditure for the full year 1981 increased 
from the Bh$ 596 million of 1980 to Bh$ 639 million because of the increase in average length of 
stay and higher prices. 
Major problems which have confronted the tourist industry and resulted in the decline on the 
number of visitors include: (i) the significant increase in vacation costs to non-United States 
visitors due to the recent steady appreciation of the US dollar; (ii) the air traffic controllers' strike 
in the United States, which resulted in a reported reduction of 25% in flights tathe Bahamas; 
(iii) adverse criticisms in the local and overseas press regarding the Government's land and 
development policies, the hallucinogenic drug problem and the inconvenience caused by the 
frequent electricity blackouts during 1981; (iv) inflation and the slower pace of economic activity 
in the United States and other major markets; and (v) intense competition by other countries for 
the scarcer tourist dollar. 
The Government has proposed the implementation of several measures in a strategy to 
revive the tourism industry, and a ten-year development plan for tourism has been prepared. A 
major objective of the strategy is to increase the domestic content of the sector. During 1980, 
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according to available data on expenditure, the government spent some Bh$ 20 million on 
monitoring, researching, servicing and promoting tourism. The figure for 1981 is estimated to be 
only slightly higher, but for 1982 planned expenditure of Bh$ 23 million was requested in the 
Government's budget plan. These figures indicate the continued confidence being placed in this 
sector in developmental activities. 
To this end, promotion of tourism is being intensified and an additional allocation of Bh$ 3 
million has been provided for this purpose in the 1982 budget. Scheduled and charter airline 
services from the United States and Europe are to be increased and additional cruise lines induced 
to stop in the Bahamas. New resort developments and major infrastructural improvements are 
being carried out by private investors and the Government, and at the end of 1981 some 1 700 new 
hotel rooms were either under construction or at a very advanced stage of planning. 
(iii) Construction. Available indicators point to very slight growth in this sector during 1981. 
As noted elsewhere, hotel construction increased and Government construction appeared to have 
given the major boost during the year. However, part-year data on building construction appear 
inconclusive and loans and advances to the construction sector show declines. 
With respect to building construction, the value of building starts and completions increased 
during the first half of the year compared with the same period of 1980. The value of commercial 
building starts (mainly hotels) increased significantly and offset the 21% decline in residential 
building starts (see table 5). The decline in the number of building permits issued, in commercial 
building starts and in the number of completions, contrasting with the large value of commercial 
buildings in progress, reflects the large-scale projects underway. These projects include a 750 room 
Table 4 
BAHAMAS: SELECTED TOURISM INDICATORS 
Total number of visitors ' 
Stopover visitors 
Cruise-ship visitors 




Expenditure per day 
Expenditure per visit 
Cruise-ship visitors'1 
Expenditure per visit 
Hotel rooms available 














































































Source: Ministry of Tourism, Bahamas, Annual Report on Tourism, 1979 and Bahamas Tourism Statistics, September 
1981, and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Preliminary figures. 
January-September. 
'January-September 1981 with respect to same period in 1980. 
Thousands. 
'Excludes tourists in transit. 
;Days. 
* Millions of dollars. 
Current dollars. 
'Occupancy rates for Grand Bahama in 1978 and 1979 were 65.4 and 62.5% and for the Family Islands 41.6 and 48.1% . 
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hotel in New Providence, a 200 room hotel in Freeport and a total of 100 hotel rooms in the 
"family islands", as well as two large chemical plants and several government educational facilities. 
Despite the overall reduction in residential building starts, construction on government 
housing projects was very active during the year and work was begun on lower-income housing 
schemes, both to build new houses and to repair and upgrade housing and related facilities in 
certain poorer communities. Persons who could not meet the normal commercial loan eligibility 
criteria and terms of repayment are being assisted with loans, loan guarantees at more favourable 
rates of interest and other concessions. The Government also increased its expenditure on 
infrastructural construction activities, as reflected in the expenditure data for public works and 
water supply. The sum of current and capital expenditures in this category increased 33% in 1980 
and 10% in 1981. The approved budget for public works and water supply in 1981 was Bh$ 24 
million, out of which 58% represented capital expenditure. Up to September, 77% of the total had 
already been spent. 
Data on loans and advances by commercial banks show declines for building const ruction and 
real estate in 1981, following increases in 1980, and reflect the situation as regards private building 
activity mentioned above. Mortgage interest rates increased on average by only about 0.25% 
points during the first three quarters of 1981. It is not clear whether this increase had much impact 
on the decisions of many private individuals to build. 
(iv) Mining and manufacturing. Reliable GDP data are not available, but on the basis of the 
preliminary estimates for 1978 this sector appears to have accounted for less than 5 % of total GDP. 
Indications are that the share of the sector has remained at about the same level in recent years. 
Mining activity consists mainly of salt and aragonite production and the quarrying of 
construction materials. Manufacturing covers a wider range of goods, of which petroleum products 
are the most significant. The remaining activities are really light industries except for a small 
Table 5 
BAHAMAS: CONSTRUCTION INDICATORS 






Residential building starts 
Number 
Value 

































































































Source: Central Bank of the Bahamas, Quarterly Review, September 1981, Vol. 8, NQ 3, December 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
January-June. 
cJanuary-June 1981 with respect to same period in 1980. 
Millions of current dollars. 




BAHAMAS: OIL IMPORTS FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION 
(Thousands of barrels and million of dollars) 
Total local consumption 
Volume 
Value 






Source: Central Bank of the Bahamas, Quarterly Review, September 1981, Vol. 8, N° 3. 
"January-September. 
January-September 1981 with respect to same period in 1980. 
volume of metal products and building materials (including cement). Important product groups 
are food and beverages and printing and publishing. 
Volume of output in manufacturing, other than petroleum, appears to have increased slightly 
in 1981. The increased fixed capital formation recorded during the year which includes two 
chemical plants, should result in higher manufacturing output during 1982. Prospects for the near 
future include a brewery and factories manufacturing PVC pipes, clothing, leather, jewellery and 
plastics. These new enterprises were registered under the New Industries Encouragement Act of 
1981. Further encouragement to industry is expected from the merging of the Bahamas Develop-
ment Corporation and the Bahamas Agricultural Corporation. The "new" corporation will 
promote the establishment of industrial and agricultural enterprises. In addition, a private sector 
initiative has been launched in the form of a development foundation to assist in setting up 
small-scale manufacturing establishments. 
(v) Energy. Data are not available on petroleum refining. This is essentially an off-shore 
operation which, however, is required by law to meet domestic consumption requirements. 
Indications are that refinery throughput declined in 1981. Oil imports (petroleum products for 
local consumption and for foreign bunkers) declined in 1980 in terms of volume while prices 
increased substantially. 
Data for the period January-September 1981 as compared with the same period of the year 
before show that the value of petroleum products imported for local consumption declined by 13 % 
to Bh$ 201 million owing to a decrease in volume. This decline is consistent with the slowing-down 
of economic growth during 1981 and the higher energy conservation consciousness (see table 6). 
Domestic prices of petroleum products remained relatively stable, reflecting more moderate 
international price increases during 1981. Local production of LPG reportedly decreased during the 
year and some imports were necessary to meet local demand. Despite the moderate price increases 
and the decrease in volume, oil imports for local consumption accounted for an estimated 35 % of 
total imports (see table 7). 
As a result of the heavy burden that petroleum imports represent, the Government has 
embarked on a programme of oil exploration which is gaining momentum. Some traces of oil and 
gas had been found in the past, and activities were accelerated in 1981. At least two major oil 
companies are involved in preliminary exploration, and permits to conduct seismic surveys have 
been issued. Some 8 500 line kilometres were under seismic survey during 1981. Several proposals 
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were placed before the Government during the year, and it is anticipated that exploration will 
increase during 1982 as the second phase of activity —the granting of exploration licences to 
companies which satisfy government requirements— gets underway. 
On the institutional side a small unit in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, with the aid of 
consultants, is responsible for monitoring, and regulating the petroleum exploration activities. It 
is expected that soon the Bahamas will accede to the San José Accord and thus be eligible to benefit 
from the Mexico/Venezuela Oil Facility. 
Data on electricity generation for the entire Bahamas are available only up to 1979. Part-year 
preliminary data, covering New Providence only, show that up to the end of the third quarter of 
1981 electricity generation was at a lower rate than in the year before, reflecting the slowing-down 
of the rate of growth of the economy (see table 8). 
During 1981 a small energy unit was established in the Ministry of Works with responsibility 
for all areas of energy except petroleum (electricity generation and distribution were already in the 
Table 7 
BAHAMAS: RATIOS OF SELECTED AGGREGATES 
1975 1979 1980 1981° 
Petroleum imports /total imports 
Petroleum imports /domestic exports 
Petroleum imports /GDP 
Total foreign currency debt/GDP 
Total foreign currency debt/domestic exports 
Petroleum imports and foreign currency debt/ 
domestic exports and net total receipts 
Source: Calculated from official data. 
"January-September. 
Excludes petroleum imports not for local consumption. 
Table 8 
BAHAMAS: INSTALLED CAPACITY A N D PRODUCTION 
OF ELECTRICITY"'' 
Public Industrial Total 
Installed capacity 
(thousands of kW) 
1977 248.2 49.6C 297.8 
1978 245.5 49.5 295.4 
1979 260.2 49.9 310.1 
1980 ... ... 371.6 
Production 
(millions of kWh) 
1977 641.2 57.8C 699.0 
1978 692.6 94.9 787.5 
1979 735.7 92.9 828.6 
1980 
Source: Ministry of Works and Utilities, Annual Report (several issues) and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Total and public production exclude some generation at government installations on Family Islands - 0.5 MW of capacity 
in 1978. 
Only thermal electricity is produced. 
c
 Cement plant out of operation most of the year. 
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portfolio of this Ministry). Current and near-future initiatives include the utilization of photovol-
taic cells for shallow-well pumping and in telecommunications; gasification of wood to generate 
electricity for water pumping; development of plastic solar water heaters; and the execution of 
energy audits and energy assessments. 
3. The external sector 
The Bahamas is an extremely open economy with great dependence on tourism and on 
"off-shore" companies operating mostly in the field of banking and finance but also in the 
goods-producing sector. The foreign dependency is also reflected in the relatively large imports 
and exports of merchandise. Gross receipts from tourism were 50% of estimated GDP in 1978. On 
the basis of crude estimates, this share apparently increased in 1980, but decreased in 1981. 
Imports (excluding the off-shore petroleum trade) accounted for roughly 50% of GDP in 1978 but 
appeared to have increased after that, while total exports (excluding the off-shore petroleum 
trade) accounted for only 15% of GDP in 1978 but seem to have increased their share since then. 
Obviously the coefficients are significantly higher when off-shore petroleum imports and exports 
are included. The earnings accruing to the domestic economy from these off-shore companies 
include wages, fees, licenses, local purchases, etc. 
The balance of payments has shown a small surplus in every year except 1976 and 1978, but 
the surplus for 1981 is expected to be much lower than the Bh$ 42 million provisional figure 
estimated at the end of the third quarter, reflecting the slowing down of economic activity. 
As indicated above, merchandise trade dominates the external accounts. In the period under 
review, imports came to some Bh$ 783 million and exports only to Bh$ 176 million, resulting in a 
large deficit of some Bh$ 600 million which represents an increase of almost 2% with respect to 
1980 (see table 9). 
This occurred because the goods-producing sectors did not increase activities to any great 
extent during the year, while exports have been declining. One major export company was phasing 
out activities as early as the first quarter of the year. On the other hand, while imports also declined 
slightly during the first nine months of 1981 compared with the same period in 1980, it is expected 
that fourth quarter imports, boosted by demand for construction materials for hotel and other 
building activity, will add significantly to the total import bill. 
For 1981 a decline of 2% was recorded in the surplus on the services account (excluding 
payments of profits and interest). This was partly due to lower receipts from transportation and 
insurance. Net travel earnings, on the other hand, increased by 6% although total tourist arrivals 
declined. The current account deficit thus came to Bh$ 75 million, which was the largest amount 
for the last three years. 
Net capital transactions have been relatively small in recent years except in 1977, when there 
was a deficit of some Bh$ 70 million under this heading. Since 1979, however, surpluses have been 
recorded, the positive balance for 1981 being Bh$ 81 million. This was mainly because of a large 
inflow of long-term loans. Real estate transactions and loans comprise the bulk of private 
long-term capital transactions. There were some fears that the adoption of the Acquisition of 
Immovable Property Act would affect property sales to foreigners, but during most of 1981 the 
value of property sales compared favourably with sales in 1980. The capital account was strongly 
supported by short-term capital inflows to the Bahamas, which were fairly substantial during the 
first nine months of 1981. Government foreign borrowing had been low during the last five years, 
but as a result of the expansion of hotel facilities official loan receipts were higher during 1981. At 
the end of 1980 total reserves stood at Bh$ 92 million and preliminary figures indicate a Bh$ 8 
million increase as of the end of 1981 to approximately Bh$ 100 million. 
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Table 9 
BAHAMAS: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Trade balance (goods) 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and 
interest on foreign capital 
Profits 
Interest 
Net private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 




















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Variation in international reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 










































































































































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official information. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions but not profits and interest. 
' In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
''Difference between global balance and variation in international reserves includes monetization or demonetization of 




The general price level, as measured by the annual averages of the Retail Price Index for new 
Providence Island, rose by 11% in 1981 (see table 10). Mainly responsible for this increase were 
higher prices of food, health and personal care, recreation and reading and miscellaneous goods 
and services. 
The rate of inflation was somewhat lower in 1981, partly as the result of an abatement in the 
rate of increase in the price of petroleum and petroleum products. Evidence of this can be seen in 
the transport section of the index, where the rate of increase was only 6% in 1981 compared with 
nearly 12% the year before. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
Full-year data are not available for 1981. In 1980, however, the money supply had grown 
relatively slowly, following periods of substantial growth between 1975 and 1979, when economic 
activity was more buoyant. 
In 1980 money supply increased by 5.6% and for the year ending September 1981 the increase 
in the money supply was nearly 5% compared with 5.6% for the whole of 1980 (see tablell).Of 
the total narrow money supply (M,) of approximately Bh$ 150 million as of 30 September 1981, 
currency outside banks amounted to about 24%. In 1977 and 1978 this share was approximately 
23% but in 1979 it had fallen. Since that time the rate of increase in currency outside banks has 
exceeded the rate of increase in demand deposits (excluding government deposits). Government 
deposits in the Central Bank and in commercial banks averaged Bh$ 21 million monthly during the 
period January-September 1981. 
In contrast, saving and time deposits together have grown more rapidly than the money 
supply (M[) during the last two years, with time deposits increasing more than twice as fast as 
savings. However, even for time deposits the growth rate slowed during 1981. It would appear that 
holders of funds have been moving from more to less liquid types of bank deposits, no doubt 
stimulated by the higher rates of interest available on savings and fixed deposits after the end of 
Table 10 
BAHAMAS: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES0 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
Annual average variations 
Consumer price index 6.2 9.1 
Food 8.2 10.9 
Housing 3.1 6.5 
Clothing and footwear 6.2 12.5 
Health and personal care 6.1 7.6 
December to december variations 
Consumer price index 6.6 11.6 
Food 8.3 15.0 
Housing 4.8 6.9 
Clothing and footwear 8.5 16.8 
Health and personal care 8.3 7.0 
Source: Department of Statistics, Bahamas, Retail Price Index, and data supplied to CEPAL. 
























Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 
Foreign assets (net) 
Domestic credit 
Government (net) 
Other financial institutions 
Private sector 




Deposits in foreign currency 
Amounts due to other local 
financial institutions 
Other items (net) 
Table 11 

























































































































Source: Central Bank of the Bahamas, Quarterly Review, September 1981, and data supplied to CEPAL. 
°As of September. 
''As of September 1981 with respect to September 1980. 
1979. Between that date and September 1981 the interest rate paid on saving deposits increased by 
2.5 percentage points while the interest rates on fixed deposits (varying by length of maturities) 
increased by at least 2.6 percentage points. Funds have also been moving rapidly into deposits in 
non-bank financial institutions, where interest rates traditionally are higher than in commercial 
banks. Between the end of 1980 and September 1981 these deposits increased from Bh$ 4.8 
million to Bh$ 7.2 million —a rise of nearly 50%. Foreign currency demand deposits and other 
deposits (permitted under the Bahamas' liberal banking laws) were much lower in September 
1981 than a year earlier, although since the balances have fluctuated almost monthly no definite 
trend is discernible. There was, however, a pronounced dip of 41% between August and Sep-
tember 1981. 
It should be noted also that the spread between the rates paid on deposits and the rates 
charged to borrowers has narrowed. This would appear to be in line with the Central Bank's policy 
of keeping lending rates low enough to stimulate borrowing for domestic investment yet high 
enough to prevent funds moving outside to seek higher returns in the North American financial 
markets. 
Loans and advances of commercial banks to the public as of end September 1981, at Bh$ 420 
million, were 8 % higher than at the end of September 1980, but only 1 % higher than at the end of 
1980. More than Bh$ 350 million were loans in Bahamas dollars, while foreign currency loans 
decreased from approximately Bh$ 85 million to Bh$ 61 million. This decline may be due to the 
Central Bank's policy of discouraging loans in foreign currencies while encouraging loans to 
finance domestic investment. 
Of the total loans outstanding to the private sector, 47 %, were in the personal and other local 
loans category. Trade and commerce accounted for the second highest share (approximately 18%). 
Increases were recorded in all categories of borrowers except tourism establishments, public 
utilities and in real estate and construction activities. Loans outstanding to the agricultural sector, 
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though still relatively small, increased considerably during the last year and indicate the growing 
confidence in agricultural investment. 
Net government borrowing excluding contingent liabilities for the year ending September 
1981 amounted to Bh$ 60 million. Government loans from local sources increased during the year 
by Bh$ 22 million and consisted mainly of foreign currency loans concentrated in the third quarter 
of 1981. As a result, the total internal national debt stood at Bh$ 237 million as of end September 
1981. Loans from external sources increased by Bh$ 38 million, mostly during the third quarter of 
1981, when the external debt outstanding increased sharply to Bh$ 48 million. These increases are 
the result of loans for financing hotel construction. The total direct national debt increased by 26% 
to Bh$ 285 million, but contingent liabilities of the Government increased only slightly during 
1981. Government borrowing from the domestic monetary authorities can be considered as 
restrained, and to the extent that proceeds from foreign loans have been deposited in local 
commercial banks until they are needed it has tended to minimize pressure on liquidity in the 
financial system. 
The level of required reserves in the banking system has been moving steadily upward as the 
money supply increased, but excess reserves have been declining since 1979 (almost coinciding 
with the contrasting trend in savings and time deposits), as the resources of the banking system 
have not grown rapidly. As of September 1981 the level of excess reserves adjusted for loans from 
the Central Bank, amounted to only just over Bh$ 6 million. 
Table 12 
BAHAMAS: CENTRAL G O V E R N M E N T INCOME A N D REVENUE 









Wages and salaries 
Goods and services 
Transfer payments and subsidies 
Savings on current account (1 -2 ) 
Capital expenditure 
Capital formation 
Acquisition of assets 
Others 
Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
Net lending 
Fiscal deficit 
























































































































































'January-September 1981 with respect to the same period in 1980. 
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(b) Fiscal policy. 
In 1980 total central government revenue amounted to Bh$ 244 million and total expendi-
ture to Bh$ 247 million (see table 12). By the end of September 1981 recurrent revenue, at 
Bh $213 million, exceeded the figure for the corresponding period of the previous year by some 
18%. Tax revenue collected by that date increased by more than 4%, while non-tax revenue 
increased by 74% compared with the same period the year before. Total expenditures increased by 
14% to Bh$ 192 million, comparing the figures for the first three quarters of 1980 and 1981, and 
the surplus was higher at the end of September 1981. 
The significant increase in non-tax revenue was due largely to payments made by the 
petroleum refinery and petroleum transhipment companies and to the transfer of profits of the 
Central Bank as required by law. The greater part of tax revenue (about 70% during 1980, or 
roughly the same share as in recent years was derived from import duties. Wages continue to 
account for the largest share of the Government's recurrent expenditure (about 55% in 1980) but 
the share is declining. On the other hand, expenditure on goods and services has been increasing 
very rapidly. Capital expenditure averaged more than Bh$ 33 million during the three years up to 
1980 and was probably higher for the full year 1981. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981 the economy of Barbados experienced a decline in real terms of the order of 2.6%, 
ending five succesive years of real growth. Per capita GDP at factor cost, in current prices, was 
B$ 6 586,1 an increase of 12% over the adjusted figure of B$ 5 868 for 1980 (see table 1). The 
decline in real production was concentrated almost entirely in the major export sectors —sugar, 
tourism and manufacturing— whose strong performance had been the driving force behind the 
expansion of the economy in recent years and all of which recorded significant drops in output 
during the year. 
Tourist arrivals fell by 5%. The decline was sharpest in the North American markets, with 
arrivals from the United States and Canada falling by 13% and 18%, respectively. Only the strong 
performance of the United Kingdom market, which recorded an increase of over 28%, and to a 
Jesser extent the 1.5% growth in arrivals from CARICOM countries, saved the industry from 
disaster. 
Manufacturing output was estimated to have declined by 3%, after six years of growth 
averaging 7.8% per year. Sugar production fell by 30% to 94 000 tons —the lowest level of output 
since 1948— in contrast with the increase of over 16% recorded in 1980. Export prices rose by an 
average of 2%, but production costs increased by 39%-The industry's performance was character-
ized by a late start to the 1981 harvest due to the delay in settling an industrial dispute, bad 
weather, and a shortage of labour, all of which combined to prolong the harvest and reduced the 
quality of the cane delivered to the factories. In addition, domestic oil production also fell by almost 
a third as greater emphasis was placed on exploration during the year. 
The domestically-oriented sectors, particularly construction and distribution (wholesale and 
retail trade) sectors, generally remained buoyant, although the real rates of growth recorded were 
lower than those of recent years. The buoyancy of the construction sector enabled it to surpass 
agriculture as a generator of income, while the government services continued to be the second 
largest contributor to GDP. Activity in the distribution sector registered a 2.1 % increase. The sector 
maintained its position as the leading income generator in the Barbados economy, contributing 
22% of GDP (see table 2). 
Total value of exports of goods and services declined by 1%, mainly because the volume of 
export goods was adversely affected by the world recession, while the total value of imports of 
goods and services increased by 8%. Although the current account balance indicated a deficit of 
US$ 84 million, this was more than offset by a large surplus (approximately US$ 105 million) in 
the balance on capital account. As a result, the global balance of payments showed a surplus of 
US$ 21 million and it was possible to add around US$ 24 million to the international reserves. 
As regards the financial sector, during the review period liquidity fell sharply as deposit 
growth failed to keep up with the expansion of credit. The growth rate of savings deposits was 
lower in 1981 than in 1980, and the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) withdrew large sums from its 
time deposit to purchase treasury bonds. The slow-down in economic activity reduced the 
borrowing needs of the manufacturing sector, and Central Bank restrictions limited credit for 
personal loans and the distribution sector. In contrast, there was a sharp rise in credit to agriculture 
and tourism. 
'Since July 1975 the Barbados dollar has been linked to the US dollar at the rate of US$ 1.00 = B$ 2.00. 
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High capital expenditure and weak revenue led to serious deterioration in government 
finances. Provisional estimates placed capital expenditure at B$ 187 million for 1981, represent-
ing an increase of B$ 84 million or 82% over the 1980 figure. This rapid upward movement 
reflected considerable cost overruns in many projects and delays in the implementation of others. 
Current expenditure for 1981 was provisionally estimated at B$ 369 million or a decrease of 1% 
from the revised 1980 figure of B$ 372 million. Current revenue on the other hand, was estimated 
at B$ 414 million. The estimated surplus on the current account amounted to B$ 45 million, 
compared with a surplus of B$ 49 million in 1980. As the year progressed, the payments imbalance 
and the fiscal deficit caused the Government to take certain measures, including borrowing heavily 
from the Central Bank. Introducing additional taxation and floating a loan on the Eurodollar 
market. At the end of the year the national debt stood at B$ 683 million —an increase of B$ 190 
million or 39% over 1980. 
Table 1 
BARBADOS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at factor cost 
(millions of current Barbados dollars) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(current prices) 
Population (thousands of inhabitants) 
Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer price index 
December - December 
Annual averages variation 
Money supply 
Wages and salaries 
Rates of unemployment 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit as a percentage of 
total expenditure of government 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
















































































Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning, Barbados, Barbados Economic Report, 1981, February 1982, Central Bank of 
Barbados, Annual Statistical Digest, 1981; Economic and Financial Statistics, February 1982; Balance of 
Payments of Barbados, 1981, and data supplied to CEPAL. 
'Preliminary figures. 




BARBADOS: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture 




Electricity gas and water 
Transport storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Tourism 
Finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services 
General services 
Government services 




































































































































Source: Barbados Statistical Service and Ministry of Finance and Planning, Barbados Economic Report, 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Growth of the main sectors 
(i) Agriculture.2The agricultural contribution to GDP at current prices in 1981 was estimated 
at B$ 126 million —a drop of 12% in contrast with a 32% increase in 1980. The sector's share in 
GDP, thus, declined during 1981 to 7.7% from its level of 9.8% in 1980. The value of the sugar 
product fell from B$ 94 million in 1980 to B$ 71 million in 1981, while non-sugar agriculture and 
fishing grew by B$ 5.7 million to B$ 55 million. Sugar's share of the GDP thus fell from 6.4% to 
4.2%. 
Total sugar production decreased by 30% from some 135 000 tons in 1980 to some 94 000 
tons in 1981. The principal factors responsible for this poor performance include the delay of some 
four weeks in the start of harvesting and unseasonal heavy rains during April to June which 
resulted in some cane not being harvested by the end of the season. The rains also affected the 
sucrose content, so that the tonnage of cane required to produce a ton of sugar was increased. A 
number of cane fires also caused damage to 2 600 hectares or about 16% of the total crop. This 
compared favourably, however, with the number of hectares burnt the previous year, when 3 837 
hectares, or approximately 25% of the crop were damaged. The tons of cane/tons of sugar ratio 
moved from 8.9:1 in 1980 to 10.3:1 in 1981, indicating a drop in yield. There was also a drop in the 
yield of cane per hectare from 75 tons in 1980 to 61 tons in 1981 (see table 3). 
Sugar revenues were considerably lower in 1981 as reduced output coincided with a weaken-
ing of the pound sterling. Thus, total sugar exports dropped by 33% from some 119 000 tons in 
1980 to some 80 000 tons in 1981 while earnings fell approximately from B$ 106 million in 1980 
to B$ 75 million. 
including sugar manufacturing. 
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Non-sugar agriculture and fishing grew by an estimated 8%. Livestock production and fish 
landed increased by 12% and 18%, respectively. However, domestic food crops declined by 2% 
and vegetable production increased by 3-2%. 
Heavy rains during the year were mainly responsible for the drops in the output of yams 
(-48%), sweet potatoes (-35%) and onions (-16%). Production of beans, carrots, cabbages, 
tomatoes and egg plants also registered decreases. On the other hand, substantial increases were 
recorded in the production of beetroot (42%), cucumbers (121%) and pumpkins (3%) (see 
table 4). 
There was no increase in cotton production during 1981 because the Government, which was 
the principal producer, ceased production. The main problems facing the industry appeared to be a 
shortage of labour and poor management. 
Poultry production rose during 1981 by 15%, as the industry replaced birds destroyed during 
the hurricane of 1980. Egg production declined by 8.5%, while milk production went down by 
18%, but increases were recorded in the production of beef and veal (6% and 16%, respectively). 
Mutton production fell by 18%, but pork production rose by about 3% in 1981. 
As regards fish catches, the upgrading of the fishing fleet after the losses suffered in 
Hurricane Allen in August 1980 may have contributed to the increase of 17% in fish landed in 
1981. 
(ii) Manufacturing. As stated above, performance of the manufacturing sector in 1981 was 
high in nominal terms, but reflected a sharp negative change in real terms. When account is taken 
of rising prices, the value of output fell in real terms by5.5 %. The contribution of the sector to 
GDP, however, remained stable at 12 %.3 
The index of total industrial production went down by 3-6% from 175.4 in 1980 to 169.1 in 
1981. As a result of the weak export demand caused by the international recession, food processing, 
electronic goods and other manufactured products declined by 5.1%, 6.5% and 11.3%, respec-
tively, compared with positive growth rates of 3.5%, 15% and 2% in the previous year. The 
production of beverages and tobacco also declined by 5.2% in contrast with its increase of 9-4% in 
1980. 
Some growth was recorded in quarrying (11.4%) and non-metallic mineral products 
(10.3%), the 1980 rates of increase having been 64.5% and 6.8%, respectively. Although the 
output of chemicals did not fall, there was a marked slowing of growth from 25.2% in 1980 to 
0.8% in 1981. Wearing apparel, which had recorded a 2.2% decrease in 1980, increased by only 
0.7% in 1981 (see table 5 for production of some manufactured goods). 
During 1981 the Industrial Development Corporation continued its efforts by expanding its 
overseas promotional activity to North America, Europe and Asia and stimulating the flow of local 
private capital by identifying viable manufacturing opportunities, undertaking some projects 
itself, and promoting joint ventures between the domestic and the foreign private sector. 
Table 3 














































Source: Barbados Sugar Producers' Association and Central Bank of Barbados. 
"Approximate value. 




BARBADOS: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(Tons) 

















































































































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Affairs, Barbados. 
"Preliminary figures. 
In keeping with its policy of providing factory space as an incentive to industry, the IDC now 
provides eight industrial estates throughout the country. It was reported that in 1981 the 
Corporation provided some 20 000 square metres of factory space and awarded approved enter-
prise status to nine firms engaged in various lines of production, including electronic assembly, 
cosmetics, footwear, household and industrial detergents, typewriter ribbons and packaging. In 
addition, an already existing industry gained approval for production of processed meats. 
Credit outstanding to the manufacturing sector from commercial banks at the end of 1981 
showed an increase of B$ 9 million to B$ 104 million over the year absorbing 16% of the total 
credit outstanding to all sectors. Credit from the Barbados Development Bank to the industrial 
sector stood at B$ 9 million. This was the main source of credit to the small business sector, which 
amounted to B$ 6 million (an increase of 15% over the previous year in keeping with the 
Government's objective of employment creation and its commitment to business development 
through support for small enterprises). 
(iii) Energy and natural resources. During 1981, the Government accelerated the expansion 
of activities in the areas of conventional and alternative forms of energy, in the development of 
mineral resources, and in the level of involvement and co-operation of the private sector in energy 
matters. In June it centralized and streamlined energy responsibilities by transferring the Energy 
and Natural Resources Division from the Ministry of Trade and Industry to the planning section 
of the Ministry of Finance and Planning and raising its status. 
In October 1981 the Government, in its attempts to widen the scope of the input in energy 
planning, created an Energy Advisory Group comprising various organizations which are suppli-
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ers, distributors or large consumers of energy, as well as financial development and scientific 
institutions concerned with energy matters. It is envisaged that this Group will assist the 
Government in defining major energy issues and the relative priorities, provide advice on a range 
of options, and ensure participation and co-operation in its members' respective areas of 
responsibility. 
Another major policy development was the establishment of a National Petroleum Corpora-
tion which, as a statutory body, will be responsible for the development of the natural resources of 
the country, including petroleum and natural gas. 
Throughout the year the Energy and Natural Resources Division carried out a comprehensive 
national energy assessment exercise, as part of the Caribbean Alternative Energy System Project, 
which was executed jointly by the Caribbean Community Secretariat and the Caribbean Develop-
ment Bank (CAR1COM-CDB) and funded by the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment. The goal of the assessment was to gain a better understanding of the national energy system 
in order to permit better design of programmes to conserve scarce energy, manage its supply and 
use, develop indigenous resources and anticipate energy problems. Among the activities carried 
out to this end interviews were conducted with representatives of public and private sector 
energy-consuming entities, including goverment departments, business associations, public utili-
ties and oil suppliers. 
In the final report of the assessment, conservation was identified as the one energy option for 
Barbados which would achieve tangible results in terms of energy savings in the very short term. 
The report also contained other information, including a compilation and review of historical, 
Table 5 
BARBADOS: INDICATORS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 










































































































































Source: Statistical Services, Barbados, Monthly Digest of Statistics; Ministry of Finance and Planning, Barbados 
Economic Report, 1980; Central Bank of Barbados, Economic and Financial Statistics, February 1982. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands of tons. 
'Thousands of litres. 
Tons. 
'Converted to the fresh milk equivalent. 
Thousands of cubic metres. 
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BARBADOS: VALUE OF IMPORTS OF SELECTED HYDROCARBONS 
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Source: Barbados, Statistical Service, Statistics of Monthly Overseas Trade, February 1982 and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Preliminary figures. 
current and projected data on energy supply, prices and demand; identification and evaluation of 
major energy policy issues, and an outline of a follow-up programme to assist in the implementa-
tion of the recommendations. 
In pursuit of its main objective of achieving self-sufficiency in petroleum supply, the 
Government embarked on an expanded programme of petroleum and natural gas exploration, 
with emphasis being shifted from conventional shallow-well drilling to deep drilling and explora-
tion. During the course of the year Mobil Explorations Barbados Limited completed the pro-
gramme of sinking six deep wells (over 10 000 feet) which it had begun in 1980. In addition a 
further five wells tapering off at 8 000 feet were completed, bringing the total to 50 wells being 
drilled. Because of the longer drilling and completion times of the deep wells and the low oil 
productivity in the deeper zones, daily oil production dropped from an average of 800 barrels per 
day in 1980 to an average of 650 barrels per day in 1981. 
Production of crude oil during 1981 was 211 375 barrels —nearly 31% lower than the 
305 454 barrels produced in 1980. Natural gas, for its part, registered a 45% decline to 9 879 
million cubic meters as compared to the 1980 figure of 17 027 million cubic meters. The shortfall 
in the supply of petroleum was made good by an increase in imports, which came to B$ 152 million 
as compared with B$ 135 million the year before (see table 6). 
Under a previous arrangement between the Government and the Barbados Light and Power 
Company, locally produced natural gas was piped to the power company in an effort to reduce 
imports. Total electricity consumed increased by 6.7% over 1980, largely as a result of on-going 
hotel and industrial expansion and increases in the number of electricity-consuming units. 
Revenue from electricity increased by 9%, reflecting a cost increase of about 2%, mainly in fuel 
prices. Electricity tariffs remained unchanged throughout the year. During 1981 the Barbados 
Light and Power Company entered into a series of loan agreements totalling B$ 126 million. 
The Mobil Corporation has been carrying out seismic surveys of Barbados in order to 
determine its hydrocarbon potential. These surveys were completed early in 1981 and the data 
analysed and interpreted. The report which was subsequently forwarded to the Government now 
forms the basis of any agreements with oil companies relating to future exploration rights and 
production practices. 
During the year the Government received technical assistance from the United Nations 
Development Programme in the organization and analysis of energy data, the control of explora-
tion and production practices, and the review and development of petroleum legislation. It also 
received assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank (1DB) in the development of 
petroleum resources. 
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The Government of Barbados (together with a number of Caribbean and Central American 
countries) reached an agreement with Venezuela and Mexico under which its total crude oil 
requirements for 1982 would be guaranteed on concessionary terms. Under the provision of this 
facility Venezuela and Mexico would provide oil to the participating countries on a 50-50 basis. A 
rebate of 30% of the cost of the oil could be used as a loan over five years at 4% interest. If used for 
energy-related capital projects, however, the loan would be converted to a soft loan of twenty years' 
duration at 2% interest. The latter option was adopted by Barbados. 
Following extensive studies, it was discovered that it would be disadvantageous for the 
refinery in Barbados to process the Mexican crude oil, and in this connexion discussions were held 
between the Governments of Venezuela and Mexico with a view to reaching an arrangement 
whereby Barbados could increase its benefit from the facility. At present Venezuela provides 
100% of the crude oil under the programme. 
The Governments of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago are also holding consultations on a 
programme similar to the Venezuela-Mexico oil facility. 
The Government of Barbados, while focusing attention primarily on oil and gas activities, 
continued to place emphasis on the examination of various forms of new and renewable sources of 
energy, especially the sun, winds, waves and biomass. 
The major advance made in this area has been in the production of solar-powered water 
heating appliances. Three local firms are engaged in this industry and market a variety of systems, 
which are being used by an estimated 2 % of local households and 15 % of hotels. The Government 
has also been proceeding with plans to utilize solar-powered space cooling systems. The first such 
unit was installed in the Government Analyst's Laboratory in September and a second unit is in the 
process of being installed in the Ministry of Agriculture. The performance of the unit already in 
operation is being monitored by the Barbados National Standards Institute. If solar-powered 
cooling is shown to be reliable and economical, its adoption could result in substantial fuel and 
operating costs savings for a wide range of public and private users. 
As regards wind energy, IDB funded a programme for the installation, maintenance and 
operation of a wind turbine. The programme will be for a period of four years and will cost B$ 3.7 
million. 
The Government has provided B$ 112 000 to finance the second phase of a feasibility study 
on the potential for generating electricity from wave energy. This phase will concentrate on 
instrumental wave data collection and analysis. 
Bagasse, a by-product of sugar cane, has traditionally been used as an energy source in sugar 
factories for generating steam to provide electricity, drive machinery and boil sugar. The 
Government of Barbados, as the major shareholder, has secured funds from the Caribbean 
Development Bank to build and equip a modern sugar factory that would, among other things, 
safeguard the participation of small farmers in the sugar industry and at the same time channel 
excess electricity produced by burning bagasse into the national power grid. However, the poor 
performance of the sugar industry resulted in this and other plans for bagasse utilization being 
shelved during 1981. It is hoped that in future crops, however, full use will be made of this source of 
energy. 
(iv) Construction. The construction sector expanded for the fourth consecutive year in 1981, 
obtaining a real growth rate estimated at 4%. The continued shortage of skilled workmen, 
together with inflated labour costs, delayed the completion of some projects. Mortgage loans from 
trust companies and commercial banks increased at the same rate as in 1980, but higher construc-
tion costs slowed activity in the private sector. Starts on housing and commercial building declined 
from 193 and 36, respectively, in 1980 to 144 and 15 in 1981, but the sharp expansion in public 
works more than offset the reduction in private sector construction. Public sector capital expendi-
ture reached B$ 187 million, an increase of 82% over the 1980 figure. The main government 
projects included initiatives in the areas of health, urban development, school construction, and 
the construction of a cement plant. 
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(b) Population and employment 
Preliminary results of the 1980 Population Census revealed that the resident population was 
248 983 persons, of whom 118 565 or 47.6% were males and 130 418 or 52.4% were females. The 
male/female distribution was about even between ages one and 29 years, gradually increasing in 
favour of females as the ages increased. Some 67.7% of the total population was in the under-35 
age group. By the end of December 1981 the resident population was estimated to have reached 
250 500 persons, an increase of 1 100 or 0.4% over 1980. The birth rate showed an increase of 1.0 
per thousand, while the death rate of 7.4 per thousand was the lowest in eleven years. 
The size of the labour force remained virtually unchanged at 114 300 persons during 1981, 
compared to 114 800 in 1980. The level of employment in Barbados is analysed on a quarterly basis 
from data collected through the Continuous Household Survey carried out by the Barbados 
Statistical Service. In the period January to December 1981 there was a net expansion in 
employment of 1 600 persons from 100 300 in 1980 to 101 900 in 1981, of whom 58 200 were 
males and 43 700 were females. 
The total number of persons unemployed decreased from 14 500 in 1980 to 12 400 in 1981, 
representing a decline of 14.5%. As a percentage of the total labour force for both sexes, 
unemployment fell from 12.6% in 1980 to 10.7% in 1981. Male unemployment fell from 9.2% in 
1980 to 7.3% in 1981, the corresponding figures for females being 16.7% and 15.1%. 
The number of persons not in the labour force grew in the course of the review period from 
59 400 persons to 62 500 (see table 7). 
3. The external sector 
(a) Merchandise trade 
(i) Exports. In 1981 the total value of exports of goods fell 7%, as against a 43% rise in the 
previous year. This reversed the trend of steadily growing exports noted since 1976. A slight 
increase in the unit value of exports was not sufficient to offset the loss in earnings due to decreases 
in export volume, which declined by around 10%, also representing a reversal of the upward trend 
observed since 1975- The unit value, however, increased by 3% following a sharp rise of 20% in 
the previous year (see table 8). 
Sugar, electronic components and clothing account for about 60% of export earnings in 1981 
(see table 9). Sugar revenue was lower in 1981 as reduced output coincided with a weakening of the 
pound sterling. Thus, a 2% increase in the average export price of sugar could not offset the loss in 
foreign exchange earnings due to the 33% decline in the sugar export volume (see table 10). 
Table 7 
BARBADOS: SELECTED DATA ON EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
1979 1980 1981 
Thousands of persons 
Total number of adults 171.0 174.2 176.8 
Labour force 109.0 114.8 114.3 
Employed 95.0 100.3 101.9 
Unemployed 14.0 14.5 12.4 
Not in the labour force 62.0 59.4 62.5 
Unemployed, as a percentage of the , - _ , . , , „
 n 
labour force 1 Z 8 l2(> WJ 
Labour force, as a percentage of ,„ _, „ _. , , . , 
total adults 6 3 7 6 5 9 MJ 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning, Barbados, Economic Report, 1981. 
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Table 8 
BARBADOS: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade 
Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of exports of 
goods 
Purchasing power of exports of 






































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 9 
BARBADOS: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total expor ts 







































































































22 37 49 54 23.5 34.8 67.9 36.7 5.1 
Source: Statistical Service, Barbados, External Trade Publications; Central Bank of Barbados, Economic and Financial 
Statistics, February 1982, and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Total domestic exports, excluding re-exports. 
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The United States and CARICOM remained the two major markets for both exports and 
imports. Exports to the United States came to US$ 82 million or 37% of total export earnings in 
1981, compared with US$ 83 million in the previous year, while exports to CARICOM fell 
marginally to US$ 63 million. Trinidad and Tobago, the largest regional market for Barbados' 
goods, introduced licence restrictions when it became evident that some exporters in the region 
were not satisfying the area of origin criteria for duty concessions. Sales to Jamaica increased but 
Barbadian exporters wer,e forced to extend substantial credit to their clients as that country 
continued to experience a severe shortage of foreign exchange. 
(ii) Imports. In the period under review the value of total imports increased by 9% as 
compared with the large increases of 31 % in 1979 and 27 % in 1980. There was a slower increase in 
the import volume which went up by only 1.5%, but the import unit value rose faster than before 
(7%). 
The main items among retained imports were machinery and transport equipment (which 
accounted for 21%); food and beverages (17%); and petroleum and petroleum products (14%) 
(see table 11). Imports from the United States amounted to US$ 190 million or 36% of total 
retained imports: an increase of 6% over 1980. The value of imports from CARICOM countries 
increased by 1% to US$ 96 million in 1981, but these countries' relative share in the import bill 
dropped slightly to 18%. 
Table 10 
BARBADOS: SUGAR PRODUCTION, EXPORTS AND EARNINGS 
1977 1978 1979 1980 198? 
Sugar production at current prices" 
Sugar production as a percentage of GDP 
Sugar exports 
Total sugar export earnings" 
Average export price0 
Production costs per tonc 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Millions of Barbados dollars. 
Thousands of tons. 
'Barbados dollars. 
(iii) Terms of trade and purchasing power of exports. The terms of trade suffered a 4 % drop 
to 97 points (1970 = 100). This was mainly because, as already noted, the import unit value 
increased more rapidly than the export unit value (see table 8). The movement of the terms of 
trade index has been quite volatile but has shown a generally declining tendency since 1976, with 
the exception of 1978 and 1980. 
The purchasing power of exports of goods declined by 14% in 1981 after the marked (26%) 
rise in the previous year, which was the fourth consecutive increase in this index. The purchasing 
power of exports of goods and services followed a similar pattern, too, since its 8% decline in 1981 
came after four years of continual increases. 
(b) Services trade 
Tourism, which is the mainstay of Barbados' foreign exchange earnings, was again adversely 
affected in the period under consideration by the recession in the major tourist markets. Thus, in 
1981 there was a 5 % decline in the number of long-stay (stopover) visitors to a little over 352 600. 
Tourist arrivals from Canada and the United States showed the greatest declines (13% and 18%, 
respectively). Despite this, the United States still supplied the greatest percentage of total arrivals 
































72 000 visitors, or 20% of the total number of arrivals. There was also a rise (6%) in the number of 
visitors from CARICOM countries (excluding Trinidad and Tobago), but arrivals from the latter 
country, who account for some 50% of total CARICOM tourists to Barbados, declined by 2% 
following currency control measures taken in their country of origin. 
Cruise ship visitors to Barbados declined by 13% while the average length of stay of visitors 
dropped from 9 8 days in 1980 to 95 in 1981, but tourist expenditure increased from US$ 237 
million in 1980 to an estimated US$ 264 million. This increase reflected the rises in hotel rates 
during the summer and winter seasons of 41% and 28%, respectively (see table 12). 
The Barbados Board of Tourism, in association with the Barbados Hotel Association, 
continued its promotional activities during the year in the country's major and other tourist 
markets, concentrating on promoting the industry through organized tours and local awareness 
programmes. Promotional tours were undertaken to the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago and Puerto Rico. 
The industry received 81 new loans totalling B$ 8 million from the Barbados Development 
Bank —an increase of 62% over the amount of loans for 1980. Priority was given to small 
businesses seeking to expand. Outstanding commercial bank credit to the sector increased by 37 % 
for the second consecutive year, reaching 15 % of total outstanding credit in 1981. Accommodation 
increased by 1 244 hotel beds during the review period, bringing total capacity to 13 864 beds, but 
the rate of bed occupancy dropped from 65% to 53%. 
(c) The balance of payments 
The global balance of payments registered a surplus of US$ 21 million in 1981, compared 
with surpluses of US$ 19 million in 1980 and US$ 13 million in 1979. Foreign reserves increased 
by US$ 24 million in 1981, compared with an increase of US$ 22 million in the previous year (see 
table 13). 
The merchandise trade deficit was US$ 345 million (twice as large as that of 1978), while the 
services balance showed a surplus of US$ 250 million, similar to the preceding year. The current 
account registered a deficit of US$ 84 million as against a deficit of US$ 27 million in 1980. 
Table 11 
BARBADOS: IMPORTS OF GOODS 
Total imports 
Consumer goods 
Footi and beverages 
Other non-durables 
Durables 

























































































































































BARBADOS: SELECTED TOURISM INDICATORS 
Total visitors 
Stopover visitors 







Hotel and guest house beds 
Average length of stay at 
stopover visitors0 
Hotel bed occupancy rate 
Estimated visitor expenditure 
















































































































Millions of US dollars. 
The deterioration in the current account of the balance of payments was further aggravated by 
the recession in North America and the United Kingdom, and net earnings from tourism 
increased by only 3%, from US$ 233 million in 1980 to US$ 240 million in 1981. Gifts and funds 
sent back by Barbadians living abroad remained at almost the same level as in 1980. Although 
private foreign investment and public sector project borrowings more than doubled during 1981, 
they were insufficient to cover the current account deficit. The Government was therefore forced 
to borrow on the Eurodollar market to the amount of US$ 30 million and the Central Bank drew 
heavily on its short and medium-term lines of credit. These include US$ 1.5 million in conces-
sional financing from the CARICOM Oil Facility of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago and 
US$ 3.5 million from the Venezuela Oil Facility. 
4. Wages and prices 
(a) Wages 
The number of wage negotiations in 1981 was minimal, since most of the negotiations were 
concluded in 1980 for a two-year period. Only certain subsectors received increases during the year 
and the average wage increase of this group was 33.9%. The average wage increase for all sectors 
of the economy was 8.4%, which compares unfavourably with the annual rate of increase in prices 
for 1981 of 14.6%. 
(b) Prices 
At the end of 1981, the retail price index stood at 125.3, an increase of 13.7 points (12.3%) 
over the figure for the previous December. The fastest monthly rate of increase occurred in 
November, when the index rose by 4.1 points to reach 125.4. 
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Table 13 
BARBADOS: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Trade balance (goods) 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Profits 
Interest 
Net private transfer payments 




















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
International reserves (minus 
sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 




























































































































































































































































































































 Services aiso include other private and official transactions, but not profits and interest payments. 
cIn addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between the global balance and the changes in international reserves includes such items as gold 
monetization or demonetization and revaluation adjustments, etc. 
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In terms of annual averages, the rate of inflation as measured by the consumer price index was 
14.6%, indicating a quickening of the pace of price increases. The most significant rises were 
observed in housing, clothing and footwear, and food. Other less significant increases were noted 
in the other sections of the index. The rate of increase in the price of fuel and light slackened 
somewhat, but there was a slight acceleration in price increases in the transportation section (see 
table 14). 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
Both the Government and the Central Bank moved to neutralize the effects of a high 
propensity to import and the slower rate of growth of foreign exchange earnings. The Govern-
ment instituted a number of revenue-raising measures which included an issue of National Savings 
Bonds. The policy of the Central Bank was designed to encourage savings; to influence the private 
sector to economize in its use of credit; to encourage the Government to take measures aimed at 
reducing spending and increasing government revenues; and to warn trade unions of the dangers 
of inordinately high increases in wages. Monetary measures adopted to achieve these objectives 
included: (i) an increase in minimum interest rates on savings deposits from 5% to 8%; (ii) an 
increase in prime lending rates first from 11% to 12.5% and then 13%; (iii) an increase in the 
average lending rate from 11% to 12.5% and eventually to 15%; (iv) an increase in the Central 
Bank's general discount rate from 10% to 18% and subsequently 22%; (v) an increase in the 
reserve requirement for commercial banks from 20% to 25% with effect from 4 November (of 
which 4% to be held in Treasury Bills and 1% in Government or other approved debentures). 
In pursuit of its policy of encouraging the development of the productive sectors, tourism, 
manufacturing and agriculture, the Bank almost entirely exempted this group from any quantita-
tive restrictions and, in this regard, subsidized the cost of credit to the sugar industry by raising its 
rediscount to the Agricultural Division of the Barbados National Bank from B$ 18 million in 1980 
to B$ 41 million in 1981. The Bank also kept open its special rediscount windows to the export 
manufactures, non-sugar agriculture and small-scale retail business sectors. 
The money supply at the end of December 1981, in its narrowest definition, was B$ 262 
million, an increase of B$ 12 million or 5% over the B$ 250 million recorded at the end of 1980 
Table 14 
BARBADOS: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1980 1981 
Annual average variations 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
Housing 
Clothing and footwear 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
Housing 






















Source: Central Bank of Barbados, Economic and Financial Statistics, February 1982. 
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(see table 15). Commercial bank deposits stood at B$ 862 million, an increase of B$ 9 million or 
11% over the 1980 level. Total outstanding commercial bank credit rose from B$ 547 million at 
the end of 1980 to B$ 649 million at the end of 1981 (see table 16). 
(b) Fiscal policy 
One of the major concerns affecting fiscal policy during 1981 was that the rapid increase in 
disposable incomes, together with the widening government deficit* might generate excessive 
demands for imports and create serious balance-of-payments difficulties. Wage settlements during 
1980 had given workers increases of 30% over two years, and further increases were granted 
Table 15 
BARBADOS: MONETARY BALANCE 
(Millions of Barbados dollars) 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 






Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and time deposits) 
Other items (net) 
































































































BARBADOS: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
COMMERCIAL BANK CREDIT 
(Millions of Barbados dollars) 
Sectors 
Total 
Agriculture (including fisheries) 































































































Source: Central Bank of Barbados, Economic and Financial Statistics, and data supplied to CEPAL. 
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during 1981. In addition, generous income tax concessions were granted to lower-paid workers in 
the 1980 budget. The rate of growth of government revenue, however, was more sluggish than 
anticipated because of the general decline of economic activity and the tax reductions. In fact, 
provisional estimates indicate that both revenues and recurrent expenditures declined, the former 
by 2% and the latter by 1%. Taking the 82% increase in capital expenditure into account, the 
aggregate fiscal deficit increased remarkably from B$ 54 million in 1980 to B$ 142 million in 1981 
(see table 17). At the end of December 1981, the total national debt was estimated at B$ 683 
million, an increase of B$ 190 million or 39% over the previous year. The domestic component 
amounted to B$ 424 million, a 29% increase over the 1980 figure (B$ 329 million), while the 
external debt at the end of 19Sl stood at B$ 259 million or 58% more than the 1980 level of B$ 164 
million. 
Table 17 





























































































On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
3. Savings on current account ( 1 - 2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit (1 - 5) 





1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Unlike many of the small States making up the Caribbean group, Belize has a relatively large 
land-mass, with known physical resources capable of sustaining a much larger population if 
adequately exploited. Unfortunately, its small population and inadequate infrastructure have 
stunted its development. 
Throughout most of the 1970s, Belize was able to achieve sustained annual growth rates of 
over 5%, reaching a level of per capita income of about US$ 750 (see table 1). This was mainly due 
to two factors: (i) a very high rate of gross capital formation, averaging nearly 30% between 1975 
and 1979, invested for the most part in infrastructure and financed principally by foreign grants 
and aid, and to a lesser but significant extent by public sector savings and (ii) a generally favourable 
international situation, especially for the country's exports. Nevertheless, as in all small, open 
economies, the evolution of Belize's economy cannot escape the vagaries of its external sector. 
Thus, in 1980 as in 1974, the high price of sugar protected Belize from the jump in petroleum 
prices. In 1981, however, much as in 1975-1976, international recession drove down the price of 
sugar, and this situation was aggravated by the unprecedentedly high interest rates prevailing in 
that year. This inevitably hamstrung Belize's economic growth, and moreover problems peculiar 
to Belize also affected the volume of sugar cane production, so that the situation might have been 
catastrophic, had it not been for the fact that previous sugar contracts at prices above the 
prevailing world levels cushioned the fall in export earnings. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global trends 
Belize averaged growth rates of over 5% per year during most of the 1970s, thanks mainly to 
the expansion of agriculture, especially sugar cane and bananas, and that of the export-oriented 
garment industry. In 1979, adverse weather conditions hurt agriculture and thus slowed growth to 
a little over 3% (see table 2), and despite improved climatic conditions growth was sluggish in 
1980 too, because of slowdowns in the manufacturing and construction sectors. Appraisals of the 
limited indicators available for 1981 suggest that the economy stagnated, if indeed it did not 
decline, throughout most of the year. 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
(i) The agricultural sector. This sector is the mainstay of the economy, directly accounting for 
a quarter of the gross domestic product, and for close to one-third when the food processing agro-
industry, which it supplies, is included. Over 90% of exports are derived from the primary sector. 
The single most important activity of the economy is the production of sugar cane, for cane 
production, and the sugar mills it supplies, account for 20% of the gross domestic product and over 
50% of Belize's domestic exports.1 Hence, to a significant extent the evolution of cane production 
determines the evolution of the economy. 
'It should be borne in mind that Belize acts as a transit point for the stockpiling and re-export of many commodities 
with no local processing. Hence, a distinction must be drawn between the level of total exports, which includes re-exports, 
and domestic exports, which refers to goods locally produced or processed. 
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Sugar cane production partially recovered in 1980 from the effects of the bad weather in the 
previous year, but it declined by almost 4% in 1981 (see table 3), while sugar tonnage declined 
even more (-5.3%). Of this sugar output, roughly 60% was exported to the United Kingdom at 
EEC prices (roughly US$ 0.35 per pound), 30% went to the United States under a guaranteed 
quota agreement (at roughly US$ 0.22 per pound), while the remaining 10% was purchased by 
Canada at world prices (under US$ 0.20 per pound). 
Thanks to these forward contracts with the United Kingdom and the United States, the 
average selling price of Belize's sugar fell considerably less than world prices, but even so the 
decline in sugar output, plus the fall in its price, reduced export earnings from this item by nearly 
14%, from Bz$ 96 million to Bz$ 83 million.2 This alone is sufficient to explain why it is unlikely 
that the country's economy could have grown in 1981. 
Banana production, traditionally Belize's second most important agricultural activity, fell by 
30% in 1981, to 10 500 tons, with a corresponding decline in export earnings. After a drop in 
citrus production in 1979 as a consequence of hurricane "Greta" the previous year, the production 
of oranges rose in 1980 to a record 41 000 tons and subsequently settled to an estimated 36 000 
tons in 1981, while grapefruit production increased from 15 000 tons to an estimated 21 000 tons 
over the same period. The outlook for the industry in 1982 looks promissing in view of the frosts 
which have affected the citrus industry in North America. 
Rice production continued to grow in 1981, when it rose by 2.5%. This sustained increase in 
the production of paddy rice is due to the combined effects of improvements in production 
technology, increased acreages and a better marketing structure. Rice is produced in two main 
areas with different technologies —the Belize district and the Toledo district. At least 5 000 tons of 
polished rice were exported to Jamaica from the Belize district in 1981. This district's high output 
Table 1 
BELIZE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of Bz dollars at 1980 prices) 
Population (thousands of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 





Annual growth rates 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 




Millions of Bz dollars 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 
External debt* 































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
'Preliminary figures. 
External public debt outstanding. 




BELIZE: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST0'' 
Total gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, fisheries and forestry 




Electricity and water 
Transport and communications 
Other services 
Commerce and restaurants 























































































































Source: Belize, Statistical Office. 
"At constant 1973 prices. 
Provisional estimates. 
resulted from its achievement of two crops per year and full mechanization, including aerial 
sowing. In the Toledo district, more traditional cultivation methods prevailed, with one crop per 
year being grown by a mixture of mechanized and "slash and burn" methods, but even so it 
produced some 4 000 tons of rice in 1981, totally filling the storage facilities. In 1981 the price 
offered to farmers for rice increased from 16 cents per pound to some 20 cents per pound. 
Generally speaking, the rest of the agricultural sector registered a mixed performance in 
1981. Poultry production increased significantly, but this was almost completely offset by the 
declines in beef and pork production. Similarly, corn and honey production increased, but the 
output of kidney beans declined. 
Over the last two years, market and price problems have been important contraints on 
agricultural production. The Government has given incentives for rice and corn, in the form of 
guaranteed prices and subsidies, but now there is a surplus of production over local demand, with 
the corresponding problems of marketing and storage. Belize is therefore actively seeking export 
markets for all major commodities, while seeking to improve quality. The Government is also 
keen on promoting investment in agro-industry. 
The rest of the primary sector, fishing and forestry, which together account for 8% of the 
country's domestic exports, showed some improvement in 1981. Exports of marine products rose 
in 1981 to Bz$ 13.4 million, from the previous year's figure of Bz$ 7.4 million, in response to 
significant increases in both volume of production and price. Thus, after the previous year's 
decline, the volume of exports of marine products, rose by 10% to some 1.1 million pounds in 
1981, thanks to the combined effects of training in fishing and record catches. The lobster market 
was especially favourable, as the price of lobster tails rose from Bz$ 7.00 in 1980 to between 
Bz$ 14.00 and Bz$ 18.00 in 1981, when lobster exports totalled some 674 000 pounds, with a value 
of Bz$ 11.1 million, as opposed to the 1980 catch of 390 000 pounds worth Bz$ 5.5 million. In 
order to maintain some balance in the marine ecosystems, the Government has decreed open and 
close seasons to control over-fishing. Deep-sea fishing has not yet been fully developed, but some 
funding in this area has been given by the Development Finance Corporation (DFC). 
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Table 3 
BELIZE: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 









Red kidney beans 

































































































Source: Belize, Central Planning Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, and data supplied CEPAL. 
"Estimates. 
Thousands of cubic metres. 
'Tons. 
''Excludes slaughtering on farms. 
Forestry continued to contribute to the country's foreign exchange earnings to the value of 
some Bz$ 3.8 million in 1980, when production was of the order of 4 million cubic: metres of 
timber. Partial data indicate a slight increase in production in 1981, but it may be that there was a 
small drop in foreign exchange earnings from this commodity, because of a decline in international 
prices. 
(ii) Manufacturing. This sector accounts for 10% of the country's gross domestic product. It is 
overwhelmingly dominated, however, by the production of sugar and molasses, whose output 
naturally follows closely variations in the production of sugar cane. The rest of manufacturing 
activity is mainly limited to a number of agro-industrial establishments, based on citrus products, 
tobacco and flour-milling (see table 4). 
Since sugar cane output declined 4% in 1981, it is not surprising that the manufacture of 
sugar, for its part, declined by a similar amount (-5%). It is likely that the same was true of the 
production of molasses, since its output, too, tends to follow closely that of sugar. There are no 
1981 data on the other industries, but their weight in overall manufacturing is too slight to alter 
the conclusion that the sector as a whole must have declined in 1981, given the predominance of 
sugar in it. The only exception might be the case of the garment industry, which although only on 
an incipient scale has become an important source of foreign exchange, accounting for over 12 % of 
Belize's domestic exports. While no firm data are available on 1981 output, preliminary appraisals 
suggest that this continued to expand. 
(iii) Construction. This sector, which is heavily dependent on government activity, normally 
accounts for some 7% of the gross domestic product, but preliminary estimates of the GDP suggest 
that there was a virtual stagnation of activity in it in 1980 (see tables 2 and 5), while overall data 
are not yet available for 1981. 
The Development Finance Corporation (DFC) constructed an industrial estate close to the 
international airport in 1980 and 1981, near the site of an existing estate. Construction of an 
expanded road network between Belize City and Belmopan continued in 1981, while grain silos in 
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the Toledo district and in Cayo district were completed in the same year. Construction work on a 
water treatment plant, which now supplies some 800 gallons of water per minute to Belize City, 
was completed in 1980. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is providing 
Bz$ 20 million for a modern water and sewerage system for Belize City. 
Firm data on private sector construction are not yet available, but the indications are that 
some construction of hotels, guesthouses and factories has taken place, despite the problems of 
supply of building materials. Commercial bank credit for building and construction work increased 
considerably in 1981 (see table 6), but this increase may have been largely offset by the sharp fall in 
DFC loans for housing. Taken together, these data suggest that at best there was only a modest 
recovery in construction during 1981. 
Table 4 
BELIZE: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 







Beer and stout' 
Flour 
Batterie/ 
1978 1979 1980 1981" Growth rates 


















































BELIZE: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Number of building plans approved 
Aproxímate cost 
Imports of building materials'" 
Cement 
Iron and steel plates and corrugated sheets 





























Source: Belize, Central Planning Unit and data supplied CEPAL. 
"Estimates. 
Millions of Belize dollars. 
'Thousands of Belize dollars. 
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Table 6 
BELIZE: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL BANK CREDIT 
Total 
Agriculture 





Government and statutory bodies 
Others 









































































































Source: Belize, Quarterly Review (several issues) and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"As of September. 
'These are based on the original unrounded data and may therefore differ slighthy from those presented above, which 
were calculated from rounded data 
(iv) Tourism. This continues to be a potentially significant earner of foreign exchange, the 
major tourist attractions being the marine life found on the continental shelf, the archaeological 
sites of Mayan origin, the cays and the scenic beauty of the rural areas and the hinterland. There has 
to date been no major governmental thrust to promote tourism, despite the country's proximity to 
the United States mainland. Tourist accommodation consists mainly of small hotels, most of 
which are family-type operations with consequently modest facilities. Recently a substantial 
amount of foreign investment has been attracted to the San Pedro district, which is the hub of the 
tourist activity, and a number of twenty-room hotels are being constructed. The view of major 
operators in the tourist industry is that there must be some form of balanced development of 
tourist facilities in step with infrastructural development, the latter being the province of the 
Central Government. Between 1978 and 1980 there was a general increase in the number of 
tourists, with a substantial number of arrivals from North America and a very large proportion of 
tourists coming overland. It is estimated that the number of tourist arrivals in 1981, however, fell 
by 2% to about 62 000 persons. 
3. The external sector 
Exports account for over 50% of the GDP. The economy is thus highly sensitive to changes in 
the prices of its key exports (principally sugar) or imports (especially petroleum) and in the 
volume of exportables. As noted earlier, it is likely that the value of Belize's domestic exports 
declined somewhat in 1981, because of the fall in the volume and/or price of its two principal 
agricultural exports: sugar and bananas. Consequently, it is probable that the country's current 
account deficit increased somewhat over 1980. This is suggested, moreover, by the Bz$ 5 million 
decline in the international reserves. Nevertheless, current account deficits of the size Belize has 
been running, though substantial (of the order of 10-15% of the gross domestic product (see 
table 7)), are still within the limits found among other countries in the Caribbean .where current 
account deficits as a percentage of GDP range from lows of the order of 5% in the Bahamas, 
Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago to highs of the order of 25 % and more in Antigua, Dominica, 
Montserrat and St. Lucia. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the resource gap or current account deficit would be 
much larger, or, alternatively, economic activity would be much lower, were it not for continuing 




BELIZE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 





Visible trade balance 
Invisibles 
Net factor income 
Net travel 
Transfers 
Overseas aid (United Kingdom) 
Other aid (Canada, United Nations) 
Remittances (net) 
Other (net) 













































Source: Belize Economic Survey, 1978-1979, Central Planning Unit, and data supplied to CEPAL. 
Preliminary estimates. 
Table 8 
BELIZE: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
(Millions of Belize dollars) 
1979 1980 1981° 




2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Goods and services 
Other 
3- Saving on current account (1 -2 ) 
4. Capital income 
5. Capital expenditure 
6. Total expenditure (2 + 5) 
7. Fiscal deficit (1 + 4 - 6 ) 
















































Source: CEPAL estimates on the basis of Ministry of Finance data and unpublished working documents. 
"Preliminary estimates for 1981. 
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4. Monetary and fiscal policy 
The Central Government, which encompasses about 75% of the public sector, has 
consistently turned in savings on current account (see table 8). These have been declining 
somewhat, however, from 4% of the GDP, as was typical through most of the 1970s, to 3% in 1980 
and then to less than 1 % in 1981. This reduction would seem to have been due to the need to raise 
wages for make up for the higher inflation of recent years, and the likely decline of revenues (with 
respect to projections) due to the stagnation or downturn of economic activity and export earnings 
during 1981. 
The money supply, defined as currency outside banks plus non-public sector demand deposits, 
increased 6% by the end of September 1981 with respect to the end of 1980. This implies an annual 
rate of growth of the order of 8%. The same calculation for the total money supply, which includes 
quasi-money (time and savings deposits), suggests an annual growth rate of the order of 18%. In 
the absence of a retail price index, and given the likely stagnation in output, this suggests a rate of 
inflation of the order of 12-15% for 1981: more or less in line with international inflation, and 
especially that of the country's principal trade partner, the United Kingdom. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Conditions in 1981 were not favourable for the Bolivian economy, and in general practically 
all the economic indicators showed setbacks compared with 1980, which had hot been a 
particularly good year either. Thus, the general trend of the economy can be summed up as a drop 
in production and investment and an increase in prices, which, together with the wage freeze put 
into practice, resulted in a substantial reduction in the purchasing power of the population. 
Furthermore, the balance of payments also turned in a negative performance. The most positive 
aspect recorded in 1981 was the fact that the central government managed to close the fiscal year 
with a smaller deficit than in previous years. 
The gross domestic product went down by 0.6%, meaning that the rate of expansion was 
negative for the firsttime since 1957. This was the culmination of a period of gradual declines in 
the growth rate which had begun in the mid-1970s. Over the last three years, the economy grew by 
no more than 2%. 
Moreover, thé drop in production meant that in 1981 the per capita gross domestic product, 
in absolute terms, was practically the same as in 1975. After the minimal recovery registered in 
1978, this indicator had been going down faster and faster every year, until finally in 1981 it 
dropped by 3-2%, so that between 1979 and 1981 it had gone down by a total of 6%. By way of 
comparison, it may be noted that whereas the per capita product of Bolivia was US$ 370 (at 1970 
prices), the average for Latin America was around US$ 900. 
After the large ( 14% ) increase in the terms of trade for goods and services registered in 1980 
after two years of nominal increases, the terms of trade went down by 3-1% in 1981: something 
which had not happened since 1975, when they fell by nearly 20%. As a result of this, there was 
also a decline in 1981 in real gross income, which went down by 1.2% (see table 1 and figure 1). 
Among the most outstanding causes of the drop in production were the declines in the sectors 
producing goods and "other services". Thus, the first of these went down by a little over 1 %, while 
the second grew by only 0.5%: only the basic services sector expanded, and even then by a 
relatively small amount ( 1.1 %). At a more disaggregated level, the highest growth rate was that of 
agriculture, which grew by 2% over the 1980 level, while the biggest drops were in construction 
and manufacturing (-7% and -3%, respectively). 
This almost generalized drop in production was accompanied by some slackening of inflatio-
nary pressures. Thus, although prices went up in 1981, they did so to a smaller extent than in 1980, 
since the variation between annual averages of the consumer price index in 1981 was 32% 
compared with the 47 % increase registered the year before. If the December-December variation 
is taken, however, then because of the declines which took place as from September the increase in 
prices was 25%, which is a fairly similar rate to that of 1980 (see table 1 and figure 1). 
Within the generally depressive tone of the economic situation, special mention must be 
made of the sharp reduction in the purchasing power of the population. As a result of the wage 
freeze decided upon at the beginning of the year, real wages went down by 24%, and in view of the 
developments which had already taken place in the three-year period 1978-1980, this meant that 
in the last four years the purchasing power has gone down by over 35%. 
The external sector experienced serious difficulties, especially from the second half of the year 
onwards, when the foreign exchange resources of the Central Bank were practically exhausted. In 
order to cope with this situation, rigid controls were applied to the sale of foreign exchange so that 
it would be used only to acquire the most essential goods and take care of the debt servicing 
payments. 
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The year closed with a trade surplus, but this was US$ 40 million less than in 1980. After 
having increased by 22% in both 1979 and 1980, the value of exports of goods and services went 
down by 2.3 % because of a decline of almost 3 % in the volume, thus making four consecutive years 
of downward trends in the quantum, with the exception of 1979. Although the unit value 
increased by 0.5%, this was the smallest rise since 1970. The value of imports of goods and 
services, for its part, increased by 1.4% because of a drop for the third year running in the volume 
(-23% on this occasion) and an increase of almost 4 % in the average price. Payments of profits 
and interest rose by US$ 60 million (an increase of 23%), and the current account had a deficit 
which was US$ 90 million larger than in 1980 (see table 1 and figure 1). The growing rate of 
payments of profits and interest has been exerting an increasingly heavy burden on the economy, 
so that whereas in 1977 these payments were equivalent to 10% of exports of goods and services, 
in 1981 this proportion came to rather more than 30%. 
Table 1 
BOLIVIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gros's domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual average 
Money 
Wages and salaries' 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 
External debt' 































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Average of nominal wages and salaries, except agriculture. 
Percentages. 
'Disbursed external public and State-guaranteed private external debt. 
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This substantial current deficit was offset by the net inflow of long-term non-compensatory 
capital, which exceeded US$ 450 million: a figure without any precedent since 1970, and marking 
an increase of 84% over 1980. 
The external debt came to US$ 2 542 million: a similar rate of increase to that of 1980. The 
fact that external credits did not increase more was due largely to the heavy existing indebtedness 
and the consequent difficulties in securing more external financing. At the same time, it was 
necessary to refinance some loans from a consortium of foreign banks, totalling around US$ 460 
million, which had originally had maturities between August 1980 and March 1983. Similar action 
had to be taken with regard to a loan from the Andean Development Corporation for US$ 20 
million. 
As a result of the domestic inflationary pressures, the effective real exchange rate went down 
considerably, reaching the lowest level since 1970. 
There was a marked slackening in the growth rate of the means of payment, which expanded 
by only 20%, whereas the year before they had increased by over 42%; this meant a return to 
growth rates relatively similar to those of the period 1977-1979. Among the reasons for this 
slower rate of growth of the money supply was the item noted earlier as one of the more favourable 
aspects of the country's economic performance in 1981, namely, that the central government 
deficit grew by only 8%, whereas in 1979 it had grown by no less than 121%, and the year before it 
had increased by 46%. In contrast with what had happened in the previous two years, and 
especially in 1979, when expenditure grew more rapidly than income, in 1981 the reverse took 
place, with income rising by almost 18% and expenditure by 13%. Even so, however, the fiscal 
deficit continued to increase sharply as a proportion of total government expenditure (43 % ), thus 
marking a period of three consecutive years of considerable increases. 
The slower growth rate of the deficit was due to the policy of restriction and reduction of 
public expenditure which was applied throughout the year, but especially in the second half, and 
which was aimed at not feeding inflationary pressures likely to result in larger fiscal deficits. 
At another level, it may be noted that in the last few days of 1981 a new investments law was 
approved, taking the place of that adopted in 1971. This was aimed at channelling new national or 
external resources towards agriculture, agroindustry, stock raising and mining. The ultimate 
objectives were to raise the degree of self-sufficiency, heighten the degree of processing of raw 
materials, increase the added value generated in the country, and raise exports, especially those of 
non-traditional products. In order to achieve these objectives, the measures introduced included 
confirmation of the right of ownership of the new assets generated, free convertibility of national 
currency for the payment of debts or the repatriation of profits, exemption from profits tax on new 
investments, reductions or exemptions regarding other taxes, etc. 
Finally, in October 1981, the so-called Three-Year Plan of the Government was adopted, 
aimed at establishing a new economic development, political and social model characterized in the 
economic field by expansion of the tax base, the elimination of subsidies and artificial prices, the 
attraction of foreign capital, a more realistic exchange policy based on the market forces, and the 
participation of the private sector in State enterprises, even extending to the transfer of some State 
enterprises. Within this Plan, special mention may be made of the new export promotion law 
which sought, through a system of fiscal incentives, to promote exports of agricultural and 
handicraft products in particular. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global supply and demand trends 
In 1981, global supply fell for the second year in succession. Its growth rate had already 
slackened markedly in 1979, and after dropping by close to 3 % in 1980 —something which had not 
happened since 1971— it declined by a little under 1% in 1981. 
In contrast with what had happened the previous year, the reasons for this behaviour were 
the performance of the product and the volume of imports. Thus, whereas in 1981 the decline in 
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Figure 1 
BOUVIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1970 71 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rates. 
^Percentage variation, December - December. 
cMillions of US dollars. 
80 81 
Table 2 
BOLIVIA: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures on imports and exports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLA for the purpose. 
global supply was due exclusively to the sharp drop in imports, in 1981 there was not only a decline 
in the volume of imports but also in the product (see table 2). 
The product went down by a little under 1 %, thus continuing for the sixth consecutive year 
the downward trend in the economic growth rate. In recent years, the biggest increase was 
registered in 1975 (6%), but from that date onwards there was a constant slackening in the growth 
rate until finally a negative rate of -0.6% was reached in 1981. The average rate of expansion of the 
economy during the four-year period 1978-1981 was only very slightly over 1 % : one of the lowest 
rates in the whole of Latin America. 
A factor which contributed particularly to the drop in global supply was the decline in the 
volume of imports. After going down by 3% in 1979 and suffering a dramatic drop of -20% in 
1980, this went down by a little over 2% in 1981, with the result that the volume of imports 
declined at an average rate of 8% per year over the period 1979-1981. 
This unsatisfactory evolution of the economy was also reflected in the drop in domestic 
demand and in the volume of exports. The first of these indicators, which had already gone down 
in 1980, suffered a further slight decline as a result of the very marked drop registered once again in 
gross fixed investment, which went down by 10%. As a result of this drop and of the even sharper 
declines which had taken place in the previous two years (see table 2), gross fixed capital 
formation went down by about one-third during the three-year period 1979-1981. 
As in the previous two years, the drop in investment particularly affected expenditure on 
machinery and equipment, for after going down by 22% in 1979 and by over 27% in 1980, this 
declined by 15% in 1981, so that between 1979 and 1981 it fell by a total of 64%. In view of the 
foregoing, the economy suffered from a high degree of decapitalization which was clearly 
demonstrated through the ratio between purchases of equipment and the gross domestic product, 
since in 1981 this ratio was exactly half what it had been ten years before. As a result of the 
unfavourable evolution of the two components of gross fixed investment and the slight decline in 
stocks, the investment coefficient was only a little over 11%: the lowest level since 1970. 
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In contrast with the marked drop in investment, total consumption increased slightly (0.5 %). 
This was due exclusively to the small rise of almost 1 % in private consumption, the modest level of 
which is explained by the contraction in the product and the wage freeze put into effect during the 
year. General government consumption, for its part, declined by 2% after the relatively small 
increases in 1979 and 1980; this reduction was due to the restrictive economic policy applied, 
particularly from the last quarter of the year onwards. 
As already noted, the volume of exports continued to fall in 1981, the decline between 1980 
and the year in question being over 6%. Except in 1979, there has been a steady gradual downward 
trend in exports, so that the average rate of change between 1977 and 1981 was - 3 % per year. 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors of production 
As already noted", the most salient feature oí the deterioration suffered by the economy during 
1981 was the 0.6% drop in the product. This figure was naturally a faithful reflection of what had 
happened in the various sectors of the economic activity. 
The only activity which registered a favourable growth rate was basic services, which 
increased by a little over 1%. In contrast, production of goods and "other services" declined by 
1.1% and 0.5%, respectively. Unfortunately, there is nothing new about this situation: on the 
contrary, it fits in with the picture of progressive deterioration observed in the last three years (see 
table 3). 
Table 3 
BOLIVIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AF FACTOR COST 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
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Thus, although the generation of basic services increased by a little over 1%, this was only 
half the 1980 growth rate and only a quarter of that registered in 1979. Growth was registered in 
both the components of basic services: electricity, gas and water grew by 1.5%, and transport by 
1 %. In the case of the first of these, the small increase registered was the lowest in the last three 
years (see table 3). Transport, for its part, although it did register some growth, increased by only 
half the amount registered in 1980 and by a little less than a quarter of that achieved in 1979. Even 
so, its average growth of 2.5% per year over the past three years was one of the highest in the 
whole of economic activity. 
The growth rate of production of goods, as already noted, was less than that of 1980; after an 
increase of 2.6% in 1977, the evolution in subsequent years was such that the growth rate for the 
period 1979-1981 was negative (-0.5%). Only agriculture expanded (2%), thus continuing the 
steady progress of previous years. In contrast, the cases of mining and construction were particu-
larly significant. The first of these declined for the fifth consecutive year (-1.3%), although it is 
true that this drop was the smallest in the period 1977-1981, when the average decline was 4.5% 
per year. 
Construction was the sector which declined most (-7%) in 1981. Coming on top of the 
declines recorded in previous years, this meant that between 1979 and 1981 this sector suffered an 
average contraction of over 4% per year. 
Finally, the "other services" sector also suffered a contraction in 1981 which, added to the 
scanty increases registered in 1979 and 1980, meant that the average annual growth rate for the 
three-year period was only 1%, thus confirming the depressive trend of almost the whole of the 
economic system. Financial activity and insurance showed a small increase, but this was smaller 
than in previous years. A similar, but more marked, performance was turned in by government 
services: after the relatively substantial expansion of 1979 and the moderate increase in 1980, the 
drop of 2% registered in 1981 gave this sector an annual average growth rate for the period 
1979-1981 of 1.6%. 
(i) Agriculture. The modest expansion of agricultural activities continued in 1981, when the 
product increased by 2%: the same rate as in 1978 and 1980, and more or less similar to that 
registered in 1979. Small though the growth rate of this sector was, it was nevertheless the highest 
in the whole economy. 
Cereals in general, which accounted for almost 45% of the cultivated area in previous years, 
showed positive growth except in the case of barley. Thus, maize —which accounts for about 30% 
of the planted area— registered the highest growth rate of the last four years in 1981 (18%), so 
that when added to the also high growth rate recorded in 1978 this cereal achieved one of the 
highest rates of increase of the whole sector (7.6%) for the period 1978-1981 (see table 4). 
Other crops of an extensive nature, such as wheat and rice, also turned in a favourable 
performance. Thus, the growth rate for the first of these was double that of 1980. In spite of the 
stagnation which took place in 1978 and the setback suffered the following year, the rapid 
expansion recorded in the subsequent two years more than made up for the previous losses, so that 
between 1978 and 1981 production of this cereal grew by 5 %. The rice crop also increased in 1981 
(2%), although this was a smaller increase than that of the year before. Because of the 35 % decline 
suffered in 1978 and 1979, this crop showed significant deterioration over the four-year period 
under review, when it went down by over 6%. 
Finally, a particularly poor performance was turned in by barley, which has been accounting 
for about 10% of the cultivated area. In 1981 barley production fell by 20%, thus registering a 
particularly dramatic decline of 44% between 1979 and 1981 because of the falls in production 
registered in the previous two years. This decline was the second most serious in this three-year 
period, after the completely adverse performance of cotton. 
Industrial crops showed uneven trends. As already noted, a particularly serious deterioration 
occurred in the case of cotton fibre. The output of this product in 1981 was only one-third that of 
1978 and the heavy drops in the period 1979-1980 (72 %), added to the contraction of 14% in 1981, 
meant that in spite of the increase registered in 1978 production went down by an average of 18% 
per year between 1978 and 1981: the fastest rate of deterioration in the whole agricultural sector. 
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Soya production too went down very sharply in 1981 (-23%). In spite of this drop, however, 
the very large increases registered in the previous three years (205%) meant that this was the 
product which grew most in the last four years (45% per year) (see table 4). 
Sugar cane production improved markedly (24%), thus making up for the declines in 
previous years. 
Finally, the rest of the crops turned in an uneven performance. Banana production grew by 
2%, that of coca 8%, while the potato crop remained unchanged. In the case of bananas, after 
sharp fluctuations in previous years the harvest during the four-year period 1978-1981 went down 
by 1 %. The coca harvest grew substantially more slowly than in other years, but because of steady 
increases from 1978 to 1980, the harvest of this product was the second highest of all those 
analysed (see table 4). In conclusion, the harvest of potatoes, which account for 14% of the 
cultivated area, showed no change for the second consecutive year after the stagnation registered in 
1979. 
The year under review was marked by a new development in Bolivian agriculture. The degree 
of improvement or deterioration in the income of the sector can be analysed by following the 
evolution of the prices of agricultural products compared with those of industrial goods. Thus, 
between 1975 and 1979 the growth rate of the prices paid for agricultural products was always 
higher than that of the prices of industrial goods, the most favourable level being reached in 1978. 
Table 4 
BOU VIA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980" 1981"
 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 c / 1981- 1978-
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BOLIVIA: RELATION BETWEEN PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL 





































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
Table 6 
BOLIVIA: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
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Source: Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy; Association of Medium-Scale Mining Companies, and National Statistical 
Institute (INE) 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands of tons fine. 
In 1980 the situation remained unchanged, but in 1981 the trend was reversed, and for the first 
time in the last seven years the parity relationship went down, thus bringing about a reduction in 
the income of the sector (see table 5). 
Furthermore, various problems of a structural nature, such as marketing system difficulties, 
the fact that a large proportion of the farms are of very small size, the low level of capitalization, 
etc., continue to be conditioning factors for the future evolution of the sector. 
(ii) Mining. The deterioration of the mining sector, except for hydrocarbons, continued 
throughout 1981, since the product generated failed to make any progress after three consecutive 
years of steady decline. Thus, in 1978 production went down by almost 10%, the next year it again 
fell by over 8%, and finally in 1980 it dropped by 2%, so that over the four-year period 1978-1981 
there has been a total decline of 19%- Going back a little further in time, it may be noted that as 
from 1971 (except for the year 1973, which registered exceptionally good results, since there was 
an expansion of 21.6%) the highest growth rate recorded was reached in 1972 (4%), since when it 
has not proved possible to exceed this figure. 
In 1981, the economic and financial difficulties of the mining sector got worse because of the 
depressed international markets and the unfavourable performance of the national economy. 
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Problems built up especially from the middle of the year onwards, because of the total control 
established by the Central Bank on the sale of foreign exchange, which obliged entrepreneurs to 
buy the foreign exchange they needed on parallel markets at higher exchange rates than the official 
one. 
The mining sector domestic product stagnated in spite of the fact that production of tin —by 
far the most important product of the sector— increased by over 9 %. This rise —the biggest in the 
last 11 years except for the 11% increase registered in 1977— took place in spite of the 15% 
decline in world tin prices. Nevertheless, this increase was not enough to offset the drops in the 
previous three years, when production went down by 19% (see table 6). 
Taken together, these data bring out the long period of crisis through which the tin mining 
industry has dragged, not only for the reasons of a general nature already mentioned for the 
mining sector as a whole, but also aggravated in the case of this mineral by several other factors: 
(a) the difference between the costs of Bolivian enterprises and those of their foreign competitors; 
(b) lower productivity; (c) the gradual exhaustion of the deposits being exploited; (d) the low 
level of public and private investment; (e) doubts about the efficiency of the public enterprises 
involved; (f) the obsolescence of the machinery and equipment used; (g) political and social 
problems, etc. These factors explain why, in the last three years, Bolivia has dropped from second 
to fourth place among world tin producers. 
Other minerals such as tungsten, silver and copper evolved favourably in 1981, although they 
are of less importance in the total group of mining activities. The trends followed by precious 
metals were particularly encouraging. Thus, silver grew by 8% even though its price went down by 
50%, representing a hightening of the trend already visible since the year before. The growth rate 
of this mineral in the period 1980-1981 was over 12%; the highest in these two years, except for 
copper. It is also worth noting the high growth rate shown by gold between 1978 and 1980, for in 
spite of the sharp drop registered in 1979, the average growth rate came to 34%, which was the 
highest rate of all during the three-year period in question. 
Tungsten production increased by almost 3% (a slower growth rate than in 1980) even 
though the world price of this metal has gone down to approximately half over the last two years. 
The small increase registered in 1981 represented the continuation of the slow but steady 
expansion begun in 1978. The lower growth rate of production was due, inter alia, to the drop in 
international demand, and especially the smaller purchases by Eastern European countries. 
Finally, copper production increased very considerably (40%), although this metal is of less 
importance in the mining sector as a whole. 
Minerals which turned in a negative performance, in contrast, were zinc, lead and antimony, 
production of which went down by 6%, 3% and 1 % respectively in 1981. With regard to zinc, the 
decline in the year under review came on top of the sharp fall registered in 1979 (-21%) and the by 
no means negligible drop of 6% in 1978, so that over the four-year period 1978-1981 production of 
this mineral has gone down by 27%. The drop in antimony production in 1981, however, was 
more than offset by the increases in previous years. As for lead, production sank by 3% over the 
period, after the stagnation registered in 1980. 
The evolution of the hydrocarbons industry is worthy of particular attention. Apart from the 
minimal recovery in crude petroleum production in 1976, output of crude has been going down 
steadily every year since 1974, the decline in 1981 being 8%. The amount produced has thus been 
going down systematically for 7 years, with the cumulative drop over this period amounting to 
more than 71%. The progressive fall in production affected exports to such an extent that they 
completely disappeared as from 1980 (see table 7). 
The extremely unfavourable evolution of the petroleum sector during this period was due 
largely to the domestic price policy carried on since 1973. Domestic oil prices were systematically 
lower than those on the international market, and this situation led on the one hand to a 
considerable increase in domestic consumption of petroleum products and, on the other, to a 
progressive reduction in the amounts available for export. 
Thus, as may be seen from table 7, during most of the 1970s, and specifically up to 1979, the 
growth rates of domestic sales of the main petroleum products were exceptionally high, 
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Table 7 
BOLIVIA: INDICATORS OF THE HYDROCARBONS INDUSTRY 
BOLIVIA 
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Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. 
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 Thousands of barrels. 
Millions of cubic metres. 
Table 8 
BOLIVIA: GASOLINE PRICES 
Nominal price Consumer price 
(pesos per index (CPI) 
cubic metre) (1972=100) 
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Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., Quanerly Economic Review of Peru and Bolivia, 1981 and data supplied 
to ECLA. 
"Up to March 1981. 
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particularly in the case of diesel oil. Between 1970 and 1980, domestic consumption of gasoline 
increased by 70%, while that of diesel oil more than trebled. These considerable increases were in 
sharp contrast with the expansion in the gross domestic product in real terms for the same period 
and with the increase in real private consumption, both of which grew by nearly 56%. 
Moreover, between 1973 and 1978 the consumption of gasoline and diesel oil rose by 43% 
and 156% respectively, while over the same period the domestic product and private 
consumption, both in constant values, grew by only 28% and 29%, respectively. 
Obviously, this behaviour was not unconnected with the evolution of price levels in the 
economy and the prices fixed for the different kinds of fuels. Thus, between 1972 and 1978 the 
price of gasoline increased in nominal terms by 127%, but taking the rates of inflation into account 
over the same period, the real variation in its price was negative, since over the seven-year period 
in question it went down by over 21%. Similarly, whereas the consumer price index rose by 188% 
over this period, the index of the real price of gasoline went down by 21% (see table 8). 
As from the end of 1979, with the sharp increases in the price of this fuel, a more realistic 
price policy began to be carried out, although gasoline prices were still not brought completely in 
line with the corresponding rate of inflation (see table 8). 
As a result of the high levels of consumption encouraged by the price policy, there was a 
spectacular drop in exports of petroleum, and after the big expansion of 80% registered in 1971 
and the 40% increase recorded during the following two years, the volume of petroleum exports 
began to drop rapidly as from 1974, until such exports completely disappeared in 1980 (see 
table 7). 
A completely opposite tendency to that of petroleum was followed by natural gas. The growth 
rate of gas production in 1981 was 4%, which was a little less than the year before (see table 7). 
This upward trend, which has lasted for four year now, is due inter alia to the fact that on account 
of the growing balance-of-payments difficulties efforts have been made to expand to the maxi-
mum the production of anything which may help to accumulate more foreign exchange. Thus, a 
large proportion of the gas extracted at present is exported, and external sales of natural gas grew 
by almost 8% in 1981 after a 1980 growth rate which was more than double that of 1979, so that 
between 1979 and 1981 they have increased by a total of over 34%. In 1981, the most important 
purchaser was Argentina, which bought over US$ 300 million worth of gas from Bolivia (50% 
more than in 1980). It is estimated that at the present rate of production the reserves will last for 
another 60 years, and investments made in Chuquisaca in 1981 totalled US$ 18 million. 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) made profits of almost US$ 140 million 
in 1981 thanks to two main reasons: the exports of gas to Argentina and the elimination of 
subsidies (although some still remain, such as that benefiting Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano as regards the 
transport of meat by air), which has made it possible to significantly increase the income from the 
sale of fuels. There are still some factors which negatively affect the performance of the enterprise, 
however, such as the 20 % tax on the value of exports which was introduced in 1942 for reasons of a 
transitory nature, and the 35% tax on differentials. 
As regards the more immediate future of mining, the Government adopted a three-year plan 
laying down the following objectives for the sector: exploration of the national territory in order to 
increase the known mineral reserves, with top priority being given to deposits of tin, silver, lead 
and gold; raising of the indexes of recovery through the industrial application of modern methods 
and systems of mineral processing; lifting of the prohibitions which exist regarding the fiscal 
reserves (which account for the very considerable proportion of 40% of the national territory); 
increasing the added value generated by the sector through a higher degree of ore processing, and 
finally, preparation of a new tax law. 
During the year, an investment plan was also prepared for the period 1981-1985, which 
provides for new investments totalling US$ 600 million (to be obtained mainly abroad), US$ 130 
million of which would go to the private mining sector. According to the studies which have been 
carried out, this would make it possible to increase the level of production by 33 % in 1985 and raise 
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Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, National Statistical Institute, and Ministry of Industry and Commerce. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Millions of litres. 
'Thousands of metres. 
Finally, in the last few months of the year investment projects proposed by the private sector 
for a total value of US$ 47 million were presented for the Government's approval. 
Among the future expansion plans of YPFB, the two most important are the gas pipeline to 
Brazil and the pipeline across the Altiplano. The first of these is now being actively studied and is 
to be carried out jointly by YPFB and PETROBRAS. It will be 1 950 km long, running from Santa Cruz 
to Sào Paulo, and it is estimated that it will cost about US$ 2 billion. The gas pipeline across the 
Altiplano, which is planned to come into operation in 1984, will connect Santa Cruz and La Paz, 
passing through Cochabamba and Oruro. In order to carry out this project, a US$ 97 million loan 
for a term of 20 years has been obtained from the Inter-American Development Bank. 
(iii) Manufacturing. Since 1976, when the manufacturing product grew by a little over 8%, 
the rate of expansion of this sector has gradually been going down, finally reaching negative rates 
of - 1 % in 1980 and - 3 % in 1981 (see table 3). 
For the second year in succession, there was a significant drop in the production of petroleum 
products, which went down by close to 11% in 1980 and by a little over 9% in 1981. These declines 
coincided with the drop in petroleum extraction (-7.7%) and the slight decline (-2.3%) in 
domestic sales of petroleum products in the past year. 
There were also considerable reductions in 1981 in the output of sugar, cement and textiles. In 
contrast, there was a significant increase in production of metallic tin and edible oils, and a slight 
recovery in that of wheat flour (see table 9). 
Sugar production, which had remained between 1976 and 1979 at a steady level of around 
267 000 tons per year, went down to 242 000 tons in 1980 and 223 000 tons in 1981, even though 
the cane harvest —after the drop of approximately 10% suffered in the three-year period 
1979-1980— showed an increase of 24% in 1981. As regards cement production, which had risen 
by approximately 27% in 1980, it dropped by 7% in 1981, reflecting the decline in the construction 
sector in the last two years. 
Among the activities whose expansion helped to lessen the decline in manufacturing output 
was the production of metallic tin, which increased by around 13% in 1981. Between 1975 and 
1978 tin production increased by a factor of 2.2, thanks to the expansion of the Vinto smelter, and 
since then it has increased a further 22%, from 16 400 tons in 1978 to over 20 000 tons in 1981. 
Since 1977 there has been an extraordinary increase in the production of edible oils, which, 
after having increased by 80% in that year, has since expanded at the rate of 14.5 % per year. Thus, 
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after being a net importer of edible oils up to 1976, Bolivia has now become a net exporter, with 
production exceeding apparent consumption by close to 40% in 1981. 
As regards wheat flour production, this achieved a slight recovery of a little over 5% in 1981 
after the 20% drop suffered in the previous two years. In 1976 and 1977, and especially in 1978, the 
national flour industry expanded strongly, more than trebling national production and thus 
reducing the need for imports.1 
Manufacturing was affected during the year by the difficulties which arose in obtaining 
foreign exchange because of the controls established by the Central Bank on its sale, which 
naturally affected the normal supply of raw materials and imported products for industry, thus 
causing repercussions on production, especially in the second part of the year. In addition, there 
was a drop in demand, and these two factors together were reflected in the lower level of utilization 
of installed capacity, which is estimated to have dropped to 40%. Furthermore, as from September 
permission was given to import some manufactures such as spaghetti, soap., etc., so that national 
production was faced with the need to improve its competitiveness in order not to lose the 
domestic market. 
3. The external sector 
(a) Merchandise trade 
Exports of goods, which had increased at the rate of around 23% per year in 1979 and 1980, 
went down by 3.5% in 1981. Imports also fell, but to a smaller extent (barely 1%) (see table 10). 
As a result of this performance, the merchandise balance showed a surplus of almost US$ 235 
million: 10% less than in 1980 (see table 11). 
The drop in exports was due both to the decline in the volume exported (-1.5%) and to the 
drop in the unit value of the products exported (-2 %). As regards the volume, this went down for 
the second year in succession after the slight recovery in 1979, thus pursuing the tendency towards 
a steady deterioration in the volume of external sales, which begun in 1977. Between that year and 
Table 10 
BOLIVIA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'The available information on wheat flour import shows that their volume has varied greatly from one year to 
another, and went down drastically in 1979 and especially in 1980. 
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1981, the decline has averaged 3% per year. In contrast, the drop in the unit value of exports was 
the first since 1975; since that year, with a few exceptions, the growth rate had every year been 
higher than the year before, with the result that between 1976 and 1980 the increase in the average 
price of exports was around 16% per year. 
Imports have been growing considerably in recent years. In 1978 and 1979 they rose by nearly 
19%, although in 1980 they went down by over 16% and in 1981 they declined again, albeit by a 
much smaller amount (-0.7%) (see table 10). 
The decline in the latter year was due entirely to the reduction in the volume of external 
purchases, which dropped by a little over 2%, since the unit value of imports increased by 1.6%. 
The volume purchased has now gone down for three consecutive years, although it is true that the 
drops in 1979 and 1980 were considerably greater than that registered in 1981. This confirms the 
change in the tendency displayed in previous years, since after eight years of steady increases 
(1971-1978) the volume of imports has now begun to evolve in the opposite direction. It may also 
be noted that it is ten years (1971) since there was such a small increase as that recorded in 1981 in 
the average price of imports. 
Together, the evolution of the prices of exports and imports of goods caused the terms of 
trade to go down by 5 % after the sharp rise registered the year before (see table 10). As a result of 
this drop and of the decline in the volume of sales abroad, the purchasing power of exports of 
goods went down by 7% after two years of steady increases. 
(i) Exports. Aftergrowth rates of close to 20% had been achieved in 1979 and 1980, the rate 
went down in 1981 (see table 12). 
The deterioration which took place in this year was due basically to the sharp drop in 
non-traditional exports and the decline in sales of tin and silver. Exports of traditional products, 
which account for approximately 90% of the total, increased (1.8%), whereas exports of non-
traditional products went down by a little over 37% (see table 10). 
Sales of tin, which was until recently the main export product, went down by a little over 9 %. 
Although this took place for the second year in succession, however, it did not offset the 20% 
increases registered during the period 1978-1979, so that the cumulative growth rate for the 
four-year period 1978-1981 was 6.5 %. The decline in the value of tin exports during the last year 
was due more than anything to the drop in world tin prices, since the volume increased by 7%. In 
the last twelve months, the official price per pound of pure tin went down by 16%: something 
which had not happened since 1975, when there was a decline of 14%. 
This drop in price was due, among other reasons, to the excess supply at the world level, the 
decline in world demand because of the international recession, and the beginning of a tendency to 
use some substitute materials. These factors were also heightened by the sale of part of its reserves 
by the United States General Services Administration. 
There was also a sharp drop in 1981 in the value of tungsten exports. Unlike the case of tin, 
the 8.5% drop registered in these was due to a sharp reduction of more than 10% in the volume 
exported, since the average unit value increased by a little over 1 %. In addition to the international 
crisis and the announcement by the General Services Administration that it would dispose of its 
stocks of this mineral, the sales carried out by the People's Republic of China through the Hong 
Kong market also played a part in affecting the behaviour of this mineral during 1981. Over the 
last four years, the big declines registered in 1978,1979 and 1981 offset the large expansion which 
took place in 1980, with the result that over this period the cumulative growth rate came to barely 
2%. 
Sales of silver —which has come to be the third most important product in the country's 
whole external trade, after tin and natural gas— also declined in 1981. Indeed, their rate of decline 
(40%) was far and away the highest of all export products. 
After an increase of over 108% in the unit value of silver in 1980, this fell by 48% in 1981, but 
the volume exported rose by 16% after having gone down by 2% in the preceding year. The 
decline in the value of exports after three years of steady increases during which the value of 
external sales more than trebled still did not prevent their growth rate over the period from 1978 
to 1981 being 184%. 
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Table 11 
BOLIVIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance' 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 
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Source: 1975-1980: International Monetary Fund.Balance of Payments Yearbook; March 1982; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. 
1
 The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: rnonetization or 




BOLIVIA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Millions of dollars , , , ° Growth rates 
breakdown 
1978 1979 1980 1981" 1971 1981" 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
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Metal products and 
machinery 




















































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. 
There were also marked increases in exports of zinc and antimony, although their share in 
foreign trade as a whole is considerably smaller (4% and 3.5% respectively, in 1981). Antimony 
sales increased by 31 %, which, coming after the 81 % rise registered in 1979, enabled them to more 
than offset the drops recorded in 1978 and 1980. Zinc, which increased 8%, showed a similar 
behaviour in the four-year period 1978-1981. 
As already noted, exports of hydrocarbons (petroleum and natural gas) confirmed their 
trends of previous years. Exports of natural gas continued to increase, whereas those of petroleum 
disappeared completely in 1979. 
Natural gas sales continued to rise at high rates: after growing at an average of 42% per year 
between 1973 and 1979, they doubled in 1980, and in 1981 they grew by a further 52%. In volume 
terms, natural gas exports also showed relatively high growth rates, although the faster growth 
only began to take place as from 1979. Among the main reasons for this favourable evolution were 
the supply contracts signed between the Governments of Bolivia and Argentina, which in 1981 
became the main client for Bolivian exports (see table 13). 
As already noted, in 1981 non-traditional exports —which only represented 10% of the 
total— turned in a negative performance, since they fell by almost 38% after the sharp rises 
recorded in 1978 and 1980, when the growth rates were 35% and 26%, respectively. The 
individual evolution of the items in this group was relatively erratic over the period. In 1981, 
however, most of them had either negative growth rates or else stagnated. 
As a result of the developments noted above, in 1981 there were substantial changes in the 
structure of exports. Thus, the share of tin —which contributed half of the foreign exchange 
income generated by exports at the beginning of the last decade— went down for the third 
consecutive year and sank to only one-third of its previous level. In contrast, whereas natural gas 
exports did not exist in 1971, ten years later they accounted for 30% of all the country's external 
sales. 
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Finally, with regard to the destination of Bolivian exports, it may be noted that the bulk of 
them went to three different areas: Argentina, the United States and the European Economic 
Community. In 1981, these three geographical areas accounted for 96% of all sales abroad, thus 
cormrming once again the tendency which nao begun some years before (see table 13). Trade 
relations with Argentina grew at an increasing rate, especially as regards sales of natural gas. As 
regards exports to the countries of the Andean Group, the most important purchaser continued to 
be Peru, which in 1981 made 75% of the total purchases of this group from Bolivia. Exports to the 
United States have shown fluctuations over the course of time, and in 1980 and 1981 they went 
down. Finally, sales to the countries of the European Economic Community also declined in 1981. 
(ii) Imports. As already noted, in recent years imports have shown high growth rates, but 
from 1980 onwards there was a change in this tendency, and this downward trend continued in 
1981, even though the requirement for a prior deposit of 25% in respect of imports which had 
been introduced in 1975 was eliminated at the beginning of the year. 
Table 1Î 
BOLIVIA: DIRECTIONS OF FOREIGN TRADE, CIF 
(Millions of dollars) 
1978 1979 1980 1981° 
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BOLIVIA: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Millions of dollars , , , ° Growth rates 
breakdown 













































































































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The biggest increase in imports took place in the case of capital goods (4%), although this 
was still not enough to offset the sharp fall registered the year before. Nevertheless, because of the 
big increases registered in 1978 and 1979 (64%) the average rate of expansion of imports of 
capital goods over the last four years came to 14%. The category which grew most was that of 
capital goods for industry (over 6%), and taking into account the large imports recorded in 1978 
and 1979, this meant that the average growth in the value of such imports came to 12% per year. 
The remaining imports of capital goods, however, continued to stagnate. 
In second place, imports of consumer goods also increased, but only by a very small amount 
(barely 0.5 % ) . In this case, the slight recovery registered in 1981 was not sufficient to offset the 
sharp decline in 1980 (-17%), so that on average the growth rate fell by 8% over the two-year 
period 1980-1981. 
Finally, imports of raw materials and intermediate goods went down for the second year 
running (this time by 2%), after the substantial increases registered in 1978 and 1979, thus 
reflecting the contraction suffered by the economy in the last two years. If we compare the average 
rate for the period 1978-1979 with that for 1980-1981, we see that whereas in the first period the 
growth rate was of the order of 32%, in the last two years a negative rate of -10% was registered. 
Within this group, the drop in imports of raw materials for industry was the most significant 
because of the high weighting (24%) which these goods have in total imports. The drop in these 
imports in 1981 was only 3 % , butas they had gone down by 19% the year before, the average drop 
over these two years was 1 1 % . Even so, because of the big expansion registered in the two-year 
period 1978-1979, such imports grew altogether over the four-year period by 6%. Purchases of 
construction materials stagnated with respect to the year before, and this, together with the sharp 
drop registered in 1979, was a good illustration of the sluggishness of the construction sector (see 
table 14). 
Bolivia displays a very high degree of concentration of imports and hence of dependency with 
respect to particular geographical areas or zones. The countries which provide most of the imports 
are the same as those which receive most of Bolivia's exports, with one exception: in the last three 
years, Japan has been the second or third supplier of the Bolivian economy after the United States, 





Raw materials and 
intermediate goods 
Fuels, etc. 
Goods for agriculture 








(b) The current account position and its financing 
In 1981, the balance-of-payments current account deficit came to close on US$ 260 million: 
US$ 90 million more than in 1980. The reason for this deficit was the behaviour of the trade and 
services balances. 
As regards the merchandise trade balance, this achieved a surplus of a little over US$ 230 
million (approximately US$ 30 million less than in 1980). 
Consequently, the current account deficit was due entirely to the behaviour of the services 
balance, and more specifically to the deficit on the profits and interest section of this balance, 
which increased by US$ 60 million in 1981 —a rise of 22%. 
When this account is broken down it is seen that payments of profits increased by only US$ 3 
million, whereas payments in respect of interest rose by US$ 53 million —an increase of almost 
21%. Because of this rise and of the even larger ones which took place in 1979 and 1980, the 
amounts involved under this heading have increased almost five-fold since 1977 (see table 11). 
As a result of the foregoing, the relation between payments of profits and interest and exports 
has followed a steady upward trend with time. Thus, in 1977 payments of profits and interest were 
equivalent to 10% of exports, while in 1979 they amounted to 21%, and in 1981 they came to 31%. 
This is of course directly related with the inflow of foreign capital and particularly with the high 
level of external indebtedness recorded. Likewise, if we compare the growth rate of exports with 
that of payments of profits and interest, it must be concluded that in the most recent past the 
development of the economy can only have been based on progressively greater indebtedness. 
Thus, from 1977 to the present time the increases in payments of profits and interest have always 
been higher than the growth rate of exports. In 1977, the growth rate of payments of profits and 
interest was ten times greater than that of exports of goods and services; in 1979 profits and 
interest payments grew by 60% while exports only increased by 21%, and finally, in 1981, such 
payments abroad once again increased by 22%, while exports went down by a little over 2%. 
The net inflow of long-term capital during 1981 came to US$ 465 million: a figure unparallel 
since 1970 and representing an increase of 84% over the previous year. Within this category, the 
most important component was long-term loans, since the amount of capital received through 
direct investments was very small, totalling only US$ 35 million. In contrast, long-term loans 
amounted to US$ 430 million, meaning that they doubled in the space of a year. 
The main recipient of external credit was the official sector, consisting of general government 
and the Central Bank. This sector received external financing to the value of US$ 325 million: 
US$ 60 million more than in 1980. The constantly increasing indebtedness of the public sector 
underlines its difficulties in procuring the resources needed by it within the domestic economic 
system, so that it has been obliged to resort to external sources. Thus, in the period 1978-1981 the 
total net inflow of capital received by the public sector was nearly US$ 800 million, representing 
an average annual growth rate of 41%. 
The second place as regards need to obtain resources abroad was occupied by the category 
denominated "other sectors", which covers the transactions of State and private enterprises. The 
most important feature of the evolution of this category in 1981 was the fact that the net inflow of 
capital came to US$ 78 million, which represents a spectacular turnaround when one bears in 
mind that in 1980 the balance on this account was practically zero. 
Finally, imports of capital by the commercial banks —including the Banco del Estado, the 
private commercial banks and specialized banks— came to US$ 28 million, which also represents 
an increase over the previous year, although smaller than in the cases mentioned earlier. 
Movements of short-term capital changed direction in 1981. Thus, whereas in 1980 there had 
been a net outflow of the order of US$ 20 million, in 1981 there was a net inflow to the value of 
almost US$ 140 million. In this case, once again, the most important borrower of external funds 
was the official sector, whose debt situation had improved in 1980 but which deteriorated in 1981. 
The total loans received came to US$ 190 million, which represented exactly 60% of the long-
term capital received by the official sector. In contrast, the "other sectors" category showed a 
change in that instead of the imports of capital to the value of US$ 28 million recorded in 1980 it 
registered exports of capital to the value of US$ 59 million. 
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In 1981 there was a net outflow of almost US$ 360 million under the heading of errors and 
omissions, representing an increase of 37% (almost US$ 100 million) over the previous year and 
the highest value achieved by this item since 1970.2 
The difficulties which the external sector has had to face in the recent past clearly had 
repercussions on the international reserves of the country which sank by the end of 1981 to a 
negative figure of US$ 250 million. 
(c) External indebtedness 
The total contracted public debt in 1981 came to US$ 3 840 million, while disbursements 
amounted to US$ 424 million, representing a decrease of a little over 1% compared with 1980, 
when the growth rate was 33%. 
Amortization payments went down by over 16%, thus representing the third consecutive 
year in which there was a decline in repayments of the loans obtained, after the big rises registered 
in 1977 and 1978. There was also a very sharp drop in the growth rate of payments of interest, 
since the 1981 rate was only 10%, compared with the rates of between 50% and 35% recorded 
during the period 1977-1980 (see table 15). 
As a result of the foregoing, debt servicing went down by 1.4% in 1981, when it represented 
28% of exports of goods and services; the fact that this percentage was lower than in previous 
years was due to the postponement of outstanding commitments which was negotiated during the 
year. 
Certain features of external public indebtedness have become more marked in recent years. 
Thus, the two main agents in the policy of external indebtedness were the central government and 
public enterprises, whose total balances at the end of each financial year were never less than 80% 
of total public indebtedness. 
(d) The effective real exchange rate 
The policy of maintaining a fixed exchange rate with regard to the United States dollar was 
continued in 1981. Since domestic inflation was higher than international inflation —as was 
reflected in the behaviour of relative prices— the real exchange rate index deteriorated with 
respect to the currencies of Bolivia's main trading partners. The index of the effective real 
exchange rate suffered serious deterioration which affected both exports and imports: thus, 
between 1980 and 1981 the effective real exchange rate for exports dropped by almost 25 %, while 
that for imports went down by rather more than 22%, both of these declines being the severest in 
the whole decade (see table 16). 
Table 15 
BOLIVIA: EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT" 
(Millions of dollars) 
End-of-year balance 
Amortization payments 


























1978 1979 1980 
20.8 10.1 14.3 
168.3 -46.8 -15.2 





Debt servicing as a percentage 
of exports of goods and 
services 
22 49 31 27 28 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Disbursed public and State-guaranteed private external debt. 
2This item has the function of reconciling the difference between total income and payments and the final variations 
in the reserves. 
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4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices 
The inflationary climate within which the Bolivian economy had been evolving since 1979 
continued in 1981. Thus, the December-December consumer price index increased by a little over 
25%, which was slightly more than in 1980 but considerably lower than the 45% registered in 
1979 (close to half). Thus, the increase in domestic prices in 1981 .was the second highest since the 
mid-1970s (see table 17). 
The slight increase in inflationary pressures in 1981 observed when the December-December 
price index is compared with the previous year becomes an appreciable slackening when a 
comparison is made of the variations between annual averages, for the variation on these terms, 
which amounted to 47% in 1980, dropped to 32% in 1981. Both these rates are considerably 
higher than those for December to December because of the pronounced decline in the growth rate 
of prices which took place towards the end of 1981. 
The consumer price index did not follow a definite trend during the year. After the sharp and 
abrupt rise of over 12% which took place in prices in January, there were six months of increases 
which fluctuated around a monthly average of 0.9%; in August, prices rose by 6%, but then they 
went down by 0.6% in the last four months of the year. 
The performance of the price index during the year was conditioned mainly by the behaviour 
of the food component, which grew at a higher rate (almost 27%) than the December-December 
general index, this performance being due to increases of over 14% and 9% injanuary and August, 
respectively, followed by a drop of 3.2% in the last four months of the year. 
The housing component of the price index, in contrast, was that which increased least (20% 
from December to December), representing a further symptom of the recessive situation affecting 
the economy, which usually has a particularly marked effect on construction and housing prices. 
The other subgroups of the index, clothing and miscellaneous expenses, rose by around 23%. 
The wholesale price index rose rather more rapidly than consumer prices, since its 
December-December increase was 28%. Despite this, however, it showed a significant 
deceleration compared with 1979 and 1980, when it increased by around 43% and 35%, 
respectively (see table 17). 
Table 16 
BOLIVIA: EVOLUTION OF INDEXES OF EFFECTIVE REAL 
EXCHANGE RATE FOR EXPORTS A N D IMPORTS" 













































Fuente: Statistical Appendix. 
"These indexes correspond to the indexes of the real exchange rate of the peso with respect to the currencies of Bolivia's 




BOLIVIA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
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Source: National Statistical Institute (INE). 
Calculated on the basis of the fourth quarter of the previous year. 
Among wholesale prices, those which increased most were the prices of imported products 
(37%); the prices of domestic manufactured products rose by 31% (i.e., less than in 1979 and 
1980), while agricultural goods increased by only a little over 14%, that is to say, considerably less 
than in the previous three years (see table 17). 
Among the factors which helped to keep up the rate of inflation during the year, mention may 
be made of the persistence of a smaller but still significant fiscal deficit which it was necessary to 
finance, and the shortage of foreign exchange registered in the second half of the year, which 
forced businessmen to acquire foreign exchange on the parallel market at exchange rates 
considerably higher than the official one. 
(b) Wages 
The economic crisis, together with the highly inflationary nature of the previous three years, 
caused a sharp deterioration in purchasing power which culminated in the dramatic situation of 
1981. 
Thus, in 1981 wages were frozen and the only increases given were those corresponding to 
seniority. This meant that on average real wages went down by the extent that domestic prices 
went up (over 24%): a decline three times as great as the already considerable drop registered the 
year before. Thus, over the period 1979-1981 the purchasing power of real wages went down by 
one-third (see table 18). 
In 1979, real wages had gone up in five sectors —mining, manufacturing, "other industries", 
construction and transport— although the only significant rises among these were in the first and 
fourth of these sectors; in 1980 wages only went up in the electricity and gas sector (8%). Finally, 
in 1981 remuneration went down in all branches of economic activity. If we analyse the last three 
years as a whole, it will be seen that the workers who suffered the sharpest drop in their purchasing 
power were those in commerce (-40%) and those in banking and services (-34%). These were 
closely followed by the workers in manufacturing, transport, petroleum and electricity and gas, 
who suffered declines of between 29% and 30%. 
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Table 18 
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3 371 3 979 5 373 5 373 10.8 18.0 35.0 
Real wages (pesos at 1976 prices) 
2 168 2 226 2 092 1 584 -8.5 
7 469 7 030 6 971 5 277 25.6 
2 663 2 749 2 443 1 850 
2 891 2 975 2 784 2 108 -7.5 
2 466 2 819 2 546 1 929 
4 081 3 519 3 798 2 875 4.4 
3 940 3 780 3 157 2 390 
5 615 5 497 4 871 3 688 
3 290 3 306 3 001 2 272 
2 455 2 311 2 119 1 604 




























































-8.2 -24.3 -11.9 
Source: National Wages Council. 
"Does not include value of seniority bonus, which naturally varies for each worker. 
Wage-earning population 
Lowest-paid 4 0 % of the population 
Middle-income 4 0 % of the population 
Highest-paid 20% of the population 
Highest-paid 10% of the population 


























Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, Indicadores económicos de corto plazo, octubre de 1981. 
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This sharp drop had negative effects not only from the point of view of social stability, but 
also from the point of view of the process of economic development itself, since they negatively 
affected national expenditure and saving. 
According to the available information on the distribution of wages and salaries,3 which 
unfortunately only goes up to 1979, between 1975 and 1979 there was a progressive process of 
concentration of income as between the lowest and highest segments. Thus, whereas in 1975 the 
poorest 40% of the wage-earning population received 22% of total wages, four years later, i.e., in 
1979, they only received 20%. In contrast, the highest-paid 10% of the population saw their share 
of total wages and salaries increase over the same period from 26.5% to 30%. The 40% of the 
population in the middle wage groups, for its part, remained more or less stable during these years 
(see table 19). 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Evolution of the means of payment 
Compared with the year before, there was a sharp slackening in the growth of the means of 
payment in 1981, since they grew by only 20% after having increased by over 42 % the year before. 
This slower rate of expansion of the money supply was connected with the lower rate of inflation 
and the smaller fiscal deficit. 
The two components of the money supply grew considerably less than in 1980. The growth 
rate of money outside banks dropped from 31% to a little under 15% —the lowest figure in the 
last four years— while current account deposits, which had increased by the unusually large 
amount of 69% in 1980, grew by only 29% in 1981 (see table 20). 
The increase in the money supply was due to a rise of 9% in the factors of expansion: only 
one-third of the 1980 increase and approximately half that of 1979. The main factor promoting the 
increase in the means of payment was domestic credit, since the international reserves suffered a 
sharp drop in the course of the year. The decline in the reserves in 1980 had been twice that of the 
previous year, and in 1981 they again dropped by a similar proportion. Thus, rather than acting as 
a factor of expansion of the money supply, foreign assets played the role of a factor of contraction. 
In contrast, domestic credit increased by over 27% but although this is quite a high rate, it too 
was less than in the previous three years. Of the total amount of domestic credit, the Government 
received 20% more resources in 1981 than the year before: a growth rate which is considerably less 
than the 66% registered in 1978 and 1980 and the 100% rise registered in 1979. 
Between 1979 and 1981, according to information provided by the Central Bank itself, the 
amount of financing provided to the central government was much larger and grew more rapidly 
than that made available to other official entities. Thus, for example, in 1979 the credit received by 
the central government was seven times greater than that obtained the year before, whereas credit 
received by the rest of the public sector barely changed between 1978 and 1979- Asimilar tendency 
was observed in 1980, when the amount of resources received by the central government doubled, 
whereas those obtained by the rest of the public sector only increased by 51%. Finally, in 1981 
there was a considerable slackening in both these growth rates, which amounted to 40% and 7% 
respectively. To sum up, between 1979 and 1981 the means of payment placed at the disposal of 
the central government increased at the rate of 236% per year, while those of the other official 
entities only grew at the rate of 21% per year. 
In contrast with the foregoing, however, the financing received by the private sector in 1981 
rose by 30%, which was the highest growth rate since 1979 and was similar to that of 1978. 
Between 1970 and 1981, financing granted by the banking system to the private sector was 
concentrated basically in three sectors —commerce, industry and agriculture and stock-raising— 
which absorbed 70% to 90% of the total. A surprisingly small proportion of total financing has 
traditionally been received by mining (3% to 7% of the total), even though this is one of the most 
'See Central Bank of Bolivia, Indicadores económicos de corto plazo, October 1981. 
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important sectors in the economic system. This situation may partly be explained by the fact that 
short-term operations predominate in the banking system, whereas in mining investments have 
long lead times, and this involves greater risks. 
The factors of contraction of the money supply decreased by 8%: the first time this had 
happened since 1973. Among them, quasi-money continued the rapid growth rate begun in 1980, 
while savings and time deposits, which had grown by 33% in that year, rose by more than 40% in 
1981. In 1979 and 1981 , current account deposits grew considerably more than time deposits, but 
in 1980 the situation was exactly the contrary. The other factor explaining the reduction in the 
factors of absorption of money was the behaviour of long-term external loans, which, after having 
fallen by over 18% in 1980, rose by nearly 26% in 1981: a rate of change which was very far from 
those registered in the period 1978-1979 (see table 20). 
As already noted, the M[ money supply grew in nominal terms by 20%, whereas the M2 
money supply rose by 28%, likewise in current values. If the sharp price increases registered 
between December and December are taken into account, however (see the corresponding section 
of this chapter), then the real variation was negative, thus resulting in a contraction in the amount 
of money circulating in the economy. 
There was also an increase in interest rates during 1981, related with the contraction in the 
money supply, the effective rates of interest (including taxes and commissions) on credits granted 
to commerce and private individuals and to the productive sectors came to 32%, which represents 
an increase of 4 and 7 points over the 1980 levels (see table 21). When the variation between the 
annual averages of the consumer price index (32%) is taken into account, however, it is seen that 
the active interest rates and those on deposits in savings banks were negative. 
Another point worthy to note is the strong process of concentration of credit which has taken 
place, at least since 1979. Since that year, three departments —La Paz, Santa Cruz and 
Cochabamba— have received close to 85 % of the total financing provided by the banking system. 
In contrast, it is very striking to note that in 1981 the credit received by Beni and Pando went down 
by almost 83% compared with the year before. 
Table 20 
BOLIVIA: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside bank 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money 
Long-term foreign borrowing 
Counterpart funds 




























































































































BOLIVIA: STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 
(Percentages) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Loans 








Savings Bank deposits 
Fixed-term deposits in 
national currency" 


























































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Mean interest rate between maximum and minimum. 
Minimum value registered 
'Maximum value registered. 
(b) Fiscal income and expenditure 
In 1981, income increased by close to 18%, while total expenditure rose by a little over 13%. 
This meant that compared with what happened in 1979 and 1980, when the deficit grew by 121% 
and 46% respectively, the growth rate of the latter dropped sharply to only 7.5%. This marked 
slackening was due to the austerity policy followed by the Government since the beginning of the 
year, which was subsequently reasserted in the second half of the year through the adoption of a set 
of measures aimed at reducing public expenditure. 
As proportions of the gross domestic product, government income and expenditure showed 
significant reductions from 8.7% to 7.8% for income and from 15.9% to 13.8% for expenditure: a 
tendency which had already been observed in previous years, especially in the case of income, and 
which indicates the insufficient flexibility of the tax system to adapt itself to the evolution of the 
product (see table 22). 
Even in 1979, when income in terms of current pesos went down, it represented a higher 
proportion of the product than in 1981. In the latter year, the increase in income was markedly 
lower than that in domestic prices, so that in real terms income went down. 
Had it not been for the extraordinary increase registered in income from petroleum and gas 
royalties, which went up by a factor of 49% in the last two years, government income would not 
have increased at all or would have done so only very slightly. Revenue from internal taxes rose by 
14%, which was much less than in 1980; customs revenue rose by 23%, which was practically the 
same as the year before, and royalties from mining went down by half. Only the extra taxes on 
exports registered a sharp recovery (64%) after the abrupt fall suffered the year before, but their 
importance compared with other revenue is not very great. 
After the sharp rises registered in the previous two years (30% and 43%, respectively), 
public expenditure only rose by 13% in 1981. As in the case of fiscal income, this meant that real 
expenditure went down even more than income when the rate of inflation is taken into account. 
All the items making up government expenditure grew much more slowly than in previous 
years. Thus, personal services (wages and salaries) and non-personal services expanded by 14% 
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and 6% respectively, which is an enormous contrast with the increases of around 6 0 % in both 
cases registered in 1980. There was likewise a marked slackening in purchases of materials and 
supplies, which grew considerably less than in 1980, although between 1979 and 1981 they trebled. 
Purchases of fixed and financial assets and payments in respect of the issued public debt also 
increased, but by smaller amounts. Thus', after having grown by over 300% during 1980, financial 
assets only increased by 10% in 1981. Similarly, after amortization and interest payments had 
risen 57% in 1979 and had almost doubled in 1980, their 1981 growth rate was barely 16%. 
As a result of the higher growth rate of income than of total expenditure, the fiscal deficit 
increased by less than 8%, but even so the tendency of previous years persisted and the Central 
Bank had to continue to finance an increasing proportion of this deficit. 
Table 22 
BOLIVIA: MOVEMENT OF NATIONAL TREASURY FUNDS 




Additional export tax 
Mining royalties 





Materials and supplies 
Fixed and financial assets 
Public debt 











































































































































As percentages of the gross 
domestic product 
Current income 11.6 9.1 8.7 7.8C 
Total expenditure 15.0 16.3 15.9 13.8C 





1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981, for the first time in several decades, the Brazilian economy experienced a severe 
contraction, which was to a large extent linked to the stabilization policy begun in the second half 
of 1980, when the worsening of the inflationary process and the external imbalance brought about 
changes in the criteria for formulating and applying economic policy. In contrast, with previous 
years, in 1981 the goals of reducing inflation and improving balance of payments received absolute 
priority, and the achievement of minimum goals of growth of the economy and employment was 
no longer taken as the fundamental objective. 
At the same time, external circumstances were very unfavourable, since they were affected by 
the recession in the industrialized countries' economies, the intensification of protectionism in 
those countries, the loss of dynamism in world trade, the drop in commodity prices, the rise of 
interest rates in international financial markets and the rise of the dollar in relation to other main 
currencies. 
As a result of these different factors, the gross domestic product fell approximately 2% in 
1980, which in per capita terms meant a reduction of more than 4%. As a result of the marked 
deterioration in the terms of trade for the fourth consecutive year, real income showed an even 
greater reduction in both global (3.3%) and per capita terms (5.6%). In these circumstances, the 
rate of open unemployment in urban areas rose from 6.3% in 1980 to nearly 8% in 1981, thus 
contributing to the decline in living standards, particularly in urban industrial areas (see table 1 and 
figure 1). 
Inflation dropped from 110% in 1980 to 95% in 1981. However, when the data are analysed 
on a quarterly basis a much sharper downward trend can be observed, since the price variation 
went from an annual rate of 126% in the final quarter of 1980 to 69% in the fourth quarter of 
1981.' 
At the same time, there was a substantial improvement in the area of external transactions, 
with a positive balance in merchandise trade being recorded for the first time since 1970, while the 
current account deficit was reduced from US$ 12 900 million in 1980 to a little more than 
US$ 11 700 million in 1981. Thus the current account deficit represented only about 46% of total 
exports after having exceeded 50% of their value in six of the seven preceding years. The 
magnitude of the internal effort realized in order to improve the balance-of-payments current 
account position becomes even more obvious when one considers the negative effects of the 
deterioration in the terms of trade and of neoprotectionism, as well as the larger interest payments 
resulting from the rise in interest rates on international markets. In addition, a significant increase 
in the inflow of long-term capital made it possible to add US$ 845 million to the international 
reserves, which had been considerably reduced in the two preceding years and had fallen to critical 
levels. 
In line with the high priority given to the fight against inflation, monetary policy was 
particularly strict, especially during the first half of the year, giving continuity to actions begun in 
the second half of the previous year. Strict ceilings on growth of the monetary base and means of 
payment were established, and to this end rigorous limits were imposed on the expansion of 
domestic credit, except for preferential loans for agriculture, exports, the fuel alcohol programme 
(PROALCOOL) and credit granted on the basis of procurement of external resources. 
•In the first quarter of 1981, inflation was equivalent to a yearly rate of 137%. 
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In contrast, interest rates were freed, except for those in respect of preferential credits, and 
this, along with theheavy sales of Treasury bonds effected for fiscal purposes and for control of the 
means of payment, produced a significant rise in such rates. The external resources procured by 
the banking system did not succeed in attenuating the rise in internal interest rates, because of the 
combined effect of high external interest rates and the faster rate of devaluation of the cruzeiro. 
Table 1 
BRAZIL: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (billions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitans) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product . 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Real gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices' 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
General price index 
(domestic availability) 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries' 
Rate of urban unemployment s 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal surplus/total expenditure 
of government 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (good and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 


















































-2.5 -2.8 -0.9 12.8 30.3 
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-2 875 -5 033 -5 944 -1 624 
-7 039 -10 482 -12 848 -11 717 
4 640 -2 860 -3 322 845 
43 511 49 904 53 847 61400 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Consumer price index for Rio de Janeiro. 
''The general price index is a weighted average of the wholesale price index (60%), the cost-of-living index for Rio de 
Janeiro (30%), and the cost of construction in that City (10%). 
'Average nominal wage in industry. 
Percentage. 
'Weighted average of rates of unemployment in Rio de Janeiro, Sâb Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre. 
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Even so, in the end it did not prove possible to reduce credit to the public sector, and loans for 
priority activities expanded more than had been foreseen. In practice, the monetary policy was 
made more flexible in the second half of the year in response to pressure from business sectors 
affected by it and the stubborn fiscal deficit. 
Fiscal policy also sought to have a restrictive effect, and tried to balance the public finances 
through reduction of spending. 
To this end, measures were adopted to contain consumer spending and an attempt was made 
to reduce the volume of subsidies granted through the monetary authority2 by raising the prices of 
petroleum products so as to prevent a deficit on that account similar to that of the year before. 
However, at the same time, the fiscal subsidies to exports of manufactures were restored.3 
Similarly, substantial losses occurred in the marketing of some commodities (chiefly coffee, cocoa 
and sugar) because of the drop in international prices, and the subsidies granted through the 
interest rates on credits to the priority activities mentioned above were also greater. Furthermore, 
despite the fact that prices and tariffs of public companies and institutions were readjusted with a 
view to improving their profitability, the demands on the Treasury for larger financial transfers to 
cover the deficits of those entities4 had a negative effect on the objectives of curbing fiscal 
spending. Moreover, there were obvious difficulties in realizing the objective of reducing invest-
ment programmes, which clearly showed up, in addition to the rigidities inherent in prior 
commitments, the limitations of the administrative control mechanisms introduced two years 
before5 and the need for the programming of medium-term public investments. 
On the other hand, the decrease in the level of domestic economic activity meant a drop in tax 
collection in real terms, and in the final analysis this resulted in the persistence of the deficit in 
relation to total spending, although this deficit went down as a proportion of the gross domestic 
product. 
With regard to the external sector, economic policy was oriented towards strengthening the 
promotion of exports, curbing imports and procuring the long-term external resources needed to 
prevent a new drop in the country's international reserves. To this effect, the rate of exchange 
varied in line with inflation: the 1980 experiment of setting in advance the annual variation in the 
exchange rate was discarded. Similarly, in April the Government restored fiscal subsidies for 
exports of manufactures,6 which had begun to flag in the early months of the year as a result of the 
adverse external conditions mentioned above. For the purpose of promoting a better external 
trade balance, restrictions on imports were maintained and the rate of the tax on financial 
operations (10F), which has an influence on the purchase of foreign exchange for imports, was 
raised. However, the deterioration of the terms of trade meant that purchasing power of exports 
improved by only 5.5%, despite the fact that their volume increased by 25%. Furthermore, in 1981 
an extra US$ 2 600 million had to be paid in interest on the external debt. This increase was caused 
chiefly by the rise in interest rates on international markets and, to a lesser extent, by the bigger 
spread over the basic reference rates (LIBOR and prime rate)7 applied to Brazil. 
The economic policy applied in 1981 also included a series of wage and price measures. Price 
controls were eliminated, except for those on consumer goods of prime necessity, and wage 
legislation was modified to reduce increases in the higher wages, while the lowest wages were 
adjusted according to the national consumer price index, leaving aside the additional 10% granted 
since November 1979. 
2These subsidies are granted through "open accounts" in the monetary budget, which in reality constitute a form of 
public expenditure. 
'These subsidies involve the return of part of the taxes on industrial products (1P1). 
4The most serious situation was that of the National Social Security Institute (INPS). 
'In 1980 a Special Ministry for the Control of State Enterprises (SEST) was set up as a division of the Ministry of 
Planning of the Republic (SEPLAN-PR). 
6These had been eliminated in December 1979 at the time of the maxidevaluation of the cruzeiro (30%). This 
incentive was thus now added to that already being granted through credits at preferential rates. 
'London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and rate for first-class borrowers (prime rate) in the United States. 
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Figure 1 
BRAZIL: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
— *y 
Gross domestic product3 
Gross domestic income3 
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Consumer prices" 
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76 77 78 79 80 81 1970 71 72 73 74 75 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. 
''Percentage variation from December to December. Up to 1979 this corre-
sponds to the consumer price index for Río de Janeiro and from 1980 onwards 
to the consumer price index for the entire country. 
cMillions of dollars. 
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In sum, the economic policy measures applied in 1981 caused a contraction in domestic 
demand but stimulated exports, the expansion of which partly offset the drop in economic activity, 
which in turn was affected by the reduction of imports. The substantial increase in interest rates 
discouraged investment and the purchase of consumer durables and contributed to the reduction in 
stock levels, which had increased the previous year. To this was added the reduction in public 
expenditure in real terms. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
In 1981 total supply decreased by 2.4%: something which had not occurred since 1942. This 
drop was due to the contraction of the gross domestic product by about 2 %, plus the nearly 11 % 
reduction in the volume of imports of goods and services. There was thus a new reduction of the 
import coefficient, which fell to its lowest level in the last ten years (see table 2). 
As had happened in 1980, the behaviour of the coefficient of imports of goods and services 
contrasted with the exceptional expansion of the volume of exports, which came to 25%, thus 
exceeding both the extremely high rate recorded in 1980 (22%) and the 9% average recorded 
during the preceding 10 years. Exports consequently represented the only dynamic component in 
global demand and continued to be a characteristic feature of the prevailing style of development. 
On the other hand, the domestic demand components showed substantial reductions: consump-
tion fell 3.3%, whereas gross fixed investment went down 7.5% (see table 2). 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
With the exception of agriculture and electricity, gas and water, most activities developed 
unfavourably in 1981, with a particularly significant drop (-6.4%) in manufcturing. This decrease 
was the chief cause of the drop in the gross domestic product, over 26% of the latter decline being 
Table 2 
BRAZIL: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 











































































































Source: 1970-1980: ECLA calculations on the basis of figures supplied by the National Accounts Centre of the Getulio 
Vargas Foundation; 1981: ECLA estimates on the basis of figures from the same source, supplemented with data 
from the Central Bank of Brazil. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLA for the purpose. 
^Changes in stocks are included in private consumption. 
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attributable to it. Construction also registered a drop of more than 4%. The fall in these two 
sectors was reflected in commerce, which showed a decrease of 3 %, and in the sector of transport, 
storage and communications (see table 3). 
(i) The agricultural sector. In 1981 the agricultural sector showed a very high growth rate of 
close to 7%, a somewhat higher rate than the one recorded the year before. However, contrary to 
what had occurred in 1980, that rate was obtained because of the extraordinary recovery of the 
coffee harvest, which contrasted with the meagre results of most of the other crops. Thus, while 
coffee production rose 88%, that of the other crops showed a decrease of nearly 1 %. Livestock 
production, however, .developed positively, growing by nearly 6% and thus recovering the 
dynamism it had lost during the previous two years (see table 4). 
The negative performance of most of the crops was partly due to climatic problems, such as 
the frosts in the centre-south region and the traditional droughts in the northeast, but also partly 
reflected the effects of the Governments's policy of reducing preferential credit to medium-sized 
and large producers at subsidized interest rates. This charge offset to a certain extent the incentives 
granted through the fixing of minimum prices, which in many cases were higher than the average 
market prices of the products traded at the beginning of the harvest. 
The coffee harvest amounted to 3.8 million metric tons and was one of the largest in history. 
This exceptional result was basically due to the effects of the measures designed to recover the 
country's coffee production after the 1975 frost, which destroyed 1.5 million plants, and it showed 
that the harvest had not been affected by the frosts which occurred in the middle of the year, 
although these could nevertheless seriously affect the following year's crop. 
In addition to the excellent coffee harvest, the bean, sugar cane and orange crops also turned 
in a favourable performance. 
Table 3 
BRAZIL: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotelsc 
Financial institutions, insurance, 
real estate and business services 
Community, social and personal 
services 
Millions of dollars 





































































































Source: ECLA calculation on the basis of figures supplied by the National Accounts Centre of the Getulio Vargas 
Foundations. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 







































































































































Source: Agricultural Studies Centre of the Getulio Vargas Foundation. 
"Millions of hands. 
Millions of units. 
Despite the damage caused by the lateness of the rain in the northeast, bean production 
increased 19% after three years of continual decreases and thus exceeded the volume produced in 
1977. It was sufficient for supplying the internal market, although in that market high prices still 
prevailed as a result of the very bad harvest of the year before. 
Sugar cane production rose for the sixth consecutive year and showed an increase of 5%, 
similar to that of 1980. This development was directly linked to the security and encouragement 
provided by the National Alcohol Programme, although in 1981 the producers insistently 
demanded better prices. Part of the expansion was due to increased yields, but another chief cause 
was the enlargement of the area used for cultivation of sugar cane. This expansion, carried out in 
many cases in highly fertile zones, has displaced other crops, especially food crops, and has at the 
same time fostered concentration of rural property in the medium term.8 
Orange production continued the rapid growth it has been showing since the mid-1970s, 
attaining in 1981 a harvest of 57 000 million units. Thanks to that exceptional development, in a 
few years the country has attained an outstanding position among world exporters of concentrated 
orange juice, and in 1981 the value of orange juice exports rose to US$ 660 million: nearly double 
the figure for the previous year. This enormous increase was decisively influenced by the 
favourable international price attained by orange juice in 1981, as a result of the severe frosts that 
affected the crops in Florida and California, which also facilitated the liquidation of stocks held by 
Brazilian producers. 
During 1981 both maize and cotton production increased by approximately 3-5%. The 
increase in the maize harvest was influenced by the improvement in prices received by the 
farmers, whereas that of cotton was due largely to the favourable climatic conditions to its 
development. 





















Among the crops which showed decreases, soya production went down by a little over 1 % 
after having recorded an unprecedented harvest of 15.2 million tons the year before. This drop was 
entirely due to the reduction of the sown area in Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul, which was partially 
offset by an increase in yield caused by favourable climatic and plant health conditions. 
In contrast, the reduction of subsidies granted to wheat producers,9 the frosts in Parana and 
the lateness of the rains in Rio Grande do Sul were decisive factors in the 19% drop recorded in the 
harvest of this grain, which is the agricultural product having the greatest share in imports. Other 
crops whose production decreased substantially were rice (-15%), peanuts (-27%) and, to a lesser 
extent, cocoa (-5%). 
After the poor results recorded in the two previous years, cattle production rose at a 
satisfactory rate of close to 6%. Although cattle slaughtering increased by only 1 % and that of pigs 
3%, there was a big increase in the poultry slaughtering (14%). However, there was a substantial 
reduction in domestic consumption, despite the fact that meat prices increased less than the 
consumer price index for food products. This contraction in domestic consumption and the 
incentives granted to exports made it possible for external sales of chicken to increase by 90% and 
exports of frozen and processed beef to increase by 700% and 28%, respectively. Pork sales 
abroad, however, continued to be affected by the sanitary problems encountered for several years 
past. 
Finally, milk production increased by 9%, chiefly due to the good supply of pasturage and the 
partial change from beef stock to dairy stock. The readjustment of prices in the first half of the year 
also encouraged an increase in production. However, in the second half of the year prices decreased 
in real terms due to the production surpluses caused by the drop in demand. 
From the point of view of rural capitalization, the financial factors mentioned above, which 
involved a relative decrease in the volume of credit and an increase in the cost of financing, 
together with the unfavourable development of the prices of agricultural products in relation to 
those of industrial products, had an influence in the sharp drop in demand for tractors and 
agricultural machinery. Purchases of tractors on the internal market were 45% less than in 1980 
and amounted to only 39 100 units, a very low figure if account is taken of the natural attrition of 
the country's fleet, estimated at between 420 000 and 450 000 tractors. 
In addition, during the year severe drops were recorded in the apparent consumption of 
pesticides (-39%) and fertilizers (-35%), although in the latter case there had been a substantial 
accumulation of stock in late 1980 in anticipation of an increase in prices and interest rates. 
(ii) Mining. After growing very rapidly in the three preceding years, mining production 
stagnated almost completely in 1981 (see table 3). This was basically due to the fact that the 
substantial increase in petroleum extraction was offset by the drop in iron and manganese mining 
as well as that of non-metallic minerals (see table 5). 
The efforts of PETROBRAS in petroleum exploration and development10 resulted in an 
increase of slightly more than 17% in crude oil production and an increase of 8% in probable 
reserves, which at the end of December amounted to 1 440 million barrels. As in previous years, 
production from offshore deposits recorded a greater expansion (34%) than that of deposits 
located on land (6%), so that offshore production came to represent 47% of the total output of 
12.4 million cubic metres.11 Natural gas production, for its part, increased by 13% to 2 500 million 
cubic metres. 
On the other hand, lesser demand by the national iron and steel industry contributed to the 
4% drop in iron ore extraction. The volume of this mineral exported, however, increased by 8%. 
The Vale do Rio Doce Company produced 54 million tons, that is, 50% of the country's 
production, and in conjunction with its associated enterprises it exported 64 million tons, or 
three-quarters of the total exported by the country. 
'The financing of the "basic cost value" to medium-sized and large producers was fixed at 80% and 60%, respectively. 
""During 1981, PETROBRAS drilled 685 wells totalling more than one million metres, while the enterprises working 
under risk contract drilled 15 wells measuring a total of 90 000 metres. 














































































































Source: Ministry of Mines and Energy, Department of National Mining production (DNPM). 
"Preliminary figures. 
In metal content. 
'Millions of barrels. 
The internal recession and the drop in external demand affected manganese production, 
which decreased by approximately 20%. Industria e Comercio de Minérios, S.A. (1COMI), the largest 
national producer, recorded a smaller reduction of slightly over 5 %, due to the fact that nearly all of 
its production is oriented towards the external market. 
Among the non-ferrous minerals, bauxite production increased by 6.5%, after a large 
expansion (117%) in 1980 due to the opening of Mineraçâo Rio do Norte for production in 
mid-1979.12 
Copper production, which had been practically paralysed since 1975 on account of its high 
internal costs, began again in November 1980 in a new mine atjaguarari (Bahía), which exported 
most of its production in 1981 (60 000 tons of concentrate) due to the delay in the work on the 
Caraiba refinery. 
Zinc ore production was maintained at the equivalent of 80 000 tons of metal content, 90% of 
which was silicate ore used to supply the plants of the Compañía Minera de Metáis e Industrial 
Inga. The refinery at Paraibuna Metáis, which uses sulphide ore produced residually by Mineraçâo 
Boquira, had to import practically all the concentrate it needed. 
The production of cassiterite increased by nearly 14.3% to 7 800 tons in terms of tin content, 
with which it was possible to supply nearly all the needs of the refineries, which, for their part, 
experienced reduced domestic demand for this metal. 
Production of non-metallic minerals for its part, developed negatively in line with the drop 
experienced in demand for construction materials. 
As for mining projects, work was begun on the Grande Carajás infrastructure, for which 
credit was arranged on the basis of the advanced sale of 27 million tons of iron ore to Japan and 
several European countries. 
(iii) Manufacturing. For the first time in the entire post-war period, in 1981 the Brazilian 
industrial sector sustained a severe drop (-6.4%). This decrease amply exceeded the most negative 
predictions made at the beginning of the year, which had all agreed that there would be a 
deceleration in economic growth but had not predicted such a substantial contraction. The decline 
was not only marked but generalized, with the sectors producing consumer durables (-21%) and 
capital goods (-10%) being the most affected (see table 6). 
"Around 60% of the production wassentforexportinthelasttwoyears.However.it is estimated that the exportable 
surpluses of bauxite will decrease in the future when Alúmina do Norte, S.A. starts operating. 
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This negative development in the industrial sector chiefly reflected the effect of the restric-
tive economic policy begun in mid-1980, which was applied more emphatically in the first half of 
1981: the period which marked the greatest depression of the sector, as there were some signs of 
stabilization in the last quarter of the year. In fact, in many branches of industry the recession 
would have been greater had it not been for the excellent performance of exports of manufactures, 
the value of which went up 32%. 
The industries producing consumer durables were negatively affected chiefly by the rise in 
interest rates, the freeing of prices in the automobile sector and the decrease in purchasing power 
in the intermediate income groups: factors which, taken together, limited potential consumers' 
access to commercial credit. Other factors which reinforced the drop in demand were the increase 
in unemployment and the lack of job security resulting from the economic crisis itself, and the 
large volume of purchases made the year before under the stimulus of the negative real interest 
rates which prevailed during most of that year. 
The even more marked contraction in production of capital goods, for its part was caused 
basically by the drop in gross domestic investment. On the one hand, public investment was 
limited during 1981 in order to check the fiscal deficit; on the other, a role was played by the 
unfavourable expectations of private investors as regards the probable development of total 
demand, given the economic situation. Finally, a third adverse factor was the decrease of available 
investment resources for agriculture as a result of the restrictive measures mentioned above in 
relation to preferential credit to this sector. 
Table 6 
BRAZIL: GROWTH OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
BY TYPES OF GOODS AND GROUPS OF INDUSTRIES 
Total manufacturing production 










Clothing, footwear, knitted goods 
Plastic articles 
Toiletries, soaps and candles 
Rubber 
Paper and paperboard 
Chemical products 





Employment in industry 




































































































BRAZIL. MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION 
Passenger cars 
Light commercial vehicles 





Vehicles running on alcohol 
and on gasoline 
Vehicles running on gasoline 
Vehicles running on alcohol 
Conversion of vehicles running 
















































































Source: Central of Brazil, on the basis of figures from the National Association or Motor Manufacturers (ANFAVEA). 
"Including multi-purpose light commercial vehicles. 
Figures only cover passenger cars, light commercial vehicles and utility vehicles. 
The intermediate goods sectors —whose total production decreased by 7%— were held back 
by the negative growth of the two sectors mentioned above, inasmuch as the small drop (-0.5 %) in 
the consumer non-durables sector was the result of the combined effect, on the one hand, of the 
reduction of purchasing power in the domestic market and, on the other, of the compensatory role 
played by the increase in exports (especially those of soya oil and orange juice). 
Among the individual industrial branches, that of transport equipment registered the largest 
drop (-21%). This was basically due to the contraction in the automobile industry, whose 
production dropped 33%. Despite the fact that nearly 214 000 vehicles were exported (36% more 
than in 1980), the assembly companies had to accumulate additional stocks, since domestic sales 
fell by 41%. Among the factors which affected this industry, especially influential were the 
reduction in real remuneration experienced by the middle-income strata, the rise in interest rates 
in the financial market and the enactment of other specific measures for the sector, which severely 
limited demand for vehicles.13 
Especially severe was the drop in production of vehicles running on alcohol, which went 
down nearly 50% becauseof the sudden decrease in demand, in contrast with what had occurred in 
1980, when sales of this type of automobile increased sharply in response to possible additional 
restrictions on the consumption of gasoline because of the Middle East conflict. This decrease was 
due both to the successive increases in the price of the vehicles and the lack of confidence in 
predictions that there would be a sufficient alcohol supply.14 These factors were joined by the 
equalization of conditions of financing for alcohol- and gasoline-driven automobiles and by the 
proportionately greater rise in the price of alcohol than in that of gasoline. The lower production 
of alcohol- and gasoline-driven vehicles led to a decline in production of 32% for automobiles, 
36% for light commercial vehicles and 26% for trucks (see table 7). 
"Thus, in 1981 the price of automobiles (which had previously been controlled by the Inter-Ministerial Council on 
Prices) was liberalized. In addition, car license charges went up and the prices of fuels, gasoline and alcohol, were 
periodically increased significantly. Furthermore, from 1979 onwards the term of financing for the purchase of vehicles had 
been reduced to 18 months. 
MAs will be seen later on, such fears turned out to be groundless since there were surpluses which had to be exported. 
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In the case of the other items in the transport equipment category, the contraction of 
production was lower (-6%), although with great differences between the different activities. 
Thus, in the railroad sector, while production of railroad cars went down by 48% —which meant 
that only 13% of the installed capacity was used— and that of locomotives decreased by 5%, the 
manufacture of passenger trains grew by rather more than 4%, with more favourable prospects 
for the years to come because of demand from the Federal Railroad Network and the underground 
lines in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The shipbuilding industry also had a negative performance, 
reflected in the dismissal of workers and in the reduction of the degree of the production capacity 
used, which in October 1981 barely reached 23%. The aircraft industry was the only one which 
registered substantial expansion, thanks to the growing sales abroad by the Brazilian Aircraft 
Corporation (EMBRAER), both of commercial and military airplanes developed in the country. 
The electrical equipment branch suffered a contraction of 10% as a result of reductions in the 
output of household electrical appliances, sound equipment and television sets. 
Another branch whose production declined sharply was the mechanical engineering industry 
(-11%), although it managed partially to offset the drop in domestic demand caused by the lower 
investment through a substantial increase in external sales. 
As a result of the decreases in the branches mentioned above and of industry in general, the 
metal-working sector suffered a sharp depression both in the iron and steel and the non-ferrous 
metal areas. 
The iron and steel industry exhibited a severe contraction of around 15%, after a decade 
during which production grew at an average annual rate of 11 % (see table 8). Thus, production of 
non-flat rolled products dropped 10%, chiefly as a result of the reduction in purchases for civil 
construction and the mechanical engineering and transport equipment industries which, together, 
represent more than 75 % of demand for these products. For its part, the 19% drop in production 
of flat rolled products was influenced, in addition to the considerable decrease in purchases by the 
automobile, mechanical engineering and packing industries, by the paralysation for maintenance 
reasons of the three State enterprises producing this type of rolled product. This in turn led to an 
increase in imports of flat rolled products and semimanufactures. 
Table 8 
BRAZIL: IRON A N D STEEL PRODUCTION 
Thousands of tons Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Pig iron 9 380 10 017 11 704 12 685 10 705 17^5 6Í l o i S2 45~6 
Steel ingots 11164 12 107 13 891 15 339 13 218 21.0 8.4 14.7 10.4 -13.8 
Rolled product 8 538 10 173 H 706 13 028 11089 17.2 19.1 15.1 11.1 -14.9 
Flats 4 482 5 614 6 657 7 313 5 920 31.9 25.3 18.6 9.9 -19.0 
Non-flats 4 056 4 559 5 048 5 715 5 169 4.3 12.4 10.7 12.7 -9.5 
Source: Brazilian Iron and Steel Institute (IBS) and Conselho de N3b-Ferrosos e Siderurgia (CONSIDER). 
During the course of the year the expansion of the installed capacity of Usinas Siderúrgicas de 
Minas Gérais S.A. (US1M1NAS), was concluded, bringing it up to 3.5 million tons in terms of crude 
steel. Financial difficulties, however, delayed the expansion of the Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista 
(COSIPA), which was also scheduled to amount to 3-5 million tons of crude steel in 1984, and the 
construction of Açps Minas Gérais S.A. (AÇOMINAS), which may enter into operation in 1983 with 
a rolling capacity of 20 million tons. The Tubarao project, developed by a consortium of Brazilian, 
Italian and Japanese enterprises to produce semimanufactures, continued with no financing 
problems, and is due to enter into production in 1983. 
The non-ferrous metals industry also experienced a decline, with aluminium dropping 7.5%, 
copper (secondary) 29%, lead 20%, tin 11% and nickel 7.5%. The only item which registered an 
increase in production was zinc (10.5 %) , due to full operation of the Paraibuna de Metáis refinery. 
182 
BRAZIL 
The sharp decrease in consumption of non-ferrous metals was reflected in the 35 % decrease in the 
value of imports and the export of domestic production surpluses to a value of US$ 160 million. 
Despite the unfavourable performance of this subsector, work continued on the construction 
of large projects, such as the Valesul Aluminio aluminium plant (VALESUL) (with a production 
capacity of 60 000 tons of primary aluminium), the programmed expansions of the aluminium 
plants of the Aluminium Company of Canada (ALCAN) and the Companhia Brasileira do Aluminio, 
the Caraiba Metáis copper refinery ( 150 000 tons of electrolytic copper), and the Tocantins (4 800 
tons of electrolytic nickel) and CODEMIN (2 000 tons of nickel contained in ferro-nickel) nickel 
plants, which were scheduled to enter into operation in 1982, with the exception of Níquel 
Tocantins which began operations in November 1981. 
The general economic recession also affected other branches producing intermediate goods 
such as chemical products, paper and cardboard, non-metallic minerals and rubber, in which 
production went down between 3% and 6% (see table 6). 
Thus the only branch which grew in 1981 was that of food products (5.5%), due chiefly to 
external sales of processed soya products, coffee, orange juice and sugar. In the other consumer 
goods branches, in contrast, the evolution was unfavourable, although the reduction in output of 
clothing, shoes and knitted goods was only small (-1.5%), chiefly due to the increase in shoe 
exports. 
(iv) Construction. As a result of the negative evolution of domestic demand and particularly 
of investment, the construction product decreased by slightly more than 10%. 
Under the effects of a considerable decrease in real income and of the financial restrictions 
imposed on the public and private sectors by economic policy, the real estate market suffered a 
slump which was.only attenuated by the continuation of work begun in previous years. Measures 
relating to monetary adjustment and the maintaining of a relatively low limit on the portion 
financed by financial intermediaries15 had results which were not very encouraging. In the low-cost 
housing area, although there was a significant increase in loans by the National Housing Bank 
(BNH), the chief financial institution in this area, these did not serve to attenuate the contraction, 
since their total amount continued to be only small. 
Some of the most significant policy measures relating to the financing of housing in 1981 
were the creation of the savings book,16 the expansion of credit facilities for the construction of 
condominiums, and the adoption by the Brazilian Savings and Loan System of measures to make 
the circulation of credit among the different regions more fluid. 
In the area of large infrastructure works, the financial limitations of the public sector reduced 
investment by State enterprises and institutions, particularly in the area of road transport, which 
only showed signs of reactivation in the second half of the year. Hydroelectric projects were an 
exception, however, and showed greater dynamism due to the priority given by the Government to 
energy projects. 
(v) Energy. Because of the economic recession, consumption of electrical energy grew only 
slightly more than 3% and the increase in industrial consumption (0.2%) was the lowest in the 
last 20 years. Other forms of consumption of electricity also increased less than in previous years: 
commercial consumption increased less than 5% and residential 7.5%. 
During 1981 the share of thermal energy in the structure of electrical energy generation 
continued to diminish. Total generation of energy was 140 600 GWH, which represented an 
increase of 2.3% over 1980, and of this total 92% corresponded to hydroelectric energy. 
As part of the effort to replace thermal energy, which is very costly in terms of its 
consumption of oil, a scarce raw material in Brazil, some important energy projects were 
concluded while others were pursued. The interconnection between electricity systems of the 
north and the northeast was completed and will soon enable hydroelectric energy produced on the 
San Francisco river to reach Belém. This will make it possible to replace thermal electric 
"This limit was raised as from August. 
'This is a readjustable savings bank book with interest added quarterly, and includes life and disability insurance 
benefits. 
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generation, meaning lower oil consumption of the order of 15 000 barrels per day. During the year 
construction was begun on the Balbina hydroelectric power station (250 000 KW of installed 
capacity, scheduled to begin operation in 1986) to supply Manaos, a city currently serviced by 
thermal energy. The contract was also signed for the construction of the Itaparica hydroelectric 
power station, which will have an installed capacity of 2.5 million KW and should enter into 
operation in 1986. In 1982 the Emborcacao power station, with a capacity of one million KW, will 
begin operation. 
In addition, construction continued on what will be the two largest hydroelectric power 
stations in Latin America: that at Itaipú (12.6 million KW) whose flood-gates will be closed in the 
fourth quarter of 1982 and whose first three turbines are expected to begin operation in mid-1983; 
and that at Tucurui (7.9 million KW) in Para State, which will begin operation at the end of 1983 
and is to supply the energy needed for the aluminium and Grande Carajás projects. 
The execution of the Nuclear Programme, for its part, will involve (according to a decision 
adopted by the Government in February 1982) the construction of nine plants (of 1200 MWeach) 
by the year 2000. Of these, Angra I is at the stage of operational testing, Angra II is under 
construction and is hoped to enter into operation in 1987, and construction of Angra III will begin 
in 1984. All these plants are located along the coast of the State of Rio de Janeiro. Four others may 
possibly be located in Sao Paulo, and another two, whose location has not yet been determined are 
due to be constructed subsequently, subsequently.17 
The policy of restricting the consumption of petroleum products, together with the contrac-
tion in economic activity, brought the apparent consumption of those products down by 8%. The 
decrease in the consumption of fuel oil was particularly sharp (-20%), mainly as a result of the 
continuation of fuel-substitution programmes in various branches of industry (see table 9). In 
addition, the reduction in the domestic consumption of petroleum products made possible their 
export in an amount equivalent to 10 million barrels of petroleum. 
The considerable increase (17%) in production of crude oil, for its part, makes it possible to 
cover the apparent consumption despite the fact that the volume of imports went down for the 
second consecutive year (see table 10). 
The National Alcohol Programme (PROALCOOL), on the contrary, had a more moderate rate 
of execuion in 1981, due to the evolution of the economic situation in general. Thus, production of 
vehicles running on alcohol registered a sharp drop, and the total number of vehicles of this type in 
Table 9 
BRAZIL: APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
Millions m3 , , , ° Growth rates 



































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and National Petroleum Council. 
Includes "B" gasoline, lubricants, household kerosene, aviation kerosene, solvents, asphalts, naphthas and gasolines and 
anhydrous and hydrated alcohol. 
"During 1981 some controversy arose concerning the higher investment costs of nuclear plants. According to 
NUCLEBRAS, the average investment per installed KW in nuclear power stations is approximately US$ 1 488. On the 
other hand, it is estimated that for the large hydroelectric power stations, including Itaipú, the average investment per KW 
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil, National Petroleum Council and External Trade Foundation, Boletín N° 21, February 
1982 (1981 imports). 
Table 11 
BRAZIL: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES I N MAIN URBAN CENTRES 
Main cities 

























































































Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatistica (IBGE), Pesquise Mensal de Empresas (PME). 
"Weighted according to the population of each city. 
service amounted to only 440 000 units, i.e., 62% of the figure laid down in the Brazilian Energy 
Model.18 This meant not only a reduction in the number of new alcohol distillation projects, but 
also the generation of alcohol surpluses which were partially exported. With a view to avoiding the 
generation of greater surpluses, at the end of the year the Executive Commission on Alcohol laid 
down some regulations which will make the approval of new distillery projects more difficult in 
the future. 
(c) Developments in employment and unemployment 
The unfavourable performance of the economy in 1981 seriously affected the employment 
situation.19 The recession particularly influenced the industrial sector, causing a substantial drop in 
industrial employment, with resulting pressures on the service sectors and a rise in the unemploy-
ment rate in the main metropolitan regions from an annual average of 6.3% in 1980 to 7.9% in 
1981. The greatest deterioration in employment levels was recorded in Sao Paulo, where the 
l8The Brazilian Energy Model is the basic document establishing the strategies for government action in the energy 
sector. Under its terms, an agreement was established between the Government and the National Association of Motor 
Manufacturers providing for a fleet of 717 000 alcohol-fuelled vehicles by 1981, 550 000 of which were to be new vehicles 
and the rest gasoline-fuelled vehicles converted to run on alcohol. 
"It should be pointed out that the employment statistics do not reflect the full seriousness of the employment 
situation in 1981, given the existence of an extensive informal labour market not covered by labour legislation, which helps 
mask, to a certain extent, the worsening of unemployment. The Pesquisa Nacional de Amostras Domiciliares (PNAD) 
includes various statistics which confirm the importance of the informal labour market. According to the 1979 PNAD 
survey, }1% of employed persons throughout the country received income not higher than one minimum legal wage unit 
(964 dollars per year). Similarly, it was observed that 29% of employed persons did not have working papers, which are 
obligatory by law in order to be able to exercise a paid activity. 
185 
unemployment rate went from an annual average of 5.6% in 1980 to 7.7% in 1981. However, the 
highest unemployment rates were recorded in Salvador and Belo Horizonte (9%) while the lowest 
(5.8%) was once again in Porto Alegre (see table 11). In the industrial sector employment went 
down by 7% compared with the average level in 1980. As from March, it began to fall rapidly, so 
that from August onwards the number of persons employed in industry was lower than in 1976, 
and in the last quarter of 1981 it was 12.7% lower than it had been in the same period in 1980 (see 
table 12). In addition, the drop in employment was widespread throughout the manufacturing 
sector, affecting all industrial branches, although with different degrees of intensity. The most 
seriously affected were the transport equipment, electrical equipment, rubber, plastics and tobacco 
industries, which at the end of 1981 registered a decrease in employment of over 20% compared 
with the average for the previous year. 
3. The external sector 
In 1981 external trade evolved favourably, and indeed one of the few positive aspects of the 
country's economic performance was the conversion of the 1980 merchandise trade deficit of 
US$ 2 800 million into a surplus of US$ 1 200 million in 1981, the first recorded since 1970.20 This 
reversal, of the order of US$ 4 billion, was due to an increase of nearly US$ 3 200 million in 
expqrts and a drop of US$ 900 million in imports. 
At the same time, the non-financial services deficit went down by approximately US$ 390 
million, especially in the transport and travel areas, and this together with the developments in 
merchandise trade, made it possible to reduce the deficit on trade in goods and services from 
around US$ 6 billion in 1980 to US$ 1 600 million in 1981. 
The financial services section of the balance-of-payments current account, in contrast, 
showed an unfavourable development due to the increase in interest rates in the international 
financial markets and, to a lesser extent, the increase in the external debt. The amount of external 
interest payments increased by around US$ 2 600 million, totalling more than US$ 10 billion. As a 
result, the substantive improvement registered in the trade balance did not bring about a similar 
reduction in the current account deficit, which went from US$ 12 850 million in 1980 to 
US$ 11 700 million in 1981. 
The surplus of around US$ 12 500 million on the capital account of the balance of payments 
made possible an increase of US$ 845 million in the international reserves, which had reached a 
critical level after two consecutive years of considerable losses. 
The favourable result achieved in external merchandise trade was due, on the one hand, to the 
application of global policies which resulted in the contraction of the economy, generating 
exportable surpluses and decreasing the need for imported goods and, on the other, to specific 
external trade policy measures which, as in previous years, were oriented simultaneously towards 
stimulating exports and restricting imports.21 
In order to stimulate exports, it was decided to adjust the exchange rate according to domestic 
inflation, without applying adjustments for external inflation. During 1981, the exchange rate was 
adjusted 35 times (practically three times per month), and by the end of the year the devaluation of 
the cruzeiro came to 95.1%: a rate practically equal to that of inflation.22 
Secondly, from April onwards it was decided to restore the fiscal susidies for exports of 
manufactures, which had been eliminated in December 1979 as part of a set of measures which 
included a special 30% devaluation of the cruzeiro. The new subsidies consist of a payment linked 
20As from the second quarter there was a steady improvement in the merchandise trade balance, which showed a 
surplus from September onwards. 
''Procurement of external credits was also encouraged. 
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Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatistica (IBGE), Indicadores Conjunturais da Industria, March 1982. 
to the FOB value of the exports and are equal for all the eligible sectors.23 At the same time it was 
announced that these subsidies would gradually be eliminated by 30 June 1983, with their level 
going down as follows: in 1981, 15% of the FOB value of the exports; in 1982, 9%; from January to 
June 1983, 3%, and as from July 1983, 0%.24 
This scheme is similar to the one which was introduced in January 1979 to replace the old 
system of fiscal subsidies so as to fulfil Brazil's commitments in GATT, and it is in line with the 
country's rights and obligations as a member of that organization.25 
In addition, during the year preferential interest rates were maintained for financing export 
production. Despite the fact that these rates were increased from 35% to 40% the benefits of this 
incentive increased —without this being an explicit element of trade policy— due to the sharp rise 
in market interest rates. 
With regard to import policy, most of the measures taken in recent years, which were in 
principle of a transitory nature, were maintained, although in a few cases with narrower coverage, 
as in the case of the additional duties on a series of products (measures taken between 1974 and 
1976), the suspension of the granting of import licenses for products considered to be of a luxury 
"The new fiscal subsidies differ from the old system in that they consist of cash payments made through private banks 
some time after the exchange or export contract has been made official, while under the old system the businesses receiving 
subsidies deducted the amount of these from the fiscal debts (IPI ) which they had accumulated in respect of their operations 
in the domestic market. However, in the administration of the fiscal accounts the fiscal export subsidies continued to be 
deducted from the tax on industrial production (IPI) revenue, so that from the accounting point of view they represent 
smaller tax revenue rather than greater fiscal expenditures (see section on fiscal policy below). 
24It should be noted, however, that in November 1981 it was decided to delay the gradual reduction of the subsidy 
planned for the year 1982, and the following scheme was adopted: up to 30 March 1982 the level would remain at 15%; up 
to 29 June 1982, 14%; up to 29 September 1982, 12.5%; and up to 31 December 1982, 9%. 
"In line with the interpretations agreed upon at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Tokyo Round) regarding 
GATT articles VI (anti-dumping and compensatory duties), XVI (subsidies) and XXIII (protection of concessions and 
advantages), Brazil, as a developing country, has maintained its right to grant subsidies to exports of industrial products, 
provided they do not cause harm to a specific industry in other member countries. On the other hand, Brazil has undertaken 
gradually to eliminate fiscal subsidies. In a few cases, where there were or could be claims for damages caused by increases in 
subsidized imports of Brazilian products, it was decided to neutralize the fiscal subsidies by applying a tax, in an amount 
practically equal to the subsidy, to exports to those specific markets. Thus export taxes were imposed on the following 
products being exported to the United States: textiles and textile manufactures; products made from leather, rubber, 
plastics and other materials; men's and boys' leather clothing; leather footwear; non-prepared cotton yarn for wholesale 
sale; pig iron; certain types of scissors; certain castor-oil products, and leather bags. In the case of women's footwear there is 
also a tax on exports to the European Economic Community. 
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nature (enacted in 1976), and the application of the Financial Transactions Tax (lOF) to exchange 
operations in connection with imports ( this tax was raised to 25 % as from 1 January).26 There was 
also continuation of the control on external purchases by the public sector,27 the pressure to obtain 
external financing for the importation of an extensive range of products, and the requirement that 
advance authorization must be obtained from CONSIDER for the importation of a large number of 
iron, steel and mineral products. 
As from the end of 1980 the "Chief importers"28 were obliged to submit annual importation 
programmes which in principle must not exceed the value of the imports made the previous year. 
Despite the fact that this measure was of a restrictive nature, since the increase in import prices 
reduced the authorized volume of imports, in practice it appears to have facilitated the granting of 
import licenses and made it unnecessary to use administrative delays as a means of discouraging 
imports. 
In addition to the restrictive policy, the drop in imports was also influenced by the contraction 
in domestic production, the lack of incentives to form speculative stocks of goods, as a result of the 
exchange policy adopted during 1981 and the rise in interest rates, and the continuation of the 
long-term policy of import substitution. 
Despite the new policy adopted in the area of devaluation of the cruzeiro, the index of the 
average real exchange rate in 1981 decreased significantly compared with the figure for 1980, the 
drop being 8.5% when calculated with respect to the dollar (see table 13). 
Table 13 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, May 1982, and Getulio Vargas Foundation, 
Conjuntura Económica, February 1982. 
26As from 5 March the tax on import operations from ALAD1 countries was reduced to 20% (BACEN resolution 683). 
"In January the ceiling for external purchases by public enterprises, excluding oil and wheat, was fixed at US$ 3 600 
million. 
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Source: Statistical Appendix. 
° These indexes were obtained by adding together the real exchange rates in relation to each country, weighted according to 
the geographical composition of exports or imports, taking into account the main trade flows of Brazil. The real exchange 
rate index in relation to a specific country was obtained by dividing the exchange index as between Brazilian currency and 
that of the country in question by the price index of Brazil and the corresponding price indexes of the other country, 
preferably using the wholesale price index. In the case of imports, the indexes for Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Kuwait 
were used as indexes of petroleum prices. There are 13 countries included in the estimates for exports and 15 in those for 
imports, representing 65.2% and 82.4% of Brasil's external trade for the period 1975-1979, respectively. 
If instead of analysing the relationship between the cruzeiro and the dollar, however, an 
analysis is made between the cruzeiro and the group of currencies of the countries with which 
Brazil maintains major trade relations, it will be observed that the evolution of the real exchange 
rate was a good deal more unfavourable in 1981. Weighted according to the geographical 
composition of Brazilian trade, the decrease in the effective real exchange rate amounted to 17.5% 
for exports and 12.8% for imports (see table 14 and figure 2). These decreases were chiefly due to 
the sharp rise in value of the dollar in relation to the European currencies and to the more than 
300% devaluation of the Argentine peso.29 It was to a large extent this deterioration in the real 
exchange rate which made it necessary to restore export subsidies so as to ease the difficulties 
which exporters of manufactured goods were beginning to have in selling their products abroad. 
Even so, the data in the form of annual averages do not correctly reflect the changes in 
exchange policy which occurred in 1980 and 1981. Thus, the drop in the annual average real 
exchange rate in relation to the dollar reflected the high level the former had attained in the early 
months of 1980 as a result of the severe devaluation of the cruzeiro effected in December 1979. 
However, during the course of 1980 the rate deteriorated considerably because of the policy of pre-
fixing the increase in the nominal exchange rate, which gave rise to a rate of devaluation that was 
much lower than the inflation registered that year. This caused a decrease in the real exchange rate, 
which went down from 134.7 in the first quarter of 1980 to 111.5 in the fourth quarter of the same 
year; in the first quarter of 1981 it again decreased, sinking to 108.2.30 
Later on, however, the real exchange rate began to recover gradually, rising to 114.7 in the last 
quarter (see figure 3 and table 13). 
29In this connection, see the section on Brazil in the appendix on effective exchange rates at the end of this Survey. 
'"This value was practically equal to the index for the second and third quarters of 1979 (107.4), before the maxi-
devaluation of the cruzeiro. In other words, the export sectors had totally lost the advantages of the maxi-devaluation. 
Consequently, the elimination of the fiscal subsidy for manufactured products and the application of export taxes to a series 
of commodities, which had been compensated by the maxi-devaluation of December 1979, involved net losses in terms of 
external competitiveness by the beginning of the year. 
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Figure 2 
BRAZIL: EVOLUTION OF THE EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 
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Figure 3 
BRAZIL: EVOLUTION OF THE ADJUSTED REAL EXCHANGE8 
(1973 = 100) 
Quarter
 1 9 g 0 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
May 1982, and Getulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura 
Económica, February 1982. 
aCruzeiros per dollar. 
(a) Merchandise trade 
(i) Exports. In 1981 the growth of the value of exports was again spectacular (16%); it should 
be noted that in nine of the last twelve years their rate of expansion has been higher than 15 % (see 
table 15). This increase in exports, it is true, was far below the initial goal of 30%, but the fact that 
that objective was not reached was due chiefly to external factors, such as the drop in the 
international prices of export products (especially commodities) and the very low growth of world 
trade caused by the economic recession in the industrialized countries and the recurrence of 
protectionist pressures in them. Nevertheless, after an unsatisfactory performance by exports in 
the first quarter, their rate of expansion improved during the rest of the year. 
The evolution of the value of exports by product groups was highly uneven; while 
commodities grew by only 5% and semi-industrialized products dropped 11.7%, manufactured 
products increased 32%, repeating their extraordinarily high growth of the five previous years. 
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Table 15 
BRAZIL: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 16 
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Source: Banco Do Brasil S.A., Carteira de Comercio Exterior (CACEX). 
"Preliminary figures. 
The composition of this item was charged as from 1980. 
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The process of diversification of exports also continued to gather pace, so that the share of 
commodities in total exports of goods fell from nearly 75% in 1970 to 38% in 1981, while that of 
manufactured products more than tripled, going from 15 to 51% (see table 16). 
At the same time, the process of geographical diversification of exports continued. The value 
of exports of developing countries grew much more rapidly (30%) than that of sales to developed 
countries (6%) and was responsible for 63% of the total increase in exports. The increase in sales 
to the first-named group of countries was stimulated in particular by the 59% growth in exports to 
petroleum-exporting countries; sales to the other developing countries rose 24%. The dynamism 
of exports to African petroleum-exporting countries was particularly significant. Exports to ALADI 
countries grew by 22%, despite the economic difficulties experienced by Argentina (Brazil's chief 
market within ALADI) which caused a 19% drop in the value of exports to that country. Excluding 
Argentina, the value of exports to ALADI grew by 41% (see table 17). 
The dynamism of exports to the different industrialized countries was very diverse. While 
sales to the United States grew by 17 %, those to the European Economic Community (EEC) rose by 
only 9%, and sales to Japan stagnated. This phenomenon partly reflected the loss of 
competitiveness of exports to Europe caused by the rise in value of the dollar with respect to the 
European currencies and was partly due also to the greater share of commodities —whose prices 
suffered sharp decreases— in exports to the EEC and Japan. 
However, the lesser dynamism of exports to the developed economies as a whole was also due 
to some extent to the lower economic growth in those countries, as well as to the intensification of 
protectionism, with its resulting effects on the growth of their external trade and, in some cases, on 
the conditions of access of Brazilian products to their markets. 
Table 17 
BRAZIL: EXPORTS OF GOODS, BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES 







































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Carteira de Comercio Exterior (CACEX). 
"Ten countries. 
Austria, Norway, Portugal,Sweden,Switzerland,Spain, Finland, Iceland, Yugoslavia, Malta, Turkey, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa. 
includes socialist countries of Asia. 
Excludes Ecuador y Venezuela. 
Total 
1. Developed countries 
United States, Canada, 
European Economic 







2. Eastern Europe 




Supplies to ships and 
airplanes; not declared 
193 
Despite the drop of somewhat more than 10% on average in the price of commodities, the 
volume of them exported rose 16%. Especially unfavourable effects were produced by' the 
decreases in the prices of such important commodities as coffee,51 cocoa and sugar, which 
confirmed especially in the first two cases, a downward trend in the medium term. Chiefly for this 
reason, the total value of exports of these three products dropped 31 %. On the other hand, exports 
of soya cake grew at an extraordinary rate (47%), due both to the greater volume exported (35%) 
and to the increase in the export price. For their part, exports of iron ore increased 11% in value 
and 8% in physical volume. 
The approximately 12% decrease in the value of exports of semi-manufactured products 
was partly due to a slight reduction in the volume exported, but chiefly to the lower export prices 
(-10%). 
The value of exports of manufactures, on the other hand, grew by 32%, despite the slight 
drop in prices. This favourable performance, moreover, included nearly all the product groups 
making up that division. Specially noteworthy, however, were the increases in sales of organic 
chemicals, petroleum products, concentrated orange juice, footwear, transport equipment and 
paper. In absolute terms the sector which contributed the most to the increase in exports of 
manufactures was that of transport equipment, whose external sales grew by more than US$ 500 
million to a total of more than US$ 2 billion in 1981: a value larger than that of sales of raw coffee 
and lower only than exports of soya meal and cake (see table 16). The increase in exports of 
manufactures such as automobiles and tractors, was partially facilitated by the sharp contraction in 
domestic demand. 
(ii) Imports. In 1981 the value of imports came to US$ 22 billion: 4% less than in 1980 and 
approximately US$ 3 billion less than the initial predictions of the economic authorities. 
Furthermore, the growth rate of the accumulated value of imports declined steadily in the course of 
the year (see table 18). 
Table 18 




















































































The basic cause of the decrease in the value of imports was the marked drop in their volume, 
which dropped by more than 13%, after having gone down marginally during the previous year 
(see table 15). This decline was due not only to the contraction in domestic economic activity but 
also to the continuing policy of containing purchases abroad, to the fact that there was no longer 
any incentive for forming speculative stocks, and, in general terms, to the long-term policy of 
import substitution. 
The downward trend in the merchandise import coefficient consequently continued in 1981, 
with the volume of such goods similar to or lower than that attained in 1977 and 17% lower than 
the extremely high level registered in 1974, which was when the restrictive policy which has 
continued in effect, with periodic alterations, began to be applied. 
3
 'It may be noted that as a result of the drop in the price of coffee, Brazil lost more than US$ 1 billion in export income 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Carteira de Comercio Exterior (CACEX). 
"Ten countries. 
4
 Austria, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Finland, Iceland, Yugoslavia, Malta, Turkey, Israel, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa. 
'Includes socialist countries of Asia. 
Excludes Ecuador and Venezuela. 
Of the major product groups, only the value of imports of fuels grew significantly (11%), 
despite the fact that their volume decreased by 5%. In contrast, the value of imports of other 
intermediate goods decreased by nearly 19%. Within this group, there were particularly sharp 
reductions in the value of imports of inorganic chemical products (-47%), organic chemical 
products (-28%), fertilizers (-43%)52 and copper and copper manufactures (-38%). Only iron and 
steel imports grew significantly (24%),33 despite a 14% reduction in their prices. 
The value of imports of consumer goods also decreased drastically for the second year in a row 
(-17% in 1980 and -25% in 1981) and represented barely 4.5% of total imports. The value of 
capital goods purchases also decreased, although to a much smaller extent (-8%). Their share in 
total imports consequently also decreased, amounting in 1981 to less than half the value recorded 
in 1970 (see table 18). 
The largest drop in import value by geographical origin was registered by imports from the 
developed countries (-14%). Brazil's purchases in the United States and the member countries of 
the European Economic Community decreased by around 15 %, but those effected injapan grew by 
18 %, confirming once more the growing importance of that country as a trade partner of Brazil in 
the last decade (see table 19). Purchases in developing countries (other than those belonging to 
'
2This sharp drop appears to have been caused chiefly by the reduction in the subsidized credit for the purchase of this 
product and the high levels of stocks held at the beginning of the year. 
"The growth of these imports was due to the increase in drawback operations and the reduction of production on 
account of the shutting down of the blast furnaces of the three State iron and steel companies for four months, for 
maintenance reasons. 
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OPEC) increased by 12% and, as in the two previous years, grew at a greater rate than those in 
developed countries. Similar behaviour was shown by imports from member countries of ALADI, 
whose share in Brazil's total imports went up from around 10% in 1970 to over 14% in 1981. 
Finally, purchases in the Eastern European countries decreased by 3% and only slightly exceeded 
the amount reached in 1976 (see table 1S^ . 
(iii) The terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports. In 1981, for the fourth 
consecutive year, the terms of trade once more suffered a significant drop, bringing their value, on 
the basis of 1970=100, to barely 56. This decline was due to a 7.5% drop in export prices and an 
11 % increase in import prices chiefly caused by the 16% rise in the price of fuels and lubricants 
(see table 15). 
As a result of the unfavourable evolution of the terms of trade, the increase in the purchasing 
power of exports of goods in the last two years has been much lower than the growth in their 
physical volume. Thus, between 1977 and 1981 exports of goods, expressed in constant 1970 
prices, increased by US$ 4 400 million, i.e., at the exceptionally high annual rate of nearly 18%. 
During the same period, however, the purchasing power of exports grew by only US$ 715 million 
(3-3% annually), which represented a loss, as an effect of the deterioration in the terms of trade, of 
more than US$ 4 billion at 1970 prices. 
(b) Services trade and factor payments 
(i) Tourism and transport. In 1981 the traditionally negative balance of trade in non-financial 
services generated a deficit of slightly more than US$ 2 800 million: 9% less than in 1980. The 
reduction of the deficit in the area of transport and insurance was closely linked with the evolution 
of trade flows. The contraction in imports was reflected in a slight reduction in outgoings, whereas 
revenue again confirmed the upward trend of recent years. This trend is linked to the expansion of 
the Brazilian merchant fleet and to the growth in exports, especially in those areas where 
participation by Brazilian transporters is most feasible. In tourism there was an increase in 
revenue, chiefly because of the greater influx of Argentine tourists in the early months of the year, 
but this dropped substantially in the following months because of the considerable devaluation of 
that country's currency as from March (see table 20). 
(ii) Profit and interest payments. The deficit in these two areas rose in 1981 to nearly 
US$ 10 300 million (US$ 3 200 million more than in 1980), out of which US$ 390 million 
corresponded to larger remittances of profits and around US$ 2 800 million to greater interest 
payments. 
The net balance in the area of interest payments increased 45%, confirming past trends 
which are closely connected to the level of the external debt but which in 1981 were accentuated 
both by the rise in interest rates in the international financial markets and the bigger spreads 
charged to Brazil over the basic reference rates.34 
Net payments of profits abroad increased 54%, with a markedly greater increase in the area 
of reinvested profits. The latter was due to the fact that the rise in external interest rates 
encouraged reinvestment of profits by foreign businesses located in Brazil. 
(c) The current account position and its financing 
The deficit on the current account of the balance of payments in 1981 amounted to 
US$ 11 700 million: nearly 10% less than the 1980 deficit. The ratio between this deficit and the 
value of exports of goods and services likewise decreased for the second consecutive year, 
amounting to 46% in 1981: considerably less than the 63% recorded in 1979.35 
54The spreads charged to Brazil amounted in 1981 to 2 1/8 over LIBOR, in comparison with 1.4% in 1980 and 0.8% in 
1979. 
"The ratio between the current account deficit and exports fell throughout the period 1974-1977, reaching a 
minimum of 39% in 1977, chiefly due to the increase in the physical volume of exports, the reduction of the physical 
volume of imports arid the sharp increase in export prices. In contrast, the increase in the physical volume of imports and 
the deterioration of the terms of trade caused this ratio to rise in 1978 (51%) and 1979 (63%). The subsequent reduction 
occurred despite a continued deterioration in the terms of trade and a growing rate of external interest payments that was 




BRAZIL: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
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Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
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(minus sign indicates and increase) 
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Source: 1976-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of official 
data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but exclude profits and interest. 
c
 In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
''This difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents the value of 
counterpart items: monetization or demonetization of gold, allocation or settlement of Special Drawing Rights, and 
variations due to revaluation. 
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In contrast with what occurred in 1979 and 1980, the 1981 current account deficit was 
financed entirely from the net inflow of external capital, which also enabled the international 
reserves to be increased by US$ 845 million. 
The net inflow of long-term capital came to slightly more than US$ 11 500 million, of which 
a little over US$ 2 300 million represented direct external investment and nearly US$ 9 200 
million took the form of loans. Direct investment increased significantly (50% ), chiefly because of 
reinvestment of profits. 
There was an inflow of US$ 16 700 million in new medium- and long-term Joans, while 
amortization payments amounted to US$ 7 800 million. The inflow received consisted predomi-
nantly of resources from private financial capital, obtained under the régimes laid down in 
resolution 68 and Law 4.131.16 This procurement of new resources was especially encouraged by 
the elimination of the controls on domestic interest rates and their resulting increase, and by the 
new exchange policy. 
(d) The external debt 
At the end of 1981, the external debt totalled US$ 61 400 million, which was 14% higher 
than that recorded one year before. This increase was almost entirely due to the procurement of 
credit by private banks through the two mechanisms mentioned above: operations which were 
especially encouraged by the Government (see table 21). Nevertheless, the growth rate of the debt 
was less than that of exports, so that the ratio between the two, which had decreased from 3.0 to 2.5 
between 1979 and 1980, went down to 2.4 in 1981. 
Table 21 
BRAZIL: TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT 
(Millions of US dollars at year end) 
Total 
Compensatory loans 
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18 194 21 528 29 500 34 625 































37 820 45 735 
172 165 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil: Boletim, vol., 16 N° 7,July 1980,Relatório anual 1980, and Informativo Mensual, N° 18, 
January 1982. 
"Includes the International Finance Corporation. 
Includes the Canadian Wheat Board, the Export-Import Bank of Japan, the Kreditanstal fUr Wiederaufbau, the National 
Bank of Denmark and OPIC. 
'"Resolution 63 allows commercial banks to procure resources from abroad, while Law 4.131 makes it possible for 

















1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Millions of US dollars 
1494 4 754 7 052 7 244 10 093 8 840 14 222 12 063 13 144 16 700 
4 814 6 226 8 122 10 713 13 013 17 000 1 476 2 577 2 595 3 666 
1 242 2 063 1 943 2 168 
234 514 652 1 498 
Coefficients of the debt (percentages) 
3 004 4 123 
1 810 2 103 
5 326 
2 696 
48.1 38.4 30.0 38.3 43.7 47.3 
98.8 54.2 36.8 50.6 47.7 70.4 


















Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Relatório Anual, 1975, 1978, 1980 and Informativo Mensual, N° 18, January 1982. 
Note: DS = Debt service. 
X = Exports of goods and services. 
LF = Loans and financing. 
D = Total debt outstanding, public and private. 
GDP = Gross domestic product. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Medium-and long-term credits. 
The debt service continued to grow rapidly during 1981, however, rising more than 30% to 
US$ 17 billion: more than double the figure recorded barely three years before (see table 22). Most 
of the increase in the cost of servicing the debt was due to the marked expansion of net payments of 
interest, which rose by 46%. Payments of principal also increased significantly (16%). 
Especially because of the rapid increase in payments of interest, the debt servicing exceeded 
for the first time the inflow of medium- and long-term credit into the country. Furthermore, the 
ratio between debt servicing and the value of exports of goods and services continued in 1981 to 
display the upward trend which had been nearly uninterrupted since 1974, so that two-thirds of the 
exports of goods and services were needed to cover payments of principal and interest (see 
table 22). 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices and anti-inflationary policy 
The priority given by economic policy to combating inflation took on much stricter features in 
the second half of 1980. Thus, in 1981 the so-called policy of gradualism —the predominant 
orientation during the 1970s— was abandoned, and greater emphasis was placed on the use of 
monetary measures and instruments in the design of the stabilization policy. This was accompa-
nied by greater control over public spending, while prices and tariffs of State enterprises were 
readjusted and price controls reduced considerably. 
The restrictive monetary and fiscal policies fostered a contraction in domestic demand, which 
affected levels of activity and caused a substantial increase in interest rates. These factors 
stimulated the reduction of stocks, and all this helped to attenuate inflationary pressures. 
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The prices and tariffs of public enterprises were significantly increased so as to reduce their 
deficits and, as a result, the transfers normally made to them by the Central Bank. The most 
significant cases were electricity rates and the prices of petroleum products. In the first case, an 
attempt was made to increase the profitability of the enterprises in this branch, by facilitating'the 
financing of ambitious investment programmes begun in previous years. In the case of the prices 
of petroleum products, efforts were made to eliminate the subsidies financed by the Central Bank, 
which had been one of the main factors in the expansion of the monetary base in 1980. These 
measures caused an acceleration in the rise of prices in the early months of 1981, but subsequently 
helped to keep down inflationary pressures when the impact of these elements on the growth of 
the monetary base decreased. 
Table 23 
BRAZIL: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
General price index" 
Total supply 
Domestic availability 
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Rio de Janeiro 
National consumer price index 
General price index 
Total supply 
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Wholesale price index 
Total supply 
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Source: Geculio Vargas, Foundation, Conjuntura económica, and Central Bank of Brazil, Informativo Mensual. 
"The general price index is a weighted average, of the wholesale price index (60%), the cost-of-living index for Rio de 






































































































Source: Getulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura Económica, February 1982. 
"Quarterly variations. 
Using the concept of domestic availability. 
The substantial reduction in price controls also caused inflationary pressures in the early 
months of the year, since many articles with substantial weight in the price index had previously 
been controlled by the Inter-Ministerial Council on Prices (CIP). Subsequently, price increases in 
these areas gradually slowed down to some extent, in direct relation to the economic recession. 
The general price index, considered from the point of view of domestic availability (IGP-DI)37 
increased by 95.2% in 1981, i.e., rather less than in 1980 (110.2%) (see table 23). 
When these data are analysed by month or by quarter, however, it may be seen that the 
reduction of inflation was considerably greater. In the early months of 1981 the accumulated 
growth of prices over the previous twelve months continued to rise, reaching its highest value in 
March; subsequently, it began to decrease gradually until the end of the year. The quarterly price 
variations, for their part, show that in the last three months of 1980 inflation attained a rate of 
22.6% (which in annual terms meant 126%), rising even more during the first quarter of 1981, 
when an increase of 24.1 % (equivalent to an annualized rate of 137%) was registered. From the 
second quarter onwards, however, there was a marked deceleration of the inflationary process, so 
that in the last three months of the year the increase was only 14.1 %, equivalent to an annual rate 
of 70% (see table 24 and figure 4). 
The downward trend in the inflation rate occurred despite the fact that, as from July, there 
was a relaxation in the strict monetary policy that had been applied since the second half of 1980. 
One factor which had an important influence on the above-mentioned trend was the slower 
growth in agricultural prices (70%), which had registered extremely sharp rises in 1980 (138%). 
"This index is calculated by the Getulio Vargas Foundation and is a weighted average of the wholesale price index 
(60%), the cost-of-living index for Rio de Janeiro (30%) and the cost of construction in that city (10%). 
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Figure 4 
BRAZIL: VARIATIONS IN DOMESTIC PRICES OVER TWELVE MONTHS 
General price index 
(Domestic availability) 
Consumer price index 













' ' ' ' l I i l i i l ' ' ' ' ' i i i ' • l i i I l i i i 
J FMAMJ JAS O N D J F M A M J J AS ONDJ F M A M J J A SOND 




- v — 
1981 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
BRAZIL 
This was partly due to the contraction in domestic demand caused by the fall in the real income of 
large sectors of the population and partly to the increased production of several essential items. 
The anti-inflationary policy did not achieve more significant results because of the inertia 
introduced by the generalized system of indexation which had been instituted several years before 
for the purpose of correcting distortions due to inflation and which in 1981 continued to be applied 
to the assets and liabilities of the financial system, real estate rents, legal obligations, the exchange 
rate and wages in both the public and private sectors. The respective readjustment coefficients 
were fixed in 1981 on the basis of past inflation, and hence varied between 95% and 100%. 
(b) Wages 
Wage policy was altered significantly in 1981. Beginning in January, the system of six-
monthly readjustments which had been set up in November 1979 was changed, and under the new 
system wages were adjusted in the following way in 1981: 
- Workers earning up to 3 minimum wage units received an increase of 110% of the 
increase in the consumer price index (CPI); 
- Workers in the range of 3 to 10 minimum wage units, 100% of the CPI increase; 
- Workers in the range of 10 to 15 minimum wage units, 80% of the CPI increase; 
- Workers in the range of 15 to 20 minimum wage units, 50% of the CPI increase; 
- Workers earning above 20 minimum wage units received no increment. 
Wages rises for increased productivity were given on the same terms as under the previous 
law. 
The new measures obviously affected workers in the higher income levels, especially those 
earning more than 15 minimum wage units, since previously those earning more than 15 
minimum wage units were entitled to receive 80% of the CPI increase in respect of that part of 
their wages over 15 minimum wage units, whereas under the new law they received only 50% in 
respect of the part between 15 and 20 minimum wage units and no increase at all in respect of the 
part over 20 minimum wage units.38 
Another important decision adopted during 1981 involved the readjustment of the minimum 
wage in the southeastern and southern regions, where it is the highest in the country, in a different 
way from that provided for in the wage legislation of November 1979. Thus, both in May and 
November, the minimum wages in those regions were readjusted by only 100% of the national CPI 
increase.39 In previous readjustments, 110% of the CPI variation had been granted, applying a 
mechanism similar to that of the wage legislation, which continued in force in 1981 for other 
regions of the country. 
This change in the criteria for readjusting the minimum wage was due to the Government's 
aim of avoiding an increase in the level of unemployment of the unskilled labour force in the 
southeastern and southern regions, as well as of gradually eliminating the differences in minimum 
wages among the different regions. 
The average wage of persons employed in industrial production in 1981 increased in real 
terms by 6%, the highest increase in the past five years (see table 25). This appears to have been 
caused by the combined effect of the dismissal of less skilled -and therefore less well-paid- workers 
and a decline of the inflationary process in the second half of the year. 
The changes in the wage legislation did not have a particularly strong bearing on global wage 
levels, as they affected barely 1.5 % of the total number of wage-earners, receiving 11 % of the total 
amount of wages and salaries paid out.40 Furthermore, although to a lesser extent than in 1980, the 
adjustments effected in 1981 included productivity increases, which were added to those granted to 
38The Government's justification for changing the law was the need to check the high incidence of turnover and 
unemployment at the better-paid levels of the work force. 
"The wage leislation provides that the minimum wage will continue to be fixed by the Government. 
40Data estimates by PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional de Amuestras Domiciliares). 
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offset the rise in prices.41 In the last months of 1981, however, these increases went down 
substantially as a result of the increase in unemployment, which reduced the workers' bargaining 
power, and also as a result of the economic difficulties faced by businesses because of the recession. 
The real minimum wage increased in S?o Paulo (3.7%) and Recife (4.9%), but decreased in 
Rio de Janeiro (-1.3%), Belo Horizonte (-1.7%) and Porto Alegre (-4.9%) (see table 26). The 
increase recorded in Recife was due to the fact that the minimum wage in the metropolitan area of 
that city was readjusted by 110% of the CPI. The increase in Sao Paulo is attributable to the fact that 
consumer prices in that city rose less than the national CPI, while in Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte 
and Porto Alegre the opposite occurred. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
In 1981 the monetary policy cotinued the line adopted in the last quarter of the previous year, 
when the resurgence of inflation and the aggravation of the difficulties in the balance of payments 
which had arisen during 1980 gave rise to a much more drastic stabilization policy, which placed 
greater emphasis on the use of monetary measures and instruments. 
This policy contained two basic elements: on the one hand, severe restriction of the expansion 
of the monetary base and the means of payment, for which strict growth ceilings were set in the 
monetary budget, much lower than the rate of inflation at the end of 1980, and on the other hand, 
encouragement of procurement of external resources by the commercial banks, for the purpose of 
obtaining resources to finance the current account deficit. 
Various instruments were used for accomplishing these goals. In the first place, efforts were 
made to reduce the fiscal deficit, especially by decreasing the amount of the subsidies implicitly 
granted by the monetary authority through the so-called "open accounts"42 or through preferential 
credits granted at negative real interest rates. 
In the second place, limits were set on the expansion of banking credit, which could increase 
by only 50% during 1981 although, as was traditional, exceptions to this limit were made 
regarding credits for agriculture, exports of manufactured goods and the National Alcohol Fuel 
Programme (PROALCOOL), and credits granted on the basis of procurement of external resources by 
commercial banks. However, some limits were placed on credit to agriculture in 1981, when it was 
laid down that, for medium-sized and large producers, only 80% and 60% respectively of the 
production cost would be financed. In previous years up to 100% was financed: a situation which in 
1981 was maintained only for small producers. 
In the third place, interest rates were freed —and rose significantly—43 except in the case of 
those on credits for the priority activities mentioned above, and the system of fixing the index of 
monetary correction on the basis of the inflation actually recorded in the recent past was restored, 
thus finally abandoning the mechanism of pre-fixing the annual increment established in 1980.44 
These measures enabled time and savings deposits to increase substantially and facilitated the sale 
of Government bonds. Similarly, the increase in active interest rates helped to restrict the use of 
credit for non-priority activities. 
•"The increases for productivity instituted by the wage legislation are adjustments established by negotiation between 
workers and employers, or set by the Government when there is no agreement between the parties. Therefore, in practice 
this criterion has no connection with the actual evolution of productivity. 
42In practice these are non-reimbursable ¿redits from the monetary authority to the Federal Government, and actually 
represent a form of public expenditure. 
•"Substantial rises and variations among the different rates were recorded. The highest rates were those charged on 
consumer loans, which at the end of 1981 rose to an annual rate of 194% on six-month loans, whereas in October of the year 
before, before the elimination of controls, they had been 99%. 
4,,I t was initially fixed at 45 % for the whole of 1980; this percentage was subsequently raised to 50% for the period July 
1980 to June 1981. 
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Table 25 
BRAZIL: AVERAGE WAGES IN I N D U S T R Y 
BRAZIL 















































Source: GetuJio Vargas Foundation; Conjuntura Económica, February 1982. 
"Calculated on the basis of a simple average of the consumer price indexes for Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte 
and Porto Alegre. 
Table 26 
BRAZIL: COST OF LIVING AND MINIMUM WAGES 
Major cities 
Sâo Paulo 






















































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of brazil and the Getulio Vargas Foundation. 
Sales of Government bonds increased considerably in 1981, the aim being to achieve strict 
fulfilment of the goals regarding expansion of the monetary base and, at the same time, to foster a 
better balance in the public finances. However, within the context of a policy of liberalizing 
interest rates, these greater sales of Government bonds favoured a further rise in interest rates on 
the domestic market. 
The objective of stimulating the procurement of external resources on the part of the 
commercial banks was consistent with the higher domestic interest rates, and the rate of 
devaluation of the cruzeiro was oriented in the same direction. No limit was placed on domestic 
credits granted on the basis of these resources, which was why they were able to increase so 
substantially. However, the high external interest rates and the requirements of the exchange 
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policy itself, whose objective was to promote exports, prevented the inflow of these external 
resources, through the national banking system, from helping to attenuate the rise in domestic 
interest rates.45 
The monetary policy described above was applied very restrictively during the first half of 
1981, making it possible to reduce substantially the expansion of the means of payment, which 
increased by only 13.5 % during that period, whereas in the corresponding period of the previous 
year they had increased by 2 3 % . 
In the second half, in contrast, there was a relaxation in this restrictive orientation, reflected 
in the evolution of the cumulative increase of the means of payment over 12 months, which in 
December 1981 came to 7 3 % , thus slightly exceeding the expansion of the previous year (see 
tables 27 and 28). This change in the monetary policy in the middle of 1981 was connected, on the 
Table 27 
BRAZIL: PRIVATE SECTOR LIQUIDITY 
(Percentage variation between end-of-December balance) 









































Source: Getulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura Económica, vol. 36, N° 2, February 1982; and Central Bank of Brazil, 
Boletim, vol. 18, N° 1, January 1982. 
Nota: M1 = Means of payment = Currency outside banks + sight deposits in the monetary system. 
M2 = M1 + sight deposits in the public savings banks + National Treasury Bonds (LTN) outside the monetary 
system. 
M3 = M2 + 50 per cent of time deposits, savings deposits, bills of exchange and real-estate bonds. 
(M3 - M2) = Quasi-money. 
Table 28 
























































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Boletim, March 1982. 
4,The interest rates on these credits rose to around 160%. 
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BRAZIL 
one hand, with the rapid economic contraction observed and its resulting effects on employment 
and, on the other, with growing financial stability problems in the business sector and pressures 
caused by a fiscal deficit which was difficult to overcome and which could not be financed with still 
larger placements of Government bonds without causing an even greater deterioration in the 
country's levels of economic activity and employment. The evolution of the international reserves 
also had an influence on this change, as will be seen later. 
Efforts to reduce the fiscal deficit were hampered by smaller tax revenue, the restoration of 
fiscal incentives for exports, the new demands for transfers to public institutions showing a deficit, 
the increase in subsidies for preferential credits,46 and the rise in external interest rates and in the 
spreads over prime rates charged to Brazil to levels unheard-of in the past. 
Faced with this situation, the authorities had to resort to increasing the monetary base, which 
went up by 48% in the second half of 1981, a rate that was a good deal higher than that recorded in 
the same period of 1980 (37%). Over the whole year the monetary base increased by nearly 70%, 
thus also exceeding the expansion recorded the year before (57%). The most significant factors of 
expansion of the monetary base were the loans to priority activities (agriculture, exports and 
PROALCOOL) and the credits to the Federal Government (see table 29). As already noted, loans for 
priority activities were not subject to the 50% growth limit and were granted at heavily subsidized 
interest rates. 
Credits to agriculture for crop financing increased by 88%, which exceeded the expansion 
estimated in the budget (80% ), even though the ceiling on financing the cost of crops was reduced 
in the case of medium-sized and large producers. 
Credits to PROALCOOL, for their part, increased by 230%, whereas the budget had provided for 
an expansion of only 95 %. This deviation was due to the momentum gained by PROALCOOL in the 
last quarter of 1980 and the beginning of 1981, for the purpose of ensuring a sufficient supply of 
fuel alcohol. 
In the case of export credits, these increased by 178%, also going well beyond the initial 
prediction, which was 135%. This greater expansion was due to the significant increase in exports 
of manufactured goods. 
Net credit to the public sector increased by 260 billion cruzeiros in 1981. An important part of 
this expansion was once more accounted for by credits to the Federal Government for "special 
operations" (122 billion cruzeiros), although the destination of those resources was different from 
that observed in 1980. Thus, in 1981 the petroleum account had a credit balance of 50 billion 
cruzeiros, whereas in 1980ithad recordedadeficit of 133 billion cruzeiros. Thissubstantial change 
was due to the Government's policy of relieving pressure on the monetary accounts and the 
effective fiscal deficit, to which end prices of petroleum products were raised by substantially more 
than the exchange devaluation and the increase in international prices of crude oil. On the other 
hand, a deficit was shown by the accounts relating to payment of the external debt of public 
enterprises, financing of buffer stocks of meat, rice and milk, and the losses on sugar exports. 
Another item which was important in the expansion of the monetary base was that of credits 
granted to the social security system (81 billion cruzeiros) to cover its high operating deficits. 
These credits were granted chiefly in the second half of the year, thus contributing to the big 
increase in the monetary base in that period. 
Credits by the monetary authority to activities not defined as priority activities showed much 
smaller growth than that of the monetary base. In particular, loans by the Banco do Brasil for 
industry and trade increased by only 47%, that is to say, much less than the general level of prices. 
Another factor of expansion was the increase recorded in the monetary authority's internatio-
nal reserves. Until July 1981, these reserves had shown a downward trend, as in previous years, 
representing a factor of contraction of the monetary base in the amount of 80 billion cruzeiros. 
•"•Although preferential interest rates increased (from 24% to 45% for agricultural credits and from 24% to 40% for 
pre-shipment credits in respect of exports of manufactures), the rates at which resources were procured by the monetary 
authority also increased. 
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From July onwards, however, they began to recover, and in December they reached a level higher 
than the balance for the previous year. The monetary expansion in the second half of the year for 
this reason was 190 billion cruzeiros, of which 147 billion corresponded to the month of December 
alone. Thus, expansion during the entire year on this account was 110 billion cruzeiros: a figure 
equivalent to 23% of the total increase in the monetary base. 
Among the factors of contraction of the monetary base, an especially important role was 
played by the net sales of Government bonds (National Treasury Bonds [LTN] and Readjustable 
National Treasury Debentures [ORTN]), which were increased substantially in 1981 for the 
purpose of financing the fiscal deficit and the programmes of credit for priority activities. The total 
amount of Government bonds in circulation on 31 December 1980 came to 2 275 billion cruzeiros. 
This figure was nearly 270% greater than in the previous year and represented net sales of slightly 
more than 550 billion, which made it possible to reduce substantially the increase in the monetary 
base. 47 
The sum total of LTN in circulation increased by 230%, while the ORTN grew by 360%. In 
order to expand sales of LTN it was necessary to raise substantially the discount rates on the bonds, 
so that the implicit rate of interest on them increased from 67% in December 1980 to 101% in 
Table 29 
BRAZIL: FACTORS OF EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION 
OF THE MONETARY BASE IN 1981° 
1. Factors of expansion 





Credit to the agricultural sector 
Crops 
Minimum prices 
Financing and purchase of coffee harvest surplus 
Marketing of wheat 
Others 
Credit to PROALCOOL 
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Other credit by the Banco do Brazil 
International reserves 
Others 
2. Factors of constraction 
Net sales of Government bonds 
Time deposits 
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Informativo Mensual, January 1982. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Variation between balances at 31 December 1981 and 31 December 1980, in billions of cruzeiros. 
'Primary emission by the monetary authority (Central Bank and Banco do Brasil), plus deposits by the rest of the banking 
system in respect of compulsory cash reserves. 
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Commercial banks 
Subject to the 50% limit 
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Others net assets 
2. Liabilities 
Time and savings deposits 
Foreign currency liabilities 
Federal Government bonds outside banking system 
Commitments to official financial bodies 




































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Boletim of the Central Bank of Brazil. 
"Preliminary figures. 
^Variation between balances at 31 December 1981 and 31 December 1980, in billions of cruzeiros. 
December 1981. The greater sales of ORTN, for their part, were due to the restoration of monetary 
correction based on past inflation. The annual correction index, which in December 1980 was 
51 %, rose gradually during 1981 to reach 9 6 % in the month of December: an increase which was 
practically equal to that of prices. 
Other factors of contraction were the increase in time deposits in the Banco do Brasil, 
stimulated by the rise in interest rates on bank deposit certificates, and the effect of the inflow of 
external credits under the terms of resolution 63 4 8 (see table 29). 
With regard to factors of expansion of the means of payment, apart from those which had an 
impact on the monetary base an important role was played by the growth of loans to the public 
sector and of credit by commercial banks for operations not subject to the 50% limit. 
The total credit of the banking system increased in 1981 by around 103% over the December 
1980 balance, with the largest increase being recorded in credit granted to the Federal Government 
(175%), while loans to the private sector grew by only 8 8 % (see table 30). Credit to the private 
sector showed great disparity between operations subject to the 50% limit, where the goal was 
practically fulfilled, and those not subject to restrictions, which grew by 156%. These operations 
not subject to limitations consisted chiefly of the granting of credit with external resources 
procured through resolution 63. 
Among the factors of contraction of the means of payment, one highly significant factor was 
the increase in the external debt of the commercial banks, under the above-mentioned mechanism 
of resolution 63, which made possible a contraction of nearly 360 billion cruzeiros, equivalent to 
26% of the total means of pay ment at the beginning of the year. Another important factor was the 
increase in savings and time deposits, which nearly tripled, encouraged by the rise in the deposit 
rates of the commercial banks. 
48The external resources which enter the country under resolution 63 become the property of the commercial banks, 
but must remain deposited in the Central Bank for 90 days, during which time the Bank assumes the exchange risk and 
interest payment obligations. 
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For their part, loans by the non-banking financial sector49 to the private sector increased by 
120%, markedly exceeding those granted by the banking sector. The largest increases occurred in 
the credits from the National Housing Bank (156%), the real estate credit corporations (133%) 
and the Federal Savings Bank ( 132 % ). The lowest increases were those of the finance corporations 
(77%), because part of their operations remained subject to the 50% expansion limit (see table 
3D. 
The evolution of loans from the non-banking financial sector to the private sector was 
favoured by the considerable increase (126%) in the procurement of resources by the former, 
especially through savings accounts (150%), which were encouraged by the restoration of 
monetary correction based on past inflation (see table 32). 
(b) Fiscal policy 
With a view to fulfilling their economic policy objectives, the authorities adopted a series of 
measures designed to reduce the fiscal deficit through decreasing spending in real terms and 
improving tax collection. 
The policy of reducing fiscal spending had some encouraging results, since such expenditure 
showed a nominal increase of 84%, which in real terms meant a drop of slightly more than 12%. 
Table 31 
BRAZIL: LOANS BY THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 










































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Boletim, March 1982. 
49The non-banking financial sector is composed of finance corporations (devoted exclusively to granting consumer 
credits), investment banks, the National Housing Bank (BNH), real estate credit corporations, savings and loan 
associations, the Federal Savings Bank, State savings banks, the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE), State 
development banks and the National Co-operative Credit Bank. These institutions do not work with sight deposits, except 
for the Federal Savings Bank and the State savings banks, which do so in an amount which is quite low (8%) in relation to 
the volume of their savings deposits. 
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Savings and loan associations 
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State savings banks 
National Economic Development 
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State development banks 
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BRAZIL: DEPOSITS A N D OTHER INTERNAL LIABILITIES 
OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM WITH THE PUBLIC 
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Boletim, March 1982. 
This behaviour was due to the considerable decline in real terms of the subsidies paid by the 
monetary authority (-31 % )50 and of outgoings in other areas of expenditure (-20 % ) (see table 33). 
The reduction of the latter was partly connected with government efforts to decrease investment 
expenditure, although this was not always achieved because of prior commitments, the lack of 
proper medium-term programming of public investments, and shortcomings in the control 
mechanisms. 
Wages and social security, expenditures,51 in contrast, increased slightly in real terms, 
reflecting some degree of inertia, difficult to change in the short term, due inter alia to the indexing 
policy applied in the area of wages. 
Contributions to assistance funds for States and municipalities increased significantly in real 
terms (8.6%) because of the priority given by the Federal Government to local authorities. 
Transfers from the Federal Treasury to public enterprises again grew considerably (15% at 
constant prices), revealing the Government's difficulties in reducing spending in this area. 
Despite the measures adopted in 1981 for the purpose of improving tax collection, the results 
were not favourable. Thus, tax collection by the Federal Government had a nominal increase of 
85.5%, which in real terms meant a contraction of 11.5% (see table 33). This decrease would have 
been greater still had it not been for the increase in revenue from the tax on financial operations, 
the rates of which were raised at the end of 1980, together with its extension to import operations, 
among others. Similarly, income tax performed relatively favourably due to the fact that payments 
made by businesses and physical persons in 1981 were determined in relation to their income of 
the year before. 
Revenue from other taxes, on the other hand, was affected by the economic recession. Thus, 
the tax on industrial products decreased more than 9% in real terms, chiefly owing to the drop in 
industrial production. Collection of this tax was also affected by the restoration of the subsidy on 
'"These subsidies ace generally granted through "open accounts" in the monetary budget which in practice constitute 
non-rêimbursable credits by the monetary authority to the Federal Government and therefore represent effective public 
expenditure. These subsidies include subsidies for credit and direct subsidies in respect of the supply of goods. Also included 
in this division are the transfers made by the monetary authority to cover the deficit of public institutions, as in the case of 
the social security system (INPS), or payments of external debt servicing commitments which some public institutions are 
not able to fulfil. 
"The latter include only the social security expenditures directly effected by the Federal Government. They therefore 
exclude those covered by INPS (National Social Security Institute). 
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exports of manufactured goods, taking the form of the refund of this tax. The tax on imports 
showed a decrease of 25 % in real terms as a result of the severe contraction of external purchases, 
especially of intermediate goods, which have the highest rate of taxation. 
The consolidated fiscal deficit of the Federal Government" in 1981 showed a nominal 
increase of 81%, which, measured at constant prices, meant a decrease of nearly 14%. This deficit 
amounted to 2.7 % of the gross domestic product in 1981 : a percentage which, although high, was 
much lower than the 4.4% recorded in 1980. The ratio between the deficit and total expenditures 
in current terms, for is part, was quite high (31.7%) and very similar to that recorded in 1980 
(32.2%). 
The National Treasury account showed a small surplus of 3 billion cruzeiros, which represen-
ted less than 0.1 % of total expenditures. This clearly indicates that, on the one hand, the imbalance 
arose in those accounts administered by the monetary authority which actually constitute effective 
Table 33 
BRAZIL: CONSOLIDATED INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION 












































































































































Fuente: ECLA, en the basis of data from the Centra] Bank of Brazil (Relatório Anual, 1981, February 1982), and Carlos 
von Doellinger's article on consolidation of the Union's finances in Conjuntura Económica, vol. 36, NQ 2, 
February 1982. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Including taxes on energy, minerals, road transport and others. 
"This consolidated deficit includes the results recorded on the Treasury account and the account of the monetary 
authority, which in reality may be considered to be fiscal accounts. 










2. Total expenditures 
Wages and social security 
expenditure 
Contribution to assistance 
funds 
Transfers from the Treasury 
to public enterprises 





Result of accounts administered 
by the monetary authority 





public spending and, on the other hand, that in 1981 there was a continuation of the problems 
arising from the lack of budget unity observed in previous years. 
In 1981, 32% of the deficit was financed through the sale of government bonds (ORTN and 
LTN), while the other 68% was covered by the Monetary Authority, unlike previous years when the 
Central Bank absorbed the whole deficit (see table 33). 
However, if the results recorded in the consolidated accounts of the Federal Government are 
added to the deficit of public enterprises —which is covered chiefly by credit from external 
sources— the problem grows considerably larger, since in this case the total public sector deficit 
would equal nearly 6% of the gross domestic product in 1981.53 Even so, this proportion was lower 
than those observed in 1979 and 1980 —which amounted to 8.1% and 7.3%, respectively— thus 
indicating a downward trend over the last three years. 
"See Carlos Von Doellinger's article on consolidation of the Union's finances over the period 1979-1982 in 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
As in the majority of Latin American countries, 1981 was an unfavourable year for the 
evolution of the Colombian economy. While the economic growth rate was the lowest in the past 
quarter of a century, the rate of inflation was the highest recorded in the same period, except for 
the rises noted in 1963,1977 and 1979- At the same time, the terms of trade deteriorated, the value 
and volume of exports, decreased sharply, the balance-of-payments current account deficit trebled, 
and fiscal operations closed for the second year running with a considerable negative balance (see 
table 1 and figure 1). 
During 1981, the gross domestic product increased by 2.5%. Not only did this rate show the 
continuation in that year of the steady and systematic loss of dynamism which began to affect the 
economy in 1979, but it also induced a virtual satgnation in the per capita product. Since the 
slackening in the rate of economic growth was accompanied by a drop in the terms of trade, per 
capita income fell slightly after having increased sharply during the boom in international coffee 
prices, from 1976 to 1979-
From a sectoral point of view, the drop in the growth rate of the gross domestic product 
reflected the loss of dynamism registered in 1981 by all the principal economic activities except the 
agricultural sector, which grew at a slightly faster rate than in 1980, and construction, which 
expanded for the second year running at a very high rate (8%). In contrast, the manufacturing 
product fell slightly in absolute terms after two years of moderate expansion, which induced a 
reduction in industrial employment and a drop for the third year running in the share of the 
manufacturing sector in the total product. During 1981 there was also a marked weakening of the 
growth rate of basic services, which up to 1979 had expanded with remarkable vigour. 
Because of this slow evolution of the sectors producing goods and basic services, the increase 
in the gross domestic product was due primarily to the expansion of the other services, which, 
although accounting for 40% of the total product, generated nearly half the increase in it in 1981. 
Nevertheless, the growth rate of services, too, was substantially lower than it had been during the 
three preceding years. 
Surprisingly, this marked and generalized decrease in the dynamism of the economy was 
accompanied by a drop in the average rate of unemployment in the main urban centres of the 
country. As may be seen from figure 1, between 1974 and 1980 the reductions in the percentage of 
jobless in the labour force systematically coincided with years when the economic growth rate 
accelerated, whereas in years such as 1979 and 1980, in which the economic growth rate fell, the 
rate of unemployment rose. In 1981, in contrast, official figures show that the rate of 
unemployment fell significantly at a time when, as already noted, the growth of general economic 
activity weakened. The main explanation for these opposing trends in production and 
unemployment was the marked drop registered in 1981 in the rates of participation in the majority 
of the main urban centres. Thus, these rates dropped sharply in Bogotá, Medellín and Cali —the 
three cities where there was also a marked reduction in the rate of unemployment— whereas 
participation rose in Barranquilla, which was the only major city where the rate of unemployment 
increased. Thus, the drop in the rates of urban unemployment really reflected the withdrawal by a 
significant proportion of the labour force from the active quest for work, rather than a significant 
improvement in the employment situation. 
Just as in the case of economic growth, the 1981 results were poor as regards inflation and 
wages and salaries. Thus, during the year consumer prices rose by nearly 27%, thereby repeating 
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their performance of the previous year, while wholesale prices increased by 23.5%, i.e., only 
slightly less than in 1980. This stability in the level of inflation resulted partly from the indexation 
of certain key variables such as wages and salaries and the exchange rate (which, in the absence of 
exogenous disturbances, tend to induce the economy to reproduce each year the growth rate of 
prices it registered in the preceding period), while it also reflected the delayed effects of the 
relatively large expansion in the means of payment which occurred in 1980. 
As the minimum legal wages were readjusted in January 1981 by a proportion equivalent to 
the inflation recorded during the previous year, and as this percentage was slightly lower than that 
Table 1 
COLOMBIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices' 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Monev y 
Wages and salaries 
Rate of unemployment' 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government^ 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 
External debt 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
16 407 17 163 17 995 19 604 20 600 21424 21959 
23.2 23-7 24.2 24.7 25.3 25.6 26.4 
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655 551 646 -373 
435 294 490 -536 
661 676 1552 1311 













Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
' National index for manual workers. 
Real wages of manual workers in manufacturing. 
'Annual averages rate for Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellfn and Cali. 
Percentage. 
'Surplus. 
Public and State-guaranteed private debt. 
'End of September. 
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of the average increase in consumer prices during 1981, the purchasing power of wages fell by a 
little more than 1%, after three years of steady and substantial rises. In 1981, the daily wages 
actually paid in the agricultural sector also dropped slightly and the average real wages of manual 
workers in manufacturing, remained at an almost total standstill, as had already occurred in 1980. 
Thus, in practice, the wages of non-manual workers in the industrial sector were the only ones 
which experienced a real increase, and small though this was (2.4%), it was distinctly higher than 
the increase in the per capita product. 
During 1981 there were also significant changes in external economic relations. One of the 
most fundamental was the turnabout in the evolution of exports of goods and services, whose 
value, after nine years of steady and marked growth, fell by 17% in 1981. To a considerable extent, 
this decrease was a consequence of the negative changes in the external economic situation, 
especially in the world coffee market; not only was the world coffee surplus supply partly 
responsible for a drop in the average price of Colombian coffee from US$ 1.79 a pound in 1980 to 
US$ 1.45 in 1981, but it also made it necessary to reduce the quota assigned to Colombia under the 
International Coffee Agreement, from 9.7 million bags to 8.3 million. Consequently, and in spite of 
the fact that the 1981 harvest amounted to the record level of 13.2 million bags, the volume of 
external sales of coffee fell by over 2 million bags compared with the preceding year. This, added to 
the lower international price of coffee beans, induced a drop of over 41% in the value of coffee 
exports. 
In addition to this the value of foreign sales of manufactures declined by nearly 20%, resulting 
from the greater obstacles faced by manufactures in gaining access to the markets of the 
industrialized countries, the loss of competitiveness of some Colombian products because of the 
rise in costs generated in particular by the increase in interest rates, and the negative effects of the 
drop in the effective real rate of exchange brought about by the revaluation of the dollar vis-â-vis 
the main European currencies. The impact of these adverse factors was not completely outweighed 
by the various incentives provided for exporters, mainly by the Export Promotion Fund 
(PROEXPO) (in such fields as credit, administrative facilities, technical assistance, transport, 
insurance and market analysis). 
For their part, imports of goods and services —which had been growing with exceptional 
vigour since 1977— expanded much more slowly in 1981. Although their value rose to the record 
level of slightly over US$ 5.9 billion, this represented a growth rate of only 7.9%, in sharp contrast 
not only with the 40% recorded in 1980 but also with the increases registered in the four preceding 
years (see table 1). 
This marked reduction in the growth rate of imports resulted naturally from the loss of 
dynamism shown by domestic economic activity in 1981; part of it should also be related to some 
extent to the changes made in trade policy. Until 1980 the authorities promoted a greater external 
openness of the economy; as regards imports, it induced the transfer of many categories from the 
previous system of prior import licences to the system of free importation, a reduction of tariffs 
(especially for capital goods), and the granting of greater facilities for imports of passenger and 
cargo vehicles. But in 1981, this free import policy was not longer fully operative: no further 
reduction of tariffs was implemented, while some restrictive measures were adopted against 
imports of such categories as textiles. 
The very uneven evolution of imports and exports in 1981 resulted in a trade deficit 
amounting to US$ 1 725 million—the equivalent of 41% of exports of goods and services, and 4.6 
times the size of the deficit recorded in 1980. This, coupled with a moderate rise in net payments of 
profits and interest, resulted in an unprecedented current account deficit of nearly US$ 2 billion. 
Not only did this amount to three times the deficit recorded the preceding year but it also exceeded 
by US $550 million the total surplus on current account accumulated during the coffee boom of 
1976-1979 (see table 1). 
This considerable expansion in the current account deficit was to some extent, however, a 
consequence of the very sharp increase registered for the second year running in the net inflow of 
capital. Thus, the net inflow of long-term capital, which had already passed the US$ 1 billion mark 
in 1980, rose to US$ 1 260 million in 1981. Of this, 51% consisted of net loans to the official sector, 
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Figure 1 
COLOMBIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
a Annual growth rate. 
^Average annual rate in Bogota, Barranquilla, Medellin and Cali 
cDecember - December variation (per cent). 
¿Millions of dollars. 
80 81 
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17% corresponded to direct investments, and the remaining 32% entered the country as net loans 
to the private sector. The latter credits, which totalled more than twice the funds received the 
preceding year, were directed primarily to the development of mining projects, especially the 
Cerromatoso nickel mine. A large amount of short-term capital also entered the country, going in 
particular to the official sector. 
As a result of these movements of capital, and in spite of the extraordinary size of the deficit 
on current account, the international reserves rose for the seventh consecutive year, amounting to 
over US$ 5.6 billion at the end of 1981 —nearly as much as the total value of the imports of goods 
and services during that year. 
The increase in international reserves was, however, much less in 1981 than in the five 
preceding years, and this was the main reason why the monetary authorities encountered fewer 
difficulties in controlling the increase in the issue of currency and means of payment during the 
year. Thus, because of the smaller pressure generated by the increase in the assets of the Banco de la 
República through the accumulation of international reserves, the Bank was not forced in 1981 to 
engage in open-market operations on the very large scale of those it had been compelled to conduct 
in past years in order to counteract the expansionary effect the increase in reserves had on the 
monetary base. Thus, the Banco de la República withdrew slightly less than 1 billion pesos through 
these reserves in 1981 —much less than the 9.4 and 18.5 billion pesos to which these transactions 
had amounted in 1979 and 1980, respectively. Moreover, the monetary authorities continued to 
encourage the policy of financial self-sufficiency of the development funds administered by the 
Banco de la República:1 another factor which resulted in lowering the growth rate of issue of 
currency. 
In addition, the credit policy vis-à-vis the private sector continued to be based on the principle 
of a self-sufficient supply of resources by financial intermediaries. To achieve this objective and 
also to combat the extra-institutional credit transactions which had been carried out, from 1980 on 
financial entities were allowed to negotiate their passive rates of interest with potential savings-
account holders. One of the results of this measure was the rapid growth of bank deposits through 
time-deposit certificates, which, after rising by 170% in 1980, nearly doubled in 1981, this being 
partly responsible for the 39% increase in loans by the banking system. Another result, however, 
was a very considerable rise in interest rates which, in the view of the monetary authorities 
themselves, was higher than envisaged and tended to discourage investments. 
From the point of view of monetary management, the more moderate expansion in 
international reserves made it possible in 1981 to consolidate one of the changes introduced the 
year before in fiscal policy. In order, to counteract the monetary expansion brought on primarily by 
the extremely rapid growth of reserves during the coffee boom, the authorities had tried to 
implement a policy of monetary restriction, as a result of which the public sector had had to 
sacrifice an appreciable proportion of its investment expenditure. In 1980, however, the public 
investment policy was substantially altered, because not only had the sacrifice led to a worrying 
deterioration in important sectors of basic social capital, but it was also incompatible with the 
National Integration Plan (PIN), one of whose priority objectives was precisely to extend and 
improve the country's basic infrastructure. This new policy was continued in 1981, when the 
Government went on increasing its expenditure on public investment faster than its current 
disbursements: while the former grew by close to 46%, the latter rose by only 27%. 
This meant that in 1981 the growth rate of total central government expenditure decreased 
sharply, while its current income rose slightly faster than expenditure; even so, the fiscal deficit 
amounted to close to 5% of the actual expenditure of the fiscal sector for the second year running. 
Since this deficit was more than covered by external credit, as in 1980, the Government was again 
able to reduce its internal debt. 
'These include the Export Promotion Fund (PROEXPO), the Agricultural Finance Fund, the Industrial Finance Fund, 
the Fund for Private Investments, the Electricity Development Fund, and the Savings and Housing Fund. 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global supply and demand trends 
In 1981 there was a sudden decline in the growth rate of total supply, which rose by only a 
little over 2%, compared with nearly 6% the year before. This decline was due both to the much 
slower expansion of the gross domestic product that year and to the sharp turnaround in the 
volume of imports of goods and services, which, after registering an exceptional rise of 26% in 
1980, came to an almost complete standstill in 1981. 
During the year the growth rates of all the components of total demand also dropped, 
particularly exports of goods and services; their volume, after having grown notably in 1979, 
already showed a slight decline in 1980, and dropped by over 12% in 1981, as a result of the sharp 
reduction in the volume of coffee exports and the lower real external sales of manufactures. 
The loss of dynamism of economic activity was also reflected in the notable decline in private 
consumption, which increased by only a little over 1 %, after having risen at an average rate of close 
to 5 % in the two preceding years. 
In these circumstances, as in 1980, the most dynamic component of demand was domestic 
investment, This variable, which had already risen by 14% that year, increased by close to 12% in 
1981. This relative maintenance of the growth rate of capital formation was however decisively 
influenced by variations in stocks, since these nearly doubled primarily, as a result, of the addition 
of some 2.5 million bags of coffee to the already considerable stocks existing at the beginning of the 
year. In contrast, gross investment in fixed capital, basically boosted by the public sector, grew a 
little more than 6% —a rate only slightly over half that recorded the preceding year (see table 2). 
Table 2 
COLOMBIA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment^ 




Exports of goods and services 
Millions of dollars 














































































































Source: ECLA calculations, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLA for the purpose. 




COLOMBIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Financial institutions, insurance, 
real estate and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and personal services 
Government services 
Millions of dollars 



































































































































Source: ECLA calculations, on the basis of official data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. 
6
 As the individual activities and the total were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond with 
the latter. 
(b) Growth of th°. main sectors 
As in the previous two years, the goods-producing sectors registered in 1981 the lowest 
growth rates. Their overall product rose by 2 % , whereas basic services increased by close to 3 % 
and other services expanded at a slightly higher rate. The reduction in the growth rate of the 
goods-producing sectors was partially attributable to the slower expansion of mining and, above 
all, to the absolute decrease suffered in 1981 by manufacturing, whose share in the total product 
declined for the third consecutive year and was in 1981 slightly under the level recorded at the 
beginning of the previous decade (see table 3). 
(i) The agricultural sector. In 1981 agricultural production rose by 3.2%, thereby exceeding 
the modest 2.6% increase achieved in 1980. This slight improvement was attributable especially to 
the bigger growth rate achieved in crop farming and, to a lesser extent, to the slight rise in the rate 
of expansion of the stock-raising sector (see table 4). The other activities in the sector, however — 
mainly land improvement and tree planting for timber— suffered a decrease of close to 1%. 
The progress made in crop farming was aided by the more favourable weather conditions 
which prevailed during 1981. Partly because of this, yields increased and the application of 
fertilizers and insecticides turned out to be more efficient. 
The acceleration of the growth rate of crop farming production in 1981 also reflected the 
more generalized expansion registered by its different components when compared to the two 
preceding years, when the higher production achieved was largely due to the very considerable 
increases in the harvest of coffee, the main crop. Thus, in 1979 the growth rate of coffee productin 
(a little over 10%) was almost three times that of other crops, while in 1980 it was more than four 
times as great. In 1981, in contrast, the relative expansion in the production of coffee was only 
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slightly greater than that of crop farming as a whole, since whereas the latter rose from 2 % in 1980 
to slightly over 3% in 1981, the rate of expansion of the coffee harvest fell from 8.5% to 3.9%. 
Nevertheless, this growth ledtoarecord 1981 coffee harvest of 13.2 million 60-kg bags: 66%more 
than the yield recorded in 1976, the first year in the coffee boom. 
The volume of production achieved was more than enough to meet the 8.3 million bag export 
quota assigned to Colombia under the International Coffee Agreement, to sell approximately 
700 000 more bags to countries not members of the International Coffee Organization and, finally, 
to meet the needs of domestic consumption, estimated at 1.7 million bags. It also meant, however, 
that in 1981 around 2.5 million bags were added to the country's coffee stocks, which at the end of 
the year amounted to close to 8 million bags. For this reason, during 1981 a credit policy aimed at 
discouraging new planting of coffee continued to be applied, and it was considered that restrictions 
should be imposed on attempts to produce coffee in marginal areas or areas suitable for the 
Table 4 
COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural production 
(1970 = 100) 
Crop farming 
Stock-raising 
Production of the main crops 













Cane for refined sugarc 






(thousands of head) 
Number of stoclc 
Number of animals slaughtered 
Total number of animals 
















































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Banco de la República and the National 




Production of oil pulp. 
'Coffee-growing year, 1 October to 30 September. 
Stock at the beginning of the year plus calves born during the year. 




COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 









































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 
'Millions of 42-gallon barrels. 
''Thousands of metric tons. 
'Thousands of troy ounces. 
cultivation of other commodities.2 The scant rise in the average domestic price of coffee —only 
9%, well below the growth rate of the general price index— also helped to restrict the expansion 
of coffee cultivation. 
In the rest of the crop farming sector, cereal production amounted to a little over 3.3 million 
tons, thereby exceeding the 1980 harvest by 2.8% in spite of the fact that the rice crop, its main 
component, remained at 1.8 million tons. On the other hand, the maize harvest increased by 3%, 
after remaining nearly stagnant during the two preceding years. The sorghum and the wheat 
harvests, for their part, experienced extraordinary increases. With respect to the first of these 
crops, the increase of over 23% achieved in 1981 more than compensated for the decreases 
suffered in the two preceding years, while the rise of nearly 35 % in the wheat harvest represented 
a continuation of the intensive growth recorded since 1979 (see table 4). Thanks to the increases in 
the maize and wheat harvests, maize imports have reduced by more than 130 000 tons, while 
wheat imports dropped by 20 000 tons. 
In contrast with the favourable evolution of cereal production, the harvest of oilseeds declined 
by 10%, basically because of the very marked drop (-43 %) in the production of soya. To counteract 
this decline and maintain an adequate domestic supply, the Agricultural Marketing Institute 
(1DEMA) purchased 16 000 tons of soya abroad and increased its imports of soya oil by 33 000 tons 
to a total of 111 000 tons. 
Although in 1981 cotton production increased slightly, cotton-growers continued to face 
difficult financing conditions, dating back to the period 1978-1979, when the cotton harvest fell by 
over 40% because of adverse climatic conditions and pests. These afflictions were compounded by 
the difficult conditions facing cotton on the international markets in 1981 (which were partly 
responsible for the accumulation of appreciable domestic stocks) and by the problems due to the 
disparity between the prices paid by textile producers and the production costs claimed by cotton-
growers. 
As regards other crops, the good potato harvest made it possible to resume potato exports, 
while the 14% rise in banana production, achieved in spite of the outbreak of sigatoka disease 
which afflicted large areas of plantations, made it possible to increase exports by nearly 90 000 
2ln this connection, see the summary of the statement by the Chairman of the Fortieth National Congress of Coffee 
Growers (held at Bogotá early in December 1981), in the organ of the National Federation of Coffee Growers, Economía 
Cafetera, Vol. 11, No. 12, December 1981, p. 4. 
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tons. Finally, the production of the different types of sugar cane fell by close to 5.5 %, contributing 
to the drop of nearly 90 000 tons in sugar exports. 
The increase of nearly 4% in livestock production was due primarily to the sharp expansion 
(12%) in the value added in the cattle-raising sector and, to a lesser extent, to the rises of around 
6% in the production of milk, eggs and poultry, which more than compensated for the 9% 
decrease in pig-raising. 
During 1981, the financial support provided to the sector through the Agricultural Finance 
Fund remained constant in real terms, since the loans extended to the sector increased by 28% at 
current prices, i.e., at a very similar rate to that of inflation. Of the total of 27.7 billion pesos loaned 
by the Fund, 52% were granted to finance semi-annual crops, vegetables and tobacco, while 16% 
went to land improvement, agricultural infrastructure works and the purchase of machinery and 
implements. During the year, the downward trend observed in previous years in the coefficient of 
utilization of agricultural credits gained further strength. Thus, the ratio between the credits used 
and the resources budgeted for that purpose, which had fallen from 94% in 1979 to 93% in 1980, 
further declined to 90% in 1981. At the same time, the allocation of credits was concentrated on 
crops requiring a large amount of technical inputs, such as cotton, irrigated rice and sorghum, 
which absorbed 78% of the total credits granted for semi-annual crops. 
In order to provide a partial solution to this situation and give support to small and medium-
sized producers, and taking into account furthermore that two-thirds of loan assistance is 
dispensed through the banking system and only one-third by the Agricultural Fund, efforts were 
made to encourage the banks to provide credits for the agricultural sector, and the technical and 
economic requirements which small and medium-sized producers must meet in order to make 
application for development credits were reduced. The regulations on credit were also expanded in 
order to assist certain priority activities of the sector, such as drainage and irrigation, and 
emergency measures were taken to help farmers who suffered severe losses as a result of floods in 
some regions. 
(ii) Mining. During 1981 there was a marked reduction in the growth rate of mining, and 
after the exceptional expansion of 14% in 1980, the gross domestic product of the sector rose by 
only 4% in 1981. Even so, the mining sector —which in 1980 had been by far the most dynamic in 
the economy— grew in 1981 too at a rate well above that of the economy as a whole, and in fact 
construction was the only sector to register a higher growth rate (see table 3). 
In constrast with what happened during the previous year, however, when there was a sharp 
increase in production in all the main categories of the mining sector except petroleum, in 1981 the 
increase in the mining product came primarily from the petroleum sector, while the extraction of 
iron ore and salt decreased sharply and that of silver registered a more moderate but still 
significant decline (see table 5). 
The 6.5 % growth rate of petroleum production (which reached a volume of nearly 49 million 
barrels) was undoubtedly the most salient feature of mining activity in 1981. This rise confirmed 
the change of trend which took place in 1980, when petroleum extraction increased slightly after 
having followed a continuous downward path during nearly the whole of the 1970s. 
The reversal of this downward trend was due to a number of measures adopted by the 
Government in recent years in order to promote exploration and drilling by petroleum companies. 
Among these measures, one of the most important was the rise in the price of incremental crudes 
and crude from new deposits to the international level, GIF Cartagena. This decision gained a wider 
impact in 1981 when it was extended to crude derived from old wells, thus putting- all the crude 
extracted on the same price level. 
Partly owing to the new incentives received, the number of exploration wells drilled rose 
from 36 in 1980 to 61 in 1981, and the volume of the investments made exceeded US$ 85 million. 
As a result of this increased exploration, important finds were made in the western plains area, and 
new operations were put into effect in the departments of Huila and Meta. During 1981, 111 
development wells were also drilled (70% more than in 1980), and new association contracts were 
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signed between ECOPETROL and private petroleum firms in respect of a larger area than that 
covered by such contracts in 1980.3 
In spite of the increase in the production of crude,.domestic consumption needs made it 
necessary to import some 7.8 million barrels —7% more than the volume imported in 1980. This 
increase was, however, partly compensated for by the 15% decrease in imports of refined 
petroleum products. 
During 1981 there was also an increase in the production of gold. Its growth rate was under 
4%, however, which was much less than in 1980, when production nearly doubled as a result of the 
incentive provided by the sharp rise in the international price of gold. In contrast, the drop in this 
price from an average of US$ 613 an ounce in 1980 to US$ 460 in 1981 discouraged the efforts of 
small-scale miners, who account for over two-thirds of the total production of gold. Even so, the 
extraction of gold remained a very important activity for the generation of income in some areas 
offering few job opportunities in the departments of Antioquia, Chocó, Nariño, Caldas and Cauca. 
Moreover, the Banco de la República, which by law is the only purchaser of the domestic 
production of gold, continued to facilitate its purchase and to provide technical assistance for its 
extraction. 
In 1981 the growth rate of the production of platinum also fell after making a partial recovery 
the preceding year, while there was a 5 % decrease in the extraction of silver, which, like that of 
gold, had risen remarkably in 1980 under the incentive provided by the rise in its international 
price. The greatest decline occurred, however, in the production of iron ore, which fell by over 16% 
because of the decrease in demand caused by the 18% drop in steel production (see table 5). 
During 1981 further progress was made in respect of the investments aimed at making it 
possible to exploit the large Cerromatoso ferronickel, deposit, and work began on the El Cerrejón 
coal deposit. 
The first of these, which is located in the Department of Córdoba, has nickel reserves 
estimated at 40 million tons and will go into production in the middle of 1982. It is estimated that 
in that year it will produce 7 200 tons of nickel, which could generate exports worth about US$ 50 
million. As of 1983, it is planned to raise its production to an annual average of rather more than 
21 000 tons. The total cost of this mining and industrial project is nearly US$ 395 million, of which 
US$ 170 million will be supplied by shareholders,4 US$ 120 million will come from loans granted 
by a group of 15 foreign and Colombian banks; US$ 80 million has been supplied by the World 
Bank; and US$ 25 million has been provided by EXIMBANK. 
The El Cerrejón coal deposit, for its part, is located in the Department of Guajira, 30 
kilometres from the border with Venezuela. The exploratory studies concluded in mid-1980 
estimated the recoverable reserves at 1.6 billion tons and confirmed the viability of its exploitation. 
This will be an open-cut operation and will be initiated in 1983, but extraction will only assume 
significant proportions in 1986, when production is expected to reach seven million tons of coal. It 
should increase rapidly in the following years and exceed 20 million tons in 1990. During the 
fitting-out stage, which began in 1981 and is expected to last six years, investments amounting to 
slightly more than US$ 2.9 billion will be required. 
(iii) Manufacturing. In 1981 the manufacturing product fell by 1%. This drop came as the 
culmination of the loss of dynamism shown by the industrial sector in the two preceding years, 
when it grew at constantly decreasing rates after its extraordinary expansion of 8.7% in 1977 (see 
table 6). 
Both internal and external factors were responsible for this decline in the industrial product. 
The most important of the internal factors was the progressively slower growth of private 
consumption, which, after rising by 5% in 1979 and by over 4% in 1980, rose by only l%in 1981. 
'As a result of this expansion and of the execution of the investment plan for new drillings and pipelines, the country 
is expected to return to self-sufficiency in the supply of hydrocarbons within a relatively short time. 
••The shareholders are the Industrial Development Institute of Colombia, which holds 45% of the capital, Billiton 
International Metals of the Royal Dutch Shell group (35%) andConicol, a subsidiary of Hanna Mining Company (20%). 
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This slackening resulted from a reduction of 0.4% in real sales in wholesale trade in the first ten 
months of the year and in the stagnation of retail sales, all of which affected the demand for 
industrial goods.5 
Another factor which had a negative effect on the manufacturing sector was the contraction 
of exports of industrial goods, which dropped considerably owing to the restrictive measures taken 
in the majority of the industrialized countries, and to the loss of competitiveness of Colombian 
manufactures caused by the rise in domestic production costs and the revaluation of the dollar 
against the main European currencies. 
As a result, production fell in nearly all industrial branches. Thus, paper production decreased 
by 2%, that of the tobacco industry by 2.5%, that of the food industry (excluding coffee) by slightly 
more than 3%, that of printing and publication by 6% and that of furniture and industrial 
chemicals by 8.5% and 12.5%, respectively. During the year the production of plastics, non-
metallic minerals, glass, non-electrical machinery and appliances and transport equipment also 
declined. On the other hand, there was a slight rise in the production of wearing apparel, the level 
of activity in the textile and leather and footwear industries rose by between 2 % and 3 %, there was 
an increase of between 6% and 7% in the production of the wood and electrical appliances 
industries, and a very sharp expansion (28%) in the output of non-ferrous metal products. 
The decline in industrial activity was also reflected in the production of the main 
manufactures. Thus, the production of both steel ingots and motor vehicles fell by close to 18%. In 
the case of the latter, the drop came on the heels of another significant decline suffered in 1980, 
Table 6 
COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
AND GENERATION OF ELECTRICITY 






























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República and the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 
'Thousands of units. 
Millions of barrels. 
eIn the 24 largest cities. 
January-October. Growth rate refers to same period in 1980. 
'For example, during the period January-November 1981 real retail sales of furniture and household electrical 
appliances fell by slightly more than 1% compared with the same period the preceding year, while those of building 




COLOMBIA: C O N S T R U C T I O N PERMITS APPROVED 
Total area 











46 other cities 
Total area of new housing 





































































































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Preliminary figures. 
'includes permits approved in the Yumbo metropolitan area. 
'Includes permits approved in the metropolitan areas of Bello, Envigado and Itaguí. 
while in the former, the decline marked the continuation of the extremely uneven growth pattern 
observed in the four preceding years. During 1981 there was also a considerable decline (-15 %) in 
the production of carbonates, which had already decreased in the two preceding years; and for the 
fifth year running in the production of caustic soda decreased. The 3% drop in the production of 
sugar, for its part, interrupted the marked and sustained upward trend shown by this commodity in 
the preceding three-year period. Thus, the only one of the leading manufactures whose production 
expanded was cement, the output of which rose by 2.5 % as in the previous two years (see table 6). 
The evolution described above resulted in a decline equivalent to 4.4% in manufacturing 
sector employment and in the stagnation of the industrial consumption of electricity, which, after 
having grown by 11% in 1978, grew at steadily declining rates in the following years. 
(iv) Construction. As already noted, construction was the only activity which maintained in 
1981 the high degree of dynamism achieved the preceding year, since its product rose by 8%, thus 
duplicating its 1980 performance. 
In the same way as in 1980, government activity constituted the primary driving force of the 
sector. Indeed, the investments made through the Ministry of Mines and Energy exceeded those 
made in 1980 by 51 %, the majority of them being channelled towards the development of projects 
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aimed at electric power generation. The investments of the Ministry of Public Works, for their 
part, were 49% higher than the year before and served to make considerable progress in the 
maintenance, reconstruction and expansion of highways and other infrastructure works. At the 
same time, large works were carried out to improve the road systems in some urban centres, 
mainly the Special District of Bogotá. 
The rapid growth of the construction sector was also stimulated by the recovery in building 
construction. Thus, the total floor area represented by the building licences approved in the ten 
main cities of the country grew by 10%, although it was still 11% smaller than in 1978 because of 
the decline suffered during the two preceding years (see table 7). The growth of non-residential 
building construction was particularly intense, and its area increased by 37%. The housing floor 
area increased by 4%, after having contracted sharply in 1979 and slightly in 1980. The cities 
where housing construction grew most vigorously were Manizales (where the area constructed 
increased by 14%), Bucaramanga and Cartagena (where the area grew by around 22%), and above 
all Cali (where the area was 36% greater than in 1980). In Bogotá, in contrast, housing 
construction remained almost stagnant, while it fell markedly in Medellin (-10%) and 
Barranquilla (-13%) and slumped for the third consecutive year in Cúcuta (-45%), reflecting the 
decrease in economic activity across the border with Venezuela. 
During the year measures were taken to strengthen the resources of the Territorial Credit 
Institute by channelling to that institution that portion of the savings deposits reserves which the 
banking system and the Public Savings Bank must devote to the housing sector. These measures, 
together with the budgetary resources allocated, increased the volume of resources available for the 
construction and purchase of low-cost dwellings to 4.4 billion pesos, with which the Territorial 
Credit Institute began to build 40 000 dwellings of this type. Other measures were aimed at 
redistributing the composition of the portfolio of the savings and housing corporations, 
stipulating that 3% of it should be used to finance building materials industries; 82%, to purchase 
dwellings and 15 % for other activities. This distribution also favoured medium and low-cost home 
loans, since it was laid down that 22% of the portfolio should be used to purchase dwellings whose 
price was 2 500 Constant Purchasing Power Units (UPAC) or less; 24%, dwellings costing between 
2 501 and 5 000 UPAC; 18%, dwellings costing between 5 001 and 10 000 UPAC, and the remainder 
for the purchase of higher-price dwellings.6 In addition, a ceiling of 10 000 UPAC was established 
for individual loans. 
(c) The evolution of employment 
In spite of the scant expansion of overall economic activity in 1981, official figures indicate 
that the employment situation in the main urban centres apparently tended to improve. Thus, the 
average rate of unemployment in the four largest cities of the country taken together, which had 
stabilized at an average of 8.8% in the years 1978 and 1979 and later rose to 9.6% in 1980, fell to 
8.2 % in 1981. Indeed, unemployment only seems to have risen in Barranquilla (from 8.2 % in 1980 
to 11.2% in 1981). On the other hand, in Bogotá —the leading employment generation centre of 
the country— the coefficient of unemployment fell from an average of 8% in the preceding year to 
5.5% in 1981, while in Medellin (a city where the highest rates of unemployment in the country 
had been recorded in past years) the unemployment figures fell steadily in 1981 from a maximum 
of nearly 16% in March to a little over 9% in December. The rate of unemployment also fell 
(although more moderately) in Cali, where an average annual rate of less than 9% was recorded 
for the first time (see table 8). 
It is of course rather difficult to explain the downward trend in the rate of unemployment in a 
year of slow growth of the economy, when industrial production decreased slightly in absolute 
terms. Although the effect of this decline on urban employment was partially outweighted by the 
6At present, however, the UPAC system leaves out vast sectors of the population, since their very small family 
incomes mean that even though the Government fixes a ceiling on the monetary readjustment applicable, they are unable 








































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Preliminary figures. 
marked expansion in the construction sector for the second consecutive year and by the increase 
which was probably recorded in the public administration staff, a more important factor was the 
drop in the rates of participation. As may be seen from table 8, these fell markedly in Bogotá, Cali 
and Medellín (the same three cities where the drop in unemployment was concentrated), whereas 
the rate of participation rose in Barranquilla, the only one of the main urban centres where the rate 
of unemployment rose. Consequently, rather than reflecting a substantial increase in employment, 
which, as already noted, would seem surprising in view of the general loss of dynamism of the 
economy, the decline in the rate of unemployment was apparently due to the fact that quite a few of 
the persons in the labour force withdrew from it and stopped seeking work actively. 
3. The external sector 
(a) External trade 
(i) Exports. The year 1981 marked the end of the long and sustained expansion of exports of 
goods registered in the preceding decade, thanks to which their value more than quintupled, rising 
from a little over US$ 790 million in 1970 to nearly US$ 4.1 billion in 1980. In 1981, in contrast, 
the value of exernal sales of merchandise declined by close to 24% because of a decrease of slightly 
more than 10% in their unit value and a contraction of nearly 15% in their volume (see table 9). 
Contrary to what had happened the preceding year, the main cause of the decline in volume 
was the drop in physical sales of coffee, which barely exceeded 9 million bags after having 
remained at over 11.1 million bags in both 1979 and 1980. At the same time, the average price of 
the coffee exported, which had already fallen slightly in 1980, suffered another —and this time 
substantial— drop of 34 US cents in 1981, averaging US$ 1.45 a pound (see table 10). 
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The decline in the international price of coffee reflected essentially the surplus supply which 
existed in 1981 on the world coffee market, and this in turn was due basically to the increases in 
production stimulated by the very buoyant international prices during the period 1976-1979. 
Because of this situation, and in view of the persistent decline in prices, it was necessary during the 
1980-1981 coffee year to change the level of the global quotas four times. As a result, Colombia's 
quota was reduced to 8.3 million bags —over 14% lower than the quota established initially.7 Thus, 
the surplus supply of coffee at the world level not only adversely affected Colombia's terms of trade 
but also, because of the quota reduction, affected the volume of Colombian coffee exports. Because 
of these simultaneous drops in price and volume, the value of coffee exports suffered a dramatic 
drop of over 4 1 % and totalled somewhat less than US$ 1.4 billion in 1981 —the lowest figure 
recorded since 1977.8 
The decline in the value of coffee exports was also accompanied by a very slow growth of the 
volume of the other external sales, which increased by somewhat less than 2%: a rate not only 
much lower than that achieved in 1980, but also lower than those recorded in any of the ten 
preceding years except 1975. 
The main cause of the near-stagnation of non-coffee exports was the considerable decrease in 
external sales of manufactures, whose value fell by 21% after having more than doubled over the 
two preceding years (see table 11). 
This radical turnaround in the evolution of industrial exports reflected the stagnation of 
sales of clothing and, above all, the sharp decline in exports of leather goods (-40%), cotton 
yarns (-47%) and, especially, sugar. Exports of this latter commodity, which had totally 
disappeared in 1977 but expanded with extraordinary intensity in the following three years to 
become the second most important export in 1980, fell by 57% in 1981 as a consequence of a drop 
of slightly more than 5% in the volume of sugar produced and of the slump in the international 
Table 9 
COLOMBIA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
7In addition to its exports to the member countries of the International Coffee Agreement, Colombia exported slightly 
more than 700 000 bags of coffee to non-member countries. 
8As a consequence of the increase in the physical sales of coffee and, above all, of the rise in its international price, the 
value of coffee exports rose from an average of nearly US$ 535 million in the period 1970-1975 to closeto US$ 1 790 
million in the period 1975-1980. 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Correspond to the New York exchange quotation for MAMS coffee (Manizales, Armenia, Medellin and Sevilla). 
US cents per pound. 
'Dollars per 70-kg bag of unroasted coffee. 
Pesos per 125-kg load of parchment coffee. 
'Per 70-kg bag exported. 
price.9 On the other hand, during 1981 the marked and persistent rise in exports of corrugated 
cardboard boxes continued, exports of cotton fabrics recovered, and, as a consequence of the 
increase in purchases by Mexico and Venezuela, the value of cement exports rose by 28%. 
In contrast with the negative evolution of exports of manufactures, the value of external sales 
of agricultural commodities other than coffee rose by 20%, coming close to US$ 500 million. A 
particularly sharp increase was shown by exports of beef, whose value rose by 82%, thereby 
doubling that recorded only two years earlier. As in past years, Venezuela remained the main 
market for this commodity, accounting for 68% of the sales. 
In spite of the outbreak of sigatoka disease which affected extensive areas of plantations, 
during 1981 banana exports continued to expand for the ninth consecutive year. Their value rose 
by 25%, thanks in particular to a 17% rise in their average price, so that they brought in a total of 
US$ 136 million (three times the total recorded only five years previously), and became the most 
important export item after coffee. 
On the other hand, as a consequence of problems related to plant diseases, markets and 
profitability, there was a significant slackening in 1981 in the growth rate of sales of flowers, 
whose value rose by less than 8% after having increased more than fivefold between 1975 and 
1980. Something similar happened with cotton exports, which, after the notable recovery they 
registered in 1980, rose by only 7% in 1981 (see table 11). 
In 1981 the export trade continued to be supported by technical and credit assistance provided 
by the Export Promotion Fund (PROEXPO). To support the financing of working capital in pre-
shipment activities, PROEXPO granted loans totalling 40.5 billion pesos. This was 31 % higher than 
the amount granted in 1980, and represented a slight increase in real terms. Of this total, 14.4 
billion pesos was earmarked for the primary sector, representing an increase of 79% over the 
'After rising in 1981 to an average of 28.7 US cents per pound (the highest price since 1974), this fell in 1981 to 16.9 
US cents. 
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preceding year, while 24 billion pesos went to the manufacturing sector, where the branches of 
activity which benefited most were food production, the textile industry, ready-made clothing and 
the manufacture of chemicals. In addition PROEXPO granted loans equivalent to nearly 1 930 
million pesos to finance the enlargement of the production capacity of industries exporting tourist 
goods and services. This, however, was only 10% more than the loans granted in 1980 and 
therefore represented a decrease of nearly 15 % in real terms. Moreover, PROEXPO came to the aid 
of the textile manufacturers in order to help them to finance the purchase of the cotton harvest so 
that they would have sufficient stocks for export production, granting them loans totalling close to 
1.8 billion pesos. The fund also expanded its post-shipment loans in 1981, granting a total of 940 
million pesos in national currency and 2 870 million pesos in foreign currency for this purpose. 
With a similar aim of facilitating external sales, PROEXPO increased export credit insurance by 
65%. Finally, it supported the export sector by granting loans to carry out feasibility studies of 
exportable production and foreign markets and to provide staff training services and technical 
assistance in design and packaging. 
During 1981 the authorities also sought to stimulate exports by modifying the system of tax 
credit certificates (CAT) through increases in the percentage applicable to exports of textiles, ready-
Table 11 
COLOMBIA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Ajusted total 














Cement (Portland and clinker) 
Cotton yarn 



































































































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Colombian Foreign Trade Institute (INCOMEX). 
"Preliminary figures. 
The data refer to export permits, so that the totals differ from the balance-of-payments figures. 
'Undjusted permits. 




COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF THE INDEXES OF THE EFFECTIVE 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS A N D IMPORTS" 


































































Source: Statistical Appendix. 
"These indexes are obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by indexes of the real exchange 
rate (table 1). The results are then added together to obtain the indexes of the effective real exchange rate. For more 
details, see the introduction to the Statistical Appendix. 
made garments and some mineral products from 9% to 12% and increases from4% to9% in the 
percentage applicable to external sales of flowers, some vegetables, leather and cocoa. For the same 
purpose, the period of maturity of CAT certificates for use to pay taxes was reduced. 
These incentives were not, however, in general sufficient to compensate for the adverse effect 
on the competitiveness of exports caused by the drop in the effective real rate of exchange; this rate 
went down by 7%, in spite of the fact that in 1981 the monetary authorities accelerated the rate of 
the gradual devaluation of the peso against the dollar,10 so that the real rate of exchange with 
respect to the United States currency rose slightly. Because, however, of the marked revaluation of 
the dollar against the European currencies in 1981, the rate of exchange between the Colombian 
peso and these currencies declined markedly11 in real terms, so that in 1981 the virtually systematic 
decline registered in the effective real rate of exchange since 1975 continued (see table 12 and 
figure 2). 
(ii) Imports. In 1981 the value of imports of goods totalled nearly US$"4.8 billion, — 8 % 
higher than in 1980. This increase was much less than those noted in each of the five preceding 
years, during which merchandise imports trebled, rising from US$ 1 425 million in 1975 to 
US$ 4 420 million in 1980. The reduction in the growth rate of the value of imports was basically 
10The average rise in the rate of exchange against the dollar rose from 11% in 1980 to 15.3% in 1981. 
n In this respect, see the tables for Colombia in the technical appendix at the end of Part Two of the Survey. 
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Figure 2 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF THE INDEXES OF THE EFFECTIVE REAL 
EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(1980= 100) 
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COLOMBIA 
due to the much more moderate expansion of their volume, which, after rising at the exceptional 
rate of over 34% during the preceding year, increased by only 2% in 1981. At the same time, the 
rise in the unit value of imports fell from nearly 10% to slightly over 6%. 
Seen from another angle, the reduction in the growth rate of imports was a reflection both of 
the effects of the slower expansion of domestic economic activity and of the changes in economic 
policy. In previous years, as a result of the coffee boom and of considerations regarding the need to 
enlarge production capacity and promote the efficiency of domestic production, greater external 
openness of the economy was favoured. With regard to imports, this policy was reflected in the 
transfer of many categories from the system of prior import licences to a free import régime, and 
in an appreciable reduction in tariffs, which dropped to very low levels in some cases such as 
imports of machinery and equipment and vehicles for public passenger transport and cargo. All 
these measures had their fullest impact in 1979 and 1980 when, as already noted, imports grew 
with remarkable rapidity. During 1981, in contrast, the import liberalization process was halted, 
the reduction of tariffs was slowed down, and some of the special measures for encouraging some 
imports were eliminated, although those aimed at promoting external purchases of capital goods 
for industry, energy and mining were retained. 
Partly as a result of these changes in trade policy and, more fundamentally, because of the 
scant increase in private consumption, imports of consumer goods, which had recorded 
extraordinary increases in the two preceding years, virtually stagnated in 1981. Thus, after rising 
by 80% in 1979 and by 42% in 1980, they increased by only a littleover 1 % in 1981 because of the 
marked slackening in the growth rate of purchases of non-durable goods and, above all, the decline 
in the absolute value of imports of durable consumer goods12 (see table 13). 
Table 13 















































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Colombian Foreign Trade Institute (INCOMEX). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes small items of non-classified imports. 
12The decrease of over US$ 60 million registered in automobile purchases was a significant factor in this decline in the 
absolute value. 
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On the other hand, imports of intermediate goods rose by 17% —faster than in 1980. This 
acceleration was exclusively due, however, to the sharp increase shown by purchases of 
intermediate goods for industry, which rose by 20% after having increased by only 4% in 1980, 
while the growth rate of imports of petroleum and fuels, which had more than doubled between 
1978 and 1980, continued to decline markedly and amounted to only 11% in 1981. 
There was also a reduction in the growth rate of purchases of capital goods in 1981, in spite of 
the fact that purchases of building materials increased by 88% after having declined by 36% 
during the preceding year. This substantial expansion was due to the purchase of machinery and 
equipment for works which are being carried out as part of the big hydroelectric projects under 
way, and for mineral and petroleum prospection and operations. The decrease in imports of 
transport equipment, in contrast, was due to the fact that in 1981, as already noted, some special 
measures adopted in 1980 regarding the purchase of transport equipment for public service and 
freight ceased to be operative, while the minimum price allowed for the purchase of private 
automobiles was raised. 
(iii) The terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports. As a result of the sharp decline 
in the unit value of exports of goods and a further (although moderate) increase in that of imports, 
the terms of trade fell by close to 16%. This represented a continuation of the downward trend in 
the terms of trade which began in 1978, following the notable improvement they showed in the 
two preceding years because of the dramatic rise in the international price of coffee caused by the 
Brazilian frosts in 1975. In fact, the 1981 drop caused the terms of trade index to sink to a level only 
slightly higher than the one recorded at the beginning of the previous decade (see table 9). 
Since, in addition to the decline in the price of exports, their volume also contracted markedly, 
the drop in the purchasing power of exports of goods (-28.5%) was considerably larger than the 
decline in the terms of trade. It brought the purchasing power of exports to its lowest level in the 
past six years, only 11 % higher than that at which it stood before the beginning of the coffee boom. 
(b) The balance of payments 
As a consequence of the reduction of slightly more than 18% in the value of exports of goods 
and services (which thus totalled US$ 4.2 billion) and a 7.5% increase in imports of goods and 
services (whose value in absolute terms rose to US$ 5 930 million) the 1981 trade deficit 
amounted to nearly US$ 1 725 million —4.6 times that recorded the previous year. 
Because of this, and of an increase of 28% in net remittances of profits and interests, the 
deficit on current account came to US$ 1 970 million: nearly four times as high as the negative 
balance for 1980 and US$ 550 million more than the surpluses accumulated during the 1976-1979 
coffee boom. 
The flow of long-term capital and non-compensatory official transfer payments totalled close 
to US$ 1.3 billion in 1981. As in the preceding year, direct investments (aimed primarily at the 
financing of some mineral projects and of petroleum exploration and exploitation activities) 
reached a high level, exceeding US$ 200 million. Net long-term loans to the public sector, 
although lower than those disbursed in 1980, also remained at a much higher level than in past 
years. They were used to finance the big projects for enlarging the electric power generation 
capacity and other projects in the fields of mining and public works. The private sector, for its part, 
disbursed long-term loans totalling somewhat more than US$ 400 million, i.e., considerably more 
than the US$ 180 million received in 1980. 
As a consequence of the expansion in the net inflow of long-term capital and the increase in 
short-term credits, the surplus on the capital account was very similar to the deficit on current 
account. For this reason, the increase in international reserves (about US$ 200 million) was much 
lower in 1981 than in the five preceding years, when the reserves rose by more than US$ 4.8 billion 
(see table 14). Thus, at the end of 1981 the country continued to hold a solid reserve position, since 
its accumulated reserves totalled US$ 5.6 billion, which was nearly equal to the total imports of 




COLOMBIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 














































































































































































































































































Source: 1976-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; (magnetic tape, March 1982); 1981: 
ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
c
 In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 
monetization or demonetization of gold, allocation or settlement of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to 
revaluation. 
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(c) The external debt 
At the end of September 1981, the total public and State-guaranteed private external debt 
came to US$ 4.9 billion, 15 % higher than the amount recorded at the end of 1980. During those 
first nine months of 1981, a total of 885 million pesos was received as new loans. Projected for the 
whole year, this would be more or less equivalent to the amount disbursed in 1980 (see table 15). 
Thus, the upward trend in the external indebtedness begunin 1979continued in 1981. While 
during the period 1975-1978 total disbursements came to US$ 1 444 million, in the following 33 
months the loans disbursed came to more than double that figure, slightly exceeding US$ 2.9 
billion. This growth in external indebtedness was due in essence to the Government's desire to 
finance part of the large investments envisaged in the National Integration Plan out of external 
resources, taking advantage of the country's good international credit position for that purpose. 
Even so, Colombia's share of external indebtedness and the burden of this debt remained lower 
than in the majority of Latin American countries of similar size. Thus, during the first nine months 
of the year, debt servicing amounted to only about 14% of exports of goods and services. 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices 
During 1981 inflation remained at the high level recorded during the preceding year, since 
the December-December variation in the consumer price index for manual workers came to 
26.7%: almost identical to the figure for the preceding year. The increase in the consumer price 
index for non-manual workers, which stood at a slightly higher level than in 1980, and the 
variation of wholesale prices, which, in contrast, was slightly less in 1981 than during the 
preceding year constitute further evidence of the stability of the rate of inflation (see table 16). As 
regards its intensity, this can be gauged from the fact that the increases in consumer prices were 
higher in 1981 than in any of the 20 preceding years except 1963, 1977 and 1979. 
As usual, the food component of the consumer price index rose much more markedly than the 
total index.13 On the other hand, the prices of clothing rose once again at a considerably lower rate 
than prices in general. 
Table 15 
COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 198Ô" 1981° 
Public and state-guaranteed 
private debt 
Disbursed debt 
Balance not yet taken up 
Disbursements ' 
Servicing of debt 
Payments of interest and commission 
Amortization payments 
Servicing of debt as a percentage
 R 
of exports of goods and services 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures up to the end of September. 
Outstanding debt balance payable at year-end. 
'Undisbursed balance of contracted debts. 
Percentages. 
"The only exceptions to this pattern in recent years occurred in 1978, when agricultural production increased 







































Among the components of the wholesale price index, the price of imports increased less than 
that of goods of domestic origin, thus repeating the pattern which prevailed during the preceding 
six years and was only broken in 1978. 
Among goods of domestic origin, the prices of agricultural commodities increased by more 
than 29%, which is the highest figure recorded in the past six years, except for 1976, when the 
prices of agricultural commodities rose by nearly 38% as a result of the great 1975 drought. 
The increase in agricultural prices also surpassed that of manufactures by a considerable 
margin, thereby resuming the trend which began in 1974 and was broken only in the 1979-1980 
period. Between 1980 and 1981, in fact, the variations in agricultural and industrial prices were 
almost exactly reversed, as the former rose during those years from 21 % to 29 %, while the latter 
fell from 30% to 2 1 % (see table 16). 
If, instead of considering the origin of the commodities included in the wholesale price index, 
their use or destination is taken into account, their evolution in 1981 was markedly asymmetrical: 
while the prices of consumer goods increased by 31 % in 1981 (practically equalling the 30% rise 
recorded in 1980) and the prices of capital goods followed a similar pattern (rising from 23.6% in 
1980 to 24.1 % in 1981 ), the prices of raw materials slackened notably for the second year running, 
since after increasing by 25.6% in 1979 and 21.4% in 1980, they rose by only 15.3% in 1981. This 
marked decline in the rate of increase of raw materials prices was partly a result of the slower 
overall economic activity and partly due to the rise in interest rates: both factors which led 
producers to reduce their inventories, with a consequent depressive effect on the demand for raw 
materials and intermediate goods. 
Table 16 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Variation December - December 
Consumer price index" 









































































































































Variation between annual averages 
Consumer price index" 
Total, manual workers 23.8 19.9 34.8 17.1 24.7 27.2 28.1 
Food, manual workers 27.2 20.2 43.2 12.6 22.7 28.7 28.5 
Total, non-manual workers 22.3 20.4 31.3 18.9 23.8 24.9 26.0 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE) and the Banco de la República. 
"National average. 
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(b) Wages and salaries 
In January 1981 the minimum legal wages were readjusted by 26.4% in both rural areas and 
urban centres, except for the capitals of departments, where they were raised by a slightly higher 
percentage. This increase was somewhat lower than the variation between the annual averages of 
the consumer price index for manual workers, and consequently the purchasing power of the 
minimum wages fell by slightly more than 1% in 1981. This decline was the first one recorded 
after four years during which minimum wages experienced continuous real increases, thanks to 
which the purchasing power of the minimum rural wage was 43% higher in 1980 than in 1976, 
while over the same period the minimum urban wage paid in the capitals of departments 
experienced a real increase of 31% (see table 17). 
During 1981 there was also a generalized decrease in the average real daily wages paid in the 
agricultural sector. Daily wages for manpower hired without meals on the farms of the hot-climate 
regions experienced the biggest deterioration (-3.7%), while daily wages, including meals, paid on 
the cattle ranches of the cool-climate regions registered the smallest decrease (-0.3%) (see 
table 18). 
In the manufacturing sector, however, despite the decline in production and employment, the 
wages paid to employees increasedby 2.4% in real terms —a bigger increase than those recorded in 
the previous two years—, while the real daily wages paid to industrial workers rose slightly for the 
second year running, after having risen by close to 19% between 1977 and 1979 (see table 19). 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
In 1981 the monetary authorities managed to reduce the growth rate of the means of 
payment, thus achieving one of the goals which they had set themselves in their efforts to bring 
about a gradual moderation of the inflationary process. Thus, the money supply increased by 21 % 
in 1981, much lower rate than that recorded not only in 1980, but also in any year in the previous 
decade except 1971 and 1974 (see table 20). This rate of increase of the means of payment also 
meant that in 1981 the real supply of money decreased, and that the ratio between this variable and 
the gross domestic product fell. 
The basic cause of the slackening in the growth of the money supply was the further marked 
drop registered by the rate of expansion of the monetary base, which after rising at an average rate 
of over 35% in 1977 and 1978 and expanding by an average of close to 30% in the following two 
Table 17 
COLOMBIA: MINIMUM DAILY LEGAL WAGES 
(Averages) 
Pesos Growth rate of real wages" 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Rural wages' 53.6 71.3 105 140 177 1.9 13.6 18.0 4.8 -1.3 
Urban wages' 
High'' 62.9 83.3 115 150 190 1.4 13.1 10.7 2.5 -1.2 
Low' 58.8 78.0 105 140 177 2.7 13.1 8.0 4.8 -1.3 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República and the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Deflated by the consumer price index for manual workers. 
Crop farming, stock-raising, forestry, hunting and fishing. 
' Remaining economic activities. 
In the capital cities of departments and adjacent municipios. 




COLOMBIA: AVERAGE DAILY WAGES IN AGRICULTURE 
AND STOCK-RAISING 
Cold (upland) areas 
With food 
Without food 
Hot (lowland) areas 
With food 
Without food 
Cold (upland) areas 
With food 
Without food 
Hot (lowland) areas 
































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Deflated by the consumer price index for manual workers. 
Table 19 
COLOMBIA: MONTHLY WAGES AND SALARIES IN 











































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"To calculate the real wages, the consumer price index for non-manual workers was used. 
To calculate the real wages, the consumer price index for manual workers was used. 
years, rose by a little under 22% in 1981. The primary factor in the more moderate expansion of 
the monetary base was the much slower growth of the international reserves of the Banco de la 
República, which increased by not much more than US$ 210 million in 1981, after having 
expanded at an average rate of US$ 640 million annually during the three-year period 1976-1978 
and at an average rate of US$ 1 460 million in the following two years, primarily as a result of the 
tremendous increase in the foreign exchange earnings caused by the boom in world coffee prices. 
Even though their expansion was much slower, however, the increase in the international 
reserves remained the major factor in the growth of the monetary base. Indeed, in absolute terms 
their increase was actually greater than that of the latter. Nevertheless, the ratio between the 
increase in reserves and the growth of monetary emission was much smaller in 1981 than in 
previous years;14 this made the task of the monetary authorities in counteracting the expansive 
,4In 1981 this coefficient came to 1.34, while in 1980 it stood at 2.19 and in 1979, at 2.52. 
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effects of the accumulation of reserves much easier, since they did not have to resort to open 
market transactions to the enormous extent which had been necessary during the two preceding 
years, when they absorbed means of payments in the amount of 9.4 and 18.5 billion pesos, 
respectively. In 1981, in contrast, the Banco de la República withdrew somewhat less than 1 billion 
pesos through its open market transactions (see table 21). 
The control of the growth of the monetary base was also facilitated by the fact that in 1981 the 
development financing funds procured more resources from the public than they received from 
the Banco de la República, this resulting in a reduction in its net credit to them. 
In 1981 there was also a drop in the net credit of the issuing institution to the Government, 
and this constituted another factor in reducing the growth rate of the monetary base. However, the 
Government overfinanced its deficit with external credit and the resouces which entered the 
country for this purpose caused an increase in the international reserves, so that the drop in the net 
credit granted by the Banco de la República to the Government finally meant that the management 
of credit did not have a contractive effect on money issue. 
Finally, another factor which helped to moderate the growth rate of the monetary base was 
the small amount of new credits granted by the issuing institute to the banks in 1981. These 
amounted to less than 2.8 billion pesos and therefore constituted only a small fraction of the fund 
used by the banking entities to expand their loans. The banks procured 28 billion pesos through 
the increase in current account deposits, while they received over 68 billion pesos through the 
expansion of time deposit certificaos. 
This latter increase meant that for the second year running time deposit certificates 
constituted the most dynamic monetary variable, since after registering an increase of 170% in 
1980, they nearly doubled in 1981. Primarily because of this expansion, and to a lesser extent 
because deposits in housing corporations again increased, the growth rate of quasi-money was 
again very high and, as in 1980, amounted to more than twice the increase in the means of 
payment. Thus, whereas quasi-money in 1978 was equivalent to only 7 5 % of the total means of 
payment, in 1981 it exceeded them by nearly 30%. For the same reason, and in spite of the marked 
slackening in the growth rate of money, the extended money supply grew at a very high rate (39%) 
which was higher than in any of the previous four years except in 1980 (see table 20). 
(b) Fiscal policy 
After continually amassing positive balances during the period 1976-1979, in 1981 the 
Government closed its accounts with a deficit for the second year running. However, this deficit 
Table 20 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF THE MAIN MONETARY AGGREGATES 
Means of payment (M[) 
Cash 
Deposits on current account 
Quasi-money (M2) 
Deposits in housing 
corporations 
Savings deposits 
Term deposit certificates 
Extended money supply 




















































































COLOMBIA: ORIGIN OF THE MONETARY BASE 
Monetary base 
Assets of the Banco de la República 
International reserves (net) 
Domestic credit 
Treasury 
Rest of the public sector 
Commercial banks 
Financial funds 
Other financial intermediaries 
Private sector 
Exchange rate differences 
Other assets (net) 
Non-monetary liabilities of the 
Banco de la República 
Commercial banks 
Financial funds 
Other financial intermediaries 
Private sector 
Transactions in the monetary market 
Long-term transactions with the exterior 


































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. 
was smaller than in 1980 (especially in real terms) and was accompanied by a considerable increase 
in fiscal savings. Moreover, for the first time in the past four years, the growth rate of current 
income exceeded that of total expenditure (see table 22). 
The latter rose by close to 32%: a substantially lower rate than the one of 50% recorded in 
1980 and also lower than those for the two preceding years. The more moderate expansion of total 
outflows derived from the lower growth rates shown in 1981 by both current expenditure and 
investment expenditure. In real terms, however, the evolution of these two components was 
different in that while current outflows increased at a slightly lower rate than that of inflation, 
investment expenditure expanded by over 45%, considerably surpassing the average increase in 
the level of prices. 
In essence this difference reflected the stress laid by the Government on the maintenance and 
expansion of the basic social capital, as provided for in the National Integration Plan. Thus, of the 
total investment of 61 billion pesos made by the Government, 22 million pesos (49% more than in 
1980) was used by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport in the renovation and expansion of 
the basic infrastructure of roads, bridges, ports, sewerage, aqueducts, etc. For its part, the Ministry 
of Mines and Energy invested 11 billion pesos (51 % more than in the preceding year) in the 
substantial enlargement of the electric power generation capacity, the extension and 
modernization of energy transmission and distribution networks, and the implementation of the 
current rural electrification programmes. In addition, the Ministry of Mines and Energy 
earmarked some of its investments for search, prospecting and appraisal activities on new mineral 
deposits and for the development of large mineral exploitation projects. Finally, the investments 
made by the Ministry of Health totalled 5.8 billion pesos and those made by the Ministry of 
Education in school construction and the expansion of educational facilities totalled 3 billion pesos. 
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In 1981 the current income of the Government rose by 35%, i.e., slightly faster than during 
the previous year. Its increase of 5.5% in real terms, however, although somewhat higher than 
that recorded in 1980, was very much below those of over 13% and9% achieved in 1978 and 1979, 
respectively. 
Moreover, the evolution of fiscal income in 1981 was characterized by a much more 
heterogeneous behaviour on the part of its main components than in previous years. Thus, while 
revenue from income and complementary taxes rose by barely 12.5% and that derived from 
customs duties increased by 18.5%, that generated by the gasoline tax rose by 60%, and the yield 
from the special exchange account15 showed a very big expansion of close to 85% (see table 22). 
These variations meant that both the yield from customs duties and, in particular, that from 
income tax fell considerably in real terms (-7.5% and -12%, respectively). In the case of income 
tax, the drop which occurred in 1981 came on top of the small real decreases in the previous two 
years and was essentially a consequence of the increasingdegreeof evasion of income tax, which is 
a revenue source of fundamental importance in the Colombian tax system. 
On the other hand, the substantial rise in the earnings from the gasoline tax was mainly due to 
the increase in the price of fuels, while the even more vigorous expansion in the resources 
generated by the special exchange account was due to the considerable increase for the third year 
running in both the interest yielded by the international reserves and the profits made on the 
Table 22 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. 
"This account includes income from interest received in connexion with the management of the international 
reserves and that derived from the purchase and sale of foreign exchange. 
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purchase and sale of foreign exchange. Owing to its considerable increase in 1981 and to the 
likewise appreciable increases recorded in the two preceding years, the yield from the special 
exchange account, which in 1978 amounted to only one-third of the income tax revenue, exceeded 
the latter in 1981 and thus became the main source of fiscal resources. 
As a result of the slightly higher growth of current income as compared with total 
expenditure, the Government's deficit fell from 11.4 to 10 billion pesos between 1980 and 1981. As 
in the previous year, this negative balance was financed in 1981 exclusively with external 
resources. These amounted, in fact, to nearly twice the total deficit, so that the Government was 





1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
During the long period which began at the end of the Second World War and ended with the 
second petroleum crisis, the Costa Rican economy was one of the most dynamic and stable in Latin 
America. Up to the first petroleum crisis, this country in fact led the region in economic growth. ' 
After that, it still occupied a privileged position until 1979, when a series of imbalances began to 
check the expansion of the product and threatened to set off a sharp inflationary process. The 
following year, the level of activity stagnated, and in 1981 the main macroeconomic variables 
deteriorated to such a point that the economy underwent its worse crisis in four or five decades. 
Thus, the gross domestic product declined for the first time in two decades and for only the third 
time since national accounts have been prepared for the country.2 The drop of 3.6% in 1981 was 
well in excess of those recorded previously (in 1956 and 1961 ), and it would be necessary to go back 
to the beginning of the Second World War to encounter a greater decline. The 10.5 % decreased in 
the gross national income and the 13 % drop in domestic demand were by far the biggest slumps on 
record, while the reduction in consumption was unprecedented. The same might be said of the 
employment situation, since never had a rate of unemployment as high as the one recorded for 
19Ç1 been measured. 
In spite of the pronounced drop in domestic demand, inflation reached a level of intensity 
unknown in the past, while the degree of deterioration of the country's external position was in 
certain respects reminiscent of the deterioration suffered during the Great Depression.3 
Outstanding in this respect were the drop of no less than one-third in the import capacity and the 
declaration of a moratorium on external debt servicing. But the magnitude of the devaluation of 
the colón in 1981 not only far surpassed the exchange modifications which took place in the 1930s 
but was comparable to the total accumulated increases in the exchange rate from the time the 
country gained its political independence in 1825 up to the end of 1980.4 
While it is true that this upheaval in the performance of the economy was to a considerable 
extent unleashed by the sharp worsening in the terms of trade, the denial to the country of access to 
the international financial markets and the marked rise in the real interest rates in those markets, 
the present crisis has been shaped primarily by factors of essentially domestic origin. The main 
factors in this connection seem to have been the persistent expansion of the deficit in the public 
finances and an excessive overvaluation of the colón. Important roles were also played, however, 
by structural factors such as the exhaustion of the agricultural frontier, the geographical shift of the 
population and exceedingly high growth of the labour force over a prolonged period. 
'See CEPAL, Series historical del crecimiento de América Latina, Santiago, Chile, 1978, table 1. 
2
 The national accounts begin in 1946. 
'Domestic price indexes are available from 1936 onwards. At all events, it can be stated that no one living in Costa 
Rica at present has experienced inflation as severe as that in 1981. 
4
 Up to the end of the nineteenth century, Costa Rica, like most of the countries of the region, used the bimetallic 
system (gold and silver). The parities in this system did not vary to any significant degree until 1870, when the value of gold 
compared with silver entered upon a prolonged period of increase in international markets. In the last years in the 
nineteenth century, Costa Rica adopted the gold standard and set the value of its new currency, the colón, at 2.15 per US 
dollar (gold). From that time up to 1980, when the parity of the colón stood at 8.57 per dollar, the exchange rate rose by a 
total of 329%; between the end of 1980 and the end of 1981, it rose by 366%. 
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After showing an average annual growth rate of 6.3% in the previous decade, the gross 
domestic product grew hardly at all in 1980 and declined by nearly 4% in 1981, so that the per 
capita product fell below the amount achieved four years previously (see table 1 and figure 1). 
Gross domestic income, for its part, dropped by over 8% owing to the sharp deterioration in 
the terms of trade for the fourth consecutive year. Moreover, the drop in the gross national income 
was greater than 10% because of the rise in interest rates on international markets. 
Together with the reduction in the level of activity, the rate of unemployment increased 
appreciably, rising from 5.3% of the labour force in 1980 to 8.3% in 1981. Between the end of 1979 
and the end of 1981, this rate rose from 3.0% to 8.7%, and at the latter date, the rate of urban 
unemployment was close to 11%. At the same time, inflation, which had been increasing slowly 
but steadily in the previous four years, accelerated sharply as a result of the severe deterioration of 
Table 1 
COSTA RICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income 
Terms of trade 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money (M,) 
Wages and salaries' 
Unemployment rate 
Current income of central government 
Total central government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total central 
, . d government expenditure 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in net international 


















































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'General real wage index of members of Costa Rican Social Security Fund. 
''Percentages. 
'Gross disbursed external debt. 
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the colón. Thus, consumer price index rose by 65% between December 1980 and December 1981, 
while the variation between annual averages was 37%. The wholesale price index, for its part, 
rose by 117% between the end of 1980 and the end of 1981, with a variation of 65% between 
annual averages. Owing primarily to the increased inflation but also to the measures taken to 
contain nominal expenditure, especially in the public sector, real wages and salaries fell by 13% in 
1981. Wages and salaries in the public sector fell by 18%, thus returning to their 1979 level. 
In spite of the magnitude of the reduction in real wages and salaries, the decline in domestic 
demand primarily reflected the very sharp contraction in investment. Thus, gross domestic 
investment fell by over 32% after having already gone down by 11 % in 1980. As in 1980, the drop 
mainly affected investment in machinery and equipment, as well as involving a further substantial 
decline in stocks. Unlike what had happened in 1980, however, in 1981 the decline in investment 
affected both the public and private sectors. In part, the behaviour of domestic demand, especially 
where investment was concerned, may be attributed to the severe real and financial restrictions 
which made themselves felt on the supply side. Thus, the volume of imports of goods and services 
went down by over 26% in 1981 after the decrease of 8% the previous year, while the real 
availability of credit fell by over 24%. A big impact was also had by the containment of public 
expenditure, which declined by 23% in real terms, and by the loss of confidence by part of the 
private sector in the future of the economy, which was reflected not only in the drop in investment 
but also in the flight of capital. Finally, an independent impact was had by the acceleration of 
inflation, with most of the indicators of the economy falling in real terms. Perhaps the most 
outstanding example of this was the aforementioned drop in real wages and salaries. Within this 
situation, the vigorous growth in the volume of exports, which rose by 18%, emerged as a positive 
element. This development, after several years of stagnation, was brought about principally by the 
notable improvement in the real exchange rate. 
With regard to the gross domestic product by sectors, the recession mainly affected 
construction and commerce. The product of the former activity fell by nearly 22 %, which, together 
with the drop of over 9% the preceding year, meant that it fell back to the level at which it had 
stood before 1976. Commerce, too, saw its product reduced for the second consecutive year, the 
decline in this case being over 16%. The other activities showed slight variations of between 
-1.6% for community and social sectors and +2.3% for agriculture. This last result reflected an 
improvement over the performance in the period 1979-1980, when the level of activity of this 
sector declined. The only branch which continued to show dynamism was electricity, gas and water, 
which grew by over 8%, after the expansion of 11.5% recorded the preceding year. The entry into 
operation of the large Arenal dam was the main cause of this development. The opening of this 
dam has meant that the goal of dispensing with hydrocarbons for the generation of electric power 
has almost been achieved. 
The volume of exports grew by nearly 18% in 1981, primarily because of an increase of no less 
than 30% in the volume ofcoffee sales abroad. This great effort was more than offset, however, by 
the worsening in the terms of trade, and since at the same time the country lost its access to the 
international capital market and a flight of domestic capital was set off, the capacity for importing 
fell markedly. In these circumstances, in the absence on any net external assets, it was necessary to 
reduce the volume of imports of goods and services radically, and indeed these dropped by nearly 
27%, causing a return to the level of 1974. Had it not been for the moratorium on debt servicing in 
the second half of the year, however, the volume of imports could have fallen by nearly as much as 
50%. The US$ 350 million freed by not making the amortization and interest payments financed 
over 27% of the imports of goods and services and came very close to the total deficit on current 
account, which was reduced from the equivalent of 12% of the gross domestic product in 1979-
1980 to the equivalent of 6.8% of the product in 1981. 
Early in 1980 the Government formulated a stabilization plan under a stand-by agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund in order to tackle the country's economic situation, which 
was already critical. This plan proposed to keep the expansion of domestic demand to a minimum 
and reduce the big current account deficit, basically through an appreciable reduction in the fiscal 
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Figure 1 

















Balance on current account^ 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
3Annual growth rate. 
t>Average annual rate, whole country. 
^Percentage variation, December to December. 
^Millions of dollars. 
77 78 79 80 81 
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deficit, which had amounted toi % oí the gross domestic product in the previous year. The option 
of modifying the overvalued exchange rate was not only rejected, but it was announced that the 
purpose of the plan was to defend the current exchange rate. Subsequently, however, it proved 
impossible to moderate the deficit in the public finances, which even rose to the equivalent of 9.5 % 
of the product. At the end of 1980 the pressure on the colón, which had until then been bottled up, 
made it unavoidable to effect a de facto devaluation of nearly 100%. After long negotiations, in 
May 1981 a new agreement was reached with the Fund to support a more rigorous stabilization 
programme. One of the main policies in this plan was the modification of the exchange policy. 
Another was the definitive placing of the public finances on a sounder basis. A restrictive 
monetary policy was also programmed. 
In 1981 the financial situation of the public sector improved considerably, largely because of 
the great progress achieved in redressing the precarious financial position of the central 
government. In its budgetary operations, the central government showed a surplus for the first 
time since 1977 and reduced its total deficit by 60%. It was therefore able to reduce its utilization of 
domestic credit by a similar proportion. This result was attributable to the vigorous growth in 
revenues and the drastic reduction of expenditure. Current income expanded by 42%, coming 
close to the budgetary goals. Total expenditure, for its part, rose by barely 3%, which amounted to 
a reduction of one-third in real terms. 
For the consolidated non-financial public sector, the total deficit was reduced by nearly 38% at 
current prices and by over 50% at constant prices. As a share of the product, it was reduced from 
9.5% the previous year to 4.1%. At the same time, this sector's net absorption of domestic credit 
fell from an amount equalling 6.4% of the product in 1980 to one equivalent to 1.7% in 1981. 
Even though it had not proved possible to carry out the tax reform contemplated in the 
stabilization plan, the quantitative goals for the public finances set in the agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund were largely achieved. Most of the remaining results turned out very 
differently from what had been anticipated, however. In the circumstances which prevailed in 
1981 the very restrictive fiscal policy became yet another factor of depression, rather than a means 
of liberating resources for use by the private sector. In the absence of special international financial 
support, however, it would appear that there was no other alternative. 
The nominal growth of domestic credit, for its part, remained far below the rate of inflation. 
Thus, the expansion of domestic credit between the end of 1980 and the end of 1981 was only just 
over 15% whereas inflation came to 65% in terms of the consumer price index and to 117% in 
terms of the wholesale price index. As a proportion of the product, domestic credit fell from 51 % 
in 1980 to 40% in 1981. There can be no doubt that the substantial reduction in the real supply of 
credit contributed to the recession in the level of activity. Consideration might have been given to 
an alternative policy, accompanied by supplementary measures such as higher tariffs and more 
rigorous price controls, in order to keep a bigger supply of credit from worsening the balance-of-
payments situation or making inflation more severe. It is clear, however, that a greater expansion 
of credit would not have solved the two basic problems faced by the economy —the severe shortage 
of foreign exchange and the intense inflationary process; on the contrary, it might have made the 
situation worse. In this connection, it might be considered that the pronounced reduction in the 
real supply of domestic credit was merely the corollary to its very large growth of previous years. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) The product and the income 
In 1980 the long period of economic growth was interrupted, and in 1981 a downright 
reversal in development was recorded. Thus, after growing at an average annual rate of 6.6% 
between 1961 (the last year in which there was a reduction in the gross domestic product) and 
1979, the level of activity in 1981 was 3% lower than the figure recorded two years previously (see 
table 2). As for the gross national product, this had begun to decline in 1980, and in 1981 it fell by a 
further 5%. Gross national income, for its part, also fell for the second year running, but in 1981 
251 
the drop was greater, amounting to 10.5% and bringing it to a level 6% lower than in 1978. This 
decline was brought on primarily by the intensification of the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
In 1977 the variation of relative prices in the international economy led to an increase in income 
equal to 4.1 % of the gross domestic product, but in 1981 this variation caused a drop in income 
equal to 4.7% of the product. The amount lost in 1981 was almost equal to the entire contribution 
of construction to the product. 
The biggest decrease, however, was the drop of over 14% in the gross domestic supply. As a 
result, both domestic supply and domestic expenditure were less than the product for the first time 
in 30 years. 
(b) Total supply and demand 
As a result of the persistent contraction in the volume of exports and the further deterioration 
in the terms of trade, on the one hand, and the substantial drop in private demand for investment 
on the other, the total supply began to decline in 1980. In 1981, in addition to the much bigger and 
more generalized drop in domestic demand, external financing became virtually non-existent, and 
the terms of trade worsened yet again. In these circumstances, the total supply fell by over 8%, 
bringing it back to the level at which it had stood nearly four years before (see table 3). 
This recessive situation was characterized, on the demand size, by the substantial increase in 
the volume of exports. This was partly related to the considerable drop in domestic demand, but in 
view of the magnitude of the rise in the exchange rate, it would seem correct to attribute to the 
latter the leading role in the expansion of exports. This positive element, which in normal years 
might have imparted dynamism to the rest of the economy, was on this occasion cancelled out by 
the very adverse evolution of the terms of trade and by the sharp drop in the real supply of credit, 
both domestic and external. 
The outstanding feature of domestic demand, for the second year running, was the serious 
decline in investment, whose dynamism had in the past promoted the growth of the economy. 
Thus, between 1970 and 1979 gross fixed investment rose at an average annual rate of nearly 11%, 
while the gross domestic product expanded ata little over 6%. Between 1979 and 1981, however, 
Table 2 
COSTA RICA: SOME PRODUCT A N D INCOME D A T A 
(Millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
1. Gross domestic product j
 2 g 2 1 ^ j 4 g l j 5 9 5 j 6 g 3 j ? 1 9 j g l 3 j 9 ? 5 2 Q g 9 2 2 Q 2 2 2 1 J 2 B 5 
at market prices ~ 
2. Indirect taxes I , 158 172 184 190 194 210 224 239 258 259 1
 7 4 r 
3. Subsidies / 5 6 7 7 3 3 9 4 5 13 1 3 / 
4. Gross domestic product j
 B Ç ) } n J j J 1 6 j 4 1 g j 4% j 5 2 g j 6U j y^ j 8 f ó j 9 5 ? j %9 j gÇ)g 
at factor cost (1 - 2 + 3) 
5. Net imports of goods 
and non-factor 66 81 28 36 33 29 52 165 181 212 168 -65 
services 
6. Net factor payments to .„ . 
the rest of the world" 
7. Terms-of-trade effect - -23 -37 -28 -100 -62 -27 81 51 31 3 -101 
8
'
 G r o s s d o m e s t l c suPP'y i 206 1 298 1 344 1 453 1 529 1 557 1 664 1 921 2 046 2 169 2 137 1 833 
(4 + 5) 
9. Gross national product
 { l 2 6 j 2 g g l j 4 g Q l 5QQ t t ? 2 4 % g 2 Q 2 l 9QQ { g Q 5 
(4 - 6) 
28 24 17 28 31 32 46 55 69 93 
10. Gross national income 
( 4 - 6 + 7) 1 129 1 182 1 251 1 365 1 379 1 438 1 554 1 805 1 871 1 933 1 903 1 703 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Centra] Bank of Costa Rica. 




COSTA RICA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 




Exports o( goods and services' 
Terms-of-trade effect 
Millions of dollars 





























































































































Source: ECLA calculations, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values by deflation, using price indexes calculated by ECLA for 
the purpose. 
gross fixed investment fell by over 34%, and total investment by 40%. The recessive performance 
of domestic demand was complemented by the drop in public and private consumption: something 
without precedent in the country's national accounts. 
The tremendous reduction in domestic demand was caused largely by the sharp acceleration 
of inflation. In addition, however, to the normal lag observed in the recovery of other variables in 
the presence of inflation —a lag which is usually even greater in economies like that of Costa Rica, 
with no history of inflation— an influence was exerted on this occasion by the deliberate 
containment of nominal expenditure. In view of the big external gap and the refusal of the 
authorities to modify the exchange policy, the idea had spread in economic circles since the 
previous year it was necessary to moderate the growth rate of expenditure considerably. In the case 
of the public sector, this idea took the shape of a budget for 1981 which aimed at restricting public 
expenditure severely and a monetary programme which provided for a reduction in the real 
liquidity of the economy and even more severe limitations on credit, especially that intended for 
financing consumption. In the private sector, it was reflected primarily in the marked reduction in 
purchases of capital goods and in the smaller number of building permits, but also in reduced 
hiring of labour and the slowing-down of wage increases. During 1981, this situation was 
compounded by the need for even greater sacrifices when the external position worsened. 
(c) Investment and savings 
As had happened in 1980, the reduction in investments had a more pronounced effect on 
capital formation in machinery and equipment than on construction. At all events, however, both 
branches suffered drastic reductions in 1981. There was also a reduction in stocks for the third year 
running, and here again the magnitude of the decrease was much greater than in the past (see 
table 3). 
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As to the performance of investment by sectors in 1981, both public and private investments 
declined radically, the former by 21 % and the latter by 28%. In the two preceding years, private 
fixed investment had fallen by over 40%, and as a result its 1981 level was barely higher than that 
of 1973. Consequently, the tendency towards a decline in its relative share in total investment, 
already noted since before 1980, became more marked (see table 4). There can be no doubt that, in 
addition to the effects of the real and financial restrictions on private investment mentioned 
above, the conflicts in neighbouring countries and the erratic way in which the economic policy 
was conducted helped to undermine the confidence in the future of part of the private sector. 
Finally, the drop in investment was also partly attributable to the measures decreed in the fourth 
quarter of the year prohibiting the importation of various kinds of capital goods. 
Gross domestic saving performed differently from investment, since it grew vigorously in 
1981 , increasing by 16.5% at constant prices. Furthermore, due to the magnitude of their opposite 
trends, domestic saving exceeded investment for the first time since 1952. This favourable 
development, however, which reflected both the upheaval in the financial situation of the public 
sector and the improvement in the performance of the private sector, was to a large extent 
frustrated by the worsening in the terms of trade and by the rise in interest rates. Thus, between 
1980 and 1981 gross domestic saving increased from 69% to 117% of gross fixed investment, but 
gross national saving rose only from 56.4% to 64.5% (see table 4). 
Table 4 
COSTA RICA: COMPOSITION, ORIGIN AND FINANCING 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT" 
(Percentages of the gross domestic investment for each year) 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 





Gross domestic savings 
Net factor payments to 
the rest of the world 
Terms-of-trade effect 
Gross national savings 
Fixed capital consumption 


























































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, World Bank data, and own 
estimates. 




COSTA RICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 




Electricity,'gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail commerce, 
restaurants and hotels 
Financial institutions, insurance, 
real estate and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and personal services 
Government services 
Millions of dollars 



























































































































As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, 
exactly with the latter. 
the sum of the former does not correspond 
A long-term trend worthy of special mention because of its direct impact on the development 
of the crisis is the drop in the effectiveness of investment. In the postwar process of economic 
growth, key roles were played by the intensive growth of capital formation and by the high and 
growing yield of investment. Thus, between 1950 and 1973 the annual average rate of expansion of 
gross fixed investment was 8.5%, while the average marginal ratio capital/product stood at the 
very low figure of 1.25 in the first half of that period, falling to 1.14 in the second half. 
Subsequently, the average growth rate of gross fixed investment rose to over 11 % per annum, but 
the effectiveness of capital formation decreased markedly in this period, as shown by the rise in the 
marginal ratio capital/product to an average of 1.98 between 1973 and 1979. So pronounced was 
the loss in effectiveness that the growth rate of the product fell in spite of the marked increase in 
capital formation.5 
A rigorous identification of the causes of this reverse is beyond the scope of this study, but it 
has been due at least partly to structural changes such as the spatial displacement of the population 
and the exhaustion of the agricultural frontier. The first factor has made it necessary to invest 
heavily in urban infrastructure, and although this has made life more pleasant, it has not helped to 
increase the productive capacity of the economy. The second factor requires bigger investments to 
keep the average productivity of the land and of the agricultural labour force from decreasing. 
Other causes include the probable effects of the exhaustion of the easy stages of import 
substitution and the excessive investment in fixed capital usually observed in highly protected 
markets in the long run. With regard to economic policy, it seems clear that the policy of 
'Between 1950 and 1973, the average growth rate of the gross domestic product was 7.0%. Between 1973 and 1979, it 
fell to 5.5%. 
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permitting considerable overvaluation of the colón adversely affected the efficiency of the 
economy by lessening the profitability of the export sector and blocking further possibilities for 
expanding into external markets. Finally, it is probably not merely by chance that lower 
effectiveness of investment has coincided with the oil crisis, since in order to make the economy 
less dependent on imported petroleum it has been necessary to make heavy investments which are 
only now beginning to bear fruit. 
(d) Evolution of the main sectors 
(i) Introduction. The evolution of the gross domestic product varied from one branch of 
activity to another, with spectacular slumps in construction and commerce, a somewhat less 
pronounced decline in other services, a slight decrease in manufacturing and little or no change in 
the provision of public services. In contrast, small increases were recorded in agriculture, 
transport, ownership of dwellings and the financial sector, while there was an appreciable increase 
in electric power generation (see table 5). 
(ii) The agricultural sector. In the midst of a recessive economic situation, the global results 
for the sector in 1981 showed a slight recovery of 2% in production, after the drop experienced in 
1980 and the virtual stagnation in 1979. The result differs, however, when crop years are compared 
with calendar years. Thus, in the case of coffee, which is the sector's main product, the excessive 
rains affected the flowering and led to an appreciable drop in production in the 1981/1982 
growing season, which will be reflected in the volumes available for export in 1982. On the other 
hand, when the evolution of this commodity in the course of the calendar year is examined, an 
increase of nearly 5% is observed. 
The expansion of the agricultural sector as a whole conceals differences in the performance of 
the individual branches: thus, export commodities rose by 4%, items for domestic consumption 
deteriorated by over 9%, while the livestock, forestry and fishery branches grew by between 2% 
and a little over 3% (see table 6). 
Bananas showed a sharp recovery thanks to the absence of the labour problems which affected 
this crop during the previous two years. The harvest also had the incentive of an increase in 
international prices and the steady devaluation of the colón. On the other hand, however, the 
excessive rains limited the growth of production. 
Cocoa and sugar cane showed negative results. In the case of cocoa, the drop amounted to 
47%, owing primarily to neglect of the plantations and to the fact that nothing had been done to 
combat disease in recent years, owing to the severe deterioration as regards prices and costs. 
The sugar cane harvest, for its part, fell slightly and thus continued its poor performance for 
yet another year. This was due to the growing tendency to move sugar cane cultivation from the 
central plateau to less fertile areas where, however, lower land costs and smaller competition from 
other crops facilitate the establishment of sugar mills and make operations more profitable. 
With respect to products for domestic consumption, rice, maize and sorghum showed 
substantial decreases, partly attributable to the scant credit support received by producers (see 
table 6). In the case of rice, the Government's policy was in fact aimed at discouraging its 
cultivation beyond the limits set by domestic demand, in order to avoid external sales at subsidized 
prices. On the other hand, the primary cause of the drop in maize production was the erratic 
rainfall, which thwarted the incentive provided by the increase of close to 30% in the support price 
granted in May. Sorghum production, also harmed by adverse weather conditions, fell by 25%. 
This will undoubtedly be reflected in the availability of chicken and pig feed during 1982, sorghum 
being the basic grain used to feed animals. The output of beans, on the other hand, was satisfactory, 
thanks primarily to the good guaranteed prices. 
The livestock sector, for its part, recovered somewhat from the decline recorded in previous 
years. Meat production recovered almost completely, while the output of milk and other products 
derived from the stockbreeding sector showed moderate increases. This recovery was due 
primarily to a promotion policy initiated in previous years on the basis of credits granted through 




COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural production 
(1975 = 100) 
Crop farming 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
' Thousands of tons. 
Millions of litres. 
'Millions of units. 
Thousands of cubic metres. 
In the fishery sector, the production capacity was raised through the purchase by the 
Puntarenas Small-scale Fish Producers' Co-operative, as part of the National Fishery Programme, 
of new boats built in Mexico and financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In 
addition, the National Production Board finished the formulation of a project for a new fishery 
terminal in Puntarenas, which it is hoped will also be financed by IDB. The size of the catch, 
however, remained very much lower than in the past. 
(iii) Manufacturing. According to preliminary calculations, the value added by 
manufacturing declined by 1% in 1981 after the virtual stagnation of the year before. It may be 
noted in this connection that the statistics for the first half of the year on employment and the 
consumption of electricity by industry suggest a greater decrease (see table 7). 
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No disaggregated official information is available on the evolution of the various industrial 
branches; however, according to an analysis carried out by the Institute of Economic Research of 
the University of Costa Rica the recession had its biggest impact in the metal manufactures and 
machinery and non-metallic minerals sectors, where production seems to have fallen by 13% and 
20%, respectively, between the first half of 1980 and the same period in 1981. In the case of the 
first of these sectors, the drop may be explained by the sharp increase in the price of imported 
inputs. In the case of non-metallic minerals, the decline appears to be related to the slump in the 
construction sector and, in particular, the drop in residential building. As for the food branch, if the 
coffee-processing, sugar-milling and cattle-slaughtering sections are excluded, the remainder of 
the branch (of great importance in the productive structure) seems to have declined by 
approximately 4%. Finally, significant dynamism seems to have been shown only by the paper and 
paper products industry and the chemical industry, thanks, in the latter case, to the recovery of 
sales of fertilizers abroad. 
Because of the need to attenuate the financial bottlenecks, the Government's economic policy 
sought to promote the production of manufactures for the external market. To this end, special 
efforts were made to secure the approval by the Legislative Assembly of the law providing 
Table 7 
COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of value added 
(1977 = 100) 
Non-durable consumer goods 





Textiles, leather and footwear 
Furniture and wood 




Paper and paper products 
Chemical products and rubber 
Petroleum refining 
Non-metallic minerals 
Metal manufactures and 
machinery 
Other indicators of manu-
facturing production 
Employment (1968 = 100) 
Industrial consumption of 




















































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Costa Rican Ministry of Economic Affairs, Industry and Commerce and 
the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
c
 Average January-June. 
Variation between January-June 1980 and January-June 1981. 
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incentives for export industries, and this was finally achieved at the very end of the year. This law 
provides for the establishment of Free Zones for the installation of industries processing goods for 
exports, and for the corresponding industrial parks. 
In the midst of the recession, several projects of some significance in the manufacturing 
sphere were inaugurated under the sponsorship of the Development Corporation (CODESA). First, 
in February a modern factory manufacturing aluminium products (primarily discs, paper and 
sheets) entered into operation with prospects of exporting in the immediate future. Second, the 
Mohín Free Zone, designed to promote the installation of export industries, was put into 
operation. At present progress is being made there in the execution of two projects soon to be 
opened: a toy factory, with investments from Taiwan, and a factory manufacturing 
pharmaceuticals, with Spanish capital. In 1981 the Consorcios Industriales de Agua Caliente S.A., 
shoe and leather factory went into operation in the Cartago Industrial park, and it is expected that 
it will reach full capacity in 1982, with its output intended for export. In addition, work is 
continuing on the expansion of a dairy products plant, which will enable the national supply tobe 
expanded considerably in the near future. Furthermore, the Montecillos Co-operative, an 
important project for the export of beef, chicken, and fish, is now in operation. 
As an example of the initiatives taken by the private sector to cope with the crisis, mention 
may be made of the ready-made clothing industry, where the enterprises reached an agreement to 
organize themselves so as to be able to tackle the financial and distribution difficulties they were 
experiencing. In this connection, it is planned to establish a marketing enterprise to promote and 
facilitate their sales abroad. 
(iv) Construction. The construction sector, which had been one of the most dynamic up to 
1979, again bore the brunt of the effects of the crisis, and in 1981 its level of activity fell by over 
21%, after having already declined by 9% the year before, while the reduction in the area 
constructed (25%) was even greater. The decline in the sector's activity in 1980 was due to a 
substantial drop in private construction, which was not compensated for by the rise in public 
construction, but in 1981 there was an across-the-board decline when the Government applied an 
austerity policy on expenditure.6 In spite of this, some important works, such as the expansion of 
the Puerto Limón docks with German technical and financial support, were completed, while work 
also continued in connection with some priority projects such as those at Puerto Caldera on the 
west coast. 
With regard to the causes of the further drop in private construction, a study carried out by the 
Costa Rican Chamber of the Construction Industry during the third quarter of the year showed 
that increased costs were the prime obstacle to the normal development of the sector. In this 
connection, the costs of finance and inputs were particularly burdensome. 
(v) Basic services. Basic services —both electricity, gas and water and transport, storage and 
communications— showed an increase in 1981. The case of electricity is particularly noteworthy, 
since in this sector the entry into operation in 1980 of the Arenal dam helped to raise the level of 
energy produced during 1981 by 8%. This result —the main achievement of the energy policy— 
made it possible not only to expand the country's energy base considerably but also practically to 
accomplish the original goal of completely replacing imported hydrocarbons in the generation of 
electric power. It also marked a big step forward in the execution of the plan to supply the urban 
centres effectively and to extend the provision of electric power to rural areas. On the other hand, 
financial problems made it necessary to postpone the initiation of other important works in the 
energy field. 
(vi) Other services. Within this category, commerce was the branch most affected by the 
crisis, reflecting the major reduction in domestic demand (three times that of the drop in the gross 
domestic product) and the very slump decline in imports. Financial activity, for its part, continued 
to grow —in spite of the sharp reduction in the real supply of credits— thanks to unusually high 
6In the period 1977-1979, public construction represented 30% of the total. In 1980-1981, the decline in private 
construction was so great that public construction rose to 40% of the total in spite of the fact that it too declined in 1981. 
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real interest rates. Since 1978, when it was decided to raise interest rates in line with their 
evolution in the main international markets, the banking and financial sector has been increasing 
its share in the total value added, so that it has risen from 4.7% in 1977 to 7.8% in 1971. 
Ownership of dwellings rose slightly, while the value added by the central government did 
not change. Finally, the remaining services in this category (predominantly personal services) also 
suffered from the effects of the recession and fell by close to 5%. 
(e) Employment and unemployment 
By the time the long period of economic expansion came to an end in 1979, the rate of 
unemployment had fallen to barely 3% of the labour force. Between November 1979 and 
November 1981, however, it nearly trebled, reaching 8.7%. At the latter date, the rate of urban 
unemployment was close to 11%, while the number of unemployed had more than trebled. In 
terms of annual averages, the rate of unemployment rose from 4.1 % in 1979 to 5.3% in 1980 and 
to 8.3% in 1981. In addition, the degree of underemployment of the labour force also rose (see 
table 8). 
Between 1950 and the first oil crisis a high growth rate could be achieved at the same time as 
stability because it was possible to absorb productively the intensive growth of the labour force. 
Between the 1950 and 1963 population censuses, the increase in the labour force averaged 2.9%. 
The growth rate of employment was not much lower, while the annual increase in the product per 
peson employed averaged 3.3%. Subsequently, the growth of the labour force accelerated to the 
exceptionally high rate of 4% per year. Even so, the economy was capable of providing full 
employment for this enormous annual increment in the available labour without jeopardizing the 
growth rate of its productivity, which remained at 3.3% per annum between 1963 and 1973. 
Unlike what had happened in the preceding period, however, this rate concealed very different 
performances in the various branches of activity. Thus, the annual variations in the gross 
Table 8 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT" 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Industry and 
Commerce. 
"Figures obtained from the household surveys on employment and unemployment carried out every four months from July 1976 onwards. 
Percentage of labour force unemployed. 
cUnderemployed population expressed in terms of open unemployment. 
Labour force as a percentage of the total population. 
'Base June 1967, data from the first household survey. 
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productivity of labour ranged from -0.3% in "other services" to 5.4% in manufacturing.7 Rather 
than being due to dissimilar expansion in production by sector, these disparities in the growth 
rates of productivity reflected the sharp variations in the increase in employment between the 
various branches of activity (a phenomenon related to the geographical displacement of a 
considerable proportion of the population in those years).8 
There can be no doubt that the productive employment of a 4% increment in the labour force 
year after year for a prolonged period presents a difficult challenge,9 and although it was tackled 
with great success for over a decade, from 1973 on the increase in employment was accompanied by 
a dramatic deceleration in the growth rate of productivity. Thus, between 1973 and 1979 the 
annual increase in the gross productivity of labour barely exceeded 1 %. The annual growth rate of 
productivity in agriculture dropped from nearly 5% in the period 1963-1973 to less than 1% in the 
period 1973-1979, and in manufacturing the level of productivity even fell.10 It is important to 
note that these adverse trends preceded the stagnation and decline of the gross domestic product in 
the period 1980-1981. 
The phenomenon of the gradual slowing-down of productivity, which helps us to understand 
the development of the economic crisis from another viewpoint, is intimately related to the loss of 
efficiency. The causes are therefore similar. It is, however, worth focusing briefly on a point not 
touched upon in the previous discussion —the apparent over-expansion of employment 
(especially in the public sector) in the period 1973-1979. Throughout the period 1950-1973, 
employment rose at a rate very similar to that of the growth in the labour force. Later, however, the 
rate of expansion of employment accelerated notably, rising from 3.9% a year between 1963 and 
1973 to 4.4% a year between 1973 and 199, whereas the growth ot the labour force remained at 4% 
throughout that period. As a result, the rate of unemployment of 7% which prevailed in the 
previous decade fell to 4% by 1979. The number of unemployed people decreased by 30% in those 
six years and was not much greater in 1979 than it had been in 1963, when the labour force was 
approximately half as big as in 1979. What is perhaps most indicative of the tightness of the 
labour market is the rate of unemployment of heads of household, which amounted to an average 
of only 1.4% in 1979. An outstanding role in this intense expansion of employment was played by 
the public sector, in which employment rose during the period 1973-1979 at the rate of no less 
than 13% per year. 
3. The external sector 
(a) Introduction 
After having fallen on average to the equivalent of 6.7 % of the gross domestic product during 
the coffee boom of 1976-1977, the current account deficit expanded to 9-4% of the product in 1978 
and to an unprecedented 12.1 % in 1979. In 1980, it was again close to the latter figure (see table 9). 
In order to bolster the severely weakened external sector of the economy without 
jeopardizing the growth of the level of activity, the Government decided to increase the country's 
indebtedness considerably, as had been done with some success in the period 1974-1975- In order 
'"Other services" include all services except for commerce and for finance and related activities. The data on the 
labour force and employment come from the Statistics and Census Bureau, Censo de Población (1950,1963 and 1973). The 
data on gross labour productivity were calculated on the basis of these employment data and the national accounts supplied 
by the Central Bank of costa Rica. 
8The degree of urbanization of the country, which hardly increased at all between the censuses of 1950 and 1963, rose 
from 34.5% to 40.6% between 1963 and 1973. The proportion of the economically active population residing in urban 
areas increased slightly more. 
'In reality, there are few countries which have experienced a similar phenomenon over a significant length of time. In 
most cases, there was settlement of empty spaces endowed with abundant natural resources, in the nineteenth century. 
10For the years after 1973, the figures for productivity have been based on estimates of the labour force and 
employment taken from the periodic employment and unemployment surveys carried out by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security and the Statistics and Census Bureau. 
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to strengthen Costa Rica's position in the international financial markets and also to open new 
sources of financing, recourse was had to the support of the International Monetary Fund. At the 
end of 1979 some US$ 26 million were obtained from the Compensatory Financing Facility, and in 
March 1980 the Government signed an agreement with the Fund concerning a stabilization 
programme covered by a stand-by agreement for US$ 60 million. Only three months later, 
however, the Government's right to draw on this agreement was suspended because domestic 
credit to the public sector had expanded more than the amount set in the stabilization plan. 
Meanwhile, and partially because of the excessive expansion of credit, the already precarious net 
position of the international reserves continued to deteriorate, until in the middle of the year it fell 
below zero. In spite of the foregoing, and although during the following months it proved possible 
to cover the deficit on the current account, towards the end of the year the country's access to the 
international financial market was virtually closed. In these circumstances, it became impossible to 
sustain the big external gap, with the result that the pressures on the colón, which had been 
resisted up to that point, produced a devaluation of nearly 100% at the end of the year. 
The country's external position had thus deteriorated to such an extent that the likelihood of 
success of any stabilization plan which did not involve a moratorium on the servicing of the 
external debt or a drastic reduction in the level of domestic income was conditional upon a new, 
but more rigorous and extensive, agreement with the Fund. 
Table 9 
COSTA RICA: MAIN EXTERNAL SECTOR INDICATORS 
Volume of exports of goods 
and services 
Purchasing power of export of 
goods and services 
Purchasing power of net 
imports of capital" 
Import capacity 
Volume of imports of goods 
and services 
Gross international reserves 
Volume of exports of goods 
and services 
Terms-of-trade effect 
Net factor payments to the 
rest of the world 
Purchasing power of net 
imports of capital 
Import capacity 
Volume of imports of goods 
and services 
Trade balance 
Balance on current account 
Total global balance 
Gross international reserves 







































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
" Here defined as the difference between the global balance of payments and the trade balance, plus the use made of credit 
from the International Monetary Fund. 
In months of imports of goods and services for each year. 
cAt factor cost, in dollars at 1970 prices. 
Gross imports of capital less amortization payments. 
' Deflated by the price index for imports of goods and services. 
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The negotiations to reach such an agreement were arduous and dragged on for six months 
before an Extended Facility agreement was finally signed in June. The new arrangement envisaged 
external financing in the amount of 275 million Special Drawing Rights (about US$ 315 million at 
the time), which was equivalent to 450% of the Costa Rica quota —the maximum amount 
permissible under the present policy of the Fund. This financing was to be paid out in equal 
quarterly amounts over a three-year period, subject to the fulfilment —also quarterly— of certain 
execution criteria, common to this and other types of Fund agreement, designed to measure the 
progress towards the macroeconomic goals laid down in the stabilization programme which the 
country undertook to carry out in exchange for the financial support of the Fund. u As is common 
in this type of agreement, the authorities undertook not to introduce new restrictions on foreign 
trade (including multiple exchange rates) or on capital flows or remittances of profits and 
interests. The agreement also included an undertaking on the part of the Government to carry out 
broad tax reforms and to devalue the exchange rate officially. 
In addition to the first drawing of US$ 25.6 million from the Extended Facility, in June the 
country obtained another US$ 34.2 million from the Compensatory Financing Facility to attenuate 
the effects of the fresh decreases in its export prices. 
Thus, the total financing granted and envisaged for 1981 is estimated to have amounted to 
3.4% of the gross domestic product.12 The difference between that figure and the amount 
considered necessary to maintain the level of activity, as well as the even greater unfinanced 
deficits which will probably have to be faced in the projected recovery and growth during the 
period 1982/1983, meant there would have to be a substantial net flow of resources from other 
sources of financing, mostly private. 
With regard to external financing requirements, the Fund's agreements have traditionally 
been such that the assistance they provide is necessary but not sufficient for the success of the 
concomitant stabilization plans. Recently, however, the directives in this connection have been 
made more flexible, permitting the advance at the first drawing of up to 40% of the total financial 
support envisaged in an agreement, when the Fund considers that the circumstances justify this. 
One such circumstance would be the magnitude of the external imbalance.13 
In spite of the fact that the deterioration of the external sector of Costa Rica was already very 
far advanced, such an advance payment mechanism did not form part of its agreement with the 
Fund. In hindsight, even if not at the time, it seems clear that some such special support would 
have been advisable in this case as well. What is certain is that scarcely a month after the 
agreement came into force, the weaknesses of the stabilization plan at the external financing level 
became obvious when the shortage of foreign exchange grew so serious that it was open to doubt 
whether the external debt obligations could be met without causing much more serious imbalances 
in the exchange rate and ultimately in the level of activity. 
In these circumstances, the Government decided to notify the commercial banks -its principal 
creditors abroad- that it could service only the short-term debt and would therefore apply what 
amounted to a roll-over to the rest of its commitments with them (including interest payments) up 
to September, when it hoped to renegotiate its external debt. Moreover, in August it proposed to 
the Fund that, in the light of the severe and persistent worsening of Costa Rica's external 
imbalance, it should be granted advance financing equivalent to about 25 % of its Extended Facility 
entitlement to enable it to meet its other external obligations and keep the domestic market 
supplied with vital imports until the time of the hoped-for renegotiation at the end of September. 
Meantime, however, some of the targets of the stabilization plan had already proved to be virtually 
unattainable owing largely to the drastic weakening of the external position. At the same time, 
differences in opinion between the various branches of the government had caused the 
"These aspects of the agreement are described in section 5: "Fiscal and monetary policy". 
12With 1980 being taken as the base year. 
"Provision has already been made for such a privilege in some recent agreements (for example, those reached with 
Turkey and Jamaica in 1980 and 1981, respectively), with notably positive results. 
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postponement (in the case of the tax reform) or non-fulfilment (in the case of the exchange rate 
changes) of undertakings entered into by the Executive in the agreement with the Fund. The 
Government's petition to the IMF was rejected, however. The Government then decided not even 
to request the drawing to which it was entitled, and a short time later it started a de facto 
moratorium in respect of virtually all its external debt, as well as its servicing. In addition, it 
prohibited the import of automobiles and capital goods for agriculture for a period of one year and 
enforced administrative measures designed to ration foreign exchange and to try to ensure the 
return to the economy of the foreign exchange generated by exports. 
Nevertheless the deterioration in the external sector was inexorable, and resulted in another 
devaluation of the colón on the parallel market of over 100% between September and October. In 
the latter month, the Government prohibited the import of the majority of capital goods, took 
measures to unify the exchange system, and again tried to induce the return to the economy of a 
greater proportion of the foreign exchange derived from exports, this time by offering a better 
exchange rate. 
In November, the IMF decided to suspend the Extended Facility agreement and at the same 
time negotiations were begun to replace it with a one-year stand-by agreement for US$ 100 
million. One of the principal obstacles to a new arrangement with respect to the Fund's position 
was overcome when after months of debate the Legislative Assembly finally approved the 
devaluation of the official exchange rate in the last week in November. Nevertheless, a new 
agreement could not be reached, and because of the proximity of the elections, the negotiations 
were postponed until after the holding of the latter. 
With regard to the external debt, at the end of the year negotiations with the commercial 
banks and holders of bonds were still in progress. One of the principal obstacles to reaching a 
refinancing agreement was in fact a sharp disagreement between the creditors themselves. The 
commercial banks wanted a common criterion to be applied to all creditors, whereas the holders of 
bonds maintained that it was not possible to refinance bonds.14 The uncertainty generated by the 
lack of an agreement with the fund and by the forthcoming elections was also partly responsible 
for the slow pace of the negotiations. Meanwhile the Government of Costa Rica ran up arrears of 
payments of some US$ 360 million. 
Various aspects of the evolution of the crisis and its dimensions at the external level are set 
forth in table 9, which shows the sharp variations in the terms of trade, the consistently precarious 
reserve position of the country, the growing dependence on external capital and the sudden drop in 
nearly all the principal indicators in 1981. In any case, it is clear that the worsening to untenable 
levels of the traditional imbalance between the expenditure and the income of the economy was 
precipitated by the pronounced deterioration in the terms of trade and the sharp rise in real 
interest rates. It may, however, also be shown that a role was played in the excessive widening of 
the external gap by internal factors, especially the growing undervaluation of the exchange rate 
and a high and persistent expansion of the deficit on the public finances. The role of the first of 
these factors will be examined in the next section. 
(b) The exchange rate 
In spite of its central importance in such a small economy, exchange policy in Costa Rica has 
traditionally been subject to considerations unrelated to the competitive position of the economy. 
In the expansive and stable world economy which existed after the Second World War until the 
first oil crisis, the adverse effects of this approach were not very noticeable, and in any case they 
were far outweighed by the series of factors which were responsible for the economy's very 
favourable performance. The revolution in the price of hydrocarbons, the rising cost of basic 
grains and world inflation, the collapse of the monetary system based on fixed exchange rates, and 
14
 For further details of the interesting questions surrounding this dispute, see A. Robinson, "Costa Rica plight 
deepens as the creditors wrangle", Euromoney, December 1981; T. Anderson, "The race of shame in the euromarkets", 
Euromoney, January 1982; "Costa Rica: Wrangling over rescheduling", The'Banker", January 1982. 
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the slump in the growth of world production and commerce, however, made it necessary, if not to 
establish an aggressive exchange policy, at least to alter the policy practiced up to that point if the 
rate of development was to be sustained. Moreover, the expansion and diversification of the 
manufacturing sector in the framework of the Central American Common Market also made an 
exchange rate designed to promote the competitiveness of the economy in extra-regional markets 
increasingly necessary and appropriate. Finally, the marked growth in the commitments of the 
public sector, without a corresponding increase in its resources, was another important 
development which needed to be offset by a reshaped exchange policy. 
In spite of all these considerations, up to the end of 1980 the traditional policy still prevailed 
on the whole, with the result that there was a notable deterioration in the exchange rate. Thus, 
between 1974, when the value of the colón was changed for the first time since 1961, and the last 
quarter of 1980, when the defacto floating of the currency was declared, the effective real exchange 
rate received for exports went down by over 19% and that paid for imports, by 17% (see table 10, 
columns 3 and 5, and figures 2 and 3).15 Moreover, practically the whole of this reduction was 
concentrated between 1978 and 1980, since the effective real exchange rate for exports declined by 
17% between 1978 and the last quarter of 1980. In addition, the loss of competitiveness was still 
more pronounced in the country's chief export market, for over the period 1974-1980, the real 
exchange rate for exports (colón/dollar) deteriorated by 22% while between 1970 and 1980 it fell 
by over 25 %.16 
In interpreting these data, it is important to bear in mind that they do not indicate the exact 
degree to which the exchange rate is over or undervaluated, i.e., they do not show the difference 
between the prevailing exchange rate and that which would be compatible with a given balance on 
the current or global account of the balance of payments. For these purposes it would be necessary 
to calculate the net effect of the combined factors which affect the supply of and demand for 
foreign exchange.17 At all events, there can be no doubt that the sharp drop in the real value of the 
colón which occurred after the first oil crisis meant a corresponding drop in the competitive 
position of the economy, and, indeed, this decline was accompanied by a stagnation of the volume 
of sales abroad and a very considerable widening of the external gap. Thus, the volume of exports 
of goods and services rose by barely 1 % per annum in this period, while the deficit on current 
account went from 4.2% of the gross domestic product in 1973 to 11.8% in 1980, excluding the 
effect of the variation in the terms of trade. Moreover, between 1978 and 1980, when most of the 
drop in the effective real exchange rate took place, the volume of exports fell by more than 2% and 
the deficit on current account increased by an amount equivalent to 5% of the gross domestic 
product (see table 9). 
At the end of 1980 the colón began to deteriorate rapidly. From a level of 8.57 per dollar which 
had remained in effect since 1974, the exchange rate rose to nearly 40 per dollar at the end of 
"I t should be noted that the opposing movement of the indexes which appear in columns 3 and 4 and in columns 5 and 
6, respectively, is due to the appreciable difference which exists between domestic inflation as measured by the consumer 
price index and that calculated on the basis of the wholesale price index. Owing to its limited coverage and to the inclusion 
of many articles whose prices are subsidized, the consumer price index is not a good indicator of inflation. These two 
problems do not exist, however, in the case of the wholesale price index, which is therefore more appropriate for 
measuring inflation, relative prices and the real exchange rate. It is, however, useful to show the distortion caused by the use 
of the consumer price index in measuring the evolution of the real exchange rate. 
"During the five-year period 1975-1979, the United States was the main export (and import) market, absorbing some 
36% of Costa Rica's total external sales. The Statistical Appendix shows the real exchange rates with respect to the 
currencies of the main countries which trade with Costa Rica. 
17
 An exercise of this kind revealed a significant overvaluation of the colón towards the end of the 1970s. Thus, a recent 
World Bank study calculated the net impact of trade policies (tariffs and subsidies) on the exchange rate for the year 1979 
and concluded that in that year the exchange rate was undervalued by at least 18%, since if all the tariffs (and subsidies) 
were eliminated, the exchange rate would have to be increased by that amount to keep the existing deficit on current 
account from increasing. To reduce the deficit to half of that recorded in 1979 without using tariffs (or subsidies), the 
exchange rate would have to be increased by 34%. See World Bank, Costa Rica: Trade Incentives and Export 
Diversification, Washington, D.C., 5 November 1980, pp. 38-39 and annex 23. 
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1981.18 On average, the effective nominal exchange rate for exports rose by 140% between 1980 
and 1981, and the corresponding real exchange rate rose by 72%. 
This rise in real terms appreciably exceeded the variation which would have been necessary to 
rule out the overvaluation of the colón, being nearly as four times as great as the drop in the 
effective real exchange rate between 1974 and 1980. In these circumstances, the effect on the 
external sector was very marked. The volume of exports of goods and services grew by nearly 18%, 
while that of imports of goods and services fell by over 25%. As a result, the first surplus at 
constant prices on the trade account since 1952 was recorded. As for the deficit on current account 
at constant prices, this fell from 11.8% of the gross domestic product in 1980 to barely 1.5% in 
Table 10 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF THE INDEXES OF THE EFFECTIVE NOMINAL 
AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS" 
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Source: Statistical Appendix. 
"For a detailed explanation of the methodology used, see the introduction to the Statistical Appendix. 
These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the nominal exchange rate 
indexes and adding the products together to give the effective nominal exchange rate indexes. 
'These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings for exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1A). The products were then added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. In calculating 
this index for Costa Rica, the wholesale price index was used. 
A procedure similar to that described in note ' was followed, except that table IB and the consumer price index for 
Costa Rica were used. 
l8This was by far the biggest annual variation shown by the exchange rate in the history of the country. At the end of 
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1981. The marked deterioration in the terms of trade largely nullified this result, however. This 
fact, together with the abrupt decline in the net availability of external financing, may go a long 
way towards explaining why the exchange rate rose more than would have been justified by the 
loss in competitiveness. It would appear that the remainder of the rise was attributable to the flight 
of domestic capital to the exterior. 
This latter phenomenon was considerably influenced by the erratic management of the 
economic policy, exemplified by the aimless exchange policy. In the course of the year there were at 
least four different and changing exchange rates: the official rate, two Central Bank rates, and that 
of the parallel market. The official exchange rate became a matter of conflict between the various 
branches of the central government. In the middle of the year, the Supreme Court declared that the 
original decision to float the currency decreed by the Executive at the end of 1980 was illegal and 
ruled that such a decision lay in the purview of the Legislative Assembly. The subsequent debate 
on the issue in the Assembly dragged on until the end of November. Meanwhile, the Central Bank 
used two exchange rates which differed from both the official rate and the parallel market rate. 
Finally, on the latter market wild fluctuations in the exchange rate in a matter of hours became a 
common occurrence. 
In November the Legislative Assembly finally agreed to devalue the colón officially, but to a 
figure only half that of the rate prevailing on the parallel market. The official rate was applied only 
to certain transactions, however, while for the rest the parallel market rate prevailed. The Central 
Bank, for its part, continued to operate on the basis of its own system. Thus, at the end of the year, 
the official exchange rate was fixed at 20 colones per dollar, the parallel market rate at 40, and the 
Central Bank rate at 35, the latter rate being applicable to all transactions except exports, which 
received a rate closer to that of the parallel market. 
(c) The terms of trade 
The stabilization of the international prices of hydrocarbons, together with the slackening of 
the inflationary processes in the industrialized countries, provided some relief after two 
consecutive years of high and growing imported inflation. Thus, in 1981 the price index for 
imported goods and services rose by 6% after rises of 13.6% in 1979 and 18.5% in 1980 (see 
table 11). However, not only did the declining value of the colón detract from this favourable 
trend, but it was far outweighed by the deterioration in export prices, which, for goods and services 
as a whole, fell by nearly 16%. As the result of these opposing movements, the terms of trade 
declined by nearly 21%. This was the fourth consecutive deterioration in this indicator and the 
largest yet recorded in the course of one year.19 In fact, in the whole postwar period, this index was 
lower on only one occasion (in 1974).20 Since 1977 (when the terms of trade reached their highest 
level since 1957) this indicator has fallen by one-third. Consequently, what amounted to a gain 
equal to 4.6% of the expanding product in 1977 became a loss equal to 5.3% of the declining 
production of goods and services in 1981. In the same way, during the period 1972-1981 gross 
domestic income fell by 2% in spite of the fact that over the same period the gross domestic 
product rose by 8%. 
At another level, the deterioration of relative prices in the external sector in 1981 thwarted 
the materialization of the benefits which would have resulted in normal circumstances from the 
sacrifice implied by the achievement of an increase of nearly 17% in gross domestic savings in 
spite of the drop in the product. One example of this was the nullification of the spectacular turn-
19
 According to the official indexes prepared by CEPAL, which start with the year 1950, the index calculated on the 
basis of exports FOB and imports CIF showed a greater loss for 1974 and for 1981. According to another (non-official) index 
calculated on the basis of exports and imports FOB and prepared for a study on Costa Rica which is being conducted in 
CEPAL, the extent of the deterioration in 1981 had only previously been experienced in 1974, in the 1890s (when there was 
a sudden drop in the then unprecedentedly high price of coffee), and in the 1960s, when a severe inflationary process was 
set off in the international economy. 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
Table 12 
COSTA RICA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 




Cattle and meat 
Sugar 
Main non-traditional exports 
To Central America 
To the rest of the world 
Industrial products 
Livestock and fishery 
products 






















































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The percentage breakdown and the growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
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about achieved in the balance of trade at constant prices, which improved from a deficit equivalent 
to 8.5 % of the gross domestic product in 1980 to a surplus equivalent to 3% of the product in 1981. 
The deterioration in the terms of trade, however, turned the 1981 balance into a deficit equal to 
1.8% of the gross domestic product. 
(d) Merchandise trade 
(i) Exports. The increase in the current value of exports was very small in 1981 (see 
table 12). Examination of the performance by commodity groups and by volumes and prices shows 
very uneven results. Within this picture, the results of the coffee trade were really dramatic in that 
the extraordinary rise of 30% in the volume exported was entirely outweighed by a further drastic 
decline in the price. Because of this, the current value of coffee exports fell in spite of the increase 
in volume. Taking advantage of the coffee stocks which had been accumulated in recent years when 
production was growing and prices declining was one of the ways still open for obtaining foreign 
exchange. After the significant real devaluation in the colón, this option was also very attractive to 
exporters, in spite of the drop in the international price. Thus, the exceptional rise in the volume 
of coffee sales abroad in 1981' largely reflected the virtual exhaustion of these stocks. Although, 
because of the adjustment in relative domestic prices, this effort resulted in extraordinary earnings 
for exporters, the drop in the international price nullified the potential benefit to the community 
as a whole.21 If it had not been for the liquidation of stocks, however, the scarcity of foreign 
exchange would have been even more severe. 
The sharp drop in 1981 brought the price of coffee down to half the record level achieved in 
1977, and the value of coffee exports fell by 26%. Nearly all the drop was concentrated in the last 
two years.22 
Banana prices, on the other hand, continued to move against the current, rising by 15 % after 
an even bigger increase the preceding year. The latest rise, combined with the recovery of 9% in 
their volume, resulted in an increase of 26% in the value of banana exports, causing this fruit to 
replace coffee as the main export item. Thanks primarily to the favourable evolution of the price, 
since 1979 the value of external sales of bananas has compensated for close to 90% of the loss in 
value of coffee exports (see table 12). 
The sharp rise in the value of sugar exports was also very welcome. In 1980, when their value 
more than doubled, this was mainly due to the big rise in the price of sugar on the international 
market. In 1981, on the other hand, the value of external sales grew by 5% in spite of the 
considerable drop in the price during the year. 
Conversely, cocoa exports —which had already been declining— again fell notably in 1981 as 
a result of the drop of 30% in the price and the 6% decline in the volume exported.2i As for the 
21
 In 1981 the average domestic price of exports rose by 202%, while the average rise in consumer prices was 37%. As 
from April, the Government took steps to tax a proportion of the unusually high gains of the export sector through a decree 
which made it obligatory for exporters to sell their foreign exchange earnings to the Central Bank at the exchange rate 
which the Bank applied to their transactions. At that time, this exchange rate was 20% lower than that prevailing on the 
parallel market (towards the end of the year, the bank rate was around 13% lower than the parallel market rate). However, 
in March these measures were repealed, and it was proposed to the Legislative Assembly that it raise the tax on the added 
value of exports from 1 % to 6%. In August, exporters were again required to exchange their foreign currency earnings at 
the Central Bank rate. In December, the exchange rate law approved by the Legislative Assembly again modified the tax 
régime for exports. Thereafter traditional exports would be taxed by 15% of the difference between the old official 
exchange rate (8.6 colones per dollar) and the prevailing parallel market rate. The corresponding tax for non-traditional 
exports to the Central American Common Market was set at 4.5%. Other exports remained tax exempt. 
22The relative or real price of coffee was still 14% higher in 1981 than in the last year of the recession (1975), at the 
end of which it began to rise appreciably. However, a comparison with the prevailing situation prior to the rise in the price 
of petroleum shows that the relative price of coffee was 24% lower in 1981 than in 1973. The real price of coffee was two-
thirds lower in 1981 than in the record year (1977). 
2
'Part of this deterioration was compensated for by the success of the government programme to promote the export 
of processed cocoa. 
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value of exports of cattle and beef, it remained approximately the same as the preceding year, 
thanks to an increase in volume. 
Altogether, the current value of traditional exports rose by somewhat more than 8%, thus 
returning to the level of two years before. On the other hand, non-traditional exports fell by 7% 
overall. This reduction was entirely attributable to the deterioration in the trade with the rest of 
Central America, where the demand for imports declined considerably. Non-traditional exports to 
Central America fell by 16% (see table 12), and in fact the drop in sales to Nicaragua alone was 
enough to produce this result. Moreover, the increase in non-traditional exports to the rest of the 
world seems surprisingly low (6%) in view of the fact that it was precisely in this category that a 
strong response to the devaluation of the colón might have been expected. In addition, non-
traditional exports had expanded considerably in the two preceding years. Here too, however, the 
performance of international prices detracted from a fairly favourable performance with regard to 
the volume exported. In this respect, the best result was that achieved by fertilizers, physical sales 
of which abroad grew by 50%. 
(ii) Imports. In 1981 there was a generalized decline in imports, in most cases by a very 
considerable amount. On average, the reduction amounted to nearly 21% at current values and to 
over 25% at constant prices. These results, which were at the same time both causes and effects of 
the economic contraction, are not surprising, however, in the light of the increase of 263% in the 
average domestic cost of imports. 
The biggest drop occurred in imports of consumer goods, whose value fell by 38% (see 
table 13). Every item in this category showed a decrease of this order. In the case of durable goods, 
it was the second consecutive year in which the nominal value declined. The magnitude of the drop 
in external purchases of consumer goods was followed by that of imports of capital goods, which 
fell by close to 23%, following a similar decrease the preceding year. Finally, the value of imports 
of intermediate goods declined by 12%. 
Table 13 
COSTA RICA: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
From Central America 
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In the case of both intermediate goods and non-durable consumer goods, the data suggest that 
sizeable stocks were accumulated in 1980 in anticipation of the devaluation of the colón. If so, the 
contractions in these categories in 1981 were less significant than they appear. In this respect, 
imports of intermediate goods for industry provide a clear example, since their value was over 
40% higher in 1981 than during the two preceding years. On the other hand, the considerable drop 
in imports of lubricants, fuels and related goods appears to be a positive development. In the past 
three years the value of these imports contracted by 60%, causing their share in total purchases 
abroad to fall from 13% in 1978 to 6% in 1981, thereby coming closer to the share they had prior 
to the first oil crisis. This result was due primarily to the entry into operation of the new 
hydroelectric power stations, although in 1981 the recession also had substantial influence. 
In view of the severe shortage of foreign currency at the beginning of the third quarter, the 
Government prohibited imports of certain goods (for example, automobiles and capital goods for 
agriculture) and imposed a system of advance import licenses for other goods. The objectives were 
to curb the growing devaluation of the colón and to ensure an adequate supply of mass consumer 
goods. This system was abandoned at the end of October, however, because it turned out to be 
difficult to apply, as well as giving rise to legal problems and complicating the negotiations with 
the International Monetary Fund. 
(e) Trade in services 
As in the case of merchandise, the performances of volume and prices in the trade in non-
factor services were likewise diametrically opposed, but even more so. While the volume of 
exports of such services grew by 29% and that of imports fell by 31 %, the unit values of the former 
decreased by 35 % on average and those of the latter rose by 10%. As a result, it was impossible to 
eliminate the deficit on this account, although it was reduced by half (see table 14). In this 
connection, it is interesting to note that whereas the substantial rise in the rate of exchange 
promoted the export of services —especially tourism, whose volume rose by 35 %—, the net effect 
by comparison with the preceding year was negative. In the case of tourism, for example, the value 
of entries decreased by 12%. Had it not been for the devaluation, however, the drop could have 
been greater. 
The considerable increment (42%) in the deficit on factor services (including private 
unilateral transfers) was another element which complicated enormously the efforts to strike a 
closer balance between expenditure and production. This larger deficit was due both to the 
expansion of the debt and to the rise in interest rates. When 1981 is compared with 1978 or 1979, 
however, the unprecedented real interest rates which have prevailed since the end of 1979 in the 
international financial markets are seen to have been the chief cause of the steady growth of that 
deficit. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that some of the interest which became due 
during the year was not paid. If the debt had been serviced normally throughout the year, the factor 
services deficit would have nearly doubled and amounted to the equivalent of 6.8% of the gross 
domestic product, instead of the 4.9% it actually represented. 
(f) The current account position and its financing 
Thanks to the extraordinary increase in the volume exported and the effects of the unilateral 
moratorium on the servicing of the external debt, it proved possible to reduce the large current 
account deficit recorded the preceding year by 42 % in spite of the substantial deterioration in the 
terms of trade (see table 14).24 As a proportion of the product, the deficit was reduced from an 
average of 12% in 1979-1980 to 6.8% in 1981. If relative international prices had remained stable, 
either the deficit on current account could have been kept down to 1.5% of the gross domestic 
product or it might not have been deemed necessary to stop servicing the debt. 
24
 It should be noted in this connection that the unpaid interest amounted to US$ 87 million. 
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Table 14 
COSTA RICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 








Unrequited private transfer 
payments 
Balance on current account 




















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance1 
Total variation in reserves' 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
frln addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. 
cThe difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: monetización or 
demonetization of gold, allocation or settlement of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to revaluation. 
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Nevertheless, it was not possible to mobilize enough external financing to meet the smaller 
domestic demand. On the contrary, with the failure of the agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund not only was Costa Rica's access to external financing closed but the international 
financial community decided to withdraw its investments from the country. In such a situation, 
which was without precedent except during the Great Depression, the country was faced with the 
alternative of reducing its volume of imports, and hence its level of economic activity, even more 
drastically or failing to meet its external obligations; and, as it had done in the Great Depression, it 
chose the latter course. 
This decision made it possible to limit the reduction in the volume of imports to 18%, instead 
of the nearly 50% which might otherwise have proved necessary, and thus keep the drop in the 
level of economic activity within limits which were socially and politically acceptable in the short 
term. The US$ 352 million in unpaid amortization and interest commitments financed nearly 
28% of the volume of imports and came close to the total deficit on current account. 
The rest of the deficit was financed primarily out of the sale of gold holdings, disbursements 
of loans already contracted, and short-term public indebtedness. The latter, which consisted 
mainly of purchases from thelMFprior to the suspension of the Extended Facility agreement, 
together with a small reduction in the gross reserves, meant a deterioration of another US$ 50 
million in the economy's net reserve position, bringing it down to US$ 190 million. 
(g) The external debt 
The growth and stability achieved by the country between the end of the Second World War 
and the first petroleum crisis did not involve a very significant increase in the external debt, 
although its servicing expanded markedly by comparison with exports, having been very low to 
begin with.25 Since the rise in the price of petroleum, however, and especially since the onset of the 
international recession in 1975, the growth of the external debt has been very rapid, whatever the 
method used to measure it. Thus, between 1975 and 1981 the gross disbursed public and private 
external debt quintupled, rising from US$ 700 million to rather more than US$ 3 560 million (see 
table 15 and figure 4). At constant prices, the external debt more than trebled,26 rising from 25% 
to 63-5% as a percentage of the product when deflated by the import price index or from 36% to 
128% when converted at the average prevailing exchange rate and expressed as a percentage of 
the gross domestic product at current prices. Using the latter method, but replacing the nominal 
rate of exchange with the real rate, a third result located between the two extremes is obtained (see 
table 9). 
The servicing and amortization of the debt rose from a combined amount equivalent to 
25% of exports of goods and services in 1975 to 50% in 1979, falling to 40% in 1980 but 
rising again —if all obligations had been met— to approximately 64% in 1981. 
As happened in nearly all the rest of the region, there was an important change in the sources 
of financing, which resulted in a hardening of the terms on which the country could gain access to 
external savings. Equally or more important in this connection, however, was the concurrent rise 
in real rates of interest all over the world. Be that as it may, these two factors would have required 
not only greater efficiency in the utilization of external financing but also the allocation of a greater 
25
 For example, the disbursed external public debt, as a percentage of the gross domestic product, fell from 8.8% in 
1950/1953 (central government only) to 7.5% in 1960/1963, rising to 130% in 1970/1973 (public sector plus State-
guaranteed private debt). As regards the servicing and amortization of the debt as a percentage of exports, this rose from 
0.4% in 1950/1953 to 8.4% in 1960/1963 and 15.9% in 1970/1973.See Costa Rica, Statistics and Census Bureau, Anuario 
Estadístico, various issues; World Bank, Costa Rica: Current Economic Position and Prospects, Washington, D.C., 1977 and 
1980, and ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
26The result is rather similar when the index of import prices (3.16 times higher) or the export price index (33 times 
higher) are used to deflate the debt. However, if another method recently suggested by Riidiger Dornbusch is adopted, the 
external debt is calculated to have increased 8.2 times between the end of 1975 and the end of 1981. This latter method 
consists in converting the external debt into domestic currency by using the operative exchange rate and deflating the result 
by the variation in the consumer price index. For a study of this old controversy, see R. Dornbusch, "Consumption 
opportunities and the real value of the external debt", Journal of Development Economics, (10), 1982. 
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Table 15 
COSTA RICA: AMOUNT, SOURCES AND USE MADE OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
Gross external debt" 
Public 
Private 
Gross international reserves 
At current prices 
Deflated by prices of exports 
of goods and services 
Deflated by prices of imports 
of goods and services 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real exchange rate 
Deflated by prices of imports 
of goods and services 
Debt servicing' 
GDP7 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Public and private disbursed. 
b
 As at 1 October. Projected on the basis of the growth of the public debt. Zero growth of the private debt has been assumed. 
cAs at 1 October. 
Colones per dollar. 
'Obtained from the balance of payments. 
Interest only. Nominal exchange rate, colones per dollar. 
'Interest and amortization payments, excluding the amortization of short-term debt. 
Refers only to the medium- and long-term disbursed external public debt. 
'On the basis of annual flows recorded in the balance of payments. Short-term capital is excluded. 
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relative share of such financing to activities which generate or save foreign exchange, or, 
alternatively, increased effectiveness in its use, plus a change in the destination of any resources of 
domestic origin which might have been freed as a result of the importation of external resources. 
Unfortunately, neither of these sets of requirements was met. 
Some of the statistics which point to this conclusion have already been discussed: the notable 
increase in the capital/product and the rapid growth in the percentage of exports of goods and 
services represented by the servicing of the debt. Instead of increasing, the efficiency of 
investment diminished appreciably and the volume of exports stagnated. 
Finally, a relatively modest and decreasing share of the indebtedness in that period was 
allocated for purposes of increasing investment. Thus, between 1973 and 1980 only 22% was 
allocated to gross fixed investment (see table 15).21 This was a result, on the one hand, of the 
sudden increase in debt servicing commitments and, on the other, of the steadily greater 
dependence of increased investment on external resources. 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices 
Although inflation accelerated slowly but surely from 1976 on, in 1981 it rose at 
unprecedented speed.28 Between December 1980 and December 1981 the consumer price index 
rose by 65 % while the wholesale index rose by 117%. The preceding year the rises had been about 
17% and 19%, respectively. The variations between annual averages, for their part, stood 
considerably lower at 37% for consumer prices and 65% for wholesale prices, owing to the fact 
that inflation became more marked during the year and particularly during the final quarter (see 
table 16 and figure 5). 
Table 16 
COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF INFLATION 




At market prices 




























Variation between annual averages 
15.2 30.1 17.4 3.5 4.2 
16.2 39.8 21.6 9.3 7.5 
Variation from December to December 
225.8 246.4 291.8 445.2 

























Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"For the purposes of this illustrative calculation, it is assumed that interest and amortization payments have first 
priority in the use of the resources obtained through the new loans. If the calculation is based on net disbursements minus 
amortization payments rather than gross financing, the share allocated to investment would double, but so would the share 
allocated to consumption. 
28The first domestic price index dates back to 1936. 
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Figure 4 
COSTA RICA: SOME EXTERNAL SECTOR INDICATORS 
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The large discrepancy between the two price indexes in 1981 is worthy of note. As indicated 
in the preceding section, the consumer price index underestimates the real underlying inflation, 
whereas the wholesale price index does not suffer from this defect and seems to come closer to the 
true value. The deflator for the gross domestic product, for its part, tends to follow an intermediate 
path. In 1981, for example, a variation between annual averages of around 53% was recorded. 
At all events, there can be no doubt that the immediate cause of the acute inflationary process 
which affected the country in 1981 was the rapid deterioration of the colon. The average rise of 
150% in the effective nominal exchange rate for imports would alone have been enough to cause 
an increase of about 75 % in the average level of domestic prices, given the share of imports in the 
domestic supply. With the increase in the external prices of imports, the total variation in the 
domestic cost of imports could have caused a rise of about 80% in domestic prices. Finally, if the 
rise in export prices in colones is also taken into consideration, the average level of domestic prices 
could have risen by over 125%, even if there had been no variation whatsoever in the prices of 
non-tradeable goods. 
In the light of the marked rise in the prices of imports and exports in national currency, it was 
really noteworthy, if not surprising, that domestic inflation was not much more intense than it 
actually was. The big rise in relative domestic prices in 1981 seems to be related primarily to the 
performance of wages. Thus, the average unit wage costs (nominal wages and salaries adjusted by 
the gross productivity of labour) rose by barely 27% as against the rise of 149% in the exchange 
rate and the increase of 65 % in wholesale prices. In actual fact, wages and salaries rose by less than 
20%, but the product per person employed fell considerably (see table 17). In addition to relieving 
the pressure on costs, the much smaller relative growth of salaries and wages was an important 
factor in the drop in domestic demand, which also helped to attenuate the inflationary process. 
There were other factors which helped to offset or contain the inflationary pressures. These 
included notably the way in which credit developed and the application of price controls. All the 
monetary aggregates grew more slowly than inflation as measured by the wholesale price index. 
The expansion of credit, however, was drastically restricted, causing an abrupt reduction in its real 
availability by comparison with the nominal gross domestic product. Thus, after having increased 
very much faster than inflation and the growth of the nominal product in previous years, in 1981 
total net domestic credit grew by 15% as compared with the variations of 117% in the wholesale 
price index and 47 % in the gross domestic product at current prices.29 The expansion of credit to 
the private sector was even more limited (see table 17). As a result, in the second half of the year 
there was an acute credit squeeze which forced many undertakings to liquidate their inventories 
and even led to decapitalization. In these circumstances, it became difficult to give full effect to or 
sustain the price increases to which the inflationary impetus from the external sector would 
otherwise have given rise. At the same time, this counter-pressure on price levels was undoubtedly 
an important factor in the restriction on wage rises. 
With regard to price controls and subsidies, their impact may be inferred from the uneven 
performance of the two price indexes. In 1981 the Government agreed with the IMF to undertake 
liberalization measures in the field of prices and subsidies.30 In particular, it was agreed that the 
State enterprises would follow a price policy which would reflect their production costs. 
Consequently, many of the public service rates were raised and some of them (including those 
regarding energy and fuels) were raised considerably. Towards the middle of the year, however, 
the Legislative Assembly voted to freeze the prices of energy sources —a measure which, although 
it had a perceptible impact on the general level of prices, aggravated the already precarious 
29The variations of the monetary aggregates run from December to December. Thus, to measure their real variation, 
it is necessary to use the corresponding variation in the price index. 
30In the 1970s an extensive and complex system of controls, quotas and subsidies was created as part of the effort to 
combat inflation. In 1978, for example, there were some 2 000 products subject to price controls. In the same year, the new 
administration started a campaign to dismantle the system, with the result that by the end of 1979 the number of products 
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financial position of the public sector and was another factor behind the suspension of the 
Extended Facility agreement. 
While it is true that the devaluation of the colón in 1981 unleashed a rapid process of 
inflation, the factors responsible for this must be borne in mind. In this respect, consideration has 
already been given to the roles played by the causes of the increasingly undervalued exchange rate; 
the deterioration in the terms of trade and the rise in international interest rates; the loss of access 
to the international financial market, and the flight of domestic wealth. Two other determining 
factors were the unusually large deficit in the public finances and an excessive expansion of the 
money supply. Thus, in 1979 and 1980 the deficits in the public finances amounted to the 
equivalent of 7 % and 9-5 % of the gross domestic product, respectively, so that it was necessary to 
expand the domestic credit to the public sector by 174% in those two years. This was reflected in 
marked pressures on the exchange rate, because of the impact both on the balance-of-payments 
current account and the level of domestic prices. In addition such a large increase in the allocation 
of credit to the public sector could be expected to force a sharp drop in the amount of credit 
channeled to the private sector and, hence, in the level of activity. Instead of resolving the dilemma 
in this way, however, it was decided, as in previous years, to increase the amount of credit to the 
private sector also, thus raising the deficit on current account and increasing the pressure on price 
levels (see table 17). 
Table 17 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF SELECTED VARIABLES IN THE 
EXTERNAL, LABOUR AND MONETARY MARKETS 
(Index 1973 = 100) 
External market 
Domestic prices of imports 
External prices of imports 
Effective nominal exchange 
rate for imports 
Domestic prices of exports 
External prices of exports 
Index effective nominal 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Projected for 1981 on the basis of data for the first half of 1981. 
bProjected for 1981 on the basis of data for the period January/November 1981. 
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(b) Wages and salaries 
In 1981, as in the preceding year, the nominal rise in wages and salaries was not high enough 
to compensate for the inflation. Indeed, there was a sharp and widespread decline in real wages and 
salaries throughout the economy. Thus, following the 3% drop recorded in 1980, the index of 
wages and salaries fell by nearly 13% in 1981, if the consumer price index is used to deflate the 
nominal movements.31 On the other hand, if the wholesale price index is used for this purpose, 
the reductions amount to 7% in 1980 and to nearly 28% in 198132 (see table 18). 
As in 1980, it was public sector manual and non-manual workers who suffered the greatest 
losses, the size of the decline in central government wages and salaries being particularly notable 
in that it came close to 18% for the second year running, so that in real terms remunerations 
dropped below their 1973 level. As regards the staff of independent institutions, their real wages 
and salaries dropped by 13% on average, after the drop of somewhat over 1% recorded the 
preceding year, and thus returned to the level at which they had stood four years previously. The 
decline in private sector wages and salaries, for their part, came to more than 9%, bringing them 
too back to their 1977 level. 
There is usually a lag in real wages and salaries when inflation accelerates, especially in an 
economy with no inflationary tradition, as is the case of Costa Rica. The intensity with which 
inflation progressed in 1981 would be enough on its own to explain the appreciable decline in real 
wages and salaries. Two further factors also exerted an influence, however: the fiscal crisis and the 
decline in the level of activity, with doubling of the rate of unemployment. 
When the performance of wages in the period before the beginning of the economic crisis is 
examined, real wages and salaries are seen to have developed very similarly to the gross national 
income, except in 1974, when they dropped sharply at a time when the income rose slightly. Thus, 
between 1974 and 1979 the indexes of real wages and salaries of the private sector and the public 
Table 18 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 






































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
"Preliminary figures. The evolution for 1981 was projected on the basis of data for the first half of the year. 
'The nominal salaries and wages were deflated by the consumer price index. 
"The figures for 1981 have been projected on the basis of data for the first half of the year. Since inflation accelerated 
throughout the year, it is likely that the drop in real wages and salaries was even greater. 
52
 Although the wholesale price index may be a better indicator of the underlying inflation, the consumer price index 
probably better reflects the situation as regards the basket of goods of wage earners. In addition, the real movement shown 
over the past decade by wages and salaries, when they are deflated by the wholesale price index, is not consistent with the 
real pattern of consumption in that period. For that reason, only the real variations which result from the application of 
consumer prices will be given in the remainder of this text. 
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sector rose by 40% and 43%, respectively, while the gross national income expanded by 40%. A 
marked discrepancy is to be observed, however, when the gross national income is adjusted by the 
increase in employment. When this is done, it is seen that the income per person employed grew 
by only 11.6 % in that period, while the product per person employed increased by only 4.1%. Even 
when the considerable reduction in real wages and salaries in 1974 is taken into account, a very 
appreciable imbalance is observed between the growth of real wages and salaries and that of the 
product and income per person employed.33 In practice, this resulted in greater external 
indebtedness rather than in a redistribution of the income in favour of wage earners. Among other 
things, the economic crisis virtually restored the relationship which existed between these 
variables prior to the first oil crisis, since the income per person employed in 1981 was 6% higher 
than in 1973, while the index of real wages and salaries was 9% higher. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
(a) Introduction: fiscal and monetary policy and the evolution of the economic crisis 
Throughout the 1970s, the public sector followed in practice a policy of increasing its material 
and administrative responsibilities in the economy systematically without having been endowed 
with the legal and material resources needed to do so. This contradiction was a decisive factor in 
shaping the economic crisis, since not only did it considerably increase the imbalance between 
what the economy spent and what it produced, but also even came to the point of compromising 
the central government's very ability to formulate and execute in a timely manner the 
macroeconomic policies dictated by the course of events. At all events, there can be no doubt that 
instead of an effort being made to prevent the imbalances from reaching unacceptable dimensions, 
it was these very imbalances which dictated —at very high cost— the macroeconomic policies 
needed to reorient the economy. 
Between 1970 and 1980, the total expenditure (less amortization of the debt) of the 
consolidated non-financial public sector showed an average yearly growth of 26% in current terms 
and nearly 11 % in real terms. As a result, this expenditure rose from an equivalent of over 25 % of 
the gross domestic product in 1970 to nearly 41 % in 1980. As for total income, this too grew more 
rapidly than the gross domestic product but much more slowly than expenditure, rising from the 
equivalent of 24% of the gross domestic product in 1970 to the equivalent of 31 % in 1980 (see 
table 19). From 1975 on, the total income barely grew at all in relation to the product, while 
between 1977 and 1980 expenditure increased by 7 percentage points. As from 1979, current 
income was no longer sufficient to cover current expenditure, and in that year the global deficit 
rose to the unprecedented figure of 7% of the gross domestic product in net terms and 11% in 
gross terms. In 1980 negative savings came close to 2% of the gross domestic product, and the 
global balance amounted to 9.5% in net terms and 12.6% in gross terms.34 
Because of its reluctance to raise taxes and tariffs, from 1976 on the public sector had to 
mobilize large amounts of domestic and external bank financing to meet its expenditure 
commitments. In 1979 and 1980, the new credits absorbed by the central government, the 
independent institutions and the non-financial State enterprises totalled close to 10% of the 
product (see table 19). Between 1975 and 1980, the total domestic credit utilized by the public 
sector grew at an average annual rate of 45.5 %, thereby rising from an amount equivalent to 6.4% 
of the gross domestic product in the former year to the equivalent of 21% of the, product in the 
latter (see table 20). 
For the decade as a whole, the growth rates of current and capital expenditure were very 
similar, although they varied greatly at different times during the period. With regard to current 
"I t is important to bear in mind that this analysis is based on the use of the consumer price index to deflate wages 
and salaries. If the wholesale price index were used, the imbalance would be of opposite sign. 
'••The gross global balance includes the amortization of the debt as a capital expenditure, whereas the net global 
balance excludes it as such (see table 19). 
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expenditure, the expansion of wage and salary costs was the most notable feature, but interest 
payments also expanded very rapidly. In this connection special mention should be made of the 
increase in public employment, which grew at an average annual rate of 13% during the period 
1973-1979, so that the total number of public employees more than doubled. 
From the institutional point of view, it was the State enterprises which were primarily 
responsible for the growth in expenditure, followed by the independent institutions, the central 
government and the municipal governments. Taken together, the enterprises increased their 
expenditure at a real average annual rate of nearly 15%, the independent institutions increased 
theirs at an annual rate of around 13%, and the central government, at a rate of 8%. The 
municipalities did not increase their expenditure in real terms. 
The cause of the boom in public expenditure and the gap between it and the income seems to 
lie, in the final analysis, in the constitutional and legal mandates which have implicitly, if not 
explicitly, dispersed the responsibility for the management of economic policy over the various 
components of the public sector and even among the different ministries of the central 
government. The most outstanding example of this institutional trend was in fact provided by the 
budgetary process, since up until very recently there was no consolidated budget for the public 
sector as a whole: instead, the majority of the independent institutions and all the State enterprises 
prepared their respective budgets separately, as did the central government. There was not even 
any ex-post accounting of the set of individual budgets. The central government itself prepared 
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" budgets for its operations, while at the same time engaging in 
considerable extra-budgetary expenditure. In addition, while one ministry was given 
responsibility for preparing the budgets, another was made responsible for their execution and 
control. As a recent study pointed out, the simple fact is that no one in Costa Rica knew how much 
the public sector planned to spend in a given period nor where the expenditure would be 
channelled.35 
Table 19 
COSTA RICA: OPERATIONS OF THE CONSOLIDATED 
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Source: ECLA.on the basis of data supplied by the Office of the Controller-General of the Republic, Ministry of Finance, 
Central Bank, Budgetary Authority, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
"At current market prices. 
Preliminary figures. 
'Includes capital inflows. 
Includes arrears of interest. 
'Includes discrepancies in statistics. 
"World Bank, Costa Rica: Current Economic Position and Prospects, Washington, D.C., 3 November 1980, p. 18. 




COSTA RICA: DESTINATION, ORIGIN AND FINANCING OF CREDIT 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data; IMF, International financial statistics. 
"Projected to the end of the year on the basis of the growth rate between November 1980 and November 1981. 
In addition, there were the rigidities and the expansionary philosophy generated by the 
system of compulsory expenditures and the related practice of allocating fixed percentages of taxes 
for specific ends and uses. Both of these are traditional features deriving from the country's 
Constitution. 
The gap between the income and expenditure of the public sector, in its turn, created a new 
series of difficult dilemmas for the economy and the economic policy. In view of its magnitude, it 
threatened to set off an intense inflationary process at the global supply and demand level unless 
either the external debt was considerably increased or private demand drastically reduced. In the 
labour market, it meant either embarking on a path of global overemployment or labour shortages 
within specific sectors and occupations, or having recourse to more foreign labour; in addition, it 
signalled the danger of wage inflation unless an incomes policy were established. In the goods 
market, it involved the need to increase the deficit on current account and, at the same time, the 
level of external indebtedness, or else the need to induce the private sector to reduce the gap 
between savings and investment, unless a system for the administrative rationing of goods were 
introduced in order to avoid running the risk of a sustained rise in the level of prices. In the 
monetary market, it meant restricting the availability of credit to rhe private sector or expanding 
the global supply of credit excessively. Finally, in the foreign exchange market, it made it necessary 
either to allow the external price of the colón to fluctuate or to alter the domestic level of prices 
while maintaining the existing exchange rate. Otherwise, there was a risk of abrupt and 
unprogrammed fluctuations in the latter. 
In practice, no clear or consistent line of economic policy was pursued in the face of the crucial 
situation at which the economy had arrived: instead events were allowed to take their own course. 
Thus, in actual fact, private demand also was allowed to expand more or less freely, since no 
restrictions were put on income nor on the availability of credit for the private sector, regardless of 
whether it was of domestic or foreign origin. In the period 1975-1979, when most of the 
deterioration in the financial situation of the public sector occurred, the real wages and salaries of 
the private sector rose just as much as, and even slightly more than, those of the public sector 
(8.5% compared with 8.3% per annum),36 and although the growth rate of domestic credit to the 
private sector was much lower than that to the public sector, it nevertheless came to 7% annually 
56However, the growth rate of employment in the private sector was barely a quarter of that in the public sector. 
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in real terms and was enough to keep unchanged the ratio between the domestic supply of credit to 
the private sector and the gross domestic product (see table 20). In addition, private indebtedness 
with the exterior grew by nearly 34% a year at constant prices during the period. These trends in 
the labour and monetary markets resulted in a real expansion of 9% a year in private expenditure: 
a rate not much lower than that of 10.3% a year recorded in public expenditure. 
The vigorous increase in domestic demand was accompanied by a reduction in the traditional 
figure of 7 % of unemployment to one of less than 3 % towards the end of 1979 and an expansion in 
the deficit on current account to the very high figure of 12% of the product in the same year. 
Simultaneously, the external debt showed intensive growth, while the gross international reserves 
fell below the equivalent of one month's imports. Concomitantly, inflation (as measured by the 
consumer price index) accelerated from 3-5% in 1976 to over 9% in 1979 (and to 18% in 1980).37 
In spite of the substantial gap in Costa Rica's external accounts, the virtual exhaustion of its 
international reserves and the intensification of its domestic inflation in comparison with that in 
its main trading partners, it was decided not to modify the exchange policy. Moreover, the 
administration which came into office in 1978 reduced a number of customs tariffs and other 
barriers to imports. In the prevailing circumstances and in the absence of any complementary 
measures, this reform, like the liberalization of many price controls, tended to aggravate rather 
than improve the situation. On the other hand, the payment of more competitive interest rates 
had a perceptible effect on private savings which partly outweighed the effects on the current 
account balance caused by the increase in the fiscal deficit and the acceleration of the issue of 
currency.38 
It was not until early in 1980 that the Government took the decision to tackle the by then 
critical situation of the economy with a stabilization plan. This plan, backed up by a stand-by 
arrangement for 60 million SDR units with the International Monetary Fund, aimed to curb the 
growth in domestic demand during the next two years and reduce the external gap, especially by 
effecting a sizeable reduction in the fiscal deficit. Not only was the option of modifying the 
exchange policy rejected, but the stabilization plan was even justified as being necessary in order to 
maintain the prevailing exchange rate. The specific measures included a rise in various indirect 
taxes and increases in the prices of energy sources. In addition, the Executive submitted a tax 
reform bill to the Legislative Assembly. 
On the expenditure side, a flat reduction of 10% in the budgets of nearly all the divisions of 
the public sector was proposed. In addition, in what amounted to a big step forward, a decree was 
promulgated setting up a Budgetary Authority responsible for approving or rejecting the budgets 
of all public sector entities and preparing and supervising a consolidated budget for the whole 
sector. Finally, restrictions were laid down in respect of the granting of credits to the public sector 
and the total growth of credit. 
The stabilization programme was a failure mainly because it did not succeed in reducing the 
deficit in public finances, which even increased as a percentage of-the gross domestic product. 
Although domestic demand was not only curbed but even reduced, no improvement in the 
precarious external situation was achieved, while inflation got worse and towards the end of the 
year the Government was forced by events to give formal recognition to the rise in the exchange 
rate. 
After protracted negotiations, in May 1981 a new and broader agreement was reached with 
the Monetary Fund in support of a more rigorous stabilization programme. However, various 
policies contained in the new stabilization programme agreed to with trie Fund had actually been 
in application since the end of 1980. One of the most important of these was precisely the 
modification of the exchange policy. Another was the reorganization of public finances through 
the application of severe restrictions on expenditure and tax reforms. 
57
 In 1980 it came to 24% when measured on the basis of the wholesale price index. 
''Between 1975 and 1979, the financial savings (time and savings deposits) of the private sector grew from the 
equivalent of 13.3% of the gross domestic product to the equivalent of nearly 26% (see table 20). As for the deficit of the 
private sector (the difference between its investment and savings), it fell from 6% to 3% of the gross domestic product. 
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(b) Fiscal policy 
In 1981 the financial situation of the public sector improved considerably, owing primarily to 
the great progress made in redressing the precarious state of the central government finances. 
Thus, in its budgetary transactions the central government showed a surplus on current account 
for the first time in four years and reduced its global deficit by nearly 60% so that it was equivalent 
to only 2.2% of the gross domestic product, compared with 7.9% the previous year. This 
improvement made it possible, among other things, to reduce the Government's absorption of 
domestic credit by a similar amount. 
This result reflected both a vigorous increase in income and strict containment of 
expenditure. Current income rose by nearly 42%, coming close to the goal fixed in the budget 
adopted in December of the preceding year (see table 21). This growth was due partly to the sharp 
rise in the level of prices during the year. It was, however, the modifications made in export taxes 
—measures complementing the revision of the exchange policy— which did most to increase 
revenue. The returns from export taxes amounted to double the amount estimated in the budget 
and were more than three times the amount collected the preceding year, representing 25% of 
current income in 1981 as opposed to less than 11 % the previous year. Substantial increases were 
also generated by the rises in the selective taxes on consumption, which were introduced the 
preceding year when the Legislative Assembly was still debating the tariff reform. On the other 
hand, the drop in the level of activity and, in particular, in the volume of imports had a negative 
effect on the performance of tax receipts.39 Finally, it should be noted that even though current 
income showed considerable growth, this was less than the rise in the gross domestic product at 
current prices. 
Table 21 
COSTA RICA: OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT" 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Office of the Controller-General of the Republic, Ministry of Finance, 
Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund. 
"Includes extrabudgetary operations. 
Budgeted. Includes the changes introduced during the year. 
'Effective (preliminary figures). 
Includes arrears of interest. 
" However, the decline in the income from tariffs was more than made up for the surtaxes applied by the Executive in 
August in response to a Supreme Court decision declaring the floating of the colón unconstitutional. This decision meant, 
among other things, that the tariffs had to be recalculated on the basis of the official exchange rate of 8.6 colones per US 
dollar instead of on the basis of the prevailing f luctating rate, as had been done since the Executive decided to float the colón 
at the end of the preceding year. 
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As regards expenditure, the increase in current spending was kept down to less than 9% in 
spite of the upward pressures exerted by inflation. This restriction was achieved through an 
absolute reduction in both interest payments on the debt and transfers to the rest of the public 
sector and to the private sector. The servicing of the public debt fell primarily because of the 
refinancing of the bonds in the hands of the commercial banks, but also because of the partial 
suspension of the servicing of the external debt in the second half of the year. With regard to 
transfers, there was marked under-execution of the programme budgeted, and the same approach 
was followed in the case of consumption expenditure, basically by not filling vacancies as they 
occurred. In the case of capital expenditure, it proved possible to decrease this by 17% in nominal 
terms by cutting the amount budgeted for capital transfers by over half and, in addition, under-
spending even this. Moreover, the nominal increase in real investment was kept down to 4%. 
Altogether, expenditure rose by only 3 % in nominal terms, representing a decrease of one third in 
real terms. 
The dramatic improvement in the budgetary operations of the central government was, 
however, partially offset by the expansion of the deficit in its extra-budgetary transactions. This 
deficit increased by over 400 million colones, so that the reduction in the combined deficit of all 
central government transactions amounted to only 38%, as opposed to the 60% reduction in the 
deficit on transactions covered by the budget.40 
The results achieved over the period for the remainder of the non-financial public sector and 
for the consolidated budgetary transactions are shown in tables 22 and 23.41 The most outstanding 
result at the general level was the magnitude of the improvement in the global balance. 
Originally, a big reduction of about 70% was programmed in the consolidated deficit of the 
public sector. With the subsequent expansions, however, the budgetary deficit in nominal terms 
came close to the level recorded the preceding year.42 In actual fact, the consolidated budget deficit 
was reduced by nearly 38% at current prices and by over 50% at constant prices. Compared with 
the final budget, the reduction was achieved primarily because the non-financial enterprises as a 
whole showed a deficit totalling only 55% of the large amount envisaged. All departments had 
lower deficits than envisaged, however (see table 22). 
On the other hand, the improvement over the previous year was entirely attributable to the 
performance of the central government, since the reduction of nearly 1 950 million colones in its 
deficit considerably exceeded the approximately 1 400 million colones by which the consolidated 
deficit was reduced. Nevertheless, both local authorities and the public service institutions also 
managed to reduce their deficits somewhat. 
In 1981 the current income of the consolidated public sector grew by 24%, while current 
expenditure increased by slightly less than 18%. Consequently, the deficit on current account was 
virtually eliminated. Capital expenditure, for its part, did not vary in nominal terms. The 
consequent reduction of nearly 38% in the global deficit made it possible, among other things, to 
40
 The combined deficit fell from close to 4 180 million colones in 1980 to about 2 600 million colones in 1981. In 1981 
total ex trabudgetary expenditure amounted to 1 538 million colones and total income to 263 million colones. The doubling 
of the extrabudgetary expenditure in 1981 was primarily due to a sharp and unexpected rise in the State and employers' 
contributions to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and to the repayment of part of the surtax to the banana producers. 
The deficit was financed primarily by increasing the floating debt and using resources scheduled for future years. See Office 
of the Controller General of the Republic, Memoria Anual, 1981, San José, 1 May 1982, pp. 48-49. 
""As may be seen, the current income and total expenditure of the central government amounted to the equivalent of 
only 47% and 46%, respectively, of the current income and total expenditure of the consolidated non-financial public 
sector in 1981. In addition, it may be noted that the current income of the State financial enterprises (the Central Bank, the 
nationalized commercial banks and other public financial entities) amounted to 95 % of that of the central government. 
42In actual fact, the budgetary process of the central government distorts the picture somewhat. As a mater of routine, 
the central government prepares a regular budget, which usually provides for the expenditure financed out of the 
government's own resources, and an extraordinary budget, which usually covers the expenditure financed primarily 
through debts. When these budgets were combined, the initial consolidated deficit of the public sector came to 2 239 million 
colones instead of 1 169 million colones. After this adjustment had been made, the reduction originally proposed in the 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Office of the Controller General of the Republic, Ministry of Finance, 
Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund. 
"According to the programme agreed with the International Monetary Fund. 
Actual results (preliminary figures). 
'Including arrears of interest. 
Including statistical discrepancies. 
secure a drastic reduction in the absorption of domestic credit, the net use of which by the non-
financial public sector was reduced by 62%. 
The magnitude of the restriction of public sector budgetary operations can only be properly 
appreciated by comparing it with the rise in the level of prices. It may be noted in this connection 
that as a share of the gross domestic product at current prices, current income fell from 31.1 % in 
1980 to 26.2% in 1981 and current expenditure went from 32.9% to 26.2%; total expenditure fell 
from nearly 40.7% to 31.5%; the global deficit was reduced from 9.5% to 4.1%, and net domestic 
financing went from 6.4% to 1.7% (see table 19). 
Even though it had not been possible to effect the tax reform, the quantitative improvements 
envisaged for the public finances in the stabilization plan agreed upon with IMF were largely 
achieved; the other circumstances, however, turned out very differently from what had been 
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expected. In the situation prevailing in 1981, the very restrictive fiscal policy became one more 
factor tending to depress economic activity, rather than freeing resources for the private sector. 
But in the absence of special international financial support there seems to have been no viable 
alternative. 
(c) Monetary policy 
In the stabilization plans supported by IMF, the monetary aggregates play a key role both as 
means of adjusting the economy and as indicators for monitoring progress towards the 
macroeconomic goals laid down in the plan. Thus, quaterly ceilings are usually set for the growth of 
total domestic credit and domestic credit to the government, and minimum values for the net 
international reserves are also established. In addition, limitations are placed on the 
Government's external indebtedness, especially in the short term. The purpose of restricting the 
expansion of domestic credit is twofold: to curb inflationary pressures, and to minimize the 
imbalance between what the economy spends and what it produces, i.e., the deficit on current 
account. The limitations on the Government's domestic and external indebtedness in turn 
determine fiscal policy and, in particular, the size of the fiscal deficit. The limitation on the use of 
domestic credit by the Government is also intended to free financial resources to the private 
sector.43 The setting of a minimum level for thejiet international reserves seems basically to be a 
measure for controlling the balance-of-payments performance, since in itself it cannot exert an 
independent influence on the balance of payments, although it does impose an additional 
restriction on the expansion of domestic credit. At all event, failure to comply with the quarterly 
floors or ceilings in respect of domestic credit and external indebtedness constitutes a reason for 
suspending the country's access to the financing envisaged when signing the agreement with IMF. 
Table 23 
COSTA RICA: MONETARY BALANCE 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, (various issues). 
"End-year balances. 
•"This measure, together with the fact that there are no limits set on the indebtedness of the private sector in the 
exterior reflects the view that the main cause of the deficit on current account is the deficit in public finances and that the 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data; IMF, International Financial Statistics, (various issues). 
"November 1981 by comparison with November 1980. 
Year-end balances for each year. 
cFor some years there are slight discrepancies in the original data (see IMF, op.cit.). Here these discrepancies were 
reconciled in the entry "other net domestic assets". 
''Each division adds up to 100%.'Roughly equal to the commercial bank reserves. 
^The multipliers were obtained directly. Those which were obtained indirectly by calculation [currency outside banks 
(demand deposits), etc.], do not always agree since the original data for some years do not tally. 
*M, was projected to the end of the year. 
Mj was projected to the end of the year. 
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Such restrictions on monetary assets and liabilities were also favoured as adjustment and 
control mechanisms in the stabilization plan which the Government of Costa Rica agreed with IMF 
in May 1981 and were strictly observed in the monetary policy throughout the year. The other two 
factors which had strong repercussions on the performance of the monetary variables in 1981 were 
the pronounced variation in the exchange rate and the inflationary process. 
It was easy to respect the ceilings on public sector indebtedness with the exterior, because the 
country's access to the international financial markets had been practically closed ever since the 
end of 1980. In contrast, it proved to be very difficult —and perhaps even of questionable 
wisdom— to abide by the restrictions on the expansion of domestic credit when the rate of 
inflation was far higher than predicted, since they amounted to drastically restricting the real 
availability of credit. At all events, the nominal growth of domestic credit was kept very much 
lower than the rate of inflation, since the variation in the total domestic credit granted between the 
end of 1980 and the end of 1981 amounted to barely 15%, whereas the rate of inflation was 65% 
according to the consumer price index and 117% in terms of the wholesale price index. As a 
proportion of the product, domestic credit fell from 51% in 1980 to 40% in 1981. The supply of 
credit to the private sector was curtailed even further, since it grew by less than 11 % in nominal 
terms (see table 23¡). By this time, however, the International Monetary Fund had already 
suspended the agreement for other reasons.44 
There can be no doubt that the sharp reduction in the real availability of credit in the economy 
also contributed to the drop in the level of activity. Consideration could have been given to an 
alternative monetary policy together with complementary measures such as higher tariffs, import 
prohibitions and more rigorous price controls, in order to keep a bigger supply of credit from 
jeopardizing the improvement in the balance of payments or helping to accelerate the inflation 
even further. It must be admitted, however, that a greater increase in domestic credit would not 
have solved the two fundamental problems facing the economy, i.e., the severe shortage of foreign 
exchange and the intense inflationary process. It might even, in fact, have made them worse. In 
this sense the pronounced reduction in the real supply of domestic credit in 1981 might be 
considered to be merely the counterpart of its excessive expansion in previous years.45 To put it 
another way, there was really very little manoeuvring space left for handling the economic policy 
in 1981. 
In spite of the modest growth of domestic credit and the further decline in net external assets 
(the net international reserves), the monetary base expanded by 163%, largely because of the way 
in which the enormous rise in the exchange rate affected the internal valuation of external assets 
and liabilities. The growth rate of the money supply (M,) was much lower, so that the monetary 
multiplier again fell markedly, dropping from 1.3 in 1980 to .89 in 1981. Between 1973 and 1978 it 
had averaged 1.76. As in past years, this reduction was mainly attributable to the increase in the 
ratio of reserves to deposits made by the commercial banks in response to the Central Bank's 
decision to raise the legal cash reserves so as to neutralize part of the factors of expansion of the 
monetary base (see table 24). 
44See section 3 (a). 
45
 It should be borne in mind that between 1973 and 1980 domestic credit rose from 32% to 51% as a percentage of the 
gross domestic product (see table 20). 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981 Cuban economic activity developed very vigorously. Thus, after having grown only 
very slowly the year before, the material product rose by almost 12 %, the fastest rate in the last five 
years and the highest in Latin America for the year in question1 (see table 1). 
This favourable result was due mainly to the noteworthy expansion in the production of sugar 
cane, a crop which, after processing, has always generated the largest inflow of foreign exchange 
into the country. After successfully overcoming the problems caused by rust —a disease which had 
affected the plantations in previous years— the efforts made to replace and renew plantations and 
to consolidate a permanent policy aimed at improving and integrating agricultural and industrial 
activities in this field gave their fruits in the 1980/1981 harvest and above all in that of 1981/1982. 
The 1981 calendar year registered the largest output of sugar in history, thanks to the success 
achieved in synchronizing the cutting of the cane at its time of fullest ripeness and its delivery to 
the sugar mills. 
Total exports also rose, because of the increase in sales of sugar and, to a lesser extent, tobacco. 
The latter crop turned in a volume of production without precedent in the last twenty years, after 
having been seriously affected in the previous two years (and especially in 1980) by the blue mould: 
a disease which brought the production of independent farmers2 down to very low levels. 
In addition to the two growth factors mentioned, reference must also be made to the process 
of accumulation, which, although extremely selective in previous years, when the growth rate of 
the economy was lower, nevertheless continued steadily, especially in certain sectors and 
programmes considered to be of basic importance, such as the energy field and the agricultural and 
industrial infrastructure. Some of these projects —in such fields as sugar, textiles, construction 
materials, certain agricultural implements, mining, etc.— were completed in 1980 and contributed 
to the increase in production in 1981. Indeed, as noted below, 1981 was perhaps one of the years 
with the highest relative level of completion of projects. 
A leading role was played by the construction sector in the execution of these projects for the 
expansion of the economic infrastructure. Thus, the expansion of the installed capacity in factories 
producing cement and other construction materials made it possible to step up the building of 
dwellings and infrastructure of a social nature (hospitals, clinics, educational institutions and even 
hotels). 
There were other elements, too, which increased the dynamism of the economic system. 
Firstly, the continued application of the system of direction of the economy adopted in previous 
years must be highlighted. Thus, for example, efforts were made to further expand and reorganize 
the systems of distribution and marketing. As part of this task, the agricultural and parallel 
markets (both belonging to the State) and the free peasants' marketsi (although the latter were of 
•In Cuba, economic activity is measured according to the System of Material Product Balances (SMPB), as is usual in 
the centrally planned economies. Almost all the other Latin American countries use the System of National Accounts 
(SNA), which is conceptually different from the SMPB, According to data supplied by the State Statistical Committee, the 
real growth rate of 11.7% was estimated on the basis of variations at constant 1981 prices. It was reported by the same 
source that the variation in the national product in current terms was almost 22%, thus giving an implicit variation in 
prices for the economy as a whole of approximately 9%. 
2These producers are mostly affiliated to the National Association of Private Farmers (ANAP). 
'See the section on Cuba in the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1980. 
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less relative importance) were responsible for expanding the coverage and facilitating the 
distribution of items of domestic consumption, thus encouraging the production of some goods in 
the private sector.4 Within the same category of factors, importance was assigned in official circles 
to the improvement of the machinery for securing external supplies, while substantial advances 
were made in the repair of different kinds of equipment. 
Within the new system of management of the economy, wage reform measures were brought 
into operation in 1980 for the whole economy in order to promote higher production through 
individual and collective rewards to workers or enterprises exceeding predetermined levels of 
quantity and quality.5 The increase in the minimum wage and the effects of this wage reform 
promoted higher production. 
Table 1 
CUBA: SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Total material product 
(millions of pesos) 
Population (thousands of inhabitants/ 
Per capita material product 
(pesos) 
B. Short-run economic indicator 
Total material product 
Per capita material product 
Terms of trade 
With the Soviet Union 
With market economic countries 
Current value of exports of goods 
Total 
Sugar 
Current value of imports of goods 
Total 
Petroleum and petroleum products 




C. External sector 
Total merchandise trade balance 
With the Soviet Union 
With the rest of the Socialist 
countries 



























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the State Statistical Committee and other international statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. 
See footnotes ¡> and
 e of table 2 below. 
'Annual average. 
ECLA estimate. 
4In the city of Havana, in addition to the many traditional units for the distribution of rationed goods, which include 
the "State parallel market", there are 33 State agricultural markets and nine free peasants' markets. 
'The subject of material and other incentives had been extensively debated on a number of occasions, and after such 
incentives had been applied several times in the course of the revolutionary process, the new system was introduced in 1980 
and its main effects began to be felt in 1981. 
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In addition, favourable effects were brought about during the year by the wholesale price 
reform decided upon at the end of 1980, which began to be applied in 1981. This reform was aimed 
mainly at updating the wholesale prices of certain basic inputs, especially petroleum. In December 
1981 it was decided to extend this reform to retail prices as from January 1982, since these prices 
had remained almost unchanged during 1981. The aim of the reform was to bring the operations of 
the various production units in line with their possibilities for paying their own way. 
The high growth rate of the conomy in 1981 was hindered, however, by the persistence of 
some bottlenecks connected with external trade and the balance of payments. 
Firstly, as on other occasions, the terms of trade were once again unfavourable for Cuba in its 
trade with the market economy countries. This, together with the growing rigidity of the 
international financial centres —factors which have also been adversely affecting the finances of 
many other countries of the region— had a negative impact on the Cuban economy. Thus, the 
external financial imbalance accumulated with certain countries and regions, among them several 
of the members of the European Common Market, made it increasingly difficult to continue 
expanding Cuba's trade with those economies.6 
As in spite of the efforts made to diversify its exports the country still has a structure of 
production very similar to that of previous decades, and moreover its economy remains extremely 
open to the exterior, it needs a very large volume of external supplies which are increasingly 
difficult to obtain from certin market economies. This situation has undoubtedly been influenced 
by factors of a non-economic nature, as in the case of the embargo maintained against Cuba for 
many years by the United States. For these reasons, purchases from the member countries of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and especially from the Soviet Union, increased 
considerably in 1981, thus significantly increasing the trade deficit with this area. 
A second serious obstacle in the short term which is rather difficult to appreciate in view of 
the high growth rate of both the global material product and the product of almost all the economic 
sectors was the decline in the production of certain foodstuffs (such as grains), which could not be 
compensated for by larger external purchases. 
Thirdly, as those responsible for running the economy themselves admist, in spite of the 
efforts made by the authorities to improve efficiency and productivity through various measures 
connected with the management of the economy, these measures are still far from having achieved 
all their objectives, with the possible exception of the improvement in the sugar industry. 
Finally, between June and October 1981 the population was affected by a highly infectious 
disease, dengue, which was intensively combated through a mass campaign co-ordinated by 
technical units of the Government with the support of the organizations of the masses, but which 
nevertheless used up substantial State resources because of the high international cost of the 
pesticides needed and the expense involved in national-scale mobilization.7 
To sum up, 1981 was a year of rapid economic growth which made it possible to speed up the 
process of accumulation and satisfy to a large extent the normal consumption needs of the 
population, while at the same time continuing to apply the policy of expanding the infrastructure 
and social services. The fact, however, that in the midst of this promising picture obstacles of 
external origin persisted and even got worse during the year, especially because of the drop in 
sugar prices, as reflected in the record deficit on the trade account, points to unpromising prospects 
for the immediate future,8 especially in view of the growing tensions of a non-economic nature 
present in the international situation. 
6With some exceptions such as Canada, Spain and some relatively less developed countries. 
'The outbreak of dengue affected nearly 3% of the country's population. 
8The annual plan for 1982 envisages growth of not more than 2.5 % in the global social product. See Humberto Pérez, 
"Informe ante la Asamblea Nacional acerca del cumplimiento del plan de la economía nacional en 1981 y sobre el proyecto 
de plan para 1982", in Granma, 30 December 1981. 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
Although adequate quantitative information was not available on the components of total 
supply and demand, some observations may be made regarding their evolution on the basis of the 
trends in domestic production and the main external trade aggregates. 
First of all, the global social product, and in particular the material product, grew considerably 
during 1981, thanks primarily to the excellent sugar harvest in the 1980/1981 and 1981/1982 
seasons after an abnormally low harvest in the 1979/1980 season. 
In spite of this, imports continued to increase, although not as fast as the material product, 
partly because of the fact that, in spite of the success achieved in the production of some basic items 
through the intensification of the policy of import substitution, the structure of production has not 
significantly changed and there is still a high relationship of dependence in this field. As will be 
noted below, according to some preliminary estimates the volume of imports from the Soviet 
Union increased by approximately 18%, while those from the market economy countries went 
down by about 7% as a result of the limitations on financing in convertible currencies and the 
policy of import substitution. 
Table 2 
























































































































































































Mining and metallurgy 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"The material product is equivalent to the value of the gross production of the agricultural, mining, manufacturing, construction and 
electricity sector. According to official sources, "the basic criterion for determining the gross production and its allocation toa particular 
sector, branch or sub-branch is provided by the nature of the fundamental activity carried on by the enterprise, establishment, or 
department having an independent balance-sheet in which the economic activity in question is effected" (see State Statistical Committee, 
Bases Metodológicas del Sistema de Balances de la Economía Nacional, Havana, November 1981, p. 9).Consequently, the information 
given in the present table does not correspond exclusively to sectors and branches of origin: the classification used records, together with 
the main production of the enterprise units, the secondary production carried out in them, regardless of whether or not it corresponds, by 
origin, to the same branch of activity. If a classification based strictly on sectors of origin were used, in line with the criterion employed by 
the United Nations in the ISIC, the conclusions at the sectoral and branch levels would be different. Thus, the information for the 
agricultural sector includes secondary productions of the industrial and construction sectors, or productions computed in those sectors. 
Nevertheless, these differences are compensated in the total material product. 
The values given in the Anuarios Estadísticos de Cuba are at current prices. In this respect, the State Statistical Committee has indicated 
that all this information corresponds to records at constant 1965 prices, noting that from that year up to and including 1980, the prices of 
imputs and final goods were frozen, and that the only goods valued at prices other than those of 1965 — and in any case frozen as from the 
year of their incorporation into the Cuban economic system — were the few articles not previously traded in the country. 
cThe growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
Preliminary figures. 
'As the individual activities and the total were extrapolated independently on the basis of the variations at constant 1981 prices estimated 
by the State Statistical Committee, the sum of the activities does not coincide with the total for 1981. 
'Including fisheries but excluding metallurgy. 
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On the other hand, bearing in mind the high incidence of sugar exports in total demand and 
the fact that the volume of such exports increased by almost 15%, it may be assumed that the 
domestic demand for goods and services increased considerably, albeit less rapidly than material 
production. This assumption is confirmed on examining the evolution of the supply of products 
for domestic consumption, as reflected in the figures on retail trade turnover and other official 
data.9 According to government estimates, the daily per capita consumption of calories rose from 2 
837 in 1980 to 2 900 in 1981, while protein consumption increased by 3%. 
With regard to investments, a number of previously initiated projects were completed during 
1981, but because of the growing difficulties encountered during the year —especially the 
accentuation in the deterioration of the terms of trade and the aggravation of international 
tensions— the criterion was followed of only undertaking new projects of an essential nature, and 
it would appear that this situation will be further intensified in 1982. At the same time, the 
expansion of the production infrastructure tended to be carried out on the basis of criteria of 
regional diversification. Outstanding among these projects were the following: an agricultural 
implement factory at Holguin, the expansion of the Mariel and Cienfuegos cement factories, a 
milk pasteurizing plant in Pinar del Rio, a meat packing plant at Camagiiey, a sugar mill and a 
glucose plant at Cienfuegos, a factory for high sugar-content products in Pinar del Rio, and a bottle 
factory at Las Tunas. Work carried out in the construction sector included the erection of over 
25 000 dwellings in the whole country, the considerable expansion of the accomodation capacity of 
four hotels, and important projects of a social nature such as two large hospitals (one in Pinar del 
Rio and another in Granma Province), five clinics, three old people's homes, four homes for 
disabled persons, 25 secondary schools, 14 primary schools and 12 kindergartens. In addition, fifty 
livestock farming centres, a dairy farm, several artificial insemination centres and other projects to 
develop the pig and poultry farming branches were completed. 
(b) Growth of the main sectors 
As already noted, the total material product grew by almost 12% after a year in which 
economic activity had increased very slowly. Almost all sectors expanded considerably in 1981 
except for the livestock sector, which grew by a little under 3%, and some branches (such as grains) 
of the crop farming sector. Industry, which had grown very little in 1980, and construction, which 
had stagnated in the period 1979-1980, grew vigorously, in contrast, during the year (see 
table 2).10 
(i) Agriculture. The overall 9% growth of the agricultural sector, which trebled its growth 
rate of the previous year, reflected opposing trends. On the one hand, basic export commodities 
such as sugar and tobacco showed great dynamism after the successful combating of the rust and 
blue mould diseases which had helped to keep their production levels down in previous years. On 
the other hand, however, there were declines in such important food products as rice, maize and 
beans (see table 3). 
9See Humberto Pérez, op.cit. 
10It is worth clarifying some other points regarding the significance and interpretation of the macroeconomic figures 
for Cuba: 
(a) As stated in the footnotes to table 2, the classification used records not only the main production of enterprise units 
but also their secondary production, regardless of whether or not it corresponds by its origin to the same branch of activity. 
The gradual improvement of the organization of enterprises and the policy of incentives which has been applied have 
resulted, in recent years, in the expansion of the secondary production of enterprise units. This is why the classification 
used, although useful from the point of view of planning, restricts the analysis if it is desired to examine activities 
exclusively according to their sectoral origin. 
(b) From the methodological point of view, the rules governing the System of Material Product Balances (SMPB), 
through its principal indicators (global social product and material production) differ from those governing the United 
Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) through its main indicators (such as the gross domestic product). Although 
the figures presented on the material product make it possible to observe the evolution of the Cuban economy as a whole, 
they may differ both from the figures for the global social product (which includes other sectors of production not 
considered in the former concept) and from those for the gross domestic product in the SNA system. 
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In the case of sugar cane, the efforts which had been made for several years past to 
synchronize the harvesting and processing of the product and incorporate modern technology and 
suitable equipment began to give very satisfactory results in the last two harvesting seasons, 
which, taken together, resulted in a record level of sugar production during the calendar year (see 
tables 4 and 7). In 1981, advances were made in cane production, in the number of effective 
harvesting days worked, and in the processing of the product (amount of cane milled per day and 
industrial yield of sugar). The weather was favourable to sugar production during a large part of 
the year, and it was only in November that excessive rain caused floods which affected the cane 
plantations in Santa Cruz del Sur and some sugar mills (see figure 1). 
Non-cane agricultural output increased by a little over 14%. This result was markedly 
influenced by the recovery of the tobacco crop, which had been almost wiped out by the blue mould 
epidemic the year before, but whose output grew sixfold in 1981. On the other hand, in addition to 
Table 3 
CUBA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION" 
(Indexes of physical volume, 1970 = 100) 























































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Including both State and non-State sectors. 
'Figures for 1970 include an estimate for the non-State sector. 
'Preliminary figures. 
Cow's and goat's milk (State sector only). 
'Slaughtering. 










































































































Source: 1960-1970: Central Planning Board, Statistical Bureau, Boletín estadístico, 1970; 1975-1980: Anuario 
Estadístico de Cuba, 1980; 1981: Data supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Sugar cane harvest year. 
Preliminary figures. 
the declines already mentioned in the harvests of rice and maize, which went down by about 4%, 
and the 17% drop in the bean harvest, there were also considerable declines in the production of 
some types of fruit (sweet oranges, mangos and guavas), coffee and henequén. In contrast, the 
output of some other crops (tomatoes, potatoes and bananas) continued to rise and more than 
made up for the decline in the other crops. Thus, even without the spectacular recovery of the 
tobacco crop, non-cane agriculture would have registered a slight increase.11 
The livestock subsector grew less than the year before (less than 3%, compared with a little 
over 6% in 1980), with differing growth rates in the different branches. On the one hand, the 
increase in cattle slaughtering was not as great as that of pigs and poultry (4%, 18% and 13% 
respectively), while although milk production continued to rise, it did so a good deal more slowly 
than the year before. The same occurred in the case of egg production, which increased by only a 
little over 1% after having grown by over 15% in 1980 (see table 3). 
(ii) The industrial sector. Altogether, industry expanded by 12%, compared with only 2% in 
the two previous years. The electricity subsector showed greater dynamism (16%) than mining 
(8%) and manufacturing (12%). The increase in the generation of electric power was achieved 
through the entry into operation of various rural electrification projects and improvements in the 
distribution and transmission systems in various plants such as the Holguin mining and 
metallurgical complex and other plants in various regions of the country. 
Largely because of the results obtained in the extraction of nickel, mining again expanded at a 
similar rate to that of the previous year, thus consolidating an encouraging trend after its scanty 
growth during the two-year period 1978-1979. In 1981, work continued on the construction of the 
first production line of the Punta Gorda nickel plant, the entry into operation of which is scheduled 
for the end of 1983. 
The rate of activity of manufacturing rose considerably. The highest growth rate 
corresponded to consumer durables and capital goods (over 20%), compared with 16% for non-
durable goods and 17% for intermediate goods (see table 5). 
The highly favourable results achieved by the metal manufactures and machinery branch 
(although its weight in the industrial sector is still only small) were due mainly to the entry into 
"Tobacco production increased by 467%, whereas in 1980 it had only represented 27% of the value of non-cane 
production. Consequently, if tobacco is excluded the increase in the latter in 1981 was approximately 2%. 
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operation of an agricultural implement factory and a factory for the production of non-electrical 
equipment, plus the expansion of a steel products plant. Finally, the assembly of buses continued to 
expand, in line with' the policy of increasing the passenger vehicle fleet, and progress was also 
made in the programming of industrial machinery repair activities, as part of the plan designed to 
expand the spare parts industry. 
Except for fuel production (essentially the refining of petroleum), which virtually stagnated, 
the rest of the branches of the intermediate goods industry registered quite marked growth during 
the year, especially in the case of textiles and construction materials, which grew by 17 % and 14%, 
respectively. The first of these increases was due to the entry into operation of a high-capacity 
Figure 1 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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plant, while the second was due to the fact that in 1981 some projects completed the previous year 
as part of the programme to expand cement production capacity began to turn out their products, 
especially the first production line in the Mariel cement factory at Havana, with a capacity of 
740 000 tons per year, and the second line of the Cienfuegos cement plant, as well as the expansion 
of the asbestos products project at Havana. 
As regards the industries oriented basically towards satisfying the demand for non-durable 
consumer goods, the 16% increase in their production reflected significant progress by all their 
components, the lowest increases being those for fisheries (8%) and foodstuffs (9%) and the 
highest being beverages and tobacco (26%). Sugar production, for its part, grew significantly in 
the context of a policy designed to improve the integration of the inputs/sugar cane/refined sugar 
production chain. 
Among the projects completed in 1980 which came into full production in 1981 were the 
Guanabacoa meat packing plant, the Pinar del Rio and Camagiiey sugar mills, a yeast plant al 
Holguin, a poultry slaughtering plant at Villa Clara, and a liquid fodder plant at Camagiiey. 
(iii) Construction. The construction sector was the most dynamic in the whole economy in 
the early 1970s, and it maintained a high growth rate, with a few ups and downs, until 1978. In the 
following two years, however, it virtually stagnated. This evolution was influenced by the differing 
performance of the different types of construction work. Thus, for example, the limitations 
imposed by the country's external trade made it necessary in the middle of the decade to postpone 
the targets which had been set for the construction of housing and schools. In previous years, the 
construction of schools and hospitals had been intensified, whereas the lag in the construction of 
housing, for example, persisted in spite of the fact that the construction of multi-family units 
continued in the capital, other cities, and rural communities. During the 1970s —when the 
population increased at an average annual rate of only 1.2%— the number of new dwellings built 
was barely enough to satisfy the needs of the natural growth of the population. At the same time, 
however, there was a substantial qualitative change, since priority has been given within the 
construction sector to the improvement and expansion of water, sewerage and electricity services 
for housing, and their coverage has been markedly expanded. 
The trends of 1979 continued in 1980, when the decline in the construction of agricultural 
installations, housing, schools, roads (except railroads) and water projects was offset by an 
appreciable increase in the construction of ports, railroads, certain special water projects, etc. In 
1981, in contrast, the satisfactory results obtained in the sugar cane harvest, together with the 
implementation of some projects such as the expansion of cement production capacity, led to an 
important change in economic policy which was reflected in greater relative growth in 
construction within material production, thus enabling it to recover its previous growth rate. This 
important change in sectoral policy was due to the more rational use of resources to fulfil the 
central planning objectives, modified in the light of short-term changes. Mention may be made, in 
this respect, of the new impulse given to housing construction, which recovered the levels of four 
years before; the significant increase in road construction in general (but not that of railroads, 
probably because of their high imported content); and finally, the increase in the construction of 
industrial installations and water projects (see table 6). 
(c) The evolution of employment and productivity 
According to official data, the average number of workers increased by approximately 3% in 
1981, probably because of higher participation by women in production and service activities. This 
increase in the labour force was accompanied by a rise of about 9% in productivity. 
Although no official information is available on the evolution of the labour force by specific 
occupational categories during the past year, it may be noted that between 1975 and 1980 the 
relative importance of technicians in the total continued to increase (from 13% in 1975 to 18% in 
1980), thanks to the efforts made to improve training. Over the same period, in contrast, the 
proportion of workers went down from 56% to 52%, and that of service workers from 16% to 
14%. 
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During 1981, the proportion of non-directly productive workers in the labour structure 
continued to grow, due especially to the increase in that part of the labour force devoted to the 
social sectors such as health and, to an even greater extent, education. 12 Within the productive 
sector, a noteworthy feature was the increase in the proportion of workers employed in 
distribution services, especially commerce, which rose from approximately 7% in 1976 to a little 
over 11% in 1980, although this in no way compensated for the reduction in the proportion of 
human resources devoted to the direct production of goods. The policy of technological 
improvement and mechanization which has been followed in the agricultural sector, especially in 
sugar cane cultivation, was partly responsible for the relative reduction in the workers employed in 
this activity. 
Finally, with a few changes, technical assistance continued to be provided to other countries in 
1981 through missions by professionals and technicians, usually for long periods. Special mention 
may be made of the assistance given in the form of medical personnel and teachers to some 
countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America (such as Nicaragua). Advisory assistance 
services were also provided, either free of charge or on a paying basis in the fields of construction 
or the execution of infrastructural works. 
Table 5 
CUBA: INDICATORS OF THE MANUFACTURING MATERIAL PRODUCT 

























































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The growth rates were calculated on the basis of real figures rather than indexes. 
'Excluding basic metal industries. 
Including, inter alia, leather industry, glass and pottery, paper and pulp, forest industries and timber processing. 
12In 1972, workers in education represented 8.4% of the total; in 1976, 9.5%; and in 1980, 12.1%. 
Total manufacturing sector1 
Non-durable consumer goods 
industry 
Food (excluding sugar) 
Sugar and sugar products 









































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data provided by the State statistical Committee and the Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 
1976 and 1980. 
"Preliminary figures. 
3. The external sector 
Despite the great dynamism of Cuban economic activity in 1981 and the record production of 
sugar achieved in that year, the serious imbalances in external trade became more acute and there 
was an aggravation of the long-standing rigidities of the economy, which was still subjected to 
significant pressure by, inter alia, the long economic embargo imposed by the United States. 
Among the positive features, mention may be%ade of the considerable increase in the volume of 
exports (especially of sugar), the drop in the value of imports from both the Soviet Union and 
from the market economy countries, and the progressive improvement of the instruments and the 
execution of complementary policies within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA). 
These favourable effects were, however, upset by various adverse circumstances: firstly, the 
world crisis which affected the international prices of a number of basic commodities, and 
especially sugar (although this phenomenon was not to manifest itself in all its seriousness until 
1982); secondly, the growing difficulties in trading with the market economy countries, due partly 
to the accumulated trade deficit but also to the rigidity with which the financial centres have been 
operating in the last few years; thirdly, the fact that the financial restrictions in question further 
accentuated the tensions of a non-economic nature and led to some freezing of trade conditions and 
volumes with some market economy countries, and fourthly, the fact that an economy which 
depends to a high degree on the exterior requires larger external purchases to keep up its growth 
rate when growing in a generalized manner, even when a strict and selective import policy is 
applied. 
To sum up, in spite of the increase in the volume of exports the deterioration in the terms of 
trade limited Cuba's capacity to make purchases in the market economies and also, acting as a 
compensatory element, led to an increase in the trade deficit with the socialist countries in general 
and the Soviet Union in particular. 
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(a) Merchandise trade 
(i) Exports. The volume of sugar exported rose by around 15 % (see table 7). There was also a 
sharp increase in external sales of tobacco during the year, thanks to the noteworthy recovery by 
this crop. In addition, increased efforts were made to secure sales abroad of certain non-traditional 
industrial products such as cement, although exports of this product are still only small. These 
positive effects, however, were offset by the drop in sales of fish, oranges and nickel, and especially 
by the decline in the international prices of sugar, which went down by 40% on the world market 
and by approximately 25% in the case of bilateral agreements, but suffered only a very slight 
decline as regards the exports to the Soviet Union.15 
The big increase in sugar production made it possible to expand the volume exported both to 
the Soviet Union and to the rest of the socialist markets. Whereas the latter had received 17% of 
the total volume sold in 1978, in 1981 they took almost 23% of the total. Although the volume of 
sugar purchased by the market economy countries was almost 50% greater than that taken by the 
socialist countries (except the Soviet Union), the foreign exchange value was practically the same 
in both cases, because of the difference in the prices paid (see table 8). 
In these circumstances, the value of exports rose by 7%, which was a good deal less than the 
increase in imports (see table 9). 
(ii) Imports. In 1981, imports increased by almost 13%: i.e., by a similar amount to the year 
before. Although data broken down by the main categories are not available, according to official 
sources there was a decrease in the volume of food imports, which up to 1980 represented 
approximately 15% of total imports from the Soviet Union.14 Within the total purchases made 
from the OECD countries, Canada was the largest supplier for the third successive year, followed by 
Japan, which in 1981 recovered to some extent its importance as a supplier of Cuba, although not 
reaching the high levels of four years before (see table 10). 
Table 7 









































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Anuarios Estadísticos de Cuba and the State Statistical Committee. 
"Calendar year. 
International Sugar Agreement prices. 
'Preliminary figures. 
International Sugar Organization, Statistical Bulletin, March 1982. 
"The Soviet Union and Cuba regulate their international transactions in line with a "sliding base" scale of prices: a 
package deal which tends to compensate for sharp fluctuations in prices. If we compare the price paid for sugar by the 
Soviet Union with that paid on the world market in table 7, we see that on average the price paid by the former was 20% 
higher than the latter during the first half of the 1970s and more than three times as high in the second half. 
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CUBA: VALUE AND VOLUME OF SUGAR EXPORTS, 
BY PURCHASER COUNTRIES 
(Percentages) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
Value 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
countries 
Rest of world 
Volume 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
countries 

































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data supplied by the State Statistical Committee of Cuba. 
Table 9 
CUBA: EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE 
(Millions of Cuban pesos) 
Total exports 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
Rest of world 
Total imports 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
Rest of world 
Overall balance 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
countries 


























1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
1 153 2 237 2 952 2 692 2 918 3 440 3 500 3 967 4 259 
477 811 1 662 1 638 2 066 2 496 2 370 2 253 2 455 
268 472 341 452 377 420 514 534 823 
408 954 949 602 475 524 616 1 180 981 
1 387 1 190 1 463 2 226 3 U3 3 180 3 462 3 574 3 687 4 509 5 081 



















328 407 374 482 
873 1 456 1 316 1 122 
11 -161 -488 -544 
-214 412 148 208 
144 -66 78 -105 



















ita from the Anuarios Estadísticos de Cuba and the State Statistical Committee. 
In the case of imports from the Soviet Union, machinery and equipment and fuels were the 
most important categories, at least up to 1980, and their total share increased from 50% in 1977 to 
almost 60% in that year. Furthermore, in spite of the special price (adjustable on an annual basis) 
granted by the Soviet Union on preferential terms, the effect of the gradual rise in petroleum 
prices has been considerable, even though these preferential prices never reached the level of those 
prevailing on world markets. Partly for this reason, the share of imports of petroleum and 
petroleum products gradually increased from 13% in 1975 to 26% in 1980. 
(iii) The terms of trade. The only year in the last six in which the terms of trade rose both as 
regards transactions with the market economy countries and with the Soviet Union was 1980. In 
1981 the terms of trade dropped 17% in the case of the former and remained virtually unchanged 
in the case of the latter (see table 11). 
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As a result of this evolution and of the volumes exported to the two areas in question, the 
purchasing power of exports to the Soviet Union increased by 12%, while that of exports to the 
market economy countries went down by 10%. 
b) The trade balance 
The merchandise trade deficit, which had increased in 1979 and especially in 1980, reached 
record levels in 1981. Thus, between 1980 and 1981 the deficit rose from approximately 540 
million Cuban pesos to a little over 820 million, equivalent to almost 20% of total exports. Even so, 
the relative amount of the deficit was well below that registered in 1971 and 1972, when the 
merchandise trade deficits were equivalent to over 60%t and almost 55% of external sales, 
respectively. Even though not of such spectacular dimensions, the most recent deficit was 
nevertheless very high and continued to be the result of a structural weakness of the economy, for 
in spite of the progress made in the process of diversification of production, the country continues 
in its external relations to show the features of a primary export economy dominated by a single 
product. In other words, the efforts which have been made for some years past with the aim of 
secturing true diversification of exports have not yet borne fruit.15 
The trade deficit came to almost 770 million Cuban pesos with the Soviet Union and 54 
million with the rest of the socialist countries. In contrast, trade with the remaining countries of 
the world was in balance. In the case of the first group of countries, the accumulated trade deficit up 
to 1974 of nearly 3 600 million pesos went down to about 2 600 million in the following four-year 
period. Various factors caused this tendency to be reversed as from 1979, however. On the one 
hand, in the last three years the external financial imbalance became more acute as a result of the 
higher prices of certain raw materials and inputs as well as the rise in interest rates and the 
Table 10 
CUBA: STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS, BY M A I N COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN 
USSR 




Durable consumer goods' 
Other non-specified goods 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the USSR Foreign Trade Yearbook (several issues) and OECD, Statistics of 
Foreign Trade. 
"January - August. 
Includes machinery, equipment and means of transport. 
'Includes coal, petroleum and related products. 
Includes metals, chemical products, textile fibres, paper and wood. 
'Includes clothing, electro-domestic appliances and cultural articles. 
Includes the other OECD countries, except Yugoslavia. 
"Thus, in the period 1978-1980 the share of sugar industry products in the total value of exports of goods averaged 




CUBA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS" 
(Indexes 1970 = 100) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Exports of goods 
Value 
Soviet union 390.5 471.8 448.0 425.9 464.1 
Market economy countries 174.0 1919 225.6 432.6 359.6 
Volume 
Soviet Union 105.1 193.8 100.2 75.5 84.4 
Market economy countries 84.8 98.0 99.5 106.2 114.5 
Unit values 
Soviet Union 371.7 454.6 446.9 563.9 550.0 
Market economy countries 205.2 195.9 226.7 407.2 314.0 
Imports of goods 
Value 
Soviet Union 268.9 336.9 365.3 406.8 466.4 
Market economy countries 284.8 184.0 159.6 253.6 249.0 
Volume 
Soviet Union 145.9 172.0 179.7 188.6 222.1 
Market economy countries 188.9 H0.2 797 112.0 118.5 
Unit values 
Soviet Union 184.3 195.9 203.3 215.7 210.0 
Market economy countries 150.8 166.9 200.2 226.4 210.1 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Soviet Union 201.7 232.1 219.8 261.4 261.9 
Market economy countries 13<U UTA U32 1795 149.5 
Source: ECLA estimates on the basis of data from the Anuarios Estadísticos de Cuba, the State Statistical Committee of 
Cuba, United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, and other international statistics. 
"Not including trade with the socialist countries, apart from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
hardening of other terms of loans. On the other hand, and possibly partly as a result of the 
foregoing, it was more difficult to obtain certain products needed for the development process 
from some parts of the world, and this phenomenon grew worse in 1980 with the intensification of 
the United States economic embargo. Finally, it proved necessary to expand external purchases 
once again in order to satisfy urgent supply needs. Because of the difficulties in obtaining financing 
in the market-economy countries, these increased imports apparently had to come mainly from 
the expansion of trade with the CMEA countries. 
Thus, in recent years there has been an important turnaround in the origin of Cuba's imports, 
for whereas in the mid-1970s the imports from the Soviet Union were of similar value to those 
from the Western countries (1 300 million pesos), in 1981 the former rose to 3 200 million, 
whereas the latter dropped to less than 1 000 million: a similar value to that of purchases from the 
other socialist countries, which five or six years earlier had only been equivalent to about one-third 
of those from the market economies (see table 9). 
This phenomenon was due, on the one hand, to the policy of import substitution which has 
been applied in récent years in order to alleviate the effects of the world crisis, and on the other to 
the restrictions caused by the acute shortage of convertible currency. 
One of the ways in which Cuba could maintain balanced trade with the market economy 
countries which have traditionally supplied it with raw materials, foodstuffs, spare parts and 
capital goods would be to diversify its exports. On the other hand, the possibilities for transferring 
the accumulated credits to direct investment are still uncertain, because trade with these countries 
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is inevitably tending to stagnate or to be replaced in part with that between Cuba and other 
countries such as Mexico and Canada, which have gradually increased their transactions. At all 
events, if some three-cornered arrangements are not adopted, the decline in trade with the first-
mentioned countries will leave accumulated debts or lines of credit pending, and these are already 
beginning to become onerous because of commitments in respect of the payment of interest and 
amortization. 
Finally, efforts were made during 1981 to achieve a bigger inflow of foreign exchange through 
the export of goods and services such as the provision of construction and technical assistance 
services to other developing countries, as already mentioned (although in some cases these 
services are provided as donations), and by increasing tourism. Although no detailed data are 
available on the inflow of foreign currency from the latter activity, the official statistics on the 
number of tourists visiting the country allow it to be calculated that they generated more than 200 
million Cuban pesos in income.16 
4. Prices and wages 
In line with the policy laid down under the System of Management of the Economy, a general 
reform of wages began to be applied in the second half of 1980 and its principal effects became 
widespread in 1981. Furthermore, some imbalances which had gradually been manifesting 
themselves led the authorities to make plans for a reform of wholesale prices, and this was carried 
out in early 1981. Finally, in line with these two reforms, reform of retail prices was begun at the 
end of 1981 so as to compensate in part for the increase in costs caused by the former. 
The general wage reform applied in the second half of 1980 had been adopted with the aim of 
promoting increased productivity, to which end wages were based essentially on the quantity and 
quality of work done. Among the main measures applied was an increase of 10% in the minimum 
wage and the improvement of the system of monetary incentives in accordance with production 
norms, some of them of an individual nature and others designed to optimize collective work. In 
other words, it was aimed to stimulate increased productivity on the part of the worker in two 
ways: at the personal level and at the level of the group of workers in an enterprise. Part of the 
latter incentive goes to a fund which is subsequently distributed on an individual basis, while 
another part is added to funds of the enterprise set aside for the execution of social projects for the 
benefit of its workers. On the basis of official data, it may be estimated that the latter reform 
increased the nominal average wage by 14% during 1981 (from 148 to 168 pesos per month). 
In general, domestic prices had remained valid since 1965 (and some of them even since 
1959), since a large percentage of them had been frozen. In view of the policy of rationing the 
supply of essential goods in order to ensure that they reach the entire population, many articles 
were sold at two considerably different prices. In all cases, except that of the products distributed 
more recently through free peasant markets, marketing was centralized and was the direct 
responsibility of the State, the difference between the two prices for a given product being 
transferred to government funds. The application of a policy of differential prices for many 
products of mass consumption and the increases in prices of inputs purchased abroad, however, 
caused serious imbalances in the finances of many production units which made the application of 
the system of management of the economy more difficult. Moreover, the fact that the prices of a 
number of products had been frozen since 1965 "disguised" the savings of enterprises. 
Consequently, among the reforms to the system of managing the economy it became clear 
that it was necessary to make some significant changes in the system of wholesale prices, and these 
changes began to be put into effect in January 1981. This reform was begun by fixing a realistic 
price for petroleum products which was very close to that prevailing on the world market. Because 
of the high incidence of this input in production in general, a new list of wholesale prices was 
16In 1981 tourism amounted to 2.4 million tourist/days: a figure 3% higher than that for 1980, which in its turn had 
been 11 % more than the year before. 
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prepared for the basic products of industry, agriculture and construction, and new tariffs were fixed 
for the transport of freight. 
During almost the whole of 1981, however, efforts were made not to transfer these increases 
to retail prices, and the prices of goods were kept frozen both in the system of rationing and in the 
parallel State markets. Nevertheless, with the consolidation of the system of distributing some 
goods through the free peasant markets already referred to, the consumer prices of the products 
sold there rose spontaneously to some extent, considerably increasing the income of those selling 
them. In these circumstances, on 15 December 1981 the reform of retail prices was begun, the 
main effects of which would naturally be felt in 1982. These reforms included changes in the prices 
of approximately 150 products: for example, the price of gasoline was raised from 18 to 32 
centavos per litre; that of boneless beef was increased from 42 to 73 centavos per pound; rationed 
milk went up from 20 to 25 centavos per litre, while the prices of all the products not subject to 
State distribution were frozen (for example, unrationed milk was kept at 80 centavos per litre).17 
No information is available on the average increase in wholesale and retail prices during the 
year. It may be assumed, however, that this increase was quite substantial in the case of the former 
but very slight in the case of the latter, since, as already noted, the reform of retail prices only began 
to be applied in the last days of the year, and even then to only a limited number of rationed 
products, albeit important ones, while the prices of products not distributed by the State were 
frozen. On the basis of official data, the variation during the year in the implicit prices used in the 
calculation of the material product was of the order of 9%, which represents a new phenomenon in 
Cuba.18 
17In Cuba, distribution of goods to the consumer is carried out by the State, except for part of the agricultural 
production —of minor overall significance— which is distributed through the free peasant markets. 
L8In view of the special characteristics of a centrally planned economy, this figure should be viewed with some caution, 
since it is not possible to infer from this item of information an approximate estimate of the variation in retail prices, as can 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The year 1981 marked a turning point in the recent history of the Chilean economy. It began 
with the expectation that the rapid economic growth of previous years would continue, and this 
expectation lasted in general for the first half of the year. During the following months, however, 
the signs that the economy had entered a recessive phase began to become more numerous, and by 
the end of 1981 it was evident that the contraction in economic activity and employment would be 
both far-reaching and difficult to overcome. Thus, although the economic growth rate of over 5 % 
was one of the highest registered in Latin America, it was due almost exclusively to the big 
expansion in the first half of the year, since in the last months of 1981 economic activity barely 
increased at all, while the rate of unemployment rose sharply. This abrupt transition from positive 
changes to others of a negative nature, not only as regards the evolution of the product but in 
almost all the main indicators —be they real or financial, effective results or expectations— was 
without doubt the most striking feature of the evolution of the Chilean economy in 1981. 
For many, this change came as a surprise, for 1981 opened with promising signs: firstly, 
economic activity had been growing at an average rate of almost 8.5 % for the last four years 
(although the growth rate was much less impressive —only 3.8%— if measured from 1974); 
secondly, inflation was clearly going down, and in 1980 a fiscal surplus had been obtained for the 
second year running, while finally the unemployment rate —although still very high— showed 
signs of slowly giving way in the face of the steady growth of the economy and, above all, the boom 
in the construction sector. Thus, the main macroeconomic variables seemed to be either under 
control or else evolving in the right direction (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The most important thing, perhaps, was that it seemed that the economy had already 
managed to absorb the potentially disruptive effects which were initially to be expected from the 
liberalization of the system of prices, the trade and financial openness, the creation of a capital 
market, the reduction in size and reorientation of the economic role of the State, and other 
structural changes associated with the new development strategy. The productive, and above all 
the distributive, cost of these changes had undoubtedly been high. At the end of 1980, however, 
even the distributive indicators showed signs of recovery: total wages were growing more rapidly 
than the product, the Government was increasing its expenditure in the social area, and such 
important indexes of social well-being as infant mortality and the percentage of undernourished 
children —aspects on which the Government had concentrated its efforts— showed steady and 
significant progress. 
There was, it was true, no lack of critical attitudes which cast doubts, for example, on the 
solidity of the economic expansion and especially the possibilities for future growth, in view of the 
low coefficient of fixed investment which had been registered from 1974 onwards. At the end of 
1980, however, the most serious doubt concerned the external balance, for in that year the growth 
rate of the value of imports had not only been very high (36%) but had also considerably exceeded 
that of exports. As at the same time there had been a sharp rise in net remittances of interest and 
profits, the current account deficit had exceeded US$ 2 billion —equivalent to one-third of the 
total value of exports of goods and services—, and although this deficit had been more than 
financed by the large net inflow of capital, this had involved an increase of almost 32 % in the gross 
external indebtedness (see table 1). 
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As the net international reserves had also risen considerably, however, to the equivalent of 
close on 60% of the value of imports of goods and services, and as exports of goods and services 
had increased at the very high rate of 29%, it was possible to argue that the concern over the 
external imbalance was relatively unfounded and even that, far from representing a problem, the 
growing balance-of-payments current account deficit was rather a sympton of the powerful 
growth of the economy, which was naturally attracting foreign capital desirous of participating in 
the profits generated by the rapid and continuous expansion of economic activity. 
Table 1 
CHILE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade 
Current value of exports of 
goods and services 
Current value of imports of 
goods and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Real wages and salaries 
Rate of unemployment' 
Greater Santiago 
Nation-wide 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government' 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in net international 
reserves 
General external debt (gross) 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Percentage. 
Growth of public sector income and expenditure as a whole in 1981. 
'Surplus. 
Excluding variation in reserves due to revaluation of gold. 
^Including variation in reserves due to revaluation of gold. 
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Finally, the downward trend in domestic interest rates —which had dropped from 39% to 
12% in real terms between 1977 and 1980— and the belief that the growing openness to external 
finance would cause them to keep on dropping also helped to explain why the expectations of most 
of the economic agents were very positive at the beginning of 1981. 
These expectations gradually changed to an increasingly marked degree, however, as the 
economy suffered a series of impacts —financial to start with and real afterwards— and the 
evolution of the main macroeconomic indicators visibly deteriorated. 
The first of these unexpected impacts was the trebling, as from the first quarter, of real 
interest rates (from 12% annually the previous year to almost 39% in 1981). This very sharp rise, 
which was at first interpreted as only transitory but which subsequently lasted throughout the year, 
helped to discourage investment and greatly increased the financial costs of enterprises, many of 
which were already highly indebted. 
A second event which unfavourably affected expectations was the bankruptcy in May of the 
important sugar refining firm Compañía Refinería de Azúcar de Viña del Mar (CRAV), 
considered till then as one of the soundest enterprises in the country. An even more serious feature 
than the loss of US$ 75 million caused by this bankruptcy to the creditor banks was the fact that it 
adversely affected the image of responsibility and efficiency enjoyed at that time by the Chilean 
banking sector abroad, since it was revealed that part of the banks' loans, instead of being used to 
finance CRAV's industrial operations, had been employed in risky speculative buying of sugar on 
the futures markets. In view of this, the inflow of foreign capital dropped sharply while the foreign 
banks took steps to make sure that the Chilean banking system could satisfactorily meet the very 
large external loans it had received in previous years, which did not carry any State guarantee. 
Although after a little while the flow of external capital was resumed and even subsequently 
reached a record level for 1981 as a whole, the CRAV episode highlighted the fact that the Chilean 
banks, and through them a large part of the productive system, depended very directly on the 
continuity and stability of these capital movements, so that any interruption or reduction of them 
could seriously compromise the evolution of domestic economic activity. 
Thirdly, as a result both of the very sharp increase in domestic demand and the low level of the 
exchange rate, plus the big inflow of foreign loans, imports grew at a staggering rate, especially in 
the first half of the year. As at the same time the volume of exports stagnated, while the price of 
copper and other export products went down markedly and net payments of interest went up, the 
current account deficit rose extraordinarily fast. Thus, within the first half of the year the deficit 
had already exceeded the very high total registered the year before, and at the end of 1981 it came to 
close onUS$ 4 900 million, equivalent to nearly 90% of the value of exports of goods and services. 
Consequently, it was already obvious in mid-1981 that the current account deficit would 
represent a serious problem and that it was the reflection of a serious imbalance in the country's 
external economic relations rather than the mere accounting result of a heavy net inflow of foreign 
capital. Indeed, by this time it was already beginning to be evident that the maintenance of an 
abundant net inflow of foreign credit, far from being a symptom of the favourable expectations 
regarding the future evolution of the economy, had become an indispensable —but not 
sufficient— condition for preventing the economy from falling into a profound recession. 
It was against the background of this already quite gloomy situation that in November the 
Superintendent of Banks stepped in to take control of eight financial establishments, among them 
four banks whose loans represented around 25% of the total private bank credit in national 
currency. This intervention was stated to be justified by the fact tha the weakness of the financial 
situation of these establishments raised fears that they would go bankrupt and cause a possible run 
on the banks. In order to avoid this happening, the Central Bank guaranteed the deposits by both 
persons and enterprises and the loans which the eight financial establishments in question had 
received from foreign banks. 
The cost of this crisis was considerable. To start with, the Central Bank had to use up 
approximately US$ 600 million to settle the problem. Even more important, however, was the 
fact that this crisis revealed the unsound commercial practices of certain Chilean banks, among 
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Figure 1 
CHILE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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them the practices of concentrating on loans to enterprises belonging or linked to the same 
economic group which owned the bank, and granting loans without sufficient guarantees. Partly 
because of these practices and partly because of the unusually high financial costs caused by the 
high real interest rates, the bad debts recognized by the banks doubled during 1981, and at the end 
of the year amounted to almost 30% of their capital and reserves. Finally, although the decision of 
the Central Bank to cover the debts of the financial establishments taken over —which were not 
guaranteed by the State— restored the confidence of foreign banks to some extent, the latter 
nevertheless changed their attitude to Chilean private banks, and this change helped to reduce the 
inflow of capital in the final months of the year, so that in the last quarter the international 
reserves went down for the first time since 1975. 
To sum up, although on the whole 1981 showed positive results in some of the main 
indicators —the product grew by over 5%, inflation dropped to less than 10% (the lowest level in 
the last 20 years), and the average rate of unemployment went down to its lowest level since 
1974— these figures, except in the case of inflation, were the result of the advances made in the 
first six months of the year, since from mid-year onwards the trends in economic activity were 
abruptly reversed. Thus, the proportion of unemployed in Greater Santiago, which had gone down 
steadily from 16.5% in March 1979 to 9% injune 1981, rose to 10.5% in September and 13.5% in 
December. At the same time, as is clearly shown in table 2, there was a dramatic fall in issues of 
import permits for capital goods and construction permits. These changes were also accompanied 
by a drop of almost 8% in the value of exports (the first since 1975), a drastic deterioration in the 
terms of trade (which dropped to their lowest level for over half a century), and an increase of the 
order of 60% in net external indebtedness. 
Thus, the year closed with a highly unfavourable state of affairs characterized by the 
stagnation of economic activity, a significant rise in unemployment, an appreciable level of 
external imbalance, and a severe crisis in the financial system. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
During 1981, the total supply of goods and services grew sharply for the fourth year running. 
Thus, after having recovered in 1977 from the enormous decline suffered in 1975, it grew at an 
average rate of 8.8% in the following three years and expanded by 9% in 1981 (see table 2). 
As had already happened in the previous four years, but this time much more markedly, the 
most dynamic component in supply was the volume of imports, whose growth rate (31 %) was six 
times that of the product. The exceptional growth in the volume of external purchases was also 
reflected in the substantial further increase in the import coefficient —which thus reached its 
highest level since the war— and still more so in the astoundingly high level of the marginal 
propensity to import. Thus, in 1981 the increase in absolute terms in the volume of imports was 
almost equal to the gross domestic product and was equivalent to half of total domestic demand. 
Domestic demand, for its part, also registered a notable increase of nearly 11%, which was 
above the already high rates registered in the previous three years and was only below the level of 
13.5% recorded in 1977, which was the year when the recovery from the 1974-1975 crisis reached 
its culmination. This increase in domestic demand was concentrated in the first half of the year 
when —as already noted— the expectations regarding the future evolution of the economy were 
still very favourable. 
The growth of domestic demand was very intense both in the case of investment and of 
private consumption, with the latter increasing by over 12%, stimulated mainly by the increase in 
real take-home pay. 
Gross fixed capital formation, for its part, which had increased by over 22% in 1980 after 
having recovered in 1979 from a drop suffered in the period 1975-1976, grew by 15.5% in 1981. 
This considerable increase took place in spite of the sharp decline in the building of new houses in 
the second half of the year and the extraordinarily high level of real interest rates throughout the 
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year. The increase registered gives an idea of the high level of demand in the first part of the year as 
well as of the important influence of expectations and the changes in them on the evolution of that 
demand. 
Because of the extraordinarily severe drop suffered by capital formation during the crisis of 
the mid-1970s, however, and in spite of its rapid growth over the last four years, the coefficient of 
gross fixed investment was only just over 14% and still did not recover the level which it had had at 
the end of the 1960s.1 Moreover, the increase in investment was accompanied in 1981 by a 
considerable drop in national saving, which went down by around 40%, so that it financed only a 
little over one-third of the gross capital formation: a proportion equivalent to only a little over half 
of that registered the year before.2 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
As in the previous four years, the growth rate of the sectors producing internationally 
tradeable goods (agriculture, fisheries, mining and manufacturing) was lower in 1981 than that of 
activities producing non-tradeable goods and services. The joint product of the latter increased by 
almost 7%, due above all to the vigorous growth of construction. In contrast, the growth of the 
sectors producing tradeable goods did not even amount to 3%, so that their share in the total 
product went down to the lowest level registered since at least I960. There was a particularly 
marked decline in the growth rate of manufacturing, which, after expanding at a rate of almost 8% 
in 1979 and over 6% in 1980, grew by only 2.6% in 1981 (see table 3). 
Table 2 
CHILE: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 




Exports of goods and services 
Millions of dollars 


















































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Chile. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLA for the purpose. 
•The figure quoted comes from figures on gross fixed investment expressed in dollars at 1970 prices. It should be 
noted, however, that according to the new national accounts prepared by the Central Bank for the period 1960-1980, in 
which the series at constant values are expressed in 1977 pesos, the investment coefficients are considerably higher. 
According to this source, gross fixed capital formation represented 19.5% of the gross domestic product in 1981. 
Nevertheless, even in this series this coefficient was slightly lower in that year than in the period 1968-1970. See Banco 
Central de Chile, Cuentas Nacionales de Chile, 1960-1980, Santiago, Chile, tables 8 and 44. 
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CHILE: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fisheries 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade 
restaurants and hotels' 
Financial institutions, 
insurance, real estate and 
business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Less: Imputed bank services 
Plus: Import taxes 
Millions of doll 




















































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Chile. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
'Excluding restaurants and hotels. 
Thus, paradoxically, since the inception of the policy of greater trade openness to the exterior 
in the mid-1970s, the activities which have grown most have been producing non-tradeable goods 
and services, whereas the share in the total product of the sectors producing exportable goods 
(agriculture, mining and fisheries), while making a recovery from the very low levels recorded 
between 1971 and 1973, was still somewhat lower in the period 1978-1981 that it had been in the 
1960s. 
(i) Agriculture. After recovering in 1979 from the 5 % decline suffered the previous year and 
growing by almost 2% in 1980, the agricultural product increased by 2.2% in 1981.3 As in the 
previous year, this increase was due principally to the expansion in livestock and fruit production 
and took place in spite of the decline registered yet again in the harvests of most of the traditional 
crops. The value of the output of the latter at constant prices, which had already gone down by close 
to 10% in 1980, went down by almost 4% in 1981. In the latter year, however, in contrast with 
what happened in 1980, when the smaller harvests were due fundamentally to the marked and 
almost generalized drop in yields, the primary cause of the 1981 decline was the reduction in the 
area cultivated. This decreased by almost 13%, mainly because of the smaller areas sown in the case 
of most of the cereals and some pulses and the drastic reduction in the area sown with sunflowers 
and rape (see table 4). 
'These rates are different from those given in table 3 because in the latter "agriculture" includes fisheries, whose 
product increased by 14.4% in 1979, 7.5% in 1980 and 13.7% in 1981. 
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Because of the contraction in the area sown and, to a lesser extent, the drop in yields, there was 
a very sharp drop in the harvests of all cereals except rice and maize. This drop was particularly 
acute in the case of wheat, output of which was the lowest for over half a century.4 The drops in 
production were even more pronounced in the case of sunflowers and rape —products whose 
cultivation was discouraged by the considerable drop in 1980 in the world prices of edible oils— 
and also in the case of all pulses except beans. 
The harvest of the latter item registered a spectacular increase of 64%, attributable almost 
entirely to the improved yields, as a result of which a record output was achieved. The same 
occurred in the case of maize, the output of which increased by 28% and thus exceeded half a 
million tons for the first time. During the year, there was also a considerable increase in the output 
Table 4 
CHILE: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 



























































































































































































































































































































Source: National Statistical Institute (INE). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Millions of pesos at 1974 prices. 
'Thousands of tons. 
Thousands of hectares. 
4
 The previous lowest harvest, corresponding to 1973, was almost 9% larger than that of 1981. The latter, for its part, 




CHILE: INDICATORS OF FRUIT-GROWING ACTIVITY 



























































































































































































































































































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Planning Office (ODEPA). 
"Preliminary figures. 
of potatoes —which was only slightly below the 1974 record— while the sugar beet harvest more 
than trebled. This exceptional increase was encouraged by the considerable rise registered in the 
world price of sugar at the time of planting sugar beet, which led producers to increase the area 
sown with this crop by over 230%. Even so, because of the repeated very large decreases which had 
taken place in the production of sugar beet in the previous three years, its output in 1981 was still 
one-third lower than in the period 1976-1977, when harvests of over 2.2 million tons were 
achieved. 
As in 1980, the decline in the production of most of the traditional crops contrasted with the 
progress shown once more by fruit production. Thus, during 1981 there was an increase in the 
harvest of all the main types of fruit except apricots, peaches, lemons and olives. There were 
particularly marked increases in the output of table grapes and apples: both crops which enjoy 
significant comparative advantages and which continue to account for the bulk of the value of fruit 
exports. Production of table grapes rose by 43%, while that of apples increased by close to 22%, 
and thanks to these increases and the also considerable rises registered in the previous three years, 
apple production doubled between 1977 and 1981, while that of table grapes increased by around 
75% (see table 5). 
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At the same time, the area of new fruit plantations continued to expand rapidly, especially 
those for the production of cherries, plums and table grapes. Nevertheless, the increase of 
approximately 24 000 hectares in absolute terms in the area of fruit plantations between 1974 and 
1981 was only equivalent to a quarter of the drop of 96 000 hectares suffered over the same period 
of time by the area sown with the 14 traditional crops. 
In 1981 there was also faster growth of the stock-raising sector, which contributes about one-
third of the total value of agricultural activity. Total meat production, which had increased by 7.5 % 
in 1980, rose by almost 15% in 1981. A decisive influence in this expansion was the increase of 
close to 14% in cattle slaughtering (which had gone down in an almost uninterrupted manner in 
the previous five years); the marked expansion recorded once again in the production of poultry 
meat (with the result that, after having gone down steadily between 1970 and 1977, it has almost 
trebled over the last six years) ; and the substantial increase registered for the fifth consecutive year 
in the production of pig meat (which exceeded for the first time the high level previously reached 
in the period 1972-1974).? The expansion of the livestock farming sector was also aided by the 
substantial increases registered, as in 1980, in production of milk and eggs (see table 6). 
Table 6 
CHILE: INDICATORS OF LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 









Source: Beef, pigmeat and mutton: National Statistical Institute (INE); other livestock items: Agricultural Planning 
Office (ODEPA). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands of tons. 
cMillions of litres. 
Millions of units. 
Table 7 
CHILE: REAFFORESTED AREA 
(Thousands of hectares) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
Total 28.0 31.0 30.3 56.2 82.6 107.7 93.2 79.0 52.2 72.3 92.2 
National 









































































enterprise 11.4 6.3 2.9 21.1 38.5 53.6 48.6 54.0 51.7 72.1 92.1 
Source: National Forestry Corporation (CONAF). 
"Preliminary figures. 
5
 During this period, the average annual production of pig meat was slightly over 50 000 tons, but this went down very 
















































































































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Crop-farming and Livestock Service (SAG). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 
cThousands of tons. 
Thousands of tons of finished product. 
'Includes output of factory ships. 
Includes dried, salted, smoked and dehydrated products. 
Finally, in 1981 there was an increase of more than 27% in the area of new or replacement 
timber plantations, another activity which enjoys marked competitive advantages. The area 
afforested during the year thus once again exceeded 90 000 hectares, which was close to the record 
areas afforested in the period 1976-1977. Unlike those years, however, when the contributions of 
the State sector and private enterprise were almost equal, in 1981 almost all the area planted 
corresponded to the private sector (see table 7). 
(ii) Fisheries. In 1981 the strong expansion of fishery activity continued for the sixth 
consecutive year. Thus, after having doubled between 1975 and 1979 and increasing 7.5% in 1980, 
the fisheries domestic product grew by close to 14% in 1981 (see table 8). 
As in previous years, the main factors responsible for this growth were fishing for industrial 
processing and the production of fishmeal. These two activities increased by around 20%, with the 
result that both have doubled their production over the last three years. The catching of fish for 
fresh consumption increased even more rapidly, since it almost doubled and thus more than made 
up for the decline in the previous year. In contrast, there was a sharp decline in 1981 in the shellfish 
catch and canning. 
(iii) Mining. After growing at an average rate of rather more than 5.5% in the previous two 
years, the mining product rose by 3.6% in 1981, which can be considered a relatively satisfactory 
result bearing in mind the decline suffered in 1981 by the international prices of most minerals. 
Indeed, with the exception of fisheries, mining was the tradeable goods-producing activity which 
grew most rapidly in 1981, due partly to the smaller relative incidence of variable costs in its total 
costs and the lower sensitivity of mining to situations of exchange rate lags such as that 
experienced by the economy in 1981. 
As in the previous three years, the mining product grew in spite of the fact that copper 
production —the most important branch of the sector— was only sluggish, growing by only a little 
over 1% after having almost stagnated between 1977 and 1980 (see table 9). As had already 

















medium and small-scale mining activity, the output of which increased by almost 15%, mainly 
because of the beginning of operations at the Compañía Minera Pudahuel mine, located near 
Santiago. In contrast, the copper production of the large-scale mining industry went down slightly 
for the third time in the last four years and was only the same as the output achieved in 1977. This 
stagnation was basically the result of the low level of investments made during this period in the 
mines belonging to the Chilean Copper Corporation. 
During 1981 the production of iron ore and nitrates likewise virtually stagnated. The nitrates 
industry was also affected by the flagging growth rate of iodine extraction —which had increased 
rapidly in the previous five years— and the drop of almost 17% in the production of sodium 
sulphate. The iron ore industry, for its part, which had recovered to some extent in 1979 and 1980, 
stagnated in 1981 as a result of the opposing trends registered by iron ore mining —which 
decreased by close to 4% — and the production of pellets, which grew by almost 3 %, although even 
so this rate was well below that achieved in the previous two years.. 
In contrast with the evolution of these branches of mining, 1981 saw the continuation for the 
third consecutive year of the vigorous growth of gold and silver production and petroleum 
extraction, while the output of molybdenum and coal increased considerably. 
Coal production, which had already increased markedly in 1980, grew by a little over 14% in 
1981. Nevertheless, these increases represented only a partial recovery from the prolonged 
Table 9 























































































































































Source: Copper: Chilean Copper Corporation: State Department of Mines; iron ore: National Statistical Institute; coal: 
National Coal Corporation; Nitrates, iodine and sodium sulphate: Chilean Chemical Corporation; petroleum: 
National Petroleum Corporation; Molybdenum: State Department of Mines and National Statistical Institute; 
gold and silver: National Statistical Institute (INE). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 
'Thousands of tons. 
Thousands of gross tons. 
Tons . 
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ndexes (1969 = 100) Growth rates 



























































































Source: Industrial product: National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) ; industrial output: National Statistical Institute (INE) 
and Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA); industrial sales: Sociedad de Fomento Fabril. 
"Preliminary figures, 
Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 
process of contraction suffered by the coal industry for about the last 30 years, which was sharply 
accentuated in 1978 and 1979-6 
In contrast, the 12% increase in molybdenum production represented a resumption of the 
strong growth process begun in 1974, which only slackened in 1979 and, above all, in 1980. The 
substantial increases in the extraction of silver, and especially gold, likewise represented the 
continuation of relatively recent but very intensive processes of expansion which were stimulated 
by the very big increases in the international prices of these metals between 1977 and 1980. Thus, 
both gold and silver mining achieved record production levels, and in fact gold extraction in 1981 
was well over three times that achieved only two years before, with its value exceeding 
US$ 100 million for the first time.7 
As in the previous two years, however, the most significant advance achieved in the mining 
sector was the further considerable increase in petroleum production, which rose by over 24% 
after having grown by 60% in 1980 and almost 30% in 1979. As a result of this, petroleum 
extraction has increased by a factor of 2.4 in the space of only three years and the proportion of the 
total demand for crude supplied by national petroleum production has risen from 20% to 45%. 
(iv) Manufacturing. In 1981, the manufacturing sector declined into almost complete 
stagnation, for the growth rate of the industrial product, which was very high (8%) between 1976 
and 1979 (when industry recovered the level it had had before its sharp contraction in 1975) and 
which was still over 6% in 1980, dropped to only 2.6%. The loss of dynamism was even more 
marked according to the indexes of industrial production prepared by the National Statistical 
Institute and the Chilean Chamber of Industry, the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, for after 
registering increases of 6% and 4% respectively in 1980, these showed no growth whatever in 
1981 (see table 10). 
The stagnation of industrial production as a whole, however, concealed the different 
perfomances of the various manufacturing subsectors in 1981. Thus, while the production of items 
'Between 1950 and 1981, the highest production of coal was in 1952, when almost 2.5 million tons were mined. 
Subsequently, production declined almost without interruption, dropping below 2 million tons per year from 1958 onwards 
and sinking to less than 1.5 million tons since 1976. 
7The drop of about one-third in the international price of gold, however, absorbed at least half the higher income that 
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of everyday consumption, intermediate products for industry and intermediate goods for 
construction declined slightly and that of transport equipment dropped by nearly 14%, the output 
of consumer durables rose by over 10% and that of miscellaneous manufactured articles by over 
12%. 
The main unevenness shown by manufacturing in 1981, however, was its varying evolution 
over the course of the year. Thus, during the first half of the year industrial production continued to 
increase at a rate of rather more than 3%, but this growth rate slackened markedly in the third 
quarter and was drastically reversed in the last three months of the year, when industrial 
production fell by 8%. 
Although this performance reflected to some extent the effects of the greater competition 
from imported goods, its fundamental cause was the sharp change in expectations which took 
place, as already noted, towards the middle of 1981. 
Since the freezing of the exchange rate at the end of June 1979, the industrial sector had been 
suffering a gradual loss of competitiveness vis-a-vis imported manufactures, for because the rate of 
Chilean inflation was much higher than the rise in international prices during the period 1979-
1981, the costs of domestic production expressed in dollars rose considerably more than those of 
foreign products. Although by the end of 1981 domestic inflation had come into line with world 
inflation, so that industry was no longer losing competitiveness, the accumulated loss between 
mid-1979 and the first half of 1981 meant that the prices of foreign goods were much more 
favourable than before the freezing of the exchange rate. This is why the very marked increase in 
domestic spending in the first half of 1981 did not held to increase significantly the sales of 
domestic manufactures. In contrast, as already noted, the marginal propensity to import rose 
enormously, leading to considerable increases in imports of industrial goods, among them some 
goods for which there was abundant unused domestic production capacity. Thus, the production of 
some categories of manufactures such as textiles, clothing and footwear stagnated at similar levels 
to those registered during the 1975 slump, and it is estimated that they probably lost about one-
third of the market through competition from similar imported goods. Indeed, 13 categories of 
industrial production which in 1969 had had a share of 38% of total industrial production 
registered levels of output below those of 1979. Moreover, this underutilized capacity does not 
seem to have been due to lack of demand, as was the case in 1975, but rather to loss of 
competitiveness vis-a-vis imports. 
However, it was apparently the turnaround of expectations, and consequently of spending,, 
which was the primary cause of the drop in sales and production in the final months of the year. 
Perhaps the most enlightening example of this change was that which took place in the case of 
intermediate products for construction. During the first half of the year, the output of these grew 
at an annual rate of over 10%, but because of the rise in interest rates and the consequent 
stagnation of sales of buildings and dwellings, it went down by 3.5% in the third quarter and by 
over 20% in the last quarter. During this latter period there was also a slump in the production of 
transport equipment —which fell to only half the level of the same period of the previous year— 
while there was a slight decline in the production of consumer durables, which had expanded 
rapidly up to September. 
(v) Construction. The sector which reflected most clearly both the crisis of the mid-1970s and 
the subsequent economic recovery was construction. The drastic reduction in expenditure on 
public works and the drop in personal income which accompanied the stabilization policy in the 
period 1974-1976 reduced construction activity to a little over half what it had been at the 
beginning of the decade, while in contrast construction grew during the period of recovery almost 
as fast as it had fallen during the crisis. Thus, by the endof 1980 most of the sectoral indicators had 
returned to their levels of 1971, when the construction sector product was a record. 
This recovery took place in spite of three important limitations: (a) the sharp reduction in 
the role played by the public sector in housing construction; (b) the halving of the share of public 
works investment in the domestic product,8 and (c) the very high real interest rates, which even in 




1980, when the real cost of mortgage loans reached its lowest point (12% per year), stood at 
abnormally high levels by any standard of historical or international comparison. 
There were various reasons why the construction firms looked forward to a high level of 
activity in 1980: (a) the general view at the end of 1980 was that the economy would continue to 
grow rapidly; (b) it was felt that there was still a large demand for housing; (c) the Government 
had announced a housing construction target for the next 8 years which was more than double the 
past average, and (d) it was expected that real interest rates would continue to go down. 
Consequently, the purchase of building land was intensified and its prices rose at a dizzy rate, while 
there was also an increase in imports of machinery and equipment for construction. 
The growth rate of the sector was indeed very high. Thus, the construction product increased 
by over 16% and, like the area of housing and industrial and commercial buildings constructed, 
exceeded the previous historical maximum levels (see table 11). 
Construction firms were severely affected, however, by the behaviour of real interest rates, 
which, instead of going down as expected, rose sharply from the beginning of the year onwards. At 
first it was assumed that this increase would only be temporary, but it persisted and real interest 
rates fluctuated around 3% per month. As a result, expectations changed markedly, and in the 
second half of the year there was a very sharp slump in the number of new projects begun, to such a 
point that in the last quarter the number of housing starts was less than a quarter the level of the 
Table 11 







































2 272 1 6 7 6 3 136 4 297 5 118 12.5 35.7 37.0 19.1 
Construction product 
Building materials 
Deliveries of cement 
for the domestic market' 
Deliveries of round 
bars for construction 
Index of real sales of 
intermediate goods for 101.4 116.6 144.9 151.2 148.4 21.2 31.3 4.4 -1.9 
construction (1969 = 100) 
Building 
Total area 









Source: Construction product: ECLA, on the basis of data provided by the National Planning Office; building materials; 
Instituto Chileno del Cemento, Instituto Chileno del Acero, Sociedad de Fomento Fabril; building: National 
Statistical Institute (INE). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 
'Millions of bags. 
Thousands of tons. 




































































CHILE: IMPORT LICENSES FOR CAPITAL GOODS AND AUTOMOBILES, 
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first two quarters of the year (see figure 2). As a result of this drastic change, the rate of 
unemployment in the construction sector, which had been going down almost without 
interruption in Greater Santiago from 33% in March 1979 to 9% in June 1981, rose abruptly and 
trebled between that month and December. 
The reason why this radical turnabout in construction trends was not more clearly reflected in 
the overall figures for the year was due partly to the fact that work continued on many buildings 
which had already been begun, since it seemed more appropriate to complete them than to leave 
them unfinished. This, together with the very sharp drop in sales, caused an increase in the 
demand for credit by the construction firms, which hoped thus to be able to hold out until better 
times returned. As certain subsequent events were to show, however, this growing indebtedness at 
such high real interest rates was bound in the long run to have an adverse effect not only on the 
solvency of the construction firms, but also that of the banking institutions which financed them. 
(c) Developments in the employment situation 
After the profound decline which it suffered during the 1974-1976 crisis, productive 
employment had been recovering very slowly. Thus, over the six-year period 1975-1980, the 
number of employed persons other than those participating in the Minimum Employment Plan 
(PEM) grew by less than 6%, i.e., less than 1% per year, while the labour force increased at an 
average rate of around 2.5 %. Even between 1977 and 1980, when the gross domestic product rose 
it in incog me of i t [ SI peí JHI, nutqnnt U f e ike m) a M 4 . y . 
over 3.6% per year. Thus, even in these conditions of rapid economic expansion, the effective rate 
of unemployment (i.e., including the PEM) went down only marginally (see table 12). 
Nevertheless, thanks in particular to the construction boom, the rate of unemployment had 
begun to go down in 1980. Thus, in Greater Santiago the proportion of persons without work was 
on average almost 2 percentage points lower during that year than in 1979, and as only half a 
percentage point of this was attributable to the increase of the PEM, the effective rate of 
unemployment in the capital registered its most significant decline since the beginning of the 
recovery period (see tables 13 and 14). 
Table 12 
CHILE: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT A N D THE 










































































































Source: For labour force, employed and unemployed: ODEPLAN estimates based on data of the National Statistical 
Institute, presented in Exposición sobre el Estado de la Hacienda Pública, Ministry of Finance, Santiago, 
October 1982. For Minimum Employment Plan, data of the National Statistical Institute (INE). 
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Table 13 
CHILE: UNEMPLOYMENT IN GREATER SANTIAGO 
(Percentages) 
Annual averages 
Total rate of unemployment 
Departament of Economics of 
the University of Chile 
National Statistical 
Institute 
Overall rate of unemployment 
among the established 
labour force (i.e., excluding 
persons seeking work for 




Government and financial 
services 
Personal and household 
services 





1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
5.5 3.8 4.6 9.7 16.2 16.8 13.2 14.0 13.6 11.8 11.1 
4.3 3.2 4.8 9.7 15.0 17.0 13-9 13.8 13.4 11.8 9-0 
4.2 2.8 3.2 6.7 11.9 12.6 99 10.5 10.1 8.7 8.5 
4.8 3.3 3.5 7.6 14.8 15.5 11.8 11.8 13.1 
16.0 8.2 6.9 13.0 31.6 34.1 28.7 23.5 24.5 
2.8 2.2 3.1 5.3 9.1 9-7 7.4 8.8 8.3 
1.3 0.5 2.0 3.3 5.8 6.5 6.0 7.5 5.4 
3.0 1.9 2.6 7.5 12.5 13.7 8.5 10.8 8.9 
3.1 2.4 2.0 4.3 6.1 6.0 6.8 7.0 5.9 
2.7 2.2 2.4 4.5 7.4 8.3 6.7 8.0 7.5 
7.4 4.7 5.2 10.9 20.6 20.7 16.3 16.5 16.0 



















Source: Department of Economics of the University of Chile and National Statistical Institute (INE). 
Table 14 
CHILE: MINIMUN EMPLOYMENT PLAN 
Number of participants" 
Total 
Metropolitan Region 
Rest of country 
Monthly allowance paid 
Nominal 
Realc 




































Source: National Statistical Institute (INE). 
"Thousands. 
Pesos. 
'Pesos at December 1978 prices, on the basis of the corrected consumer price index given in table 23 below. 
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The improvement in the employment situation continued during the first half of 1981, when 
the total number of participants in the PEM went down markedly and the rate of unemployment in 
Greater Santiago dropped below 10% for the first time since December 1974. 
This tendency was abruptly reversed, however, in the second part of the year as a result of the 
sharp drops in spending and production. Thus, in the capital the proportion of persons without 
work rose from 9% in June to 10.5% in September and 13.5% in December (see figure 3). The 
change was also very noticeable in the other urban centres of the country, in all of which, except 
those of the first four (northernmost) regions, the rates of unemployment in September were well 
over those of March and were, without exception, higher than in Santiago (see table 15). 
Thus, even though on average the unemployment rates (regardless of whether or not the 
members of the PEM are included in the calculations) in 1981 were the lowest since 1974, the year 
nevertheless ended with a dramatic employment situation. In December 1981 the number of 
unemployed in Greater Santiago came to over 160 000: the highest figure registered since March 
1976. The unemployment rate in manufacturing was 17%, while that in construction was 27%, 
and altogether one out of every five workers was without a job. Moreover, around 170 000 persons 
were registered in the PEM, but the purchasing power of the allowance paid by this programme 
suffered a further drop of 15% in 1981, so that in real terms it was equivalent to only 36% of what 
it had been in 1975 (see table 14). 
3. The external sector 
(a) Main trends 
One of the most serious doubts which arose at the beginning of 1981 regarding the future 
evolution of the Chilean economy centered on its external imbalance, particularly as the previous 
year the current account deficit had increased by 68% and had for the first time exceeded US$ 2 
billion. 
For many observers, this was due to the "exchange rate lag" which had begun to be generated 
since the freezing of the exchange rate at 39 pesos per dollar in mid-1979- This measure actually 
symbolized a wager on the successful achievement of the central objectives which it was aimed to 
reach through such exchange policy, ranging from the achievement of a reasonable degree of 
external balance (elimination of balance-of-payments problems) to the attainment of greater 
progress in one of the indicators of the domestic balance (stability of price levels). The exchange 
rate had in fact been used between 1974 and 1978 as the main instrument for securing balance-of-
payments equilibrium, and this objective was largely achieved, thanks mainly to the extraordinary 
growth of non-traditional exports. From mid-1979 onwards, however, exchange policy had been 
used as a direct means of facilitating the reduction of the rate of inflation. According to this new 
approach, the external balance would be achieved in the short term through the net inflow of 
capital and, in the long term, through the depreciation (or appreciation) of the currency resulting 
from the differences between domestic and external inflation rates. In view of the fact that, after 
the fixing of the exchange rate, the rate of inflation did not adjust immediately to this but, on the 
contrary, rose immediately after the devaluation and slackened only gradually in the course of 
1980, this led to a significant reduction in the real exchange rate and, ultimately, in the relative 
prices of tradeable goods (see table 16 and and figure 4). The consequent deterioration of the 
international competitiveness of domestic products was one of the main reasons for the 
accentuation in the current account deficit during that year. 
The supporters of the exchange policy, however, argued that this deficit was not a major 
problem, since it had been more than financed by the net inflow of capital, which had amounted to 
over US$ 3 300 million in 1980 and helped to produce a considerable surplus on the global balance 
of payments. 
Nevertheless, a considerable part of this capital had been attracted by the combination of high 
nominal domestic interest rates (of the order of 4% per month) and the fixed exchange rate. This 
combination made external indebtedness very attractive to domestic debtors, since as long as the 
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exchange parity remained unchanged and the domestic rate of inflation was higher than the rate of 
interest charged on the loans in foreign currency, the cost of these loans was negative in terms of 
pesos. Moreover, the advances and growing solidity apparently displayed by the Chilean economy 
compared with others meant that loans to Chilean firms seemed attractive to the international 
commercial banks 
In 1981, however, both the imbalance on the current account and the external indebtedness 
accelerated at an alarming rate. The first of these rose from a little over US$ 2 billion in 1980 to 
almost US$ 4 900 million in 1981, which was equivalent to close to 90% of the value of exports of 
goods and services and around 15% of the gross domestic product. At the same time, the net 
external debt, which had increased at a relatively moderate rate up to the previous year, rose by 
close to 60% in 1981. The seriousness of these exceptional increases was also aggravated by the 
fact that the value of exports dropped for the first time since 1975. 
Figure 3 
CHILE: QUARTERLY UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR GREATER SANTIAGO 
Unemployment rate 
(per cent) 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
































































































Source: Department of Economics of the University of Chile. 
Thus, by the end of 1981 there was no longer any doubt that there was a substantial external 
imbalance. In these circumstances, the discussions centered firstly about the question of whether 
the deficit was due mainly to exogenous factors (such as the rise in international interest rates or 
the drop in the price of copper) or to domestic economic policy measures (such as the maintenance 
of fixed exchange parity), and secondly about the most suitable measures that should be taken to 
tackle the imbalance. While some took the view that the problem could be solved by reducing the 
level of domestic prices and maintaining the exchange rate, others felt that it would be better to 
devalue. The great majority, at all events, acknowledged by this time that the Chilean peso was 
considerably overvalued. 
(b) External trade 
(i) Exports of goods. In 1981 there was an interruption in the rapid and persistent expansion 
which exports had been registering since 1976, for after increasing from US$ 2 100 million in the 
latter year to US$ 4 700 million in 1980, the value of external sales of goods dropped by almost 
16% in 1981. 
This decline was partly due to a slight reduction in the volume exported, which went down by 
a little over 1 % after having expanded at an average rate of almost 11 % during the previous eight 
years, but its main cause was the sharp drop (-15%) in the unit value of exports (see table 17). 
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The decline in the latter indicator, in its turn, mainly reflected the even greater drop (-20%) 
suffered by the average price of copper as a result of the international recession and, in particular, 
the sharp contraction suffered in the central countries in 1981 by the motor industry and housing 
construction, which are both activities using large quantities of this metal. The real price of copper 
thus dropped to its lowest level since at least I960, and this meant that its purchasing power had 
now been extremely low for the last six years (see table 18 and figure 5). Because of this decline 
and a drop of around 1 % in the volume exported, the value of external sales of copper fell by 2 3 % 
and thus represented only 43% of the total value of exports of goods (see table 19). 
During 1981 there were also considerable declines in the sales of all the other traditional 
products except iron ore. In the case of most of these products, these declines were due both to the 
lower world prices and to smaller volumes exported. 
Table 16 
CHILE: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE INDEXES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS" 
(1980= 100) 
Effective real exchange rate index for: 
Annual and 






























































































































Source: Statistical Appendix. 
"For a detailed explanation of the methodology used, see the introduction to the Statistical Appendix. 
The domestic products sub-index of the wholesale price index was used for purposes of deflation. 




CHILE: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES 
FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(1980 = 100) 






— Effective real exchange rate index for exports 50 
Deflated by domestic products components of consumer price index 
Deflated by corrected consumer price index 
Effective real exchange rate index for imports 
Deflated by domestic products components of consumer price index 
_ Deflated by corrected consumer price index 
J_ _L J_ J_ _L J_ J_ _L 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
333 
The most radical change, however, was that which took place in non-traditional exports, 
whose intensive and sustained growth had been one of the most positive features of the evolution 
of the economy since 1974. Their value had grown eightfold between that year and 1980, but in 
1981 it went down by 14% as a result of drops of 20% in the non-traditional exports of mining 
products and manufactures. Whereas the decline in the value of the former was due exclusively to 
the deterioration of international prices, the drop in the value of exports of industrial goods was 
due mainly to the smaller volumes exported. This decline was particularly significant since, on the 
one hand, non-traditional exports of manufactures had contributed over one-fifth of the total value 
of external sales of goods in 1980, while on the other, this reflected most directly the loss of 
international competitiveness caused by the drop in the real exchange rate. 
Non-traditional exports of agricultural and marine origin, in contrast, continued to increase, 
although their growth rate (7.5.%) was only a quarter of that registered on average in the previous 
three years. A decisive influence in their expansion was once more the increase in the value of 
exports of fresh fruit (especially grapes and apples), beans and fresh fish. 
(ii) Imports. Under the incentive of the extraordinary increase in domestic spending and the 
low level of real exchange rate, imports of goods increased rapidly for the fifth consecutive year. 
Their value, after recovering in 1977 the level which it had had before the 1.975-1976 crisis and 
subsequently increasing by 150% over the next three years, rose a further 20% in 1981. Unlike 
what had happened the previous year, however, when the rise of 30% in the value of imports had 
been due principally to the increase in their unit value, in 1981 the main cause was the expansion of 
their volume, which grew by 18%, thus making a total increase of almost 50% in the last three 
years.9 The rise in unit value, in contrast, was very moderate (1.5%) and was not only much 
smaller than the increase of around 23% registered in the previous two years but also the lowest 
since 1970 (see table 17). 
Table 17 
CHILE: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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Purchasing power of exports 


















































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
9The expansion of the volume of imports was naturally much greater (almost 140%) if we take the last five years. 
However, a considerable part of this increase represented the recovery from the sharp drop experienced in the period 1975-




CHILE: PRICE OF COPPER ON THE LONDON METAL EXCHANGE 


























































































Source: Central Bank of Chile, International Monetary Fund, and ECLA estimates. 
As in 1980, the component of imports which grew most rapidly was that consisting of 
consumer goods, the value of which registered a further considerable rise of 35% after having 
almost doubled in the course of only the two previous years, so that its share in the total value of 
imports of goods rose sharply to nearly 38%: an unusually high level in historic terms.10 The main 
reason for the sharp increase in external purchases of consumer goods was the exceptional rise in 
imports of automobiles, whose value, after having doubled between 1977 and 1980, doubled yet 
again in 1981 (see table 20). At the same time, imports of other non-food consumer goods 
continued to increase very rapidly (48%), so that their value increased almost fivefold over the last 
four years. In contrast, the value of external purchases of foodstuffs went down slightly in 1981. 
The growth rate of imports of capital goods also went down during the year. The value of 
these imports, which had gone up at an average rate of 35% in the previous three years and had 
continued its upward trend even in the first half of 1981, subsequently shrank drastically, so that 
the increase for the year as a whole was only 13% (see table 20 and figure 2). 
Imports of intermediate goods, in contrast, increased by 12%, which was only a little less than 
the year before. This somewhat lower growth rate was due firstly to the smaller imports of 
petroleum, the amount of which went down slightly for the second year running as a result of the 
rapid increase in domestic production, and secondly to the much smaller rise which took place in 
1981 in the prices of the goods imported. 
(iii) The terms of rade and the purchasing power of exports. In 1981 the terms of trade 
continued to deteriorate sharply. This occurred in spite of the fact that, thanks to the relative 
stabilization of the international price of petroleum, the drop in the world prices of many other 
basic commodities and the slight slackening of inflation in the main industrialized countries, the 
'"This share was below 30% in every year of the 1970s. 
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unit value of imports rose by only 1.5% after having increased at a rate of approximately 23% in 
the previous two years. The relief which this represented, however, was more than offset by the 
abrupt drop of nearly 15 % in the unit value of exports, mainly because of the even larger decline in 
the international price of copper. 
As a result of these changes, the terms of trade went down by almost 17%, which was the 
sharpest drop recorded since the 1975 crisis, when they dropped by 40% (see table 17). In 1981, 
the terms of trade thus sank to their lowest level since 1928, which is the first year for which 
comparable statistical data are available. The significance of this reduction becomes even clearer 
when we remember that it came on top of the considerable declines registered in three of the 
previous four years. Because of this, the average value of the terms of trade during the period 1977-
1981 was not only equivalent to barely half that registered during the favourable five-year period 
1966-1970, but was actually 27% lower than that corresponding to the period 1931-1935 (which 
includes the most critical years of the Great Depression) and was even slightly below the level of 
the period 1942-1946, when this indicator fell to its lowest point in the entire period 1928-1976. 
As a result of the sharp new drop in the terms of trade and the slight reduction suffered for the 
first time since 1972, by the volume of exports of goods, the purchasing power of the latter 
declined by 18.5 %. The drop was not so pronounced in the case of the purchasing power of exports 
of goods and services, which had also increased more rapidly up to 1980. If the increase in the 
population is taken into account, however, the decline suffered in 1981 meant a return, in this case 
too, to a situation practically equal to that existing in 1970. 
(c) The balance on current account and capital movements 
Because of the considerable increase in the value of imports and the decline in the value of 
exports, the trade deficit rose by an usually large amount. Thus, after having nearly doubled in 
1980, the deficit on the trade in goods and services trebled in 1981, reaching the record level of 
close to US$ 3 500 million (see table 21). 
. At the same time, net payments of interest continued to increase rapidly as a result of the 
growth in external indebtedness and the higher interest rates on international financial markets. 
The total value of these payments exceeded US$ 1 300 million and was equivalent to almost a 
quarter of the value of exports of goods and services: a proportion ten percentage points higher 
than that of about 14% averaged in the previous three years. 
In these circumstances, the current account deficit came to the astoundingly high figure of 
almost US$ 4 900 million. This was not only well over double the already large deficit registered 
the previous year, but was over four times the size of the deficits registered in 1978 and 1979. 
This exceptional increase in the current account deficit was influenced by a multiplicity of 
factors, some of them of an external nature and therefore relatively inevitable, but others 
attributable to the economic policy and to the expectations held and decisions taken both by the 
domestic private agents and the international commercial banks. 
Among the first group of causes, undoubtedly the most important was the abrupt 
deterioration in the terms of trade, whose effect on the increase in the current account deficit may 
be estimated at between US$ 800 and 1 000 million. A second exogenous factor which helped to 
accentuate the external imbalance was the already mentioned rise in interest rates on international 
financial markets, which meant that net payments of interest to the exterior increased by about 
US$ 100 million. Thus, about one-third of the increase in the deficit was due to the influence of 
external factors. 
Consequently, most of the aggravation in the external imbalance was due to factors either 
directly linked with the economic policy (such as the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate) or 
deriving from the interaction between that policy and the expectations of the domestic or 
international private agents, such as the exceptional expansion in domestic spending and the no 
less extraordinary inflow of external loans. 
Thus, the net inflow of external credits, which had already increased in a noteworthy manner 
the year before, when it rose from a little under US$ 2 billion in 1979 to over US$ 3 billion in 1980, 
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again rose very sharply to a total of close to US$ 4 500 million. The expansion was particularly 
great in the case of net medium- and long-term loans, which increased by over 60%, despite the 
fact that in the official sector the amortization payments exceeded the loans received by almost 
US$ 500 million. This massive inflow of loans was also accompanied by the doubling of direct 
foreign investment, so that the net inflow of capital in 1981 came to the unprecedented figure of 
US$ 5 billion. 
Thus, despite the extraordinary size of the current account deficit, the balance of payments 
finally closed with a small surplus of a little over US$ 100 million11 (see table 21). 
Table 19 
CHILE: VALUE AND BREAKDOWN OF EXPORTS, FOB 
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Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
"Preliminary figures. 
"Because of the drop in the international price of gold, however, the net international reserves declined by 
approximately US$ 300 million. 
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Figure 5 
CHILE: PRICE OF COPPER ON THE LONDON METAL EXCHANGE 
(US cents per pound) US cents 












1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
^Nominal price deflated by the United States wholesale price index 
(1970= 100). 
^Nominal price deflated by the index of the unit value of Chile's 
imports of goods and services (1970 = 100). 
(d) The external debt 
CHILE 
Another result of the large inflow of external loans in 1981 was naturally a considerable 
increase in external indebtedness. Hence, the gross external debt, which had already increased at 
an average rate of around 30% per year in the previous three years, rose by 35% in 1981 to a total 
of approximately US$ 14 500 million: three times the total of only four years before (see table 22). 
As had already occurred in 1980, but this time to a much more marked degree, this new 
increase in gross external indebtedness derived exclusively from the larger commitments con-
tracted by the private sector. Thus, whereas the external public debt and State-guaranteed debt 
went down from US$ 4 700 million in 1980 to US$ 4 400 million in 1981, the external private 
debt rose from a little less than US$ 4 700 million, in 1980 to US$ 8 100 million in 1981. This 
meant that it increased fivefold in only the last thre¿ years and in 1981 exceeded for the first time 
the external public debt, the total amount of which, in contrast, was practically the same in 1981 as 
in 1978. 
Furthermore, and in open contrast with what had taken place in previous years, the growth 
rate of net external indebtedness in 1981 was considerably higher than that of gross indebtedness. 
As a result of the rapid increase in the latter and the decline registered, for the first time since 1975, 
in the external reserves, the net external debt increased by almost 60% in 1981, so that its absolute 
volume rose considerably more in that year than in the preceding 7 years. 
Another symptom of the aggravation of the problems connected with external indebtedness 
in 1981 was the noteworthy rise in the debt servicing coefficient. Because of the sharp increase>in 
payments of principal and, above all, interest, and the simultaneous decline in the value of exports 
of goods and services, the debt servicing amounted in 1981 to the equivalent of 58% of those 
exports: a much larger proportion than the already high figures of 40% to 45% registered in the 
preceding 5 years (see table 22). 
Table 20 
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CHILE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
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Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
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'Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
c
 In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
''The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices 
In 1981 there was quite a marked reduction in the rate of inflation, for the 9-5% rise in 
consumer prices was not only much less than the rate of 31% registered in 1980, but also well 
below all those registered in the previous 40 years, except for that corresponding to the year I960. 
The slackening of the inflationary process was reflected even more noticeably in the evolution of 
wholesale prices, which, after rising 58% in 1979 and 28% in 1980, actually went down by almost 
4% in 1981 (see table 23). 
This decline in the growth rate of prices was due to the maintenance of fiscal balance and, 
above all, the preservation of the exchange parity vis-a-vis the dollar fixed in June 1979. This latter 
policy had the result that the growth rate of domestic prices finally came close to the rate of 
international inflation, albeit with a much greater lag than had originally been expected and only 
because of the total opening of the trade account. The restrictive effect of the fixed exchange rate 
policy on price rises was also stregthened in 1981 by the appreciation of the dollar on international 
exchange markets and the drop in the international prices of many basic commodities: both 
developments which, as already noted, helped to bring about a considerable reduction in the 
variation in the unit values of Chilean imports. 
The incidence of exchange policy on the course of inflation was also manifested in the uneven 
evolution of the different price indexes. Thus, the index which rose most rapidly in ] 981 was that 
of building —which measures the cost of an internationally non-tradeable good— whereas there 
was a decline in the wholesale price index, where an important role is played by internationally 
tradeable goods, whose prices, in an open economy with a fixed exchange rate, tend in the long run 
to come into line with international price levels. 
The restrictive consequences of the exchange policy on the rate of inflation were compounded 
in the second half of the year by the effects of the sharp drop in total demand and the accumulation 
of considerable stocks of dwellings, automobiles and other consumer durables which it was not 
possible to sell. 
(b) Wages 
Two factors had a decisive influence on the evolution of real wages in 1981. The first was the 
drastic fall in the rate of inflation, which, together with the system of readjustments of wages and 
salaries as a function of past inflation, helped to increase their purchasing power considerably. The 
second was the application of the reforms to the pension system, which not only significantly 
altered the costs and benefits of the social security system in the medium and long term, but also 
had an immediate effect on the take-home pay of a considerable part of the labour force. 
(i) Wages and the cost of labour. In 1981, the index of real wages and salaries rose by a little 
over 9%, thus maintaining its average growth rate of the previous four years. As a result, real 
wages registered a total increase of 55% over the last five years. In spite of this considerable 
increase, however, the drastic fall suffered by real wages and salaries during the period 1972-1975 
meant that even in 1981 they had still not recovered their 1970 level and were 14% lower than in 
the two-year period 1971-1972 (see table 24). 
As had already occurred in previous years —but this time even more markedly— the main 
factor promoting the rise in the purchasing power of wages was the readjustment machinery 
provided for in the labour legislation, whereby the nominal wages and salaries of workers subject 
to collective negotiation must be increased by at least the same percentage as the rise in the 
consumer price index during the preceding period. In view of the pronounced downward trend in 
the rate of price increases in 1981, the application of this machinery meant considerable rises in 
the purchasing power of wages and salaries. Thus, for example, the collective agreements whereby 
nominal wages and salaries were increased according to the inflation over the previous twelve 
months (35% on average), meant that the real level of wages rose by almost 13%, since the 
average rise in consumer prices in 1981 was slightly under 20%. 
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Not all workers benefited from the effects of this provision regarding readjustability, 
however. Thus, the purchasing power of wages adjusted strictly in accordance with the general law 
on readjustments remained stable, as the number of readjustments was once again reduced in 
1981.12 As had already happened in 1980, this reduction in the number of readjustments offset the 
positive effect which —had the previous frequency of the latter been maintained— the sharp 
decline in inflation should have had on the purchasing power of wages subject to the system of 
automatic readjustments. 
Table 22 
CHILE: EXTERNAL DEBT0 
(Billions of dollars) 








































1.3 1.9 2.4 3.2 
0.9 1.3 1.5 1.8 
0.4 0.6 0.9 1.4 
45 41 40 58 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Deuda externa de Chile 1981, July 1982. 
"Amounts disbursed and pending payment at 31 December of each year. 
'including balances and credits contracted by some prive enterprises subsequently incorporated into the public sector. 
'Excluding balances in respect of credits contracted by enterprises subsequently incorporated into the public sector. 
''Credits entering under articles 14, 15 and 16 of the International Exchange Law and credits under Decree-Law 600. 
'Corresponds to the international assets o the Central Bank, less liabilities with the International Monetary Fund. Gold is 
valued at market prices and mutual credit agreements are taken at their net value. This explains the difference compared 
with table 21, where gold is valued at 35 SDR units per ounce. 
yThe servicing is lower because of the renegotiation of the external debt. 
12
 In 1981 there was only one general compulsory readjustment of wages, when they were increased by 14% in August. 
In contrast, in 1980 there were two compulsory readjustments, one in April (8%) and another in October (14%), while in 
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CHILE: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1972 1973 ° 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Variation from December to December 
Consumer price index 
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Corrected consumer price 
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Source: National Statistical Institute; Cámara Chilena de la construcción; José Yáñez, "Una corrección del índice de 
precios al consumidor, 1971 -1977," in Comentarios sobre la situación económica, Department of Economics of 
the University of Chile; and René Cortázar and Jorge Marshall, "Indice de precios al consumidor en Chile: 1970-
1978", Estudio CIEPLAN, NQ 4, November 1980. 
"1971-1973: based on the index of Yáñez; 1974-1978: based on the index of Cortázar and Marshall. 
Moreover, as a result of the reduction of the pension contributions which had to be paid by the 
employer, the real cost of labour for enterprises increased less in 1981 than did wages and salaries. 
As this had already happened in the previous four years also, because of the application of the 
policy of systematically reducing contributions and financing and increasing part of the social 
security benefits with funds from the fiscal budget, the cost of labour for the employer increased 
12% less during the five-year period 1977-1981 than did real wages. The difference registered 
during the period 1970-1981 was 6%, so that the real cost of labour was 8.5 % lower in 1981 than in 
1970 (see table 24). As in the course of the latter period the product per worker employed (not 
including those in the PEM), adjusted by the sharp drop in the terms of trade, rose by 10%, the cost 
of labour per unit of the product was almost 20% lower in 1981 than in 1970. 
(ii) Take-home pay and the reform of the pension system. The new pension legislation which 
began to be applied in 1981 had an important effect on the take-home pay of a significant part of 
the labour force, for under the provisions of this reform, the social security contributions became 
the responsibility of the worker, regardless of whether he continued to contribute to one of the old 
social security funds or transferred to the new system of private pension funds (Administradoras 
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de Fondos Previsionales -AFP). In order to make up for the effect of this change, the income of all 
wage-earners was adjusted by an amount equivalent to the increased contributions which they 
would have to make, so that in principle their take-home pay would remain the same. Those 
workers who transferred to the new pension system, however, had their contributions reduced 
from an average of 27% of their nominal pay to 17%,13 so that on average their take-home pay 
was 12% higher than if they had stayed in the old system.14 The new legislation thus established a 
powerful incentive for workers to join the new private pension funds, and this explains why by the 
end of the year almost 45% of the labour force was in fact contributing to such funds." 
Table 24 
CHILE: EVOLUTION OF REAL WAGES AND SALARIES 













































































Source: 1 ) Index of nominal wages and salaries of the National Statistical Institute (1NE), deflacted for the period 1971-
1973 by the consumer price index prepared by José Yáñez, op.cit. for the period 1974-1978 by the corrected 
consumer price index given in table 23 below; and for the period 1979-1980 by the consumer price index of the 
1NE. 
For the years 1970-1976 the figures correspond to the average for April, July and October, which for 1977-
1980 they represent the average for the whole twelve months. 
2) Index of cost of labour calculated on the basis of the index of wages and salaries (column 1), ajusted by the 
variations in the rates of contributions payable by the employer in respect of the taxable income. As these 
calculations do not take account of variations in the ceilings on taxable income or categories of income exempt 
from contributions, they probably slightly overestimate the Variations in cost. The variations in employers' 
contributions were taken from table 1 of the study by José Pablo Arellano, "Elementos para el análisis de la 
reforma previsional chilena", in Estudios CIEPLAN, December 1981. 
1
 ' The reduction in contributions was justified by the savings represented by extending retirement age, eliminating the 
lump sum previously payable on termination of employment, and increasing the number of years of contributions required 
in order to receive the minimum old-age pension. 
HThe average increase was probably actually somewhat smaller, since the contributions actually paid by enterprises 
were usually only about 50% of those nominally laid down by the law, either because certain classes of income were not 
taxable, because of the existence of flat-rate ceilings, or because of simple evasion of obligations. For these reasons, the 
contributions actually made by employers, according to the national accounts, were equivalent to approximately 15% to 
20% of wages and salaries instead of the average rates of between 20% and 30% payable in accordance with the law. 
"About 89% of the workers who joined the private pension funds were wage-earners, the remaining 11% being 




CHILE: MONETARY INDICATORS 
Money issue (£) 
Total money supply 
Private sector (M,) 
Public sector (PS) 
Term deposits (TD) 
From 30 to 89 days 
From 90 to 365 days 
Readjustable 
Non-readjustable 
Over one year 
Private money + term deposits 
(M2 + M, + TD) 
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Source: Central Bank of Chile, Síntesis Monetaria. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes bonds of the Department of Savings and Investments (DAI). 
' Includes other deposits for less than 30 days. 
Millions of dollars. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
In 1981, monetary policy was conditioned by the effects of two significant and unexpected 
events. The first of these was the abrupt threefold increase in real interest rates from the first 
quarter onwards, which, as it did not subsequently subside, kept interest rates at an extraordinarily 
high level throughout the year. The second was the deterioration of the financial soundness of a 
growing number of enterprises, the first public manifestation of which was the bankruptcy of an 
important sugar refining enterprise at the beginning of the second quarter, which had far-reaching 
repercussions, culminating in the takeover by the Central Bank in October of four commercial 
banks and four finance establishments. 
The rise in real interest rates naturally helped to increase the burden of financial costs in the 
total costs of enterprises, as well as helping to reverse the expectations of big new capital gains 
which had existed at the beginning of the year. Furthermore, together with the growing 
uncertainty regarding the solvency of enterprises, this helped to generate doubts about the stability 
and soundness of the whole financial system. 
The persistence of the high rates of interest and the problems of the financial intermediaries 
originated mainly from the changes which had arisen in the demand for credits, rather than from 
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the evolution of the money supply. The latter —and especially the erratic course of domestic 
credit— had more of an influence on the composition of the monetary aggregates and, through 
this, on the short-term fluctuations in interest rates. 
(i) The principal monetary aggregates. In 1981, the course followed by the principal 
monetary aggregates was very disparate. Thus, while the issue of money went down by almost 7% 
after having grown in the previous two years at an average rate of over 40%, and the amount of 
money increased by barely 2 % after having likewise expanded very rapidly in previous years, term 
deposits rose by rather more than 70%, as they had done also in 1979 and 1980 (see table 25). 
These notable differences in growth rates were mainly the result of the changes made in the 
regulations governing deposits by public bodies and the considerable increase in real interest rates. 
Thus, in 1981 the compulsory deposit coefficient applicable to the unified fiscal bank account was 
reduced from 8 7 % to 10%, and the obligation which many public institutions had previously had 
to keep their deposits in that account was eliminated. As a result of this, the bank multipliers 
increased and this, in its turn, enabled the amount of money to increase in spite of the decline in the 
actual issue of currency. The much smaller increase in money than in quasi-money, for its part, 
reflected the influence of the rise in real interest rates. Even so, thanks to the considerable 
expansion in term deposits, the ratio between the broadest concept of the money, supply and the 
gross domestic product rose for the second consecutive year and reached the record level of almost 
20% (see table 26). 
In contrast with what had happened in the previous three years, when the increases in the 
issue of money had originated almost exclusively from exchange operations, in 1981 the latter 
played a contractive role. The effect of this reduction, however, was partially offset by the 
expansion of the other operations of the Central Bank (see table 27). 
(ii) Interest rates. As may be seen from table 28, real interest rates on loans had gone down 
steadily between 1977 —when they stood at the unusually high level of 39% per year— and 1980 
—when they dropped to an average of 12%. At the beginning of 1981, it was expected that this 
decline would continue until the rates came close to those prevailing in international markets, 
Table 26 


























































Source: Ministry of Finance, Santiago, Exposición sobre el estado de la hacienda pública, July 1981. 
"M, = Private sector money. 






CHILE: ORIGIN OF VARIATIONS IN MONEY ISSUE 
(End-December balances for each year, in millions of pesos) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
Adjusted issue 
Exchange operations 
Operations with treasury 
Domestic credit 





















































Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
Table 28 
CHILE: BANK INTEREST RATES 



































































Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
"Annual rates projected on the basis of quarterly rates. 
''Calculated on the basis of the nominal rates published by the Central Bank, the corrected consumer price index given in 
table 23, and the consumer price index of the National Statistical Institute (period 1979-1981). 
which, although they had risen sharply in the last quarter of 1980 to a level of 5-6% real interest 
annually, continued to be much lower than the Chilean rates. Thus, it did not seem unreasonable to 
assume that the real interest rates in Chile would continue to go down, especially in view of the 
relatively extensive financial and commercial openness prevailing and the maintenance of a policy 
of keeping the exchange rate fixed. 
Consequently, it came as a shock to most of the economic agents when, in February 1981, real 
interest rates suddenly rose to a level of 3.5% per month. Just as surprising and undoubtedly more 
serious was the fact that they remained at similar levels for the rest of the year, so that their annual 
average came to almost 39% —practically the same as the extraordinarily high rate registered in 
1977 (see table 28). 
Both the initial rise in interest rates and their subsequent maintenance at a very high level 
were due to a succession of phenomena seen at the time as being only temporary, such as the lag 
with which the economic agents adjusted their inflationary expectations to the abrupt decline in 
inflation from February onwards; the sharp reduction in the issue of money which took place in the 
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same month because of the advance payment by the Government of a State debt to the Central 
Bank; the bankruptcy of the sugar refining firm CRAV in May and the reduction in the inflow of 
external capital which this caused; and finally, the growing lack of confidence in the national 
financial system, which led to a net outflow of capital in the last quarter of the year and culminated 
in November with the State takeover of eight financial institutions. The fact that all these 
phenomena took place one after another contributed to the continuation of the high rates of 
interest. 
Precisely because each of these events was seen at the time as being only temporary, however, 
the demand for credit remained at a high level, just as though the long-term cost of credit were low 
(which, as already noted, was what most of the agents expected at the end of 1980). Consequently, 
instead of going down as a result of the rise in interest rates, the amount of loans requested 
remained undiminished, and the demand for credit became virtually inelastic with respect to short-
term interest rates. 
To put it another way, the demand for credit by enterprises, which had increased at the 
beginning of the year because of the favourable expectations then prevailing, remained high as 
time went on, first of all because it was thought that the rise in interest rates would only be 
temporary, and subsequently because the accumulated financial costs were so high that it was 
necessary to obtain new credits in order to avoid the heavy loss of capital that would have been 
caused by the liquidation of assets needed in order to pay the accumulated financial commitments. 
Thus, the country passed from a situation injwhich the demand for credit was high because of good 
expectations to one where the demand for credit remained high because it was hoped that 
"something" would happen which would make it unnecessary to liquidate assets at a clearly and 
increasingly recessive time.1<s In other words, the natural reluctance to suffer heavy losses of capital 
discouraged the liquidation of assets and, consequently, kept the real interest rates high.17 
(iii) The Government intervention in the financial system. In these circumstances, it was 
clear that no matter how efficient enterprises might be, they could not keep on paying such high 
real interest rates on a continuing basis without seriously weakening their financial position or 
even compromising their solvency, for although loans in foreign currency —which amounted to 
one-third of the total loans— were much cheaper, they nevertheless involved an exchange risk. 
Even if this latter factor is not taken into account, however, the average rate of interest on all loans, 
both in domestic currency and in foreign currency, was of the order of 27% per year in real terms. 
In view of the high level of indebtedness existing in the country —which exceeded 50% of the 
domestic product— this meant that every year it was necessary to pay interest equivalent to some 
15% of the product. This transfer, which would have been difficult even in normal times, was 
virtually impossible in a period such as the second half of the year, when the economy was sliding 
rapidly into a profound and generalized recession. 
In effect, the process described above meant a pronounced redistribution of income from 
debtors to creditors (especially depositors), in which the financial system served as an 
intermediary. As the situation went on, however, the fate of the banks and other financial 
institutions was increasingly linked with that of their debtors, for in practice the banks tended to 
renew their loans to most enterprises, even in order to finance interest payments, rather than 
demanding the fulfilment of the guarantees backing up the credits, either because many of the 
debtor enterprises were linked to the same economic group to which the bank in question 
belonged, or because the guarantees had lost much of their real value in view of the difficulties 
16The case of many building projects was an illustration of this process. Once the sites had been purchased and 
construction work had been begun on the projects at the beginning of the year, this was continued in the second half of the 
year, even though the signs of a drop in demand were already evident, because their liquidation would have meant an 
enormous loss of capital and might even have compromised the solvency of the enterprises involved. In these 
circumstances, it seemed preferable to try to gain time by continuing the projects with additional bank financing. 
17This rigidity of the "value" of assets took away one of the degrees of freedom to make the necessary adjustments in 
the second half of 1981, and through the accumulation of debts which the enterprises were less and less capable of paying it 
helped to increase the cost of the adjustment which would eventually have to be made in the long run. 
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Table 29 
CHILE: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME A N D EXPENDITURE 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, Budget Office. 
"Preliminary figures 
Including revenue from customs duties and extrabudgetary adjustments. 
'Surplus. 
Including advance payments of USÎ 422 millions. 
'Including advance payments of USÎ 867 millions. 
Including advance payments of USÎ 346 millions at 1976 prices. 
'Including advance payments of USÎ 423 millions at 1976 prices. 
standing in the way of liquidating assets in a recessive situation. In this way, the banks collaborated 
in the postponement of the liquidation of assets and thus helped to keep the demand for loans and 
the rates of interest high. The inevitable consequence of this policy, however, was an increase in 
the amount of bad debts, which doubled in the course of the year and, by its end, were equivalent to 
over 2 5 % of the capital and reserves of the banks. 
What was most serious, however, was not so much the problem raised by the increase in the 
bad debts as that of the credits granted to enterprises linked to the banks themselves, and it was 
this latter problem which broke first and led to the intervention by the Superintendent of Banks, in 
November 1981, of four banks and four finance establishments. These eight financial 
intermediaries accounted for about 30% of the total loans by the financial system in national 
currency, and in turn, the enterprises belonging or connected to the owners of these financial 
institutions accounted for a large part of their total loans. Since, moreover, the enterprises in the 
same group used cross-guarantees, so that a single real guarantee could serve as a guarantee for 
various loans, their capacity for absorbing losses was only minimal and consequently this too 
compromised the solvency of the financial intermediaries, which were their main creditors. 
In these circumstances, in order to avoid loss of confidence —at both the national and 
international level— in the entire financial system because of the possible bankruptcy of such 
important financial estalishments, the Superintendent of Banks took over the affairs of these eight 
intermediaries and guaranteed the payment in full of their commitments to their creditors 
(domestic depositors and foreign banks). This financial backing involved the disbursement of over 
US$ 600 million by the Central Bank and was the main factor explaining the increase in the 
domestic credit granted by this institution. 
In spite of this intervention, however, mistrust in the solidity of the financial system 
continued to grow, since these events had revealed the irresponsible manner in which many such 
establishments operated: something which helped to significantly reduce the inflow of external 
capital during the last quarter of the year. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
In 1981 there was a slight slackening of the rigorous fiscal policy applied from 1974 onwards. 
Thus, after having registered in the previous two years the country's only two surpluses in the 
entire period 1950-1980, the central government accounts closed in 1980 with a small deficit 
equivalent to 4 .5% of fiscal expenditure and a little over 1% of the gross domestic product (see 
table 29). 
However, this variation in the end-year results of the public finances was due mainly to the 
Government's decicion to make US$ 870 million of advance service payments on the external 
debt, together with the drop of over 50% in the income contributed by the State copper 
corporation because of the sharp decline in the international price of copper. Thus, if the 
Government had not made this advance payment of part of the external debt servicing costs, the 
fiscal results would have shown an end-year surplus equivalent to 1.6% of the gross domestic 
product. Moreover, if the income from the copper industry had not gone down, this too would have 
generated a surplus, equivalent to approximately 0.7% of the product. 
The decisive incidence of these two factors on the fiscal results was also reflected in the 
evolution of the income and expenditure in foreign currency. While the latter rose by almost one-
third, due above all to the rapid growth in the external debt servicing, the former went down 
almost by half as a result of the decline in the income from the copper industry already referred to. 
In 1980 this income had amounted to slightly more than the total interest and principal payments 
in dollars, whereas in 1981 it was only sufficient to finance 35% of these payments. 
In contrast with the heavy deficit registered on the transactions in foreign currency, those 
effected in pesos showed a surplus for the seventh year running. This was partly due to the rapid 
increase in tax revenue, whose growth rate of 25 % was once again higher than that of the domestic 
product at current prices (20%). As in 1981 fiscal expenditure in national currency expanded even 
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faster than this, however, the absolute amount of the surplus went down sharply, and as a 
proportion of total expenditure it dropped from almost 11% in 1980 to less than 7%. 
Partly because of this expansion of expenditure in local currency, and partly because of the 
even sharper rise (31%) in expenditure in dollars, the proportion of fiscal expenditure to the gross 
domestic product rose markedly for the second consecutive year and reached its highest level since 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Economic activity in Dominica during 1981 was affected fundamentally by the sequels of the 
natural disasters of 1979 and 1980. On 29 August 1979 the island was ravaged by Hurricane David, 
followed in that same year by Hurricane Frederick and in August 1980 by Hurricane Allen. 
Agriculture and housing were severely damaged, as well as roads and other main elements of the 
island's infrastructure, and the country was forced to rely on heavy inflows of international aid and 
grants for its social and economic reconstruction. These large and timely inflows seem to have 
averted excessive distress, and the GDP, which fell sharply in 1979, showed a partial recovery in 
1980. Preliminary estimates suggest that there was a further increase in 1981, (see table 1). 
Much emphasis was placed on support for agriculture, whose performance only started to 
improve during 1981, thanks partly to STABEX and other grants. Construction activity increased 
and efforts at economic diversification resulted in a higher contribution to GDP by the more 
dynamic though small manufacturing sector. The balance of payments continued to be unfavoura-
ble, and deficits had to be financed by foreign budget support and capital grants. Domestic 
revenues could not cover expenditure, and the termination of budget support grants from the 
United Kingdom, coupled with wage demands from the Civil Service Association, aggravated the 
already poor situation of government expenditure. The principal objectives of economic policy in 
Dominica in the period concerned have been to expand investment, to increase employment and 
productive capacity, to mitigate balance of payments problems, and to effect structural changes in 
public finances. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Growth of the main sectors 
(i) Agriculture. Agriculture has always been the mainstay of Dominica's economy, accounting 
for almost 40% of total GDP before the hurricanes of 1979 and 1980. In the immediate post-
hurricane period, production fell drastically, as major export crops were seriously damaged. It is 
estimated that the hurricanes damaged 75% of banana acreage, 40% of the grapefruit trees and a 
similar proportion of the coconut, trees. Official statistics indicate that the sector's contribution to 
total GDP at constant prices stood at 23% in 1980 and 25% in 1981 (see table 2). Its contribution to 
exports and employment also fell. Thus, unprocessed agricultural products constituted over 60% 
of total exports in 1978 but amounted to only about 35% in 1980, and whereas 28% of registered 
employed persons worked in agriculture in 1978, by 1980 the figure was only 23%. 
Since bananas are Dominica's single most important export corp, trends in total export 
earnings have been in line with those in this sub-sector. After contributing over 45% of export 
earnings in 1978 and 1979, banana earnings fell to approximately 30% in 1980 (see table 6 below), 
when banana production was 41% below the level of 1979. As a result of programmes initiated by 
the Dominica Banana Growers' Association (DBGA), the 1981 output has shown signs of recovery, 
(see table 3), although official sources report that the 34 750 ton target for 1981 was not actually 
reached and that in fact only about 22 000 tons were produced on about 10 000 acres of land. Apart 
from the smaller acreage and low productivity per acre, farmers faced a situation of price 
disincentives. Furthermore in 1981 the DBGA was forced to impose strict quality measures and as 
much as 40% of the bananas produced were rejected by the Association, resulting in still lower 
exports. 
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Coconut production, which has been second in importance to banana-growing over the years, 
also declined in 1980 and the nine million nuts produced then were only half the amount produced 
in 1979. However, a replanting programme financed by the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) has begun with the aim of replanting 3 000 acres by 1982. Because of the reduced 
crop of nuts, industrial problems, and an illicit trade in coconuts to the French islands, expansion of 
copra production was impossible. 
Citrus production has followed the general trend of the agricultural sector as a whole. After 
the hurricane in 1979, production of limes, grapefruit and oranges fell by about 50% and has since 
shown only slight improvement. Although recent estimates indicate that lime production 
increased in 1980 and 1981, the export earnings from lime juice fell by over 90% in 1980. It is 
claimed that during 1981 there was some improvement. Projects for the rehabilitation of the 
existing 2 000 acres of lime trees and expansion to 1 000 more have not yet been financed. The 
Government has recently purchased the lime processing plant from private interests and has made 
initial steps towards rehabilitation. There were no significant changes in grapefruit and orange 
production in 1980 and 1981, but there have been some marketing difficulties. Grapefruit, which is 
exported mainly to Europe, obtained premium prices for only eight weeks during September and 
October, when supply from the major producing countries was low. The 1981 market is estimated 
to have been smaller than anticipated and the situation was further aggravated by low prices, 
competition from Cuba and unfavourable exchange rates between the pound sterling and the East 
Caribbean dollar. A loan from the Caribbean Development Bank has been earmarked for the 
expansion of packaging facilities. 
A major drawback to the sectors' performance has been the serious financial position of the 
DBGA. A number of funding agencies have promised finance but the adequacy of the help offered is 
questionable. The Dominican Agricultural Marketing Board (DAMB) has not been very effective in 
Table 1 
DOMINICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1979 1980 1981" 
81.4 88.3 96.2 
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Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data.. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Data relate to fiscal year (1" July - 30 June of following year). 
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Wages and salaries -33.7 
Current income of government 9.6 
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Source: Data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Estimates. 
handling domestic crops, especially because of poor management. Until proper management is 
established the marketing of agricultural goods will remain a bottleneck. 
Livestock production continued to lag behind demand, since there has been a general lack of 
interest in financing projects in this area. A small programme has been started involving stud 
servicing, fattening and importation of new breeds of sheep, goats and pigs. 
(ii) Manufacturing. In absolute and relative items, this sector is very small, as is evidenced by 
its modest contribution to overall GDP and employment. Between 1978 and 1981 its share of total 
GDP has fluctuated between 5 and 6%, and there has been a noticeable decline in the number of 
people employed in the sector during this period. 
Manufacturing activity in Dominica has traditionally centered around labour-intensive indus-
tries employing simple technology and consuming little energy. The major enterprises mostly 
process agricultural products (coconuts and citrus), but there is a promising garment industry in 
addition to small establishments producing rum, cigarettes and soft drinks. The sector's GDP 
increased substantially (about 19%) in 1980 and by 2% in 1981. Much of this growth is 
attributable to soap production (see table 4). After declining by 30% in 1979, soap production 
increased by 138% in 1980 and by a further 20% in 1981. Although the production of coconuts, 
which constitute a major input of soap manufacture, has been negatively affected by the hurri-
canes, the importation of tallow from the United States has proved a very economical substitute 
and was responsible for the relatively high rates of growth in the production of soap in 1980 and 
1981. 
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The Dominica Government has embarked on an enthusiastic industrial promotion campaign 
to complement its efforts in agriculture. Through the new Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) it has been attempting to encourage the private sector to play a more active part. To this end, 
new legislation is being drafted and the IDC has been made responsible for encouraging and 
assisting both local and foreign investors in establishing labour-intensive assembly operations, 
industries to produce agricultural inputs, and the development of the country's marine resources to 
meet domestic as well as foreign demand. 
The IDC's efforts since 1979 began with the provision of infrastructure. Two buildings have 
been constructed to house garment industries, and plans have been made for the establishment of a 
tyre-retreading industry, firms producing mattresses and pepper sauce, a multipurpose agro-
processing unit, the production of ornamental plants in a joint venture with Venezuela, and the 
shipping of fresh water to the Middle East. 
(iii) Construction. Construction activity increased during 1980 and 1981 on account of several 
emergency rehabilitation projects. Thus, in 1980 the construction GDP rose by approximately 
70%, and in 1981 it rose a further 9%. The volume and value of trade in building materials grew 
significantly. A further reflection of the sharp increase in construction activity is seen from the 
distribution of loans by commercial banks. At the end of 1979, loans outstanding to this sector 
stood at EC$ 785 0001 —some 38% below the figure for the previous year—but at the end of 1980 
Table 3 
DOMINICA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
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Source: Data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Estimates. 
'Millions of nuts. 




DOMINICA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 

































































































Source: Data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Ions. 
' Thousands of litres. 
Thousands of cases. 
'Thousands of KWH. 
these loans stood at EC$ 1 526 000 and by the end of September 1981 the figure was EC$ 1 606 000 
(see table 12 below). 
Construction was oriented towards the rehabilitation of priority areas such as roads and 
houses, and further plans were made for the improvement of main roads and agricultural feeder 
roads. Designs have been completed for the reconstruction of the port and bridges, while the 
reconstruction of public buildings is still at the concept stage. The Caribbean Development Bank 
(CDB) has been approached for help in the construction of factory shells to accommodate new 
enclave industries. Considerable importance has been assigned to the maintenance, reconstruction 
and development of educational, health and housing facilities, for which negotiations are still in 
progress. 
(iv) Energy. Dominica's relatively low dependence on imported petroleum makes it some-
what unique among the smaller Caribbean islands. Its precipitous topography and abundant forest 
resources afford it the opportunity of economically generating power from hydroelectric installa-
tions, wood and charcoal. Approximately 90% of power needs are satisfied by hydroelectric 
installations. 
After the hurricanes, electricity consumption fell as a result of the destruction of installations 
and transmission lines. Power was subsequently diesel-generated until the facilities were restored 
during 1981. Consequently the sector's GDP fell in 1979 and 1980 by 22% and 34.5% respectively, 
but by the end of 1981 it had increased by 29%. 
During 1980 imports of petroleum products increased and so did prices, increases in which 
were felt immediately by consumers. There were substantial increases in import duties as well as in 
the retail price of gasoline. 
There has been some speculation about Dominica's potential as regards alternative sources of 
energy and studies have been made of the island's potential for hydro and thermal energy 
generation, but to date no projects have materialized. 
357 
3. The external sector 
(a) Tourism 
Compared with most other Caribbean islands, tourism in Dominica remains largely under-
developed. In relation to other economic activities, this sector has always been very small and can 
still be considered embryonic. Moreover, the natural disasters of 1979 and 1980 thwarted efforts to 
develop what little tourism potential existed at that time. 
As far as the total GDP is concerned, this sector's contribution has consistently totalled about 1 
to 2 %. The total number of visitors declined in 1980 and 1981, although the drop was less rapid in 
1981, when the greatest decline was in the category of excursionists (see table 5). At the same time 
that the total number of visitors has gone down, so too has visitor expenditure, which fell by about 
11.5% in 1980. To date, no data are available for 1981. The hurricane destruction of some of the 
major hotels was responsible for a 23% reduction in the number of beds, but there are signs of 
rehabilitation. 
Despite this sector's limited potential, the Government of Dominica and the Dominica 
Tourist Board (DTB) recognize that there is room for expansion. The Government's tourism 
strategy attempts to integrate tourism into national life, to ensure better spending of tourism 
funds, to develop new and existing tourist attractions, to establish more efficient air links and 
deepwater dock facilities and to seek further impetus by encouraging foreign investment in the 
sector. 
During 1980 and 1981 the Board spent most of its funds on overseas promotion. Local efforts 
included motivation surveys, heightening of local awareness, hospitality training seminars, revival 
and support of folkloric entertainment and maintenance of natural beauty spots. The Board is 
fairly confident about the prospects for the industry. 
(b) Trade and payments 
No official balance of payments statistics have been prepared by Dominica. In spite of the 4% 
increase in export earnings in 1980, the trade deficit almost tripled because of the heavy foreign 
exchange outflow due to increased imports made necessary by the rehabilitation and reconstruc-
tion efforts for coping with the current emergency situation (see tables 6, 7 and 9). 
Table 5 
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Source: Data supplied to CEPAL. 
Table 7 
DOMINICA: IMPORTS OF GOODS CIF, BY SITC SECTIONS 
Total 
Foot and live animals 
Meat and meat preparation 
Meat and flour (wheat) 
Milk and cream 
Margarine and lard 
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Source: Data supplied to CEPAL. 
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Preliminary data for 1981 indicate that export earnings almost doubled. No statistics are 
available to determine the source of this increase, but it would appear that soap has become a major 
contributor, since export earnings from this product almost trebled in 1980 and it has been 
suggested that this trend continued in 1981. Imports in 1981 increased by about 6%. 
Dominica's major trading links are still with the United Kingdom and United States, which 
together supplied 50% of its imports and absorbed 36% of its exports (see table 8). Trade within 
the region is conducted mainly with the more developed CARICOM countries, with Dominica being 
especially dependent on Trinidad and Tobago for its imports and on Jamaica for its exports. 
Table 8 
























































































































Source: Data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Includes Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands. 
Continental Latin America. 
Table 9 
DOMINICA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
1978 1979 1980 
Exports of goods 
Value 
Volume 
r Unit value 
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DOMINICA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
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Fuel and light 
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Source: Data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Due to the devastation caused by hurricane David, it was not possible to compile the index for September and October 
1979. 
4. Prices, wages and employment 
World price developments are normally the main determinant of price movements in 
Dominica. Since the latter half of 1979, however, price increases have been largely a result of 
dislocation and shortages ensuing from the hurricanes, and a system of price controls that is not 
enforced. 
The annual average for the consumer price index increased by 33% in 1980 compared with 
18% in 1979; the highest increase since 1974. In 1981 the rise was of the order of 13% (see 
table 10). Higher food prices and energy costs contributed significantly to these increases. In 
addition to the scarcity of food and its high import prices, the island lost some of its hydroelectric-
ity generating capacity, and fuel and light costs were 70% higher during the greater part of 1980. 
During 1981 food prices rose by 16%, and the hydroelectric plants were repaired. Notable declines 
also occurred in the housing and beverages and tobacco sections, with the result that the rate of 
inflation went down during 1981. 
Dominica provides no official index from which changes in wages can be measured. Wage 
agreements during this period were influenced by the Government's grant of an average 82% 
wage increase to civil servants in December 1979. In December 1980 a new wage agreement was 
made between the Government and the Civil Service Association whereby public servents would 
receive 10% increases each year from 1982 through 1984. Moderation in the remuneration 
practices of the private sector was called for in order to help contain the rate of cost-pushed 
inflation. 
Although complete data on employment are not available, official statistics collected by the 
Social Security Scheme indicate that the services sector accounted for almost 50% of total 
employed persons in 1980, agriculture ranking second with an employment rate of 23 %. It is to be 
noted that the statistics collected by the Social Security Scheme exclude own-account workers and 
thus result in an undercount, possibly in both the services sector and the agricultural sector, since it 
is thought that a large proportion of the agricultural labour force consists of own-account workers. 
If they were included, the relative importance of agriculture in the total labour force might well 
surpass that of any other sector. As a consequence of the hurricanes of 1979 and 1980, employment 
in the commerce and hotel sector fell from 2 651 in 1979 to 1 921 in 1980. 
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5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
The absence of a National Central bank in Dominica makes it difficult to measure the money 
supply accurately. The East Caribbean Currency Authority, which acts as a regulator of currency for 
the Less Developed Countries (LDCs), estimates that quasi-money increased by 14% in the twelve 
months up to the end of December 1980. Data available to the end of September 1981 put the total 
amount at EC$ 72 million. The relative increases in both time and savings deposits hint at an 
increase in the money supply (see table 11). 
An analysis of commercial bank credit through data on loans and advances outstanding 
indicates generally higher amounts outstanding at the end of September 1981 than at the end of 
1980. Indications are that apart from the government and the household sectors, the distributive 
sector and the agricultural sector were the major recipients of bank credit (see table 12). 
(b) Fiscal policy 
Official estimates of government fiscal operations during 1980 and 1981 reveal heavy 
increases in total revenue and expenditure. While the current account deficit for the fiscal year 
1981/1982 grew by over 280%, the total fiscal deficit rose by almost 200% (see table 13). 
Current government revenue, most of which came from consumption taxes, showed minimal 
growth during the fiscal year 1981/1982. A general strike among civil servants ended with the 
Government granting and 82% increase in personal emoluments over three years in December 
1979- Current expenditure during the fiscal year 1980/1981 increased by about 27%. 
In the wake of the hurricane devastation in 1979 and 1980, government transfers to statutory 
bodies more than doubled, but by the end of 1980 the Government decided to monitor more closely 
the activities of these bodies in order to minimize overspending. The government sectors share of 
the GDP at current prices was 22% (EC$ 32 million) in 1980. 
Heavy concentration on rehabilitation projects financed by external sources has increased 
capital outlays and this is expected to continue in the immediate future. Capital grants finance 
virtually the entire investment effort by the goverment. 
Table 11 
DOMINICA: MONETARY BALANCE 
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Source: East Caribbean Currency Authority, Commercial Banking Statistics, December 1981, and data supplied to 
CEPAL. 
"As of September. 
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Source: East Caribbean Currency Authority, Commercial Banking Statistics, December 1981, and data supplied to 
CEPAL. 
" As of September. 
'As of September 1981 with respect to same period 1980. 
Table 13 
D O M I N I C A : C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T I N C O M E A N D E X P E N D I T U R E " 
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Source: Government of Dominica, Estimates of the Commonwealth of Dominica 1981/1982, and data supplied to 
CEPAL. 




Dominica's fiscal development has always been difficult because of the contrast between its 
limited revenue resources and its costly expenditure programmes. Thus the 1980/1981 and 
1981/1982 budgets embody concerted efforts to secure an improvement in public finances. 
Measures to restrain spiralling current expenditure include: 
( 1) A new wage policy whereby increases in public sector wages will be spread over a period of 
three years, rising by 10% per annum. A call has been made for moderation in trade union 
demands and private sector wage adjustments; (2) a freeze in public sector recruitment, a cut in 
travel allowances and encouragement of early retirement; (3) improvement in the management 
and accounting practices of statutory bodies. 
Revenue measures include: 
(1) Increased import duties and consumption taxes, especially on lubricating oils, beer and 
soft drinks; (2) removal of import duty concessions on building materials and vehicles; (3) intro-
duction of taxes on telephone and telegraph services, and increases in postal rates in airport 
landing taxes, and property and land taxes. This package is expected to help to secure the 
improvements in the financial situation necessary for sustained efforts in production and inves-
ment. Such improvement is especially important because the United Kingdom ended its budget 
support payments in 1981. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The signs of a worsening economic situation which were observable in 1980 gathered 
intensity and scope in 1981. Thus, the growth rate of the gross domestic product, which had been 
going down steadily since 1976, reached an unsatisfactory level of 4.3% in 1981, so that the per 
capita product rose barely 1 %. Moreover, domestic prices increased by 18% (the biggest rise since 
1974); the fiscal deficit soared by 142%; the balance of payments current account deficit went up by 
52%, and international reserves fell by US$ 380 million (see table 1 and figure 1). 
In addition to the continuation in 1981 of the downward trend in some important economic 
variables, both domestic and external, which had accompanied the loss of dynamism in recent 
years, several unfortunate events also took place —such as the border conflict with Peru and the 
death of President Roídos— which increased the uncertainty regarding the expectations of the 
economy and contributed to the maladjustment and weakening of the various components of total 
supply and demand. 
The loss of dynamism of the product was most evident in the case of gross income, which 
increased by only about 3% owing to the appreciable worsening in ther terms of trade. 
As regards the evolution of production activities during the year, a marked slackening was 
observed in the growth of basic services, commerce and government services. Moreover, the 
recession in construction which had begun in 1979 became more acute. 
Only the continuation of irrigation, electricity, road construction, housing and other public 
sector programmes, to the extent that the limited financial resources available to the government 
and its enterprises so permitted, made it possible for at least a small increase in construction to be 
registered. In contrast, private construction appreciably reduced its level of activity, and employ-
ment in the sector declined. 
In contrast, agriculture recorded fairly satisfactory results, while the production of petroleum 
rose and manufacturing managed to maintain a relatively high rate of growth, although lower than 
the exceptionally high rate (12%) registered between 1972 and 1978. 
External trade relations were also involved in the general weakening of the economy. Exports 
of goods and services rose barely 3%, in contrast with the much larger increments obtained in 
previous years. External sales in particular were adversely affected by the drop in the prices of such 
important commodities as coffee and cocoa and, to a lesser degree, petroleum. They were also 
affected by the restrictions and closures of some external markets due to the recession and by an 
8% revaluation of the sucre in real terms in relation to the currencies of purchasing countries, 
which caused Ecuadorian exports to lose some of their competitiveness. 
Imports, meanwhile, grew at twice the rate of exports, although they declined in terms of 
volume. This increased the trade deficit, and as a result of this and of a growing outflow of profit 
and interest payments, the current account deficit rose from US$ 616 to US$ 933 million. 
Added to the bigger current account deficit was a smaller inflow of capital, reflected in the 
drop of US$ 380 million in the international reserves. This situation had not arisen since 1975, 
when the reserves declined by only US$ 65 million. 
At the same time, the long-term external debt totalled US$ 4 820 million at the end of the 
year —US$ 770 million more than at the end of 1980. 
The sluggish growth of economic activities during the year was accompanied by an intensifi-
cation of the rate of inflation (which rose from less than 15% in 1980 to 18% in 1981); an 
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insufficient increase of 12% in the means of payment, which accentuated the lack of liquidity in the 
economy; and a sharp increase in the fiscal deficit, which doubled its percentage of total expendi-
ture (see table 1). 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global supply and demand 
In the last three years the rate of growth of domestic economic activity has notably declined. 
The gross domestic product, which increased (with certain ups and downs) at the exceptionally 
high average rate of nearly 10% annually between 1971 and 1978, gradually reduced its progress in 
the following years and grew by only 4.3% in 1981. This evolution was accompanied in both 1980 
and 1981 by slight decreases in the volume of goods and services imported, which contrasted with 
the rapid expansion of the volume of imports up to then and helped to slow the growth of global 
supply of goods and services in those years to only 3.7% and 3.4%, respectively (see table 2). 
Table 1 
ECUADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981° 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government^ 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 





































































































5.0 23.2 26.2 27.1 18.1 





-208 -487 -252 
-377 -730 -647 
146 13 87 





045 4 816 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Percentages. 




ECUADOR: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 




Exports of goods and services 
Millions of dollars 


























































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices , which were converted to constant 1970 values by deflation, using price indexes calculated by ECLA for 
the purpose. 
On the other hand, the volume of exports of goods and services, which in 1980 had fallen 
significantly, recovered partially in 1981, when it rose by about 2%. In 1981 the expansion of 
domestic demand continued to weaken, growing by only 3.5 % after increasing at an average rate of 
5% in the previous two years and an average of approximately 12% between 1971 and 1978. 
Investment was the component of expenditure most seriously affected by the scanty expan-
sion of economic activity, and in fact gross fixed investment barely rose above the previous year's 
level (its increase is estimated to be below 1 %), as a result of the decline that private investment 
appears to have registered and the scanty growth of public investment, which was limited by 
financial problems. 
The drop in private investment was especially evident in construction, which was affected by 
the high costs of inputs and financing and the fact that sales of dwellings and commercial premises 
came virtually to a halt. As a result, the volume of imports of construction materials dropped to 
half and the planned building area in the three main cities fell by 17%. Investment in machinery 
and equipment also diminished, being affected by similay financial problems, the lack of liquidity 
and gloomy expectations concerning a foreseeable expansion in the main economic activities. This 
view was reflected in the fact that the volume of imports of capital goods for industry declined by 
20% in 1981, that of capital goods for agriculture fell by 39% and that of transport equipment 
remained practically at the samel level. 
(b) Growth of the main sectors 
In contrast with the evolution of the product by kind of economic activity observed over the 
past decade, the rate of growth of the production of goods registered in 1981 was similar to the 
rates recorded for basic services and other services, owing to the considerable loss of dynamism in 
the latter two categories of activities (see table 3). 
Some minor progress in the growth of agriculture and manufacturing, together with the 
notable recovery of mining, in which the production of hydrocarbons has a considerable share, 
explains the satisfactory results obtained in the production of goods in 1981. In contrast, construc-
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Figure 1 












Gross domestic producta\ / 
l i l i I Y. I L J I L 
Consumer prices'5 







Balance on current account0 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data 
aAnnual growth rate. 
bPercentage variation from December to December. 
cMfllions of dollars. 
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tion continued to show singular sluggishness for the third consecutive year, in sharp contrast with 
its notable expansion over the period 1973-1976. 
Basic services (especially transport, storage and communications), and commercial activity 
and government services among "other services", turned in greatly reduced growth rates. In 
contrast, provisional information for 1981 indicates a significant rise in financial activities and 
insurance, which is not easy to account for since it is not in keeping with the trends in commercial 
activities, construction and other production activities, nor with the poor situation- presented by 
the external variables. 
(i) Agriculture. Agriculture had a relatively good year in 1981. Except in a few part of the 
country where there was a drought, the rainfall was that of a normal year and benefited the crops, 
especially cereals. Despite these favourable conditions, however, it is estimated that the crop 
farming product increased by only a little over 2%, and although this was more than in previous 
years, it was still very low. Added to these crop farming results were the increases of around 5 % in 
livestock and fisheries production and the rise of about 10% in forestry. They all contributed to the 
4% growth of the sector's total product: the highest rate recorded since 1974 (see table 4). 
In crop farming some long-standing problems persisted, including the high cost of inputs and 
the fixing of very low producer prices. Added to these in 1981 were the difficulties in placing some 
products abroad, in addition to the low prices obtained on external markets. Similar circumstances 
arose within the country for several important items of domestic consumption, owing to excess 
supply which coincided with a contraction of demand, either because of the lower purchasing 
power or the lack of storage capacity of the National Storage and Marketing Enterprise (ENAC), or 
Table 3 
ECUADOR: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 







Electricity gas and water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 















































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, at factor cost the sum of the former does not 
correspond exactly with the latter. 
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else because of the insufficient installed capacity of enterprises processing agricultural products. 
For this reason ENAC was authorized as an exceptional measure to export 200 000 quintals of rice 
and 400 000 quintals of maize from its stocks. 
Production of cereals increased by over 13% in 1981. Rice output reached record levels and 
the harvests of hard maize and wheat were also quite high. The wheat crop, which had fallen to 
very low levels in the past few years, increased by 31% in 1981, but nevertheless this grain 
continued to be imported in large quantities to supply the domestic market.1 Among the agricultu-
ral export commodities, an outstanding feature was the bumper coffee harvest, which was 32% 
higher than in 1980, despite the severe fall in the world price. The average price of Ecuador's coffee 
exports, which had already dropped 25 % in 1980, fell a further 22% in 1981. Added to this was the 
reduction to 61 000 tons of the export quota assigned to Ecuador by the International Coffee 
Organization and the rise in domestic production costs. 
Table 4 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador, the Planning Office and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
"Preliminary figures. 
•According to import licences, 247 000 tons were imported in 1981, i.e., 25% more than in 1980 and six times more 




Cocoa and bananas registered decreases in production during the year. In addition to the low 
external prices, which went down by 21% in 1980 and 27% in 1981, cocoa was affected by the 
smaller demand from processing enterprises in the country. Banana production, for its part, 
suffered the effects of lower external demand, rises in the prices of inputs and difficulties in the 
aerial fumigation of plantations. The harvest of sugar cane also declined, owing to high production 
costs and (in the opinion of entrepreneurs) unremunerative controlled prices, which were only 
adjusted in October but then provoked public protest demonstrations. 
In contrast, 1981 saw a notable increase in the production of cotton, which gave rise to sales 
problems owing to the insufficient processing capacity of the cotton gins and the suspension of 
purchases by ENAC for lack of funds. 
Among the agricultural commodities destined mainly for the domestic market, mention may 
be made of the excellent results of African palm oil production, which increased by 43% to nearly 
three times the level of 1978. Production of potatoes and yuca, together with fruit and vegetables, 
registered slight increases in 1981, but the production of pulses fell by 5.6%. 
During the year, the Government repeatedly had to revise official prices because of the 
maladjustments occasioned by rises in production costs or the overproduction of some crops, such 
as cotton. The Government also intervened in the difficult situation faced by coffee and cocoa 
producers, reducing the tax payable on these commodities and adopting other measures to benefit 
these activities. 
With the aim of expanding the system of marketing agricultural commodities, the Banco 
Nacional de Fomento began to participate in the marketing of poultry in Quito and Guayaquil. 
Later on it proposes to extend its action to commodities such as rice, maize and soya beans, through 
the establishment of mixed marketing enterprises. 
While cattle stocks continued to increase (by a little over 2%) in 1981, supported by imports 
of fine breeding stock, the production of beef rose by about 3% and output of milk by 2%.2 As 
regards the production of other kinds of meat, pork and poultry meat output registered increases of 
6% and 9%, respectively, and that of mutton went up by somewhat less than 2%. 
Fishing activities, for their part, continued to develop at a relatively high rate (about 5%), 
notwithstanding the problems deriving from the rise in the price of fuels, which even caused the 
temporary stoppage of fisheries operations and of industries processing these products. The price 
of diesel oil, which had risen from 3.42 to 11 sucres per gallon, was soon reduced to 7 sucres per 
gallon, exclusively for the fisheries sector, with the idea of gradually adjusting it in the ensuing 
months until it returned to 11 sucres. 
The volume of exports of fisheries products is a good indicator of the level of this activity. 
During the year about 152 000 tons of these products were exported, or 3.7% more than in 1980. 
The last two years have witnessed rapid growth of the culture of shrimps to which the Govern-
ment has given intensive support by granting coastal plots and credit facilities. The Central Bank 
and the Ministry of Natural Resources established a credit line equivalent to about US$ 40 million 
for shrimp culture in an area of 16 000 hectares. Thus, the volume of shrimp exports rose from 
5 500 tons in 1979 to 11 200 tons in 1981, their value being US$ 77 million in the latter year. 
Significant advances were made in 1981 in agricultural, forestry and fisheries development 
programmes as part of the 1980-1984 Development Plan, although budget cuts prevented the 
goals established for the year from being fully attained. In the evaluation of the 1981 Operational 
Plan, only the progress made in the integrated rural development programme, with six projects 
under way, was considered to be satisfactory; the rest of the programmes in the sector were 
regarded as below that level. 
The implementation of the agrarian reform programme was considered "relatively accepta-
ble". In 1981 approximately 56 000 hectares were taken over to benefit 6 500 families, and nearly 
42 000 hectares were assigned to another 3 900 families, but all these figures were lower than 
those for the previous year. 
2According to import licences, imports of powdered milk dropped from 7 100 tons in 1980 to 3 200 tons in 1981. 
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The Marginal Rural Development Fund (FODERUMA), intended to provide assistance and 
social services to very low-income rural communities, carried out several programmes in 1981 
which benefited 342 000 rural workers and cost 146 million sucres. Two-thirds of this sum was 
invested in the organization of special programmes for the development of production and social 
welfare, while the remaining third was used to provide credit, mainly for crop farming and 
stock-raising activities. 
(ii) The petroleum industry. The excess supply in the face of depressed demand observed in 
the world petroleum market during the year did not have major consequences for Ecuador, since it 
affected neither the extraction of crude petroleum, which rose by about 3 % to 76.8 million barrels, 
nor its export, which went up in volume by approximately 15%, while its value grew by 12% to 
US$ 1 560 million (see table 5). 
Nevertheless, at some moments during the year there were difficulties in marketing the 
product abroad, which led to the accumulation of large stocks inside and ouside the country (in 
Bonaire in the Caribbean) at a significant cost. Similarly, between January and October there was a 
gradual deterioration in the average sales prices of crude, from US$ 40.3 per barrel to US$ 32. In 
the last two months, prices showed some recovery to US$ 33.80, which gave an average sales price 
for the year of US$ 34.20 per barrel, i.e., just under the US$ 35 recorded in 1980. 
The incorporation of new production fields such as Yuca Sur, Culebra, Yulebra, Auca Sur and 
Pasaltena, all situated in the Amazon region, helped to increase the volume of petroleum extracted 
from nearly 205 000 barrels per day in 1980 to 210 400 barrels in 1981, notwithstanding the 
decrease in the natural flow of oil in many wells. 
In 1981, 59% of the production of crude was exported. The refineries processed 5% less 
petroleum than in 1980, mainly as a result of brief disruptions in the Esmeraldas refinery, which 
resulted in a drop in the production of fuel oil and diesel oil. 
The rapid growth rate of domestic consumption of petroleum-derived fuels continued to 
decline during the year, and their sale in the country, which had risen by 13.5 % and 10% in the two 
Table 5 
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ECUADOR: I N D E X OF M A N U F A C T U R I N G PRODUCTION 
General index 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and footwear 
Wood and wood products 
Paper and paper products 
Chemicals, petroleum deriv-
atives, coal, rubber 
and plastic products 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic metal products 
Metal products, machinery 
and equipment 






































































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
preceding years, rose by 7.6% in 1981 (see figure 2). To some extent this was connected with the 
sharp rise in the prices of fuels recorded in February, after they had remained constant at 
extraordinarily low levels since before the big increases in world petroleum prices in 1973-1974. 
As a result of these rises, gasoline prices almost trebled and that of the most widely consumed 
grade of gasoline rose from 4.65 to 15 sucres per gallon.3 
In 1981 various efforts were made to find new deposits of hydrocarbons which would help to 
raise production. Thus, with the aim of intensifying prospection activities and production, the 
Government sent to the National Chamber of Representatives an amendment to the 1972 Law on 
Hydrocarbons, which is expected to attract the participation of foreign enterprises in domestic 
petroleum activities. Furthermore, in 1981 the State petroleum enterprise (CEPE) undertook 
intensive seismic prospection in the Oriente region and offshore and drilled 29 wells in the 
Amazon region, —six more than in 1980. 
Up to the end of 1983 CEPE plans to incorporate 8 new oilfields, which will increase 
production by 35 000 barrels a day and will add some 150 million barrels to the proven reserves.4 
At the end of 1981 the Shushufindi liquefied gas plant started to operate and work was 
completed on the construction of the multi-purpose pipeline which will carry the gas to Quito. 
This plant will produce about 540 000 barrels a year, which is equivalent to approximately 40% of 
total consumption of liquefied gas, to around two-thirds of present output and to 80% of imports. 
Towards the end of the year a drilling platform rented from a Mexican company arrived in the 
Gulf of Guayaquil. This will enable CEPE to develop the Campo Amistad and other structures rich 
in gas reserves located in that zone. 
'The price of kerosene rose from 2.80 to 6 sucres per gallon; that of turbo fuel from 5.34 to 22 sucres and that of diesel 
oil from 3.55 to 11 sucres per gallon, except in the case of diesel fuel sold to fishing companies, which was raised 
temporarily to only 7 sucres per gallon. 
4
 AI though there is some difference of opinion as regards the magnitude of the recoverable proven oil reserves, a 
reasonable estimate places them at around 820 million barrels, which at the present rate of extraction would last a little 
more than 10 years. 
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Figure 2 
ECUADOR: CRUDE PETROLEUM DATA 
Millions of barrels 
J 1 JL I I I i_ 
1 9 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 8 79 80 81 
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In addition to the 175 billion cubic feet of natural gas reserves existing in the Amazon area, 
there are 202 billion cubic feet in the Gulf of Guayaquil, upon whose exploitation depend a number 
of industrial projects to be established in the Guayas province, including a new refinery, a 
petrochemical complex, a polypropylene plant, a fertilizer plant and a steel works. 
(iii) Manufacturing. For the second year in succession manufacturing activities continued to 
lose some of the momentum that had characterized their development. Thus, after growing at a 
rate of around 11 % annually in the period 1974-1979, production increased by 6% in 1980 and by 
less than 5% in 19815 (see table 6). 
The highly diverse problems, both domestic and external, which affected the evolution of the 
economy during the year meant a shortage of financing for industry; rises in the costs of raw 
materials, manpower (partly as a result of the reduced working day) and fuels and electric energy; 
contraction of demand, especially for consumer durables and intermediate goods; and a decline of 
16% in the volume of industrial exports. Thus, 1981 marked a drop in the volume of external sales 
of important products such as petroleum derivatives (-27%), processed cocoa products (-22%), 
sugar (-30%), and household electrical appliances (-19%). 
The important food industry, which accounts for rather more than 40% of total production of 
manufactures, contracted by about 3%, although this was partially offset by the increments in 
beverages and tobacco, the other components of this branch of industry. Production volumes of 
textiles and clothing, wood and wood products, and chemical substances and products for their 
part, grew by an average of around 6%. In contrast, a significant increase was noted in the 
industries manufacturing basic metal products and especially non-metallic minerals, with the 
entry into operation of the new Cemento Nacional cement plant with a production capacity of 
1 500 tons a day. 
According to the surveys of the current situation carried out by the Planning Office it would 
appear that between 1980 and 1981 the utilization of industrial installed capacity as a whole fell 
from 74% to 69% ; that of the consumer durables industry went down from 78% to 70%, and only 
that of capital goods increased, from 72% to 77%. Employment rose by 7% during the year in the 
282 enterprises covered by the survey. 
Furthermore, there was a significant decrease in investment in industry during the year as a 
result of the depressive symptoms observed in general economic activity and the high cost of 
external financing. As noted earlier, one indicator of this phenomenon was the 20% decrease in 
the volume of imports of capital goods for industry and the 5% fall in raw materials and 
intermediate goods for industry. However, credit granted by the national banking system to 
industry up to the end of August (27 417 million sucres) increased by 32% in nominal terms with 
respect to the same period in 1980. 
Thirty-four new enterprises and 19 already in existence applied for benefits under the 
Industrial Development Law during the year, predominant among them being those manufactu-
ring metal products and machinery, chemical products and food and beverages. Apart from the 
entry into operation of the Cemento Nacional cement plant and the entry into production of the 
expansions to Cemento Guapán and the mixed-capital enterprise Fertilizantes Ecuatorianos, there 
were considerable delays during the year in the progress of the main manufacturing projects. 
(iv) Construction. In 1981 the growth rate of construction slowed even further, and over the 
last three years this sector has virtually stagnated. This situation was particularly marked in the 
case of private construction above all during the first half of the year. The public sector, in 
contrast,was able to maintain a certain amount of growth of its activities through the execution of 
some projects for which it was responsible, notwithstanding the financial difficulties it had to face. 
Similar problems to those affecting the general economic situation were also the cause of the 
loss of momentum in construction. In the first place, sales of dwellings and commercial premises 
virtually ceased and, secondly, construction costs soared owing to the higher cost of labour, 
5This decline in the growth rate of manufacturing production in 1981 is not consistent with that of the sector's gross 
product, which grew faster in 1981 than in the previous year. 
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financing, and especially construction materials, which were also in short supply. As a result of the 
conflict with Peru, imports of cement from that country were discontinued, causing a temporary 
shortage of cement and sharp unauthorized rises in its price.6 Towards the middle of the year the 
Government raised the official price of cement from 65 to 99 sucres per sack. 
As a result of the sector's stagnation, the volume of imports of construction materials fell 
25% during the year. The lesser dynamism of private construction was also clear from the 33% 
decrease in the area proposed to be built in Quito, and in the case of house construction the decline 
was as much as 40%. On the other hand, the area proposed to be built in Guayaquil rose by 21% 
and in Cuenca by 5%. 
The construction of dwellings intended mainly for the low- and middle- sectors, in contrast, 
registered a notable increase during the year. The Banco Ecuatoriano de la Vivienda (BEV) and the 
National Housing Board (JNV), which in 1980 had constructed around 6 000 dwellings and 
"housing solutions",7 started work on approximately 14 000 units in 1981. At the same time, BEV 
obtained financing from the Banco Ecuatoriano de Desarrollo for the equivalent of some US$ 24 
million in order to continue the housing programmes in Guayaquil and US$ 63 million from the 
World Bank and the International Development Association to initiate a plan for the construction 
of 4 500 dwellings in Quito. This was done without neglecting construction programmes in other 
parts of the country, in particular in some rural areas which are being given special attention. 
For its part, the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS) also fulfilled to a high degree its 
house construction programmes, which comprised 10 900 units, or 34% more than in 1980. It also 
raised the amount of its mortgage loans to IESS members from 600 000 to 850 000 sucres. 
Apart from the construction of dwellings and health and educational premises, the Govern-
ment continued to make headway in road construction and, jointly with State enterprises, 
participated in the construction of dams and of infrastructure for the major projects considered in 
the 1980-1984 Development Plan. 
During 1981 progress was made in the construction of approximately 270 kilometres of 
highways, without counting the construction of two stretches of the Ibarra-San Lorenzo highway, 
for which a sum equivalent to about US$ 25 million was assigned. Special emphasis was also placed 
during the year on the construction of local roads, which are of great importance for agriculture 
and the marketing of agricultural products. At mid-year, 470 kilometres of such roads were under 
construction, and towards the end of the year the Ministry of Public Works came to an agreement 
with the provincial authorities of Guayas to build a further 590 kilometres. 
(v) Electric power. In the course of the year only the 51 MW Santa Rosa thermal plant,desig-
ned to provide Quito with electricity, came into service, apart from several small plants, some of 
them hydroelectric. With these contributions the country's installed electric generating capacity 
increased by about 8%, to approximately 1 200 MW, of which about 80% is of thermal origin. The 
generation of electricity increased by a similar proportion, since although the new potential 
incorporated operated for only part of the year, the progress made in the interconnection of 
electricity systems enabled fuller use to be made of the installed capacity. 
At the same time, work continued on the construction of the Paute hydroelectric plant, whose 
first two phases are expected to be completed in 1982 and which will add 500 MW to the country's 
electric power capacity. Progress also continued in the execution of the rural electrification 
programme by the State electricity enterprise. 
6The shortage of cement was later solved through imports from other countries and the entry into operation of a new 
plant, Cemento Nacional, with a capacity of 1 500 tons per day. 
'The so-called "housing solutions" are basic dwellings which are handed over to the recipients benefiting from this 




3. The external sector 
(a) Merchandise trade 
Ecuador's favourable merchandise trade balance fell in 1981 from just under US$ 330 to 
US$ 210 million. On the one hand, exports increased by barely 1.5%, affected by low prices and 
restricted demand for several of the main export products. This was reflected in a small increase of 
2% in the volume exported and a slight deterioration in the unit value of exports (see table 7). 
Imports of goods, for their part, continued to increase and grew by 7%, which was more than 
in the previous year but much lower than the unusually high rates recorded in the three year period 
1977-1979. To a large extent the increase in the value of imports was due to the higher prices, 
which rose 6.6%; in contrast, they do not seem to have shown any great change in volume. 
As a result of the movement of the unit values of both trade currents, the terms of trade 
suffered a deterioration of 7%, which caused a decrease of 5.5% in the purchasing power of 
exports of goods. Nevertheless, in the last five years the terms-of-trade index has improved by 
22% and the purchasing power of exports by 24%. By way of comparison, in the five previous 
years these increments came to 91% and 260%, respectively (see figure 3). 
(i) Exports. The insignificant increase registered by exports of goods in 1981 represented an 
abrupt break in the marked upward trend (20% annually) shown since 1976. This phenomenon 
was influenced by highly diverse situations with respect to the main export products. Among the 
factors common to them all, however, mention should be made of the difficulties in placing 
products on the external markets; the low prices for several important export commodities; and 
the gradual decline in the effective real rate of exchange (7.6% in 1981), which has detracted from 
the competitiveness of Ecuadorian products on external markets and has reduced the domestic 
exporter's profit rates. 
Notwithstanding the slackening of demand for crude petroleum at the world level, owing to 
the restrictions on consumption and the utilization of reserves, sales of Ecuadorian petroleum 
increased by approximately 15% in volume (to about 45 million barrels) and 12% in value; its 
average price dropped slightly from US$ 35.20 to US$ 34.20 per barrel in 1980. In addition, there 
were some important changes in the destination of these sales. Notable in this respect was the 
initiation of sales to Korea to a value of US$ 500 million, and the appreciable increment in those 
destined for the United States, which rose from US$ 276 to US$ 450 million. 
Table 7 
ECUADOR: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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ECUADOR: EVOLUTION OF PURCHASING POWER OF 
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ECUADOR 
In contrast, exports of petroleum products fell in both volume (-27%) and value (-14%). 
Other important commodities whose sales decreased were bananas, coffee and processed 
cocoa products (see table 8). 
Exports of bananas declined by 12%. Although the world price did not fall, internal problems 
raised costs and reduced production. 
For their part, sales of coffee went down by 19% owing to a 22% drop in price following the 
previous year's fall of 25%. The volume exported of (56 000 tons) was slightly larger than that 
recorded in 1980, but it was still 40% below the average exported in 1978 and 1979, and it was not 
enough to fill even the reduced quota of 61 000 tons assigned to the country by the International 
Coffee Organization. 
Exports of cocoa beans increased by close to 47% and fisheries products by 26%, despite the 
stoppages in the fishing and related processing industries in protest against the rise in the price of 
fuels. With respect to marine products, a significant increase was noted in exports of shrimps, 
which exceeded US$ 77 million thanks to the rapid development of their culture on the coast in the 
last few years. 
The volume of cocoa exports, which had fallen steadily from 69 000 tons in 1974 to 14 000 in 
1980, doubled during the year, although the average sales price, which had been decreasing since 
1978, dropped by 28%. On the other hand, sales of processed cocoa products, whose value was six 
times that of sales of cocoa beans in 1980, fell by 42% owing to similar declines in volume and 
price. 
Exports of other processed products, which had nearly trebled in the previous two years, 
suffered a decline of 12% attributable entirely to the reduction of sugar sales to one-third in both 
volume and price. 
Various measures adopted during the year were designed to make export products more 
competitive and improve the financing of these operations. Thus with the aim of promoting 
external sales, the rate of interest on advances on exports granted by the Central Bank was reduced 
from 6% to 4% annually. Secondly, the scales of ad valorem taxes on exports of coffee and cocoa 
were also reduced.8 Finally, with similar aims, a fund for the financing of exports was set up with 
IDB and domestic resources and will be administered by the Export Promotion Fund. 
Table 8 
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Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"The data are based on export permits, so the totals do not match the ones in table 7. 
SA proportion of 96% of the revenue from the tax on coffee exports is distributed as follows: 40% to a buffer fund to 
stabilize the price of this commodity, 20% to a coffee development and productivity fund, and the rest to a fund for credit to 
coffee growers. The proceeds of the tax on cocoa are distributed in a similar manner to benefit this activity. 
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(ii) Imports of goods. The difficulties with respect to export markets and prices and the 
decrease in international reserves led to the adoption of various measures aimed at containing 
imports. Preliminary balance-of-payments information indicates a 7% increase in imports of 
goods, which is slightly higher than in the previous year but considerably lower than their annual 
growth rate (26%) in the period 1977-1979. As noted earlier, the increase in imports in 1981 was 
entirely due to rises in prices, since the increase in volume was negligible (see table 7). 
According to Central Bank9 import registers, the most drastic decreases in 1981 were in 
consumer goods (which had increased most in 1980) and construction materials, which had also 
risen sharply in the previous year. In contrast, considerable increments took place in the value of 
imports of transport equipment and, to a lesser degree, of capital goods and materials for 
agriculture, while imports of fuels, which are of little relative importance, also continued to rise 
(see table 9). 
Imports of capital goods for industry, which up to 1979 had increased fairly rapidly, remained 
practically unchanged in 1980, while in 1981 they decreased. In contrast, purchases of raw 
materials and intermediate goods for industry dropped to one-third of their previous growth rate 
in 1980 and then barely increased in 1981. 
The performance of the various types of imports during the year reflected, on the one hand, 
the loss of dynamism in industrial and construction activities in the last few years and, on the other 
hand, the effects of the measures adopted to contain imports, especially those which raised the 
prior import deposits.10 At the same time, import tariffs were raised for 506 items, mainly luxury 
goods, and towards the end of the year imports of motor vehicles were prohibited. 
Table 9 




































































































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Corresponds to imports permits granted. The total includes a relatively insignificant group of unclassified imports. 
9The total amount of these import registers, not all the transactions in which were necessarily carried out, and the 
values of which are expressed in CIF values, differs from the figures in the balance of payments. Unlike the latter, the 
import registers do not show any substantial variation in imports in 1981. 
10The following percentages were established 15 % of the value of imports in list I, section B; 20% on compensation or 
barter imports in list II, and 50% for goods included in list II. In addition, the holding time for the deposits paid in respect of 
imports on list II was increased from 180 to 270 days. 
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(b) The current account deficit and its financing 
The balance of payments current account deficit deteriorated sharply from some US$ 615 
million in 1980 to US$ 940 million in 1981. This was due primarily to the increase in interest 
payments on the external debt, which amounted to US$ 550 million net in 1981, and secondly to 
the increase in the trade deficit as a result of the scant rise in exports of goods and services 
compared with that noted in imports. Net remittances of profits rose by only US$ 15 million. In 
the last five years the balance-of-payments current account position has rapidly worsened, passing 
from an average deficit of US$ 215 million in the period 1975-1977 to one three times larger in the 
ensuing three years and then to US$ 940 million in 1981 (see table 10). 
Concurrently with the increase in the current account deficit there was a smaller net inflow of 
capital (US$ 310 million) in 1981 ; so that the balance of payments closed with a deficit of a little 
over US$ 360 million and the country's international reserves fell by US$ 380 million. There had 
been no decrease in reserves since 1975, and in that year it was only US$ 65 million. Total 
international reserves dropped from US$ 1 030 million at the end of 1980 to US$ 650 million at 
the end of 1981, a sum barely equivalent to two-and-a-half months of imports. 
The smaller net inflow of capital registered in 1981 is explained by the fact that the gross 
inflow under the heading of long-term loans did not vary with respect to 1980, whereas 
amortization payments on such loans amounted to US$ 84 million more than in the previous year. 
In addition, there was a net outflow of US$ 91 million of short-term capital —compared with only 
US$ 8 million in 1980— and an outflow of US$ 153 million (US$63 million in 1980) for 
unspecified items included under the heading of errors and omissions. 
(c) External indebtedness 
At the end of 1981 the long-term external debt was approximately US$ 4 820, while the total 
external debt amounted to US$ 5 540 million. Four-fifths of the total indebtedness was public and 
the remainder private, and in the case of the long-term debt, the share of the public sector was a 
little over 87% (see table 11). 
In 1981 the external debt with a term of over one year grew by 19% which is a little less than 
the rates registered in the last two years and bears no relation to what happened between 1976 and 
1978 when the balance of the external debt rose from US$ 700 to US$ 1 260 million. 
The border conflict with Peru caused the economic authorities to revise and reduce the 
programme of investments and projects established for 1981, postponing or suspending the 
execution of those on a lower scale of priority. This made it possible to channel financing towards 
objectives of more immediate necessity and was reflected in the contraction of public sector 
borrowing from a total of close to US$ 1 400 million in 1980 to a little over US$ 900 million in 
1981. This was accompanied by considerable changes in the sources of credit. Thus, credit from 
international private banks and suppliers was halved and that granted by international institutions 
fell by 30%. Only loans contracted with foreign governments increased, among them the resources 
provided by the Agency for International Development (AID) for the Integrated Rural 
Development Project and the project connected with the development of alternative energy 
sources. 
Of the total loans contracted by the public sector in 1981, 22% were obtained from 
international institutions, 18% from governments, 58% from foreign banks and 2% from 
suppliers. The change in the origin of loans also led to improvements in their terms, especially as 
regards the extension of their maturity. Thus, the proportion of loans with a term of over 10 years 
increased from 18% in 1980 to 22% in 1981. 
In spite of the substantial drop in the contracting of credit for the public sector, disbursements 
totalled US$ 1.4 billion in 1981, i.e., 9% more than in the previous year. Credit procured by the 
public sector —which represented 87% of the total— rose by 25%, while that obtained by the 
private sector fell drastically for the second year running (see table 11). This was partly due to the 
fact that the high interest rates in the international financial markets, contrasting with the low real 
rates in the country and the weakening of domestic economic activity, helped to discourage private 
381 
Table 10 
ECUADOR: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Trade balance 
Profits and interest 
Profits 
Interest 
Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 


















Errors and omissions 
Net capital movements 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates and increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 













































































































































































































































































Source: 1976-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of data 
supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
cIn addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




external indebtedness in the last two years and tended rather to stimulate the outflow of private 
capital from the country. 
Servicing of the external debt, for its part, rose by 32%, i.e., much more rapidly than 
disbursements. The rise was especially marked in the case of interest payments, which went up 
from US$ 410 million in 1980 to over US$ 670 million in 1981, so that for the first time they 
exceeded the amount paid under the heading of amortization (US$ 650 million). Servicing of the 
total external debt, (which also includes short-term loans) amounted to a much higher figure 
(US$ 2 110 million in 1981), of which US$ 800 million represented interest and US$ 1 310 
million amortization payments. This sum was 50% higher than the amount paid in the previous 
year and was equal to 72% of the value of exports of goods and services. 
(d) Evolution of the real exchange rate 
In* 1981 approximately 70% of total foreign exchange transactions were effected at the 
official exchange rate of 25 sucres to the dollar. This rate, applicable to trade transactions and 
operating under the control of the Central Bank, has remained unchanged since 1970. The rest of 
the exchange operations are effected at a fluctuating exchange rate on the free market, in which 
private banks, foreign exchange offices and the Central Bank participate; the Central Bank began 
to intervene in this market from the middle of 1981 onwards with a view to regulating the price of 
the dollar. Nevertheless, the free exchange rate, which in the previous 5 years had increased by 
barely 10%, rose by nearly 19% between the beginning and end of 1981 from 28.4 to 33.7 sucres to 
the dollar, and in November reached a peak of 35 sucres. '1 This increase was the result of a series of 
Table 11 
ECUADOR: EXTERNAL DEBT 
Millions of dollars Growth rates 
1979 1980 1981 1980 1981 
Long-term debt 












Total external debt 




Service as a percentage 


















































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Meanwhile, consumer prices in Quito increased 74% between 1975 and 1980 and 16.4% in 1981. 
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circumstances which gave rise to a bigger demand for dollars, such as the outflow of capital in 
search of higher rates of interest, the fall in the international reserves and the growing 
expectations of devaluation. 
In contrast with the small real increase in the free market exchange rate, the effective 
exchange rate on the official market fell by about 10% in 1981 (see table 12 and figure 4). This fall 
was influenced, on the one hand, by the fact that Ecuadorian inflation in 1981 exceeded that of its 
principal trade partners, especially the United States with which Ecuador carries on practically 
40% of its foreign trade and, on the other hand, by the revaluation of the dollar with respect to the 
yen and the principal European currencies.12 In view of this new fall in the effective real exchange 
rate and the almost continuous downward trend which it followed during the 1970s, its level in 
1981 was about 30% lower than at the beginning of the previous decade. In these circumstances, as 
noted earlier, imports tended to become less expensive than the corresponding domestic products, 
while exportable products became relatively more expensive, thereby reducing the 
competitiveness of Ecuadorian products.13 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) Domestic price trends 
The rate of inflation increased once again in 1981. Thus, the consumer price index in Quito, 
measured from December to December, registered a rise of close to 18% in 1981: the highest 
recorded since 1974, when the index surprisingly rose by about 22%. Since then (1975-1980) the 
annual increment in domestic prices has been around 12%, increasing in 1980, to 14.5%. The 
variation in the 1981 index between annual averages was a little over 16% (see table 13). 
Table 12 
ECUADOR: EVOLUTION OF INDEXES OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 









































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from IMF, Supplement of Exchange Rates and International Financial Statistical. 
"These indexes correspond to the indexes of the real exchange rate of the sucre with respect to currencies of countries with 
which trade is carried on, weighted by the relative importance of exports or imports, as the case may be, to or from those 
countries. 
12For the methodology and sources used in calculating the effective real rate of exchange, see the technical appendix at 
the end of Part Two of this Survey. 
"These trends do not however, take account of the effects of tariffs, quotas, prior deposits and other measures applied 
to imports on the price of imported products, nor the effects of subsidies, tax refunds, tax exemptions and other benefits 




ECUADOR: EVOLUTION OF INDEXES OF EFFECTIVE REAL 
EXCHANGE RATE FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(1980=100) 
1970 71 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data obtained from IMF, Supplement of Exchange 
Rates ma International Financial Statistics. 
: Index of effective real exchange rate for exports. 
: Index of effective real exchange rate for imports. 
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Price increases in Quito came in an intermediate position between the annual average 
variation of 13% in Guayaquil and 18% in Cuenca. 
The temporary expansion of public expenditure due to the hostilities with Peru at the 
beginning of the year and the appreciable adjustment of the prices of petroleum-derived fuels were 
two developments occurring in the early months of the year which it was feared would have severe 
inflationary effects. The rise in fuel prices rapidly affected the costs of transport, production of 
thermal electricity and, in general of manufacturing and agriculture. As a result, the various sectors 
affected insistently requested during the year —with varying results— a revision of their tariffs 
and prices, while the workers pressed for the adjustment of their wages. 
To the aforementioned factors were added others such as the implementation of a more 
realistic price policy for a number of basic consumer products (reflected in the fixing of higher 
prices with the aim of promoting their production); marketing problems which gave rise to 
temporary supply shortages; and the effects of imported inflation. 
The inflationary effects of these factors were, in part, counteracted by the lack of liquidity and 
the restriction of demand, and also by the excellent harvests of some important basic agricultural 
consumer products which, in view of the lack of purchasing power of the State marketing 
enterprise ENAC, were in some cases sold at less than the official prices. 
In the first half of the year the consumer price index rose at a fairly even rate equivalent to 
25 % annually; it remained static in the next two months and then continued rising at a rate of 19% 
annually as from September. The food component of the index followed a similar trend, although 
it was clearly accentuated (30% annually) in the last four months of 1981.H 
(b) Wage policy 
In 1981 the system of adjustment of minimum wages was altered. The old system established 
a scale of minimum wages for workers in general, and for some broad categories of workers. Since 
the wage adjustments were not effected at regular intervals (among other reasons), they some-
times assumed considerable magnitudes which naturally helped to accelerate a rise in domestic 
prices. Thus, the last adjustment at the end of 1979 doubled the minimum wage of workers in 
general from 2 000 to 4 000 sucres a month. 
The labour authorities consequently changed the system of general wage adjustments for 
another which reviews and fixes the levels of wages by sectors of activity. For this purpose, 81 
wages commissions were established with the representation of workers, entrepreneurs and the 
Government; 71 of these commissions determined new wage scales due to come into force in 1982. 
Table 13 
ECUADOR: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX" 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Consumer price index 
Food 
1976 1977 1978 
Variation from December to December 
13.1 9.8 11.7 
14.3 9.0 10.6 
Variation between annual averages 
10.7 13.0 11.7 
















Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Corresponds to the consumer price index for middle- and low-income families in Quito. 
14Among the foodstuffs that increased most in price during the year were the following: yuca and potatoes (106% and 
53%); refined and coarse sugar (54% and 30%); bread and bananas (25%); beef (23%); fish (28%) and rice (10%). On 





ECUADOR: MONETARY BALANCE 
End-year balance (millions of sucres) Growth rates 
Money 
Currecy outside banks 
Demand deposits^ 
Factors of expansion 




Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings 
and time deposits) 
Bonds 






















































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, April 1982. 
"Balance at end of November. 
January-November 1981, with respect to January-November 1980. 
c
 Includes deposits in the Central Bank made by the private sector. 
As a result of the rises in the prices of basic products and services during the year there were a 
great many strikes and stoppages for higher wages, which led to improvements for only some 
sectors of workers. Because of its financial difficulties the Government kept the wages of public 
employees frozen and took on no new personnel. 
Unfortunately, no information is available on the evolution of wages in 1981. According to 
data from some sectors of production, however, it is estimated that, on average, the adjustments 
barely exceeded the increase in domestic prices. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary trends 
In 1981 there was a limited expansion of the means of payment of around 12% if the balances 
at the end of December of each year are compared. Both currency outside banks and demand 
deposits, the two components of the means of payment, increased by similar proportions (13% 
and 11% respectively). These increases were insufficient for the smooth operation of economic 
activity, which suffered from lack of liquidity during the major part of the year. In this respect, it 
should be recalled that production of goods and services increased by 18% in terms of current 
prices and that domestic prices rose by 18% from December to December (see table 14). 
In absolute terms, the issue of money in 1981 was around half that of the previous year. The 
primary issue was 30% below that of 1980, while the secondary issue, originating in the decrease in 
the public's deposits in banks, was 57% less. 
Several factors helped to keep down monetary expansion. The first was the drop in the 
international monetary reserves to two-thirds of their level of the end of 1980. The contractive 
effect of this decline on money issues was also strengthened by the decrease in net credit from the 
Central Bank to the public sector and by the increase in the amount of prior import deposits. 
Another contributory factor was the sales of stabilization bonds and bank acceptances by the 
Central Bank in the securities market, and the Central Bank's intervention in the free exchange 
market, which reduced the liquidity of the financial system by an amount estimated at around 5 
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billion sucres. Nevertheless, the contractive effects of these factors were more than offset by the 
credit assigned to the private sector, which up to November had risen.by approximately 30%, or 
slightly more than the previous year. 
As a consequence of the conflict with Peru, the withdrawal of deposits and the expansion of 
credit to the private sector, there was an increase in money in circulation in the early months of the 
year which the monetary authorities hastened to correct by the adoption of various measures 
including the establishment of a compulsory marginal bank reserve; a maximum increase of 2.5% 
in the balances of active operations for 45 days (except for credits to production and to finance 
exports), and the establishment of higher percentages for prior import deposits, especially on 
luxury goods. 
As from March, the means of payment showed successive increases and decreases and various 
monetary policy instruments were used to regulate them, although not always with that sole 
purpose. This was so, for example, in the case of the changes that were made in the percentage of 
the minimum legal reserves of private banks for their demand deposits, which rose from 25.5% at 
the beginning of April to 28% towards the end of May but thenceforth gradually declined to 22% 
in December. 
In addition, medium- and long-term interest rates were raised with the purpose of 
encouraging domestic saving. Thus, the rate for savings certificates and time deposits was raised 
from 8% to 13% annually; the rate of long-term bank loans went up from 12% to 15%, while 
short-term credit to industry and agriculture remained at an interest rate of 12%. Nevertheless, 
the real interest rates continued to be negative. External loans were authorized at a rate of over 
12%, provided the interest rate at which they were obtained did not exceed the LIBOR or Prime 
rates plus two points and that it was higher than 12%. 
Another factor which helped to increase the volume of credit, improve the liquidity situation 
and promote exports was a provision which reduced from 6% to 4% annually the interest rate on 
Central Bank operations with individuals in respect of advances on exports.15 Furthermore, the 
interest rates on operations and rediscounts of the Export Promotion Fund in the Central Bank 
were reduced. 
(b) Fiscal and public sector income and expenditure 
Notwithstanding the efforts made to contain public expenditure and reduce the fiscal deficit, 
the latter (which had already increased the year before by about 70%) rose by a little over 140% in 
1981. It thus totalled 20.8 billion sucres and represented 35% of total expenditure: a proportion 
almost double those registered in the previous two years (see table 15). 
This serious financial situation was due to the negligible increment in income —which 
increased only by a little over 1%—and the much greater expansion of expenditure, which rose by 
28%. 
The dynamism developed by expenditure the previous year, when it increased by 64%, 
combined with the extraordinary expenditure caused by the conflict with Peru and the meagre 
prospects of rises in tax revenue and petroleum income owing to the weakening of external trade 
and domestic activities, led the authorities to implement a policy of containing public expenditure, 
while at the same time introducing tax changes whose effects were not generally perceived during 
the year. 
The curtailment of fiscal expenditure mainly affected capital spending which rose 21% 
despite the fact that debt amortization payments alone increased by 80%. Current expenditure 
rose 30%; in particular, the payment of interest on the debt increased 60% to the significant 
amount of close on 5 billion sucres. In addition, current transfers more than doubled in 1981 owing 
to the extraordinary transfers which had to be made to "special accounts", the Defence Board and 
the National Participation Fund (FONAPAR). On the other hand, expenditure on wages and salaries 
"Up to the end of October these advances totalled 14.1 billion sucres, or approximately a quarter of the total credit 
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Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and National Development Council. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Net total income; taxes paid with tax savings certificates and agrarian reform bonds have been deducted. 
cUse or net accumulation of funds during the financial year, according to whether the balance is positive or negative. 
Balance of payments deferred until the next year (positive sign) and of payments made to cover expenditure of the 
previous year (negative sign). 
increased by 16% (similar to the increase in consumer prices in Quito), while purchases of goods 
and services rose by only 9%. Among the restrictive provisions, one of special importance was the 
prohibition of filling vacancies in the public administration. 
As regards fiscal income, its scanty increase was mainly due to the 8% decline in income from 
the petroleum industry to an estimated 13.1 billion sucres, representing one-third of total income. 
On the other hand, traditional income went up by about 7% with tax revenue other than that 
originating in the petroleum industry growing by 10%. The increase in traditional tax revenue in 
1981 derived from increments of 42% in direct taxes, only a little over 3% in indirect taxes, and 
1 % from taxes on foreign trade. 
Notable among the tax measures adopted during the year were the changes introduced in 
taxes on income, commercial transactions and vehicles. Also important were the changes 
introduced in import tariffs, by virtue of which at the end of July taxes were raised on over 500 
import items, mainly non-essential and luxury goods. In contrast, in October the tax scales were 
reduced for coffee and cocoa exports, which were particularly affected by the low world prices of 
these commodities. 
The deficit on the public sector accounts, was 41.6 billion sucres, or 37% higher than the 1980 
figure. Although this increase was considerable, however, it was far below the growth rate of the 
deficit in the budget accounts (140%). 
Total public expenditure was 117.7 billion sucres, or 15% higher than in 1980. While current 
expenditure rose by about 20% (38% in 1980), capital expenditure went up by only a little over 
9%, despite the fact that this includes amortization payments on the debt (17.3 billion sucres) 
which were 21% higher than those paid in 1980. The increment of barely 5.5% in real public 
investment, however, reflects the extent of the restrictions on public expenditure which caused the 
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postponement and delay of important projects. Financial investment, for its part, dropped by 11 % 
(see table 16). 
Approximately 77% of public expenditure was directly or indirectly related to development 
programmes and policies envisaged in the 1981 Operational Plan, in which a sum 25% higher 
than this had been envisaged but was not available, among other reasons, for lack of financial 
resources. About two-thirds of public expenditure was financed in 1981 from ordinary income. 
This increased less than 6% during the year, whereas in 1980 it had risen 43%. Traditional 
income rose 8% and income from petroleum by 4.4%, contrasting with the fall in income from 
this source in the General Budget results. Of the 33.6 billion sucres of petroleum income, 5.2 billion 
were obtained from the rise in the domestic sales prices of hydrocarbons. 
A proportion of 42% of the deficit of 41.6 billion sucres was financed by domestic credit and 
the issue of bonds and 55 % by the disbursement of external credit in an amount slightly lower than 
that of the previous year. 
Table 16 




























































































1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary1 
In 1981 El Salvador was still sunk in the protracted conflict which has aroused worldwide 
attention and has reinforced the climate of uncertainty and polarization of social forces in the 
country. This grave crisis has had profound and dramatic repercussions which could last for several 
generations and which are in some cases totally irreparable, such as the tens of thousands of human 
lives lost. Moreover, the material losses have been so great that their effects will be felt at least 
beyond the medium term. Although it would be premature to try to specify the financial cost of 
economic reactivation and the restoration of the highway, energy, communications, transport, 
productive equipment and housing infrastructures which would be necessary in order to make 
good the damage, any estimate would come to hundreds of millions of dollars at least. 
Other circumstances have also severely affected the distribution and production structures. 
For example, besides the traditional emigration abroad which has mainly been due to the constant 
population explosion, in recent years there has been an exodus of persons of all levels of skills, 
among them many technicians and professionals. Similarly, partly because of the conflict and 
partly because of the search for work opportunities, internal migrations of the population from 
one region to another have continued to expand, whereas in the past such movements only 
occurred during the sugar harvesting season. Finally, the financial difficulties and climate of 
skepticism with respect to the ending of the armed struggle and the prospects for a reactivation of 
the economy have led to neglect the maintenance of machinery, livestock herds and plantations 
and a very severe reduction in the inventories of raw materials and essential inputs. On some 
occasions, the faulty management of equipment or delayed maintenance was due to the fear of acts 
of violence, which were increasingly frequent as the year progressed. 
Added to this very sombre picture were adverse factors of external origin which are described 
below, and which had even more serious economic effects in 1981 than in the previous year. 
In 1981 the country suffered for the third consecutive year from a contraction of economic 
activity. The gross domestic product, which had declined by a little under 2 % in 1979 and by nearly 
10% in 1980, again contracted by a similar amount to the previous year. In the case of gross 
income, the drop was more pronounced because the terms of trade deteriorated for the fourth year 
in a row. In other words, over the past three years there has been a decline of 20% in productive 
activity —meaning that the per capita product fell in 1981 to the level of 20 years before— and a 
decrease of 26% in per capita income. The very sharp decline of economic activity was also clearly 
reflected in underemployment and open unemployment. According to official estimates, the latter 
rose from almost 17% in 1980 to 25% in 1981, one of the highest figures in Latin America. The 
negative effect of this increase was also reinforced by a decline of almost 13% in real wages and 
salaries (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The critical economic situation again reflected a combination of domestic factors —especially 
the armed conflict— and those of foreign origin. Among the latter was the international economic 
recession, which affected almost all the countries of the region in varying degrees in 1981 and thus 
also contributed to a loss of dynamism in trade with Central America. 
1
 Although the economic situation in El Salvador in 1981 is presented in this chapter according to the outline usually 
used in the Survey, the impact of extra-economic factors on the development of the national economy is treated more 
thoroughly than before. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that the structural causes and persistence of external 
limitations which have been contributing to the division of Salvadorian society for several years were accompanied in 1981 
by the dramatic situation of large contingents of the population who were forced to reduce the satisfaction of their basic 
needs substantially in the face of a gradual decline in economic activity and growing job instability. 
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Indeed, since the sharp deterioration of the terms of trade in 1981 came on top of the drop of 
almost 30% suffered by the latter in the three previous years, it was a serious obstacle which would 
have affected the economic situation even if there had not been such an intense political conflict, 
for while there was a moderate increase in the prices of imports, this was accompanied by a very 
sharp drop in the prices of coffee and cotton, the two products which account for most of the 
income of the country. 
Likewise, although the volume of imports dropped because of the application of a more 
restrictive buying policy —due in particular to the meager levels of international reserves— the 
recession caused a severe contraction in export volumes. The resulting deterioration in the balance 
of payments was reflected in three facts: (a) the negative trade balance quadrupled; (b) the current 
account deficit more than doubled, and (c) the international reserves decreased sharply for the 
Table 1 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries' 
Unemployment rate 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Real minimum wages of agricultural worker, except for harvesting of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. 
''Percentages. 
'Surplus. 
Disbursed external debt public. 
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third consecutive year. Despite a considerable increase in foreign loans —which were not always 
allocated to productive sectors or infrastructural works— El Salvador maintained a relatively 
small medium- and long-term external debt, especially compared with that of other Central 
American countries.2 However, it should be noted that short-term indebtedness continued to 
increase significantly. 
One of the weakest points in the 1981 economic situation was the growing imbalances in the 
Government finances, although it may be assumed that they were not due to inflation, since the 
rate of the latter declined from 19% in 1980 to 12% in 1981 as a result of the stabilization 
programme and the careful management of the monetary variables. Tax collection, however, 
suffered the effects of the recession and the drop in the international prices of export products, and 
this counteracted the increase in the collection of other taxes, whose trend depends essentially on 
the rise in prices. Despite the austerity policy and strict selectivity in outlays, expenditure rose 
more rapidly than current income, thus resulting in'a rise of more than US$ 80 million in the 
Government deficit, compared with an increase of approximately US$ 400 million in the latter 
during the previous year. Similarly, financial imbalances became worse in some public enterprises, 
such as that responsible for the distribution of electricity, due to the fact that, on the one hand, 
electricity consumption decreased, while on the other, the generation of electric power suffered 
sizeable losses from the acts of violence which affected the transmission lines, the repair of which 
required extraordinary expenditures. 
During 1981 the restrictive nature of the monetary policy was accentuated. Contributory 
factors in this were the contraction of the international reserves and the orientation of net 
domestic credit, which went largely to the central government, to the detriment of credit to public 
institutions and the private sector. In order to help contain the inflationary process, the monetary 
authorities chose not to expand the creation of money and tried to remedy the public finance 
situation rather than seeking to promote productive activity, in view of the apparent irreversibility 
of the recession due to the imbalance in the productive apparatus, and especially the extremely 
unfavourable behaviour of the external variables. • 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
In 1981 the degree of contraction of the economy was relatively similar to that registered the 
previous year, but it was more serious because it occurred for the third consecutive year. Thus, over 
the past three years total supply has dropped nearly 25%, the decrease in the volume of imports 
being much more pronounced than that of the domestic product (see table 2). 
The causes of the decline in productive activity were mostly the same as those observed in 
1980,3 but they were made even worse by an attitude of deep skepticism with regard to the 
short-term prospects of the country, which contributed to the fact that only minimal production 
programmes were established, and almost all investment was stopped. Various other factors also 
had an influence on this situation: the intensification and territorial expansion of the conflict 
—which had an undoubted impact on agricultural activity— together with frequent acts of 
sabotage affecting the productive apparatus and distribution machinery; the delayed effects of a 
certain neglect of the productive equipment since the beginning of the confrontation, particularly 
in industry but also in the agricultural sector, where there was some lack of care of livestock herds 
and plantations; the natural delay before the reforms carried out by the Government could bear 
fruit, and finally the deterioration of the Central American market on which some previously very 
dynamic activities basically depended. In summary, during 1981 the economy operated with a high 
percentage of idle capacity, and the obstacles encountered —fundamentally financial— made it 
necessary to resort to a large extent to the running down of inventories of raw materials. 
2In 1981 the medium- and long-term external public debt was a little under US$ 635 million. As a comparison, the per 
capita external debt amounted to slightly over 10% of that of Costa Rica. 
'See the chapter on El Salvador in the Economic Survey of Latin America 1980, CEPAL, Santiago, Chile. 
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Figure 1 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1970 71 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. 
^December - December percentage variation. 
cMillions of dollars. 
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At the same time, the volume of imports was nearly 40% lower than that of three years 
before. This was mainly due to the decrease in the purchasing power of the country, partly because 
of the accumulated effect of the trade deficits which were not offset by entry of capital, thus 
resulting in a substantial decline in the international reserves. The drop in these reserves, along 
with the growing imbalance in the Government finances, led the authorities to adopt a 
stabilization programme early in 1981, which caused external purchases to contract even further. 
On the demand side, the depression was very generalized under almost all headings for the 
third consecutive year and was manifested in declines of around 9% in both domestic demand and 
in export volume. In the latter case, the principal causes of the decline were the low levels of 
production of the principal export products and the above-mentioned weakness in the Central 
American market. As regards domestic demand, the deterioration in gross fixed investment was 
very significant, since it decreased by approximately 14%, due to similar declines in investment 
made by the public sector and by private activity, resulting in a notable drop in construction and a 
radical decline in purchases of equipment and machinery. As stocks of goods also declined, total 
investment fell by more than 18% during the year, thus making a descent of nearly 70 % in the past 
three years. 
From the point of view of private consumption, the situation became extremely serious 
because of the deterioration in real wages and the increase in levels of unemployment and 
underemployment. This decline, along with that of the two previous years, resulted in a decrease in 
personal consumption of around 18% in the past three years (see table 2). These dramatic results 
imply that at the same time the structure of private consumption must have undergone a rapid 
change, with a relative increase in the demand for essential goods such as food, to the detriment of 
demand for other less necessary goods. Despite this fact, the drop in absolute values of food 
consumption, largely caused by the insufficiency of supply, reflected a substantial reduction in the 
satisfaction of basic needs. 
Table 2 
EL SALVADOR: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 




Machinery and equipment 




Exports of goods and services 









































































































































Source: ECLA estimates on the basis of official data supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed indollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values by deflation, using price indexes calculated by ECLA for 
the purpose. 
395 
Finally, government consumption fell slightly for the first time in recent years, as a result of 
the stabilization policy adopted by the authorities early in 1981. 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
Although the intense depression of economic activity was not in itself worse than that of the 
previous year, when added to the former it obviously aggravated the already critical situation. With 
the exception of government activity and ownership of dwellings, the value added by the rest of the 
sectors declined in various degrees, the most pronounced drops being in manufacturing, commerce 
and transport (see table 3). 
(i) Agriculture. The decline in agricultural activity was less pronounced than in economic 
activity as a whole, but because of the importance of this sector as a generator of foreign exchange 
and employment and as a supplier of essential goods its deterioration was one of the principal 
maladjustments of 1981. 
There was a decline in the harvests of almost all crops, both for export and for domestic 
consumption, and in many cases for the second or third year in a row. As a result of this, levels of 
production were lower than those of 1978 in all cases (see table 4). 
Among the strictly economic causes of this decline, one of the most decisive was the behaviour 
of the international prices of some of the principal products exported by the country —coffee, 
cotton, sugar and beef—, whose gradual decline increasingly discouraged production and at the 
same time led to neglect of the plantations, equipment and livestock herds. To this were added 
such problems as lack of availability of credit and difficulties in obtaining inputs such as fertilizers 
and weed killers, due to the lack of foreign exchange. 
Table 3 
EL SALVADOR: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels' 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
i * d personal services Government services 




























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 




EL SALVADOR: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
1978 1979 1980 1981" 
Growth rates 
1978 1980 1981° 
Index of agricultural , „ , , « , . „ y , , „ „(,
 2 9 - 9 x , 
product ion (1968 = 100) n ¿ A °5-4 1 4 0 - J liJ,J Í J r y ^ 
Crop farming 146.4 150.3 142.8* 133-1* 3.9 -5.0 -6.8 
Stock-raising 173.0 173.2 160.4* 161.8* 0.1 -7.4 0.9 
Product ion of the main crops ' 
Coffee 3 521 3 807 3 600 3 436 8.1 -5.4 -4.6 
Ginned cotton 1 713 1 410 1 349 987 -17.7 -4.3 -26.8 
Sugarcane 3 692 3 214 2 415 2 455 -12.9 -24.9 1.7 
Maize 11088 11392 11473 10 078 2.6 0.7 -12.2 
Beans 939 1 010 852 812 7.6 -15.6 -4.7 
Milled rice 1 104 1 266 1 320 1 050 14.7 4.3 -20.5 
Sorghum 3 518 3 485 3 041 3 000 -0.9 -12.7 -1.3 
Indicators of stock-raising 
Number of animal slaughtered 
Cattle 217 203 173 164' -6.5 -14.8 -5.3' 
Pigs 168 150 127 141' -10.7 -15.3 11.0' 
Mil l / 376 410 351 ... 9.0 -14.4 
Eggs* 834 836 781 .„ 0.2 -6.6 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data supplied by the Central Reseve Bank of El Salvador, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Ministry of Planning and Co-ordination of Economic and Social Development. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Estimated on the basis of variations in the value added at constant prices. 
cIn thousands of quintals, with the exception of sugar cane, which is expressed in thousands of tons. 
Thousands of head. 
'Estimated on the basis of variations in livestock slaughtering in the municipal slaughterhouses of departmental capitals 
and export slaughterhouses between the period January-September 1980 and the same period in 1981. 
Millions of bottles. 
"Millions of units. 
Moreover, although the agrarian reform decreed early in 19804 was not fully implemented, it 
at least reached farms of more than 500 hectares, where a high proportion of the cotton, sugar cane 
and livestock and approximately one-fifth of the coffee are produced. An attempt was made to 
maintain the traditional productive structure in the form of co-operatives, but even if there had not 
been extra-economic conflicts in 1981, there would still have been limitations arising from the 
implementation of a process of reform which, according to past experience, almost always requires 
several years to bear fruit and which, in the case of El Salvador, has been affected by the shortage of 
skilled and semi-skilled human resources for managing the expropriated farms. 
To the above restrictions must be added the climate of upheaval which was reflected in the 
gradual increase in acts of sabotage directed against the production, harvesting and distribution of 
many articles and which even affected the production and communications infrastructure. In 
addition, many business groups tenaciously opposed the implementation of the Government's 
economic policy, demanding more credit support and different "rules of the game", which were 
difficult to establish and maintain in view of the precarious financial situation, both domestic and 
foreign, and the growing difficulties caused by the economic and extra-economic obstacles. All 
these factors grew in importance in 1981 and led to a widespread slowdown in agricultural activity. 
4
 At the beginning of 1980 the Government decreed the expropriation of farms of more that 500 hectares, and several 
months later that of properties of 100 to 500 hectares, with the possibility of the latter being awarded to their tenants. 
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In the case of coffee, the principal export product, the further decline of approximately 5 % in 
production was due to two particular causes, besides the general ones already mentioned. After the 
nationalization of foreign trade, and in view of the precarious financial situation of the country, the 
new body created to centralize coffee policy5 chose to accelerate coffee sales as much as possible, 
although the marketing process was less effective because stocks were not sufficient to allow 
speculation with the sale, as had been done before. This situation and the discontent of business-
men, either because of domestic price levels or because of the financial terms of the credit resources 
obtained, led to a slowdown in efforts to increase the coffee harvest during the agricultural year 
1980/1981. This climate of discouragement became worse, moreover, with the gradual deteriora-
tion of prices during the year. Moreover, the lack of attention to the coffee plantations led to the 
spread in 1981 of the damaging effects of rust, an increasingly difficult disease to fight. 
Production of cotton, which is second on the list of commodities generating foreign exchange, 
had been declining since 1978, but in 1981 it dropped by almost 27% to a level less than 58% of 
that registered in the former year. The relative rise in international cotton prices in 1980 did not 
stimulate planting sufficiently, mainly because in the case of this crop the reformed area is very 
large and there are problems in administering it efficiently. 
Although sugar cane was one of the crops most affected by acts of sabotage, production of it 
nevertheless rose by nearly 2% in 1981, after having declined by one-third in the previous two 
years. However, during 1981 the disease called "sugar cane smut" began to affect the plantations 
seriously and undoubtedly had an effect on the 1982 sugar harvest. 
The crisis in the agricultural sector was also reflected in all its intensity in the low production 
of cereal, which created a serious food supply problem. The harvests of beans, maize and especially 
rice went down considerably, and although the drop in the production of sorghum was much less 
severe, it came on top of a previous sharp decline in 1980 (see table 4). This drop in the production 
of cereals and other essential items of the popular diet was one of the most important elements in 
the crisis, and its effects on the satisfaction of such a basic need of the population could not be offset 
by the support given by the Governments of Venezuela and the United States. Moreover, towards 
the middle of the year the Salvadorian Price Regulation Institute froze the prices of these products, 
and although this action helped to keep the inflationary process down, it somewhat discouraged a 
second planting, which is normally carried out at the beginning of the second half of the year. 
As for livestock production, the few indicators obtained are relatively contradictory. On the 
one hand, cattle slaughtering went down once again, but by a smaller amount (-5%) than in the 
previous two years. On the other hand, there appears to have been an 11% increase in pig 
slaughtering, which had sharply contracted in previous years. However, it is possible that these 
indicators, altough they come from official sources, do not reflect the real evolution of production, 
since in recent years the keeping of statistical records has been made extremely difficult, and for 
this reason in some cases it has been necessary to make estimates by indirect means. Moreover, the 
critical conflict situation has made it necessary in certain regions to slaughter animals more or less 
indiscriminately in order to satisfy the need for food. According to official qualitative information, 
poultry production also contracted substantially during 1981, and the same appears to have 
occurred in the case of milk and eggs. 
As regards fishing —an activity which is still quite insignificant despite the financial support 
and technical assistance received in previous years— sufficient information is not available to 
evaluate its evolution. In 1981 the Government took measures to reorganize the sector, and among 
other complementary measures, the Ministry of Agriculture was made responsible for co-
ordinating the implementation of the policy through a General Office of Fishery Resources, which 
thus took over some duties previously carried out by the Ministry of the Economy. 
(ii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing, together with transport, storage and communications, 
was the activity most affected by the crisis. Industrial production, which had already decreased by 
16% in 1980, fell by more than 17% in 1981, dropping toalevel around one-third lower than that 
5
 At the beginning of 1980 the Instituto Salvadoreño del Café (National Coffee Institute) was established, absorbing 
and expanding the functions previously carried out by the Compañía del Café. 
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registered in 1978 (see table 5). This situation had a very unfavourable effect on employment. 
Thus, it is estimated that between the middle of 1980 and the middle of 1981 the number of 
workers in the manufacturing sector contributing to the social security system decreased by 35 000 
persons, which also led to financial imbalances in the system. 
As in 1980, the depression significantly affected all branches of manufacturing. The most 
seriously affected, however, were the industries manufacturing food, beverages and tobacco, 
clothing and leather products, and petroleum products and rubber, in all of which production 
decreased by more than 19%. Especially serious was the slowdown in the production of food, since 
along with the decline in production of cereals mentioned above this had a strong negative impact 
on the satisfaction of some of the basic needs of the population. 
According to the results of an official survey,6 the main cause of the decline in production, in 
contrast with the two previous years, was the lack of imported raw materials. However, the 
informants also mentioned as other causes of the drop in production the insufficient domestic 
demand, problems of financing, and the rise in the cost of raw materials. On the other hand, in 
1981 labour conflicts had almost no influence on the decline in manufacturing activity, although 
they had played a major part in the slowdowns recorded in the two previous years. 
According to this survey, the recession in manufacturing was also manifested in a lower level 
of utilization of installed capacity, which dropped from 77% in 1979 to 72% in 198Ô and 66% in 
the first half of 1981.7 Although the food industry was the one which used its capacity most (75 %), 
Table 5 
EL SALVADOR: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Value added index (1977 = 100) 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles and clothing 
Textiles 
Clothing and leather products 
Wood and paper 
Wood and its manufactures 
Paper and paper products 
Chemicals, petroleum products and rubber 
Chemical products 
Petroleum products and rubber products 
Non-metallic mineral products 
Machinery and metal products 
Machinery and equipment 
Metal products 
Other manufactures 
Other indicators of manufacturing 
production 
Industrial consumption of 





































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Estimated on the basis of January-July variation. 
'Only includes persons who worked 35 hours or more per week. 
6The survey was made by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador with a sample of nearly 30% of all enterprises 
employing more than 100 workers. 
7It is possible that the percentage of idle capacity was even greater in the medium-sized and small enterprises. 
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this nevertheless represented a marked decline. In the metal manufactures and machinery 
industry, the idle capacity was greater, with the rate of use declining from 65% in 1979 to only 
40% in 1981. On the other hand, the percentage of capacity utilized in the chemicals branch stayed 
relatively high, thanks to a group of production units basically oriented towards the Central 
American market, despite the fact that, as mentioned above, the depression and stagnation in the 
other countries of the subregion also affected levels of production. 
In the companies surveyed, the current value of acquisitions of machinery and equipment 
dropped by about 85% between 1979 and 1981, and investment in construction fell by more than 
90%. Of this meager capital formation, slightly less than half was absorbed by the branches 
producing foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco. In view of the low demand for fixed investment in 
both 1980 and 1981, the financing obtained was almost completely used for working capital. In the 
opinion of the businessmen interviewed, among the causes hindering the procurement of finan-
cing was the shortage of lines of credit and the relative increase in the already high interest levels. 
The national banking system continued to be the main source of financing, while contributions 
from abroad declined. 
According to another survey, made by private bodies,8 the political situation was the principal 
cause of the deterioration in production in 1981, followed in order of importance by the shortage of 
foreign exchange, the decline in domestic demand, and the lack of external supply of raw materials. 
In the case of the enterprises connected with the Central American Common Market, an 
important cause was the problem of payments between the countries. This survey coincides with 
that of the Central Bank in indicating that labour conflicts did not constitute a determining factor 
in the contraction of activity. Finally, in the industrial enterprises surveyed, employment declined 
by more than 15% in 1980 and by nearly 14% in the first eight months of 1981. 
(iii) Construction. In 1981 the gross domestic product of construction dropped by 8%, and as 
the decline in the previous two years had been much greater, the level of activities thus barely 
exceeded half of that recorded in 1978 (see table 3). 
The generalized recession again limited private investments. Towards the middle of the 
1970s, construction of medium- and high-level housing had been gradually increasing through the 
savings and loan system, while some efforts made during those years to construct low-income 
housing and infrastructure works also helped to trancform this activity into a source of dynamism 
within the economic system. Once these possibilities had been exhausted, however (especially 
because of the high proportion of imported inputs required by houses constructed under the 
Table 6 
EL SALVADOR: INDICATORS OF THE PRODUCTION 
AND CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRICITY 
Net production (thousands of K W H ) 




Government and other 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Inspección General de Empresas y Servicios Eléctricos (IGSE) and 




















































8Made by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of El Salvador. 
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savings and loan system), and in view of the financial imbalances of the public and private sectors, 
construction was one of the first activities affected by the depression which began in 1979 and 
worsened in the next two years. In turn, its deterioration had an intense and cumulative impact on 
unemployment. 
In order to relieve the crisis, during the first months of the year the administration adopted 
measures designed to reactivate construction by means of public expenditure. This was oriented 
towards expanding essential urban services (sanitation, sewerage, water supply, pumping and 
storage, etc.), improving certain marginal areas, intensifying the implementation of energy 
programmes begun in previous years, and promoting the building of some housing, for which 
some international credit support was received. However, as will be seen below, the financial 
difficulties of the Government made it necessary to postpone the execution of these projects in the 
context of a relatively austere economic policy. 
(iv) Basic services. As a whole, the provision of basic services declined considerably, especially 
because of the deterioration of the transport sector, whose product dropped more than 17 % due to 
the smaller movement of domestic and imported cargo and, to a lesser extent, the reduction in 
passenger transport. In both cases, especially in the last months of the year, the automotive 
equipment suffered from acts of sabotage which are difficult to quantify but which will require 
quite large investments when efforts are made to reactivate the economy after peace is restored. 
The sectors producing electricity, gas and water were also affected by the general critical 
situation. The drop in the generation of electricity was primarily due to contractions of approxima-
tely 17% in both commercial and industrial consumption and a slight drop in residential 
consumption. Only government consumption and that of municipalities increased sharply (51%) 
because of street lighting and other complementary projects, but this demand only accounted for 
16% of total consumption (see table 6). 
(v) Other services. Of the other activities producing services, only government services and 
ownership of dwellings showed a slight increase (see table 3). In the first case, this was due to the 
fact that, despite the austerity policy, government activity continued to be carried out especially 
through current expenditure, and the staff of public servants was generally retained. 
(c) Employment and unemployment 
Because of the enormous decline in economic activity in recent years, there can be no doubt 
that in 1981 unemployment and underemployment reached unprecedented levels, although in 
view of the climate of instability existing in part of the territory any estimate of unemployment not 
taken from census data may be subject to a large margin of error. However, taking into account, on 
the one hand, that the deterioration in total economic activity of approximately 20% over the last 
three years must have caused very grave employment problems and, on the other, that an official 
report estimated open unemployment at about 25% in late 1981 (see table 7), it must be concluded 
Table 7 
EL SALVADOR: EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
1 9 7 8
 1979 1980° 1981 
Unemployment rates 
National 3.7 6.7 16.2 25.0* 
Agricultural sector 3.3 7.8 
Other activities 4.0 5.7 8.9 
Source: CLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Planning and Co-ordination of Economic and Social 
Development. 
"First half of year. 
See Informe sobre la economía, made public by the President of the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador on 22 
December 1981. 
401 
that the employment situation not only reached unprecedented dimensions in El Salvador but was 
also one of the worst observed in the whole region in the past few decades. 
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that neighbouring countries, and even some not 
bordering on the country, such as Mexico and the United States, have been receiving high 
contingents of Salvadorian labour over the past two years which have greatly exceeded the 
traditional migratory flows. Although precise data are not available on the total number of 
Salvadorians who have left the country in recent years, it is estimated that this could be as high as 
400 000 persons. Assuming that probably between 35% and 40% of this number correspond to 
members of the labour force, it may be assumed that unemployment would have been considerably 
higher if they had remained in the country.9 Finally, some partial data confirm the ever-increasing 
decline in levels of employment. Thus, the above-mentioned survey made by the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry indicates that between January 1980 and August 1981 employment 
dropped 27% in manufacturing, 56% in construction, 25% in commerce, 33% in transport and 
16% in other services. This partial information refers essentially to what occurred in the cities, 
where levels of unemployment may have been greater than in rural areas. In the latter, subsistence 
agriculture and small enterprises, which are very numerous, maintain certain levels of 
employment even in critical situations. Moreover, compared with a decline in the agricultural 
added value of somewhat over 4%, that of the rest of the economic activities, which are essentially 
urban, decreased nearly 12%. 
3. The external sector 
In 1981, the domestic difficulties were compounded by those coming from the exterior, for 
the terms of trade evolved very unfavourably through the year, and this fact, added to the obstacles 
persisting from previous periods —such as the flight of capital— made it necessary to continue 
applying a very austere external supply policy and to take a series of exchange control measures in 
early 1981.10 As this did not yield the expected results, however, and the support from the 
Table 8 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
9
 In June 1980, the economically active population was estimated at slightly under 1 600 000 persons (see Ministry of 
Planning, Indicadores económicos y sociales, July-December 1980, p. 214). 
10This policy regulated travel expenditures, support of students and medical and hospital expenses abroad, and 
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of El Salvador and the Ministry of 
Planning and Co-ordination of Economic and Social Development. 
"Preliminary figures. 
international financial community was insufficient to provide the medium- and long-term credit 
needed (although the latter exceeded that of previous years), the net international reserves 
decreased considerably. This did not occur in the case of the gross international reserves, because 
the short-term indebtedness continued to increase as in 1980 (see figure 2). 
(a) Merchandise trade 
After registering a surplus of slightly over US$ 60 million in 1980, the merchandise trade 
balance showed a deficit of US$ 66 million in 1981. The cause of this turnabout was the sharp 
decline for the second consecutive year in the value of exports, which was far more pronounced 
than the drop in the value of merchandise imports. This 18% drop in the value of exports was due 
to similar decreases in both volume and unit value (see table 8). The latter was affected especially 
by the sharp drop in the international prices of the principal export products in 1981. Thus, while 
the price of coffee sold by El Salvador dropped by an average of nearly 33%, the prices of cotton, 
sugar and shrimps fell to less than half the previous levels. 
Sales of coffee and cotton, whose export has a strong impact on the Salvadorian economic 
system, declined by approximately 20%. On the other hand, sugar and shrimp exports rose 16% 
and 31 % respectively, due to a relative recovery in their levels of production. However, since these 
goods still carry little weight within the structure of exports, these rises represented an increase of 
barely US$ 10 million (see table 9). 
The deterioration of intra-Central American trade led to a sharp contraction in the value of 
the principal non-traditional exports. The decline was especially noteworthy in the case of 
clothing, perfumery and cosmetics, etc. This was in contrast to what occurred in 1980, when this 
trade was still an active element in a group of important industrial activities. Trade with the rest of 
Central America slowed down because of the stagnation or economic depression of the other 
countries of the area, the effects of which were aggravated by the measures taken by some countries 
in respect of payments and selectivity of purchases because of the external liquidity problems 
affecting several of them. 
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Figure 2 
EL SALVADOR: EVOLUTION OF EXPORTS, IMPORTS, EXTERNAL 
PUBLIC DEBT AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data provided by the Central Reserve Bank 
of El Salvador. 
EL SALVADOR 
On the import side, the growing difficulties as regards the balance of payments had already 
caused a gradual reduction in external purchases in previous years. In early 1981, with the 
worsening of the external financial situation, the Government formulated a stabilization 
programme involving the control of imports through a system of prior deposits and measures 
aimed at eliminating all unnecessary purchases.11 The value of imports was thus reduced by 
îpproximately 5 % for the second consecutive year. Although this decrease affected all categories 
jf imported goods except fuels, it was especially severe in the case of capital goods and consumer 
durables. The value of imports of the latter fell by 50% to a level only slightly over a quarter that of 
only three years previously. Over the same period, imports of capital goods fell by 66% (see 
table 10). 
Although in 1981 the unit value of imports increased at a much slower rate than the preceding 
two years, the drop in the prices of the principal export products caused a 14% deterioration in the 
terms of trade of goods. This unfavourable situation came on top of the continual deterioration 
registered in the terms of trade since 1978, after coffee prices had risen considerably in the 
two-year period 1976-1977. The decline in the terms of trade thus came to over 40%, and when 
added to the drop in the volume of exports this meant that in 1981 the purchasing power of the 
latter dropped by nearly 23% (see table 8). 
(b) The services trade and factor payments 
As in the previous year, the deficit on the services account slightly exceeded US$ 100 million. 
This stability was partly due to the fact that although there was little inflow of tourists into the 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador and the Ministry of 
Planning and Co-ordination of Economic and Social Development. 
"Preliminary figures. 
"In 1981 the provisions which had been in effect in this respect since 10 November 1980 were extended for a further 
period. Among the imports prohibited were the following: alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, perfumes, cosmetics, 
cloth, blankets, bed linen, glassware, gold and silver jewellery, radios, television sets, music centres, washing machines, 
motor vehicles, yachts, phonographs, etc. In principle, this provision did not apply to products from Central America and 
Panama. 
12
 According to official information, income from tourists entering the country decreased 21 % in 1977,47% in 1980 
and 56% in the first half of 1981, compared with the same period in 1980 (see Ministry of Planning and Co-ordination of 
Economic and Social Development, Indicadores económicos y sociales, January-June 1981). 
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Table 11 
EL SALVADOR: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 














































































































































































































































































Source: 1975-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of official 
data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
cln addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




Factor payments decreased slightly, mainly because with the deepening of the recession 
remittances of profits to the exterior fell by US$ 5 million. 
(c) The current account situation and its financing 
Because of the deterioration in the trade balance, the negative balance on the current account 
totalled nearly US$ 240 million: more than double the figure of slightly under US$ 120 million 
registered the previous year. As the net flow of capital came to approximately US$ 200 million, the 
international reserves decreased for the second time in the past three years, thus aggravating the 
critical shortage of foreign exchange (see table 11). Because of this, together with the continued 
flight of capital (although at a slower rate than the previous year) and the need to import some 
non-authorized raw materials and products, the price of the US dollar on the informal parallel 
currency market was as much as 40% higher than the official rate of exchange. 
(d) External indebtedness 
According to available information, the balance of the disbursed medium- and long-term 
external debt, which had come to US$ 475 million in 1980, was over US$ 630 million in 1981. 
Approximately 60% of this increase was absorbed by official institutions, while the remaining 
40% was used by the central government (see table 12). Among the credit which went to official 
institutions, an important proportion consisted of loans provided especially by international 
financial bodies, in order to continue the construction and expansion of energy13 and 
telecommunications projects, the expansion of the water main network and the improvement of 
drinking water services, as well as the equipment of storage plants. A particularly important 
disbursement to the central government was that earmarked for the improvement and expansion 
of the road network. It should be emphasized, however, that both the public bodies and the central 
government had difficulties in applying the funds immediately and in all cases for the intended 
purposes, either for administrative reasons or because of the austerity policy which became 
progressively more rigorous. 
Table 12 
EL SALVADOR: EXTERNAL PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 





Servicing of external public debt 
Amortization payments 
Interest payments 
Servicing of external debt, as a percentage 

















































2.2 5.9 3.2 2.2 3.4 4.0 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Disbursed. 
"Expansion of the Ahuachapán thermal plant, the San Lorenzo hydroelectric project,electrical interconnection with 
Guatemala, development of geothermal resources, etc. 
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The servicing of the external public debt remained almost unchanged, and barely accounted 
for 4% of total exports. Although this percentage was slightly higher than in 1980, it was much 
lower than that of the other countries in the area of relatively similar size. Nevertheless, it is worth 
repeating that in 1981 there was an intensification of the phenomenon observed during the 
previous year, consisting of a considerable increase in short-term indebtedness, which made it 
possible to maintain a minimum level of gross international reserves. The debt accumulated for 
these purposes —that is, the difference between the gross and net international reserves— 
exceeded US$ 300 million at the end of 1981, or the equivalent of more than 30% of exports of 
goods and services. 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices and anti-inflationary policy 
Between 1976 and 1980 the price indexes, both consumer and wholesale, rose at gradually 
increasing rates. In the last months of 1980 this trend was accentuated, with certain basic 
necessities, such as food, becoming more and more expensive. 
In these circumstances the Government adopted a series of measures, within the framework 
of a stabilization programme, in an attempt to stem the inflationary process.14 Among these were 
the freezing of the wages of rural and urban workers and efforts to contain public expenditure, 
which will be discussed below. As a result of these measures and the substantial drop in the rate of 
increase of the unit value of imports, the growth rate of consumer prices dropped from 18.6% in 
1980 to 11.6% in 1981, while over the same period the rate of increase of wholesale prices dropped 
from 17% to 12.6% (see table 13). 
Table 13 
EL SALVADOR: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index" 
Food 




Fuels and energy 
Consumer price index" 
Food 




Fuels and energy 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Corresponds to the metropolitan area of San Salvador. 
'Base 1955 = 100. Excludes coffee. 
"Includes coffee. 
14
 The principal provisions referred to the regulation of some prices of basic articles, rent reductions (a measure which 
was revoked halfway through the year), freezing of wages and salaries, drug prices, etc., as well as the establishment of 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
As in 1980, the growth of food prices was more rapid than that of other goods, either 
considering variations between annual averages or those from December to December. This was 
partly a reflection of the insufficiency of supply and the problems of distribution, which 
contributed to the fact that many foods were the subject of speculation on various occasions during 
the year, with consequent rises in their unit value. Thus, for example, during the first half of the 
year there were increases of varying degrees in the wholesale prices of the basic cereals (beans, 
maize, millet and rice), despite the measures taken to maintain the guaranteed prices for 
agricultural producers. 
(b) Wages 
The financial difficulties of the central government, public enterprises and economic 
activities as a whole forced the authorities to take measures to freeze wages in both the public and 
private sectors. This policy was also applied to payments in kind (food) and minimum wages, 
which stayed at the nominal levels of 1980 and in some cases even those of 1979. Moreover, the 
Government decided to reduce the bonus it had annually awarded its civil servants. 
Since despite the decline in the rate of inflation the latter still remained relatively high, these 
measures produced an appreciable drop in real wages in all sectors. In the case of minimum wages, 
the shrinkage of purchasing power was between 7% for workers in the metropolitan area and 
13% in most agricultural activities (see table 14). This considerable difference was due to the fact 
that in 1980 almost no adjustments were made in rural wages, whereas some were made in respect 
of activities in the capital. Thus, although in 1981 all wages remained frozen, their average 
evolution during the year was different in the capital from that in the rural areas. 
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Because of this new decline, the total drop in the real minimum wage for agricultural workers 
came to 22% over the past four years, while during the same period the real minimum wage of 
industrial workers and workers in services in San Salvador remained almost unchanged, and that 
of employees in commerce decreased slightly. These differences probably helped in previous years 
to increase the flow of labour into the capital in search of employment, which in turn led to greater 
unemployment in the capital in 1981 than in rural areas. 
Despite the considerable decline in real wages in 1981 there were no labour conflicts. It is 
possible that the critically unstable employment situation led the labour force, which is only weakly 
unionized, to try to keep their jobs rather than to press for increased wages. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
Once again the worsening of the balance-of-payments problems (especially because of the 
reduction in net international reserves) and of the fiscal situation, together with the persistence of 
inflation, were factors which interfered with the proper evolution of the monetary variables and 
indirectly blocked the achievement of the objectives sought through the credit policy. 
From the beginning, and with greater emphasis than in the previous year, the austerity 
policies regarding public expenditure, price stabilization and wage freezing were reflected in the 
monetary sphere in the cautious management of the means of payment. The money supply, which 
in 1980 had increased at a relatively similar rate to that of the growth of the gross domestic product 
at current prices, decreased in 1981 by nearly 2%, although the product increased by approxi-
mately 4%. 
This decline in the means of payment was largely caused by the drastic contraction in the net 
international reserves and by the fairly rapid increase in the factors of absorption—such asquasi-
money and long-term foreign borrowing, which rose more than 20%. The evolution of domestic 
credit was also fairly dynamic overall (see table 15). 
Until 1978 a large part of the Government deficit was generally financed from domestic 
sources, because the market for the sale of securities was quite easy. It was not necessary, therefore, 
to rely to a great extent on the support of the banking system or the Central Bank. Accordingly, in 
Table 15 
EL SALVADOR: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) 
Bonds 
Long-term foreign borrowing 














































































































that year the public sector as a whole absorbed only 8% of total domestic credit, while private 
activity received the remaining 92%. This situation changed somewhat in 1979, when the 
proportion absorbed by the public sector reached 18% (especially credit to enterprises), and even 
more in 1980, when the proportion was 44%, although on that occasion the portion of this credit 
directed to the central government increased considerably. Finally, in 1981 the flow was so great 
that 80% of the increase in domestic credit was earmarked for the Government, compared with 
only 14% for private activities or public enterprises. 
As a result of the foregoing, although credit expanded during the year by nearly 20%, the 
banking system was not able to comply fully with some of the objectives it had proposed to achieve 
even as far back as 1980, mainly because of the need to attend to the financial requirements of the 
State as a whole and to support a certain growth in public expenditure which —although small— 
partly made up for the slowdown in private activity. Thus, the credit which could be directed to the 
agricultural sector was relatively limited, and it was not possible to make full use of some of the 
lines of credit which, with the support of the Agency for International Development, could have 
helped in the reactivation of the economy, the consolidation of reforms and the improvement of 
marginal communities. 
From the point of view of monetary policy, besides the caution in the management of the 
principal instruments and the allocation of credit mentioned above, there were major differences 
with respect to the previous year. Thus, neither the maximum legal reserves nor the rates of 
interest were changed. Perhaps one of the most important features was the effort made from the 
beginning of the year to stimulate the opening of accounts in foreign currency in the national 
banking system (at first only in dollars and later in other currencies), which did not, however, have 
as much success as expected. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
The situation of the public finances again became very serious, with the fiscal deficit rising by 
17% and still being equivalent to approximately one-third of total government expenditures (see 
table 16). Although an attempt was made to correct this imbalance through the application of an 
austerity policy, this was not possible for various reasons. 
Firstly, the persistence of the economic recession had an impact on tax revenues, which were 
lower than had been expected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Although tax collection increased 
slightly in nominal terms as a result of inflation, this increase could not compensate for the decline 
resulting from the recession, so that income fell in real terms. Second, the decline in production of 
export goods —which have a high impact on tax income— was accompanied by a drop in the 
international prices of these articles. 
On the expenditure side, two factors militated against the achievement of the proposed 
objectives. Firstly, the Government covered the total external payments, which in the case of 
amortization were more than double those of the previous year. Although this managed to project 
an image of relative solvency to international creditors, the large sums involved limited the 
possibilities of reducing the deficit in line with the austerity policy. 
Secondly, although real investment by the Government was cut drastically, it was not possible 
to do the same in other components of public expenditure, where there are a considerable number 
of obligations with few possibilities of "trimming". Such is the case, for example, with wages, 
which are difficult to reduce when an attempt is being made, as in the fiscal year analysed, to 
maintain levels of employment, as well as with other current expenditures needed for the 
acquisition of some essential goods and services. 
In these circumstances, current income rose by only a little over 5%, after the very sharp 
decline suffered during 1980. Almost no measures were adopted during the year to help raise 
revenues substantially. The only tax that was raised was that on the sale of goods and services 
(called "stamp tax"), which went up from 1% to 2%, representing an increase of approximately 
50 million colones in tax collection, which was completely offset by sizeable decreases in other 





1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The external sector necessarily plays a decisive role in the evolution of small island economies 
such as Grenada, where it accounts for well over half of the gross domestic product. Nevertheless, 
for reasons which will be analysed below, internal developments proved to be at least as decisive as 
external ones in shaping Grenada's development in 1981. 
Hurricanes so damaged agricultural production in 1980 that the 1981 output showed a 
significant improvement over that year even though the recovery was partial and incomplete. 
Since agriculture accounts for almost one-third of Grenada's gross domestic product, this was a 
very positive development for the economy. 
Equally decisive was the dynamic role played by public sector investment, which doubled 
between 1980 and 1981. Though this implied a sharp increase in foreign debt (see table 1) the 
funds were mainly directed to a project which can reasonably be expected to raise Grenada's future 
opon carÉgs - t e new airport (or internationaJ ¡et n i it Foil Saline. In k short term, 
and certainly in 1981, this project and the associated capital expenditure caused construction to 
play a leading and dynamic role in the economy. 
Notwithstanding the significance of these positive developments in agriculture and construc-
tion, they served at best to offset the sharp decline in Grenada's tourist earnings, which fell by 11 % 
in nominal terms. Since tourism accounts for half of Grenada's exports and directly or indirectly 
affects one-third of its gross domestic product, this hamstrung overall economic growth in 1981. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Growth of the main sectors 
Agriculture and tourism continue to be the mainstays of the Grenadian economy, each 
accounting for close to one-third of the gross domestic product (see table 2). In the case of tourism, 
the benefits are spread over various sectors of the economy, including virtually all of the hotels and 
restaurants sector and much of wholesale and retail trade, transport and communications. In 1981 
there was a partial recovery of the agricultural sector after the damage which the 1980 hurricane 
did to the harvest, but this recovery in agriculture was more than offset by the significant decline in 
tourism. Consequently, only construction played a truly dynamic role, its expansion being largely 
determined by the Government's heavy investment in the Point Saline international airport. 
(i) Agriculture. In 1980, Grenada's agricultural output was severely damaged by Hurricane 
Allen and heavy flooding throughout the second half of the year, and as a result virtually all crops 
registered sharp declines. Because of better climatic conditions agriculture experienced a partial 
recovery of output in 1981, yet for the most part, production was unable to reach 1979 levels (see 
table 3). 
A notable and important exception to this was the case of nutmeg production, which 
increased 40% in 1981. Since nutmegs account for 20% of Grenada's agricultural exports and of 
the order of 5% of its GDP, this expansion was of substantial significance. Unfortunately, because 
of marketing difficulties this important gain in output could not be readily translated into higher 




GRENADA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of current dollars) 
Population (thousands of inhabitants) 







B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of good 
and services 
Consumer price index 
December-December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Unemployment rate 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
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C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 
External debtc 






























































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Percentage. 
'External public debt outstanding. 
Clove production, though not yet back to 1979 levels, recovered sharply from 1980. The 
remaining export crops showed sluggish performance (maize and cocoa beans) or sharp declines 
(cinnamon, condiments, and most especially bananas). Indeed, banana production was almost 
25% below its 1979 level: a decline attributed to moko and leaf spot diseases —the former 
appearing for the first time in 1978. Moko and leaf spot eradication programmes have been 
initiated, but production will continue to be affected until the diseases are contained and increased 
acreages can be put into production. 
Altogether, the volume of agricultural export crops harvested increased by close to 9% in 
1981. Because of the nutmeg marketing difficulties, however, the volume and value of agricultural 
exports actually declined (see table 4). 
The output of crops mainly destined for domestic consumption was uneven at best, and on the 
whole unsatisfactory. While most fruits and basic root crops showed modest increases, important 
declines were registered in vegetables and limes, and sugar cane output fell by more than 20%. 
The fact that the recovery of agricultural output in 1981 was only weak and partial was all the 
more serious in view of long-run trends. The Agricultural Census of 1981 showed that acreage 




G R E N A D A : GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY K I N D OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY A T FACTOR COST 
Millions of current 
East Caribbean dollars 
Percentage 
breakdown 
1979 1980 1981 1979 
Total gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, fisheries and forestry 




Electricity and water 
Transport and communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade 
































Source: Grenada, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning. Last available breakdown of GDP. 
Table 3 
G R E N A D A : INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(Metric tons) 








































































































































































Source: Grenada, Central Statistical Office. 
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Moreover, the little land available is subdivided into over 8 000 tiny plots, so that most farms are 
under 2 hectares, and even the country's largest 80 farms average no more than 70 hectares. 
Finally, and possibly most alarming, is the fact that the average age of farmers is well over 50 years. 
This implies that the young are refusing to look to agricultural activity for work —a fact quite 
consistent with farmers' complaints of not finding workers, despite an unemployment rate of 
27% and almost double that among youth. Given Grenada's high man/land ratios (a 38 000 man 
labour force with 14-21 000 hectares of cultivable land), it is improbable that agriculture will be 
able to play a leading role in output or employment in the future. Nevertheless it must hold its 
own, for it still accounts for one-third of the GDP, and if agriculture were to stagnate or deteriorate, 
it would undoubtedly leave a shortfall too large for the possible growth sectors (tourism and the 
incipient exports of manufactures) to absorb alone. 
Consequently, if agriculture is at least to hold its own, farming must again be made attractive 
to the young as a profession and not merely a means of subsistence. Agricultural exports must be 
promoted: farms need to be consolidated to nearer family-size levels; credit should be extended; 
agricultural infrastructure must be provided; and it is necessary for the security of crops to be 
assured. A number of agricultural sector projects, covering agricultural credit, feeder roads, a farm 
management training centre and a banana development programme, have been included in the 
Public Sector Investment Programme. Moreover, an agricultural co-operative programme is 
underway which is especially addressed to attracting youth and experimenting with a different 
model of development. Twelve such co-operatives were begun in 1981. 
Two other initiatives worth noting in connexion with primary sector activity are the National 
Fisheries Corporation and the Forestry Development Corporation established in 1981 to exploit 
the extensive fish and timber resources available in Grenada. These initiatives are still too new to 
have had much of an economic impact or admit of an evaluation, however. 
(ii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing contributes only about 3% to the GDP in Grenada. It is 
largely (and until recently exclusively) of an agro-industrial or food processing nature, aimed at 
satisfying domestic consumption. Since the national market is small, the scope for manufacturing 
growth is very limited, production being conditioned by fluctuations in the agricultural outputs 
GRENADA 
Total merchandise exports 











Sauces and condiments 
Table 4 
: MERCHANDISE EXPORTS 
























































































































which serve as inputs (the case of sugar and rum) and the largely vegetative growth of local 
demand. In recent years, Grenada has begun developing export-oriented industries which may 
permit this sector to play a more dynamic role. 
At all events, at present the largest role by far is still played by manufactures aimed at the 
domestic market. Because of the most important of these (sugar and beer) registered declines in 
output, overall manufacturing output is estimated to have declined 2%, notwithstanding the 
continued substantial increase in export manufactures. 
Preliminary data indicate that sugar production declined by 71% during the year (see table 5) 
and while the final figures probably will not show a decline of this magnitude, especially bearing in 
mind the 21% reduction in sugar cane output, the decline of over 50% in sugar cane output since 
1978 clearly bodes ill for the sugar industry. Rum production increased by 6% in 1981, but rather 
than indicating the success of 1981 production, this merely reflected the fact that the factory was 
off-stream for the final two months of 1980. The 1981 figure thus represents a decrease of 2.5% 
over 1979, the last year of full production. 
Flour production, which came fully on-stream in 1980, increased by 59% in 1981, when 18% 
of flour output was exported to CARICOM countries. Figures for the production of coconut meal, 
edible oils and laundry soap are only available for the period January-July 1981. Comparison with 
the corresponding seven-month period the year before shows an increase in edible oil production 
of 51% but a decrease in coconut meal production of 13%. 
The production of laundry soap increased enormously during 1981, as the supply of raw 
materials was finally assured. 
The data available for furniture and garment production relate to the value of exports. 
Furniture exports were not able to sustain the level recorded in 1980, and declined by 25%, but the 
clothing industry which is far more important in terms of value exported, continued to record 
impressive rates of growth in export earnings, the volume of output increasing by over 100%. 
Table 5 
GRENADA: INDICATORS OF M A N U F A C T U R I N G PRODUCTION 



















































































Source: Grenada, Central Statistical Office. 
"Preliminary data. 
Tons. 
'Thousands of litres. 
January-July. 
'Thousands of East Caribbean dollars of 1981 purchasing power, deflated by the US wholesale price index for consumer 
goods. 
•'Data relate to exports 
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The major thrust of current government policy in manufacturing is the development and 
expansion of an agro-industry to process fruits and spices for local and CARICOM markets. The 
project, which is still in its early stages, currently absorbs produce that is surplus and would 
normally go to waste. If it is to fully meet the existing market potential, the supply of raw materials 
and other inputs, such as containers, will need to be secured by longer-term contracts, and the 
sporadic operation of the factory due to electricity cuts will need to be corrected. 
(iii) Construction. Once again in 1981 construction was the leading sector of the economy, 
growing by a further 14.5% after the spectacular increase of 208% in 1980. This rapid growth in 
the two years in question was due mainly to the initiation of the Point Saline International Airport 
project. Nearly EC$ 391 million was spent on the airport's construction in 1981, EC$ 27 million of 
which was in foreign grants and nearly EC$ 11 million in loans. This project looms large in the 
Grenadian context, accounting for half of the country's investment and over 10% of gross 
domestic expenditure. It is thus the single most important dynamic factor in the Grenadian 
economy today, and as such is a major reason for the increased role of government in the economy. 
By comparison, other construction projects were clearly dwarfed in importance. A total of 32 
housing units were completed in 1981, and even the housing repair programme, which covered 
973 households, absorbed less than EC$ 800 000. Construction and repair work of public 
institutions in education, health and agriculture amounted to less than EC$ 350 000. Even 
previously important public works projects are small by comparison: all road and bridge repair 
work, together with Grenadian feeder road construction, totalled about EC$ 8 million. 
(iv) Tourism. It is estimated that close to one-third of Grenada's GDP depends on tourim in 
one way or another. This is true not only of hotels and restaurants, but also of much commerce, 
transport, services and even agriculture. A fact which is just as important and of even more direct 
significance is that fully half of Grenada's foreign exchange is derived from tourism. 
While considerable efforts are being made to prepare for tourism —principally, but not 
exclusively, through the construction of the international airport able to handle wide-bodied jets 
and so to exploit charter flight tourism— the fact remains that Grenada experienced an 11% 
decline in tourist earnings in 1981 (see table 6). Since these earnings are expressed in current EC 
dollars, this implies a much sharper decline in the real volume of activity, of the order of at least 
20%. Given the importance of tourism to the economy, this was a very significant brake on 
Grenada's growth. 
Table 6 




Average length of stay of 
stopover visitors (days) 
Number of cruise-ship calls 
Number of yacht calls 
Hotel and guest house beds 




































































Millions of East Caribbean dollars. 
'The exchange rate of the currency used in Grenada (the Eastern Caribbean dollar) is EC$2.7 = US$ 1.0. 
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As table 6 indicates, there was quite a sharp decline in the number of tourists: almost 15% 
among stop-over visitors (who account for 90% of tourist expenditures), and over 50% among 
cruise ship visitors. The number of visitors from the United States, Germany and the United 
Kingdom declined by 24%, 21 % and 14% respectively —probably a reflection of the sharp fall in 
the number of cruise ships calling in at Grenada. On the other hand, guest arrivals from CARICOM 
increased by 11% and from Venezuela by 5%, so that Caribbean tourists now comprise one-third 
of all tourists. 
It is true that tourism throughout the Caribbean has turned in a weak performance, due 
mainly to the recession in the major industrial countries: for example, visitor arrivals went down 
in 1981 by close to 6% in Barbados, and by over 4% in the Bahamas. Nevertheless, other factors 
are also involved in Grenada, for not only was Grenada's decline in tourists much sharper in 1981 
than elsewhere in the Caribbean, but it came on top of a similar decline in the previous year (-2% 
in nominal terms and of the order of -15 % in real terms), whereas in 1980 tourism had grown in 
Barbados and the Bahamas. 
Among these adverse factors was a fire at the Holiday Inn which reduced the availability of 
first class hotel rooms by approximately 50% and total room capacity by 25%. Unfavourable 
reporting of political developments is also thought to have reduced the influx of tourists, especially 
those from the United States. Finally, the virtual absence of organized marketing and tourist 
promotion has further militated against full exploitation of the industry's potential. With the new 
airport scheduled for completion in 1983 and the Government's increasing awareness of the 
importance of the industry and the need for effective tourism promotion, however, the possibility 
of tourism playing a dynamic role in the economy looks promising. 
(b) Employment and unemployment 
A labour force survey conducted in October 19802 showed 38 000 persons (34% of the 
population) to be economically active. Of those fully employed, 35 % worked for the government 
or State-owned enterprises, while somewhat over 10 000 persons (27%) were unemployed. This 
problem was especially acute among the young, since 63% of the total number of unemployed 
w'ere in the 15-24 age group, which thus had a rate of unemployment of the order of 50%. 
In view of the sharp increase in public investment in 1981, the situation may be expected to 
have improved. Nevertheless, such a high rate of unemployment reflects both the scanty oppor-
tunities open in agriculture, given its low land/man ratio, and the natural aspirations of the young 
to work in activities that provide more than mere subsistence. This underlines the need to seek 
dynamic sectors of economic activity, all of which must necessarily be outward looking, such as 
agricultural exports, tourism or exports of manufactures. 
3. The external sector 
As is natural in an economy the size of Grenada, the external sector plays a decisive role. 
Exports constitute over 50% of the gross domestic product, with half of export income consisting 
of tourist earnings, while imports because of the influx of capital donations and loans during the 
year, have risen to a figure equivalent to over 80% of the gross domestic product. 
(i) Exports. The value of merchandise exports increased slightly over 9% in 1981 (see 
table 4), yet still remained well below 1979 levels. 
One reason was the important decline in the prices of two of Grenada's key exports, nutmegs 
and cocoa (see table 7). Another was the aforementioned difficulties experienced in the marketing 
of nutmegs, the result of which was that while production grew 40%, the volume actually exported 
dclined by 16%. Equally important, however, is the fact that the recovery of the agricultural sector 
was weak, so that the volume of exports did not increase markedly. Only the manufacture of 
clothing, a non-traditional export, showed vigorous growth. 
2Grenada, Employment, Unemployment and Householding Survey, 1980. 
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The EEC continued to take most of Grenada's merchandise exports (72%), and the United 
Kingdom alone accounted for 36%. These figures were, however, less than the percentages for 
1980 (77% and 44%, respectively). On the other hand, the CARICOM share of Grenadian exports 
increased to 18% in 1981, compared with 10% in 1980. The Trinidadian contribution to this 
increase was most significant, moving from less than 8% of total exports in 1980 to almost 15 % in 
1981. Thus in 1981 it became the third largest market for Grenada's exports after the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, and moreover it purchased a highly diversified package of 
products. Most rapid growth was registered in non-traditional food and vegetable exports and 
clothing. In contrast, exports to North America fell from 6% to 4% of total export earnings. 
As indicated earlier, Grenada's tourist earnings in 1981 declined sharply, by 11 %, so that it is 
estimated that the total value of Grenada's exports of goods and services actually fell in 1981 (see 
table 8). The decline is not significant in nominal terms, amounting to only 1%, but when the 
inflation which has affected the value of the US dollar (notwithstanding its relative appreciation in 
international markets) is taken into account, this would point to a decline of 5-10% in the real 
purchasing power of Grenada's exports. 
(ii) Imports. The value of imports increased by 7% in 1981 (see table 8). This was less than 
the 1980 growth rate (15%), but rather than reflecting any change in the volume of imports it was 
an indication of the reduced world inflation between the years 1980 and 1981. Preliminary 
estimates indicate that CARICOM still provides about 30% of all the country's imports, with 
petroleum accounting for nearly half of this amount, while the EEC and North America each 
provide a further 25 %. Food accounts for about 36% of all imports, capital goods 16%, petroleum 
16%, and airport-related imports 9%. 
(iii) Invisibles and the capital account. Official balance of payments statistics are not prepared 
by Grenada. Some of the elements of this balance can, however, be identified and are presented in 
table 8. No attempt is made to arrive at a formal balance, however, since not all of the components 
are known. 
From the available data it is clear that the trade balance was not only negative but increasingly 
so. This trade deficit was partly financed by invisibles, comprising remittances by Grenadians from 
abroad, which are estimated not to exceed EC$ 6 million for 1981. Aid inflows for 1981 slightly 
exceeded EC$ 35 million, while borrowing from abroad came to almost EC$ 33 million. As a result 
of this external borrowing, the external debt increased 90% in 1981, to a level of the order of 25 
million, which is over 3 times the amount owed in 1978, but still well below the country's export 
earnings (see table 9). 
Table 7 
G R E N A D A : PRICES OF SELECTED EXPORTS 
















































Source: Grenada, Central Statistical Office. 
"Figure of EC$ 6.85 includes cloves and stems; no figures available for cloves alone. 
Increase over 1979 price. 
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Table 8 
GRENADA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
GRENADA 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Service 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Trade balance 
Profits and interest 
Profits 
Interest 
Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Counterpart items 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 











































































































































Source: 1975-1979: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook (magnetic tape, March 1981); 1980, 
1981: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions. 
'Including general government and Central Bank. 
rfIn addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
"Including private and State non-bank enterprises. 
I^ncludes counterpart items in respect of monetization or demonetization of gold, allocation or settlement of Special 
Drawing Rights, and variations due to revaluation. 
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4. Prices and wages 
Inflation declined somewhat in 1981 when it amounted to 17.7%, compared with 20.6% in 
1980. Given the fixed exchange rate and the openness of the economy, inflation is normally 
determined mainly by world inflation. However, in recent years and certainly in 1981, internal 
inflation exceeded imported inflation by a considerable margin. This was partly due to the 
incomplete recovery of agricultural output, on the supply side, and to the even stronger influx of 
foreign capital for airport construction, on the demand side. The sharpest increases in prices were 
registered by furniture and appliances 56%, and clothing and footwear 27% (see table 10). Food, 
which is the main item in the price index, with a weight of 59%, registered an increase of almost 
20%. 
A number of wage agreements were concluded in 1981. Estimates suggest that central 
government employees achieved an average wage increase of 17%, with teachers' income 
increasing by 14%-24.5%, nurses by 17%-25% and civil servants' by 12%-17%. Port workers 
gained 15% and utility workers between 5 % and 20%. 
Table 9 
GRENADA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Total external indebtedness 
Servicing of external debt 
Amortization payments 
Interest payments 
Servicing of external debt, as 
a percentage of total exports 
Average interest rate 
































Source: World Bank. 
"Preliminary figures. 
External public debt outstanding. 
Table 10 





Alcohol and tobacco 
Clothing and footwear 
Fuel and light 
Housing 






































Source: Grenada, Central Statistical Office. 
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In the private sector, agricultural workers gained 11.5%, manufacturing workers 12.5%-
17.5%, motor repairers 15%, and banking employees 15%-20%, while the increase in commerce 
ranged from 7.5%-32%. Thus it is likely that the real wages of most workers lost ground to 
inflation during 1981. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy. 
Grenada, as a member of the East Caribbean Currency Authority, has no central bank of its 
own. There are four major foreign commercial banks in operation and a locally owned National 
Commercial Bank (NCB), which is the second largest in the country. 
The money supply increased 11% in 1981 (see table 11), the central government's fiscal 
situation being the principal source of that expansion. The evolution of commercial bank credit 
was, however, negative since it declined 2% in 1981 (see table 12). Though credit to agriculture, 
Table 11 
GRENADA: MONETARY BALANCE 
(Millions of East Caribbean dollars) 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposit 
Factors of expansion 




Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) 





















































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, May 1982. 
"September. 
September 1981 with respect to September 1980. 
Table 12 








Building and construction 
Personal loans 
Other advances 





















































































17.3 17.7 12.6 16.8 23.4 15.6 27.5 2.0 -28.6 
12.6 17.2 15.5 24.5 16.3 19.1 -9.0 36.8 -10.1 
Source: Grenada, Ministry of Finance. 
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tourism, construction and transportation showed strong growth, the shares of agriculture and 
tourism in total credit were still below 1976 levels, and were well below their contributions to GDP. 
(b) Fiscal policy. 
In 1981, if one excludes grants, Grenada accumulated a deficit on its current account budget in 
excess of EC$ 6 million, or 10% of total revenue (see table 13). The current revenue of EC$ 61 
million, although 2.5% higher than the revenue collected in 1980, fell well below the projected 
figure of EC$ 70 million. Current expenditure, which had been budgeted at EC$ 70million for the 
year, was reduced to a realized figure of EC$ 66.7 million, but even so it was 7.9% higher than in 
1980. 
Revenue from import duties declined by 13 % and reflected the general reduction in economic 
activity, particularly in tourism. Actual receipts were 25% lower than originally budgeted for. 
Income tax revenue increased by 2.5%, well below the rate of inflation. Consumption duties, while 
up 48% over 1980, nevertheless fell 10% short of the original budget estimates. Export duties, on 
the other hand, which had declined by 40% in 1980, rose 9.7% in 1981 and were 35% higher than 
targeted. 
Whereas current expenditure as a whole increased by 8%, the wages and salaries account 
increased by less than 3%, implying important reductions in real wages. Other current expendi-
tures increased by 14%. Actual expenditure was 4% lower than the budget estimate. 
The 1981 budget made provision for capital expenditures of EC$ 90 million, an increase of 
277% with respect to 1980. The amount actually spent was EC$ 66 million, up 103% over 1980. 
The reasons given for this shortfall include the late receipt of some of the project funds and 
bad weather, which had the effect of putting some projects behind schedule. It may be noted that 
expenditure on the new Point Saline International Airport project accounted for nearly 59% of 
total capital expenditure for the year. 
In the past, grants in aid covered the bulk of the difference between total expenditure and 
revenue. Once again in 1981 these grants were of the order of EC$ 35 million, but this time they 
covered only half the deficit. The other part of the sizeable fiscal deficit for 1981 was covered by 
loans from Libya and the IMF. Thus the level of foreign debt virtually doubled between 1980 and 
1981. 
Table 13 
GRENADA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Other current revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other 
3. Saving on current account (1 - 2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit or surplus (1-5) -42.0 
7. Aid grants 























































































1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981 the Guatemalan economy had to face up to numerous adverse factors, including a 
deterioration in the terms of trade, which were reflected in the virtual stagnation of the gross 
domestic product, whose growth rate amounted to only 1%, and a drop in the per capita gross 
domestic product of nearly 2%. Even in order to maintain this minimal level of economic activity 
the country had to draw on its international currency reserves, which went down markedly (see 
table 1 and figure 1). 
The elements which contributed to this discouraging picture were many and varied and also 
mutually intensified each other. Some are already of a long-standing nature —1981 was the fifth 
year running in which there was a downward trend in the economic growth rate— while others are 
of temporary, short-term character, and some are of domestic origin while others are external. 
Among the most outstanding adverse phenomena was, first of all, the evolution of the world 
economy, which was manifested in a drop in external demand —and consequently in unit prices— 
for most of the products which Guatemala exports,1 this situation being made worse by the rise in 
the cost of imports and especially the movements of interest rates, which widened the gap between 
conditions on Guatemalan capital markets and those prevailing at the world level. 
Secondly, there was a sustained and significant contraction in private capital formation for 
the third year running because of the lack of investment opportunities in an increasingly depressed 
market, the running down of the construction activity connected with the process of repair of the 
damage caused by the February 1976 earthquake, and above all, the uncertainty generated by 
phenomena of a non-economic nature which will be referred to later. Thirdly, the economic 
recession in the other Central American countries —which was generally even more severe than 
that affecting Guatemala— adversely affected the level of activity of the Guatemalan 
manufacturing sector because of the high level of economic interdependence which still prevails 
among the countries of the subregion in connexion with the process of Central American 
integration. 
Finally, the tensions of a social and political nature and the climate of generalized violence 
which accompanied them affected the economy in various ways which went beyond a mere 
contraction in private investment. 
Faced with this mass of obstacles, the Government adopted an expansive policy in public 
expenditure, especially that connected with capital formation. There can be no doubt that this 
policy helped to reduce the adverse consequences which the above phenomena would otherwise 
have had on the level of economic activity and employment, especially in certain sectors such as 
construction. This was only achieved, however, at the cost of growing financial imbalances in both 
the public and external sectors. With regard to the former, the sluggish growth of the collection of 
fiscal income due to the depressed level of the economy, together with the reduction decree during 
1981 in the tax base of some taxes levied on exports, meant that the higher expenditure had to be 
financed through ever- increasing levels of indebtedness. The central government deficit thus rose 
to an unprecedented level equivalent to 6.5 % of the gross domestic product, and 85 % of this deficit 
was financed through domestic credit granted by the Central Bank: a situation which, as wejl as 
•This problem was made even more serious by the fact that, under the terms of the International Coffee Agreement, 
Guatemala had to accumulate considerable stocks of exportable coffee. 
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affecting the capacity of the financial intermediation system to expand credit to the private sector, 
also became the principal factor of monetary expansion. The direct effects (the imported 
component of public expenditure) and the indirect effects of this expansion were manifested in the 
increased value of imports of goods, which rose in nominal terms by approximately 7% compared 
with the year before. 
This latter phenomenon, together with the contraction in external demand already referred 
to, largely explains the unprecedented deficit on the balance-of-payments current account, which 
came to a little over US$ 590 million, or 6.8% of the gross domestic product. A noteworthy feature 
in connexion with the capital account was the relatively modest use made by the public sector of 
external indebtedness (except for the IMF compensatory financing referred to later). Guatemala 
experienced growing difficulty in gaining access to private capital markets, both because of the 
risks which some sources of finance perceive in Central America at the present time and because of 
Table 1 
GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Real gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual average 
Money 
Nominal wages and salaries' 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government 
M 
. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 























































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Calculated on the basis of social security contributions. 
Percentage. 
'Public external debt plus State-guaranteed private debt (disbursed). 
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the differentials between the active and passive interest rates prevailing in Guatemala and those 
registered in the main financial centres. Moreover, the net flight of private capital observed in 
previous years continued in 1981, and all this led to a loss of gross reserves of the order of US$ 295 
million. Thus, Guatemala ended 1981 with gross international reserves which were barely 
sufficient to finance 10 weeks of imports at the levels of that year, and with an actual deficit in its 
net reserves. 
Against the background of general slackening of the economy described above, it may be 
assumed —and this is confirmed by the few available indicators— that the levels of open and 
concealed unemployment increased significantly, although it would appear that the total amount 
paid out in salaries and wages increased as a result of the considerable adjustments in minimum 
wages granted in 1980, whose main effect was felt as from 1981.2 This may explain why private 
consumption grew slightly faster than" the gross domestic product. 
Apart from public expenditure, the only dynamic element in the economic picture in 1981 
was the increased supply of food —especially basic grains— although this took place at the 
expense of the supply of other exportable agricultural products because land traditionally prepared 
for cotton growing was diverted to the growing of cereals. This, together with the general 
sluggishments of the economy, helps to explain also the modest rise in prices (the consumer price 
index increased by around 11% in terms of annual averages), at least in comparison with the 
average levels of inflation in the industrialized countries. 
All the above phenomena combined to subject the financial intermediation system to heavy 
pressure. The banks in the system suffered during most of the year from a situation of acute 
shortage of liquidity, due to the downward trend of deposits and an increase in the demand for 
credit associated with the restrictions on the availbility of external financing. This situation was 
aggravated by the domestic credit needs of the public sector —to which the monetary authorities 
gave priority— and the difficulties experienced by the banks in recovering their fitting-out loans, 
especially those granted to coffee growers. 
In response to these difficulties, the Guatemalan authorities adopted some measures of 
adjustment towards the end of the year in line with a programme agreed with the International 
Monetary Fund in October 1981. Recourse was had to the compensatory financing facility for 
fluctuations in export income (US$ 88 million) and the first regular financing tranche (US$ 22 
million). Among the main adjustment measures taken were: (1) the freeing of interest rates by 
imposing a ceiling of 15% on active rates instead of the 11% previously in force, in the hope that 
passive interest rates too would rise by around four points; (2) the decision to follow a more 
cautious public expenditure policy in 1982 (reflected in the budget for 1982 submitted to the 
legislature towards the end of 1981 and the announcement that no wage increases would be 
entertained for the public service in 1982), and (3) the undertaking to finance an increasing 
proportion of public sector capital expenditure with external financing, so as to increase the access 
of the private sector to domestic credit without causing a significant increase in the total assets of 
the intermediation system. 
This set of measures indicates a reversal of the type of economic policy applied during 1981, 
but since the measures were adopted towards the end of the year it may be assumed that they will 
only begin to affect the performance of the economy in 1983. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global supply and demand trends 
Table 2, which shows the evolution of the main global supply and demand variables, is an 
eloquent illustration of the comments made in the previous section. Thus, the gross domestic 
product grew by only 1%: the lowest rate recorded in the last 30 years and representing a drop of 
1.5% in the per capita product. Nevertheless, in view of the mass of adverse factors faced by the 
2See the section on Guatemala in CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1980. 
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Figure 1 
GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Consumer prices'3 
















1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. 
^Percentage variation September - September. 
cMillions of dollars. 
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country during the year, it might be maintained that even this minimal rate of growth should be 
interpreted as something of an achievement. 
The almost complete stagnation of total demand was due to the sharp contraction in the value 
of exports (which went down by 9%)and an even sharper drop in private fixed capital formation 
(which diminished by nearly 14%). The contraction in the export sector was further aggravated by 
the deterioration in the terms of trade and the financial restrictions which affected various 
producers because of the need in some cases (such as coffee) to accumulate stocks and in others 
(such as certain sales to the rest of Central America) to offer export credits to cover arrears in 
payment. 
In contrast, the main source of dynamism during the year was public expenditure, and 
especially that connected with investment. Although the total incidence of such expenditure in the 
gross domestic product is only small—it increased from 11.7% in 1980 to 13% in 1981—it is very 
noteworthy that its relative share in total fixed capital formation rose from 41% in 1980 to almost 
51% in 1981. This phenomenon, made possible by the execution of a relatively limited number of 
large-scale projects —especially those in the yield of hydroelectricity, the port on the Pacific, and a 
hospital construction programme— enabled the increase in public investment to offset the drop in 
private investment and permitted the gross domestic fixed capital formation to show a modest 
increase. Private investment, for its part, would have been even smaller had it not been for the 
high capital expenditure of several transnational corporations in petroleum prospection and 
extraction. 
On the supply side, although the nominal value of imports rose compared with the previous 
year, their volume went down. Thus, for the third year running imports grew more slowly than the 
gross domestic product —the import coefficient dropped from 21 % in 1978 to 14% in 1981— in 
marked contrast with the past performance of the Guatemalan economy and even with the 
performance observed during most of the 1970s. It is too early to say whether this involves some 
structural change or if, as seems more likely, it simply shows that in periods of economic recession 
the marginal propensity to import declines as a result of the shift in demand to essential goods, in 
respect of which Guatemala has been relatively self-sufficient, especially in 1981 thanks to the high 
production of cereals. Furthermore, it may be assumed —and the available indicators confirm 
this— that imports of luxury goods went down in view of the climate of uncertainty mentioned 
elsewhere in this study. 
Finally, in 1981 there was an increase in stocks, due mainly to the substantial amounts of 
coffee wich Guatemala was obliged to withhold under the terms of the International Coffee 
Agreement. It is estimated that the amount of coffee withheld in this way came to 800 000 bags (of 
45 kg each) by the end of the year, which undoubtedly had a marked influence on the changes in 
stocks shown in table 2. 
(b) Growth of the main sectors 
The evolution of domestic supply at the level of the various branches of activity was very 
much in line with the overall picture described above. The only sectors which showed a certain 
amount of dynamism were construction —due exclusively to public investment— and public 
administration. In contrast, the other sectors of production evolved at rates close to that of the 
global economy (see table 3). 
(i) The agricultural sector. With regard to the performance of this sector, two items of 
particular importance are worthy of note. The first of these is the sluggishness which characterized 
the sector as a whole, whose growth rate was one of the lowest in the last 30 years, due basically to 
the slackening of external demand for the two main export products (coffee and cotton) and the 
difficulties encountered in cotton growing as a result of the very expensive techniques which now 
predominate. The second item was the considerable dynamism shown by food production, 
especially of basic grains. 
These apparently contradictory facts were actually quite clçisely connected, since the negative 
effect of external market conditions on cotton growing acted as a positive element in the 
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production of cereals, with resources normally devoted to cotton production being diverted to 
maize growing. Another element which contributed to the exceptionally large cereal harvest was a 
highly favourable rainfall pattern. 
As regards the main export products, it was coffee which faced the most serious problems. In 
the first place, the contraction in external demand which manifested itself both in a drop in unit 
prices for this crop and in the need to withhold part of the production under the terms of the quota 
system established by the International Coffee Organization discouraged the use of modern 
techniques to maximize production. Secondly, it was more difficult to gain access to financing for 
harvesting, in view of the severe shortage of domestic credit and the reluctance of some producers 
to seek credit abroad at the interest rates prevailing in international markets, together with the 
restrictions which the external suppliers themselves placed on credit. Thirdly, the outbreaks of 
coffee rust (hemileia vastatrix) detected in previous years spread rapidly and the area affected rose 
from 910 hectares in mid-year to over 4 600 hectares at the end of the year. The presence of this 
fungus not only reduced coffee yields but also significantly raised cultivation costs. Finally, coffee 
growing was adversely affected, like most other agricultural activities, by the social and political 
tensions prevailing in the country, which manifested themselves inter alia in acts of violence on 
the plantations, physical damage in some cases, and interruptions in the normal cycle of 
harvesting, processing and marketing. For these reasons, the volume of coffee produced dropped 
by almost 10% (see table 4). 
As regards cotton, the area planted for the 1981/1982 season went down by 2 5 % from 
105 000 hectares to 79 000 hectares. The reason for this was the declining profitability of this crop 
because of the drop in international prices on the one hand and the substantial increase in 
production costs on the other, due to the increasing use of costly inputs, especially chemicals. 
Moreover, like coffee, cotton growing encountered difficulties in obtaining credit as well as 
suffering from the problems connected with non-economic factors already referred to. As a result 
of all these phenomena, the production of ginned cotton went down by almost 2 3 % compared 
with the previous year, with a consequent drop in the production of cotton seed and of the oil and 
fat obtained from it. 
Table 2 
GUATEMALA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public 
Private 




Exports of goods and services 
Millions of dollars 

























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de Guatemala. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollar 




GUATEMALA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fisheries 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels' 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de Guatemala. 
"Preliminary figures. 
fcAs the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
'Includes financial institutions, insurance and real estate, except ownership of dwellings. 
^Includes restaurants, hotels and business services. 
The professional associations of coffee and cotton growers sought relief from the situation 
through which they were passing and proposed to the Government various measures aimed at 
reducing tax levels and improving access to credit. Although the Government did not comply with 
all their requests it did reduce the tax base of the export taxes on these two products: an aspect 
analysed in more detail below. 
The evolution of the other export commodities followed more normal trends. Thus, the area 
of sugar cane harvested and the volume of cane milled increased by approximately 5.5%, while the 
volume of bananas produced increased by 10%. Cardamom continued to be an important export 
product, but its growth is apparently nearing its limit, since the volume increased only 3.5% 
compared with the previous year. 
As regards products for domestic consumption, their output grew very rapidly due partly, as 
already noted, to an exceptionally favourable rainfall pattern, partly to the diversion of some 
23 000 hectares of land from cotton growing to the very intensive cultivation of cereals (especially 
maize), and partly to the remunerative levels of the support prices fixed by the Agricultural 
Marketing Institute (INDECA). Altogether, production of cereals (maize, rice and wheat) increased 
by 10.5% with respect to 1980, while production of beans rose by 60% over the abnormally low 
level of the previous year (see table 4). 
The livestock sector also registered quite rapid growth in spite of the restrictions imposed for 
several weeks, for sanitary reasons, on the access of frozen meat to the United States, which is the 
main export market. According to official data, beef production increased by nearly 9%, while 
production of pork, mutton and poultry meat continued its growth rate of previous years, this 
growth being very rapid in the case of the last of these products. 
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In spite of the foregoing, however, the very high weighting of coffee and cotton in total 
production helped to offset the upward trend shown by the rest of the agricultural sector, so that 
overall in this sector recorded one of its slowest growth rates in recent years. This reduced 
employment opportunities3 and led to a drop in the volume of exports. The Government reacted 
to this situation by reducing taxes on these two crops, which, in turn, aggravated the fiscal deficit 
referred to below. 
Finally, it may be noted that the events of 1981 may be of some importance for the evolution 
of the structure of distribution in the future, for two reasons. Firstly, because the relative 
complexity and high cost of combating coffee rust means that this action is normally not within the 
reach of small producers, of whom there are some 45 000 in Guatemala compared with some 2 500 
medium-sized and large producers. Experts in the matter consider that the differential access of 
the different strata of producers to the technological and financial resources needed to control the 
rust disease could force most of the small producers out of this activity within four to five years. 
Secondly, because of the high yields capable of being achieved in maize production through the use 
of modern technology on land normally prepared for export crops, this too has displaced 
thousands of subsistence peasants out of coffee growing, at least in 1981. 
(ii) Mining. The main mining activity in Guatemala during the period 1977/1979 was the 
exploitation of nickel deposits. During the last quarter of 1980, however, this activity was 
temporarily suspended because of the adverse conditions prevailing on the internatinal market, 
and in 1981 not only did the processing enterprise not resume operations, as had been foreseen, 
but it closed down for an indefinite period, with the consequent dismissal of most of its staff. Thus, 
in 1981 mining production registered a substantial drop compared with the previous year, since 
the other mining activities of the country —extraction of lead, cadmium and copper— have only 
an insignificant share in the total gross domestic product. 
With regard to petroleum activity, which was begun on an incipient scale in 1978, it had been 
hoped that there would be a rapid increase in such activity as the work of the four transnational 
corporations carrying on an active prospecting programme in various areas in the north of the 
country progressed. The increase in the volume of petroleum extracted in 1981 compared with the 
Table 4 
GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural production 
(base year 1975 = 100) 
Crop farming 
Stock-raising 
Production of the main crops 

























































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands of hands. 
'Millions of quintals. 





GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
preceding year was only modest, however, despite the official announcements of a substantial 
increase in the country's proven reserves. Thus, average extraction in 1981 came to some 4 500 
barrels per day (rising to 6 600 during the last quarter), compared with 4 100 barrels per day in 
1980. This slow rate of operations —the enterprises had requested authorization to increase 
production to 12 000 barrels per day— was due to the Government's conservation policy aimed at 
maintaining a suitable relation between the level of exploitation and the proven reserves. Action 
aimed at expanding the scale of these operations continued, however, through an invitation to 
submit tenders for the signing of prospecting and operating contracts in new areas in the northern 
Guatemala sedimentary basin. 
(iii) Manufacturing. The manufacturing sector had to face up to two adverse phenomena in 
1981 : the drop in the general level of economic activity, and the increasing restrictions on trade in 
manufactures within the framework of the Central American integration process. These two 
phenomena were reflected in a contraction —or, in the best of cases, very slow growth— in 
demand for most manufactures, especially those of a non-essential nature. 
There are unfortunately few indicators regarding this situation, but those which exist fully 
support the foregoing assertions. Thus, for example, the volume of cigarette production in the first 
nine months of the year was almost 24% below that of the same period in 1980, and a comparable 
phenomenon occurred with the manufacture of alcoholic liquors and beer. The Guatemalan glass 
bottle plant, which had been working three shifts a day during 1980, reduced its level of activity to 
only one shift during the second half of 1981. Businessmen connected with the branches of 
industry producing clothing, textiles, footwear and some canned foods reported reductions in the 
volume of production and level of employment compared with the previous year. Most of the 
activities connected with construction, too, were adversely affected by the decline in this sector, as 
is shown by the drop of 1 % in cement production. In contrast, the pharmaceutical industry kept up 
a relatively rapid rate of expansion, connected no doubt with the essential nature of its products 
and hence their ready access to the rest of the Central American Common Market. 
To sum up, the sector as a whole was in a state of virtual stagnation (see table 5). The estimate 
that the value added in manufacturing went down by 1% might even turn out to be very 
conservative if we take into account the following indicators: consumption of electricity by 
manufacturing enterprises went down by almost 8% in the first 11 months of the year compared 
with the same period the preceding year; imports of raw materials went down in real terms by 
approximately 5 %; and exports of manufactures to the rest of Central America went down in real 
terms by over 20%. 
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This unfavourable picture, which was accompanied by rising levels of unemployment among 
urban workers, also led to a decline in investments in new manufacturing activities or in the 
expansion of existing ones. The only new industrial project worthy of note which was in course of 
execution in 1981 was a sawmill complex which forms the first stage of a pulp and paper industry 
promoted by the National Finance Corporation with the participation of Spanish capital. 
In response to the foregoing phenomena, industrial policy revolved around the need to 
diversify markets for the existing industries. Government authorities and businessmen made 
several visits to explore new markets, especially in neighbouring Caribbean countries, and the 
Executive sent to Congress various bills aimed at promoting exports of manufactures to markets 
outside the region through tax concessions, the granting of preferential credit and other 
promotional measures. At the time of writing this study, these bills were still under consideration. 
(iv) Construction. Although the high level of public investment enabled the construction 
sector to show a growth rate slightly higher than other economic activities, its rate of expansion 
was much lower than that registered in previous years. This is attributable to a very significant 
contraction in all types of private construction. Thus, for example, construction permits issued in 
Guatemala City, expressed in thousands of square metres of construction, showed a drop of 39 % in 
the first ten months of the year compared with the same period the year before, and it should be 
recalled that even this level was considerably less than it had been in 1979 (see table 6). This 
reduction was partly due to a certain levelling off in the reconstruction work to make good the 
effects of the February 1976 earthquake, but it reflected to a greater extent the generalized 
contraction in economic activity and the uncertainty generated by the non-economic factors 
already referred to. 
With the aim of partially offsetting this trend, the Government established a programme for 
promoting private housing construction through the rediscounting at preferential rates of credits 
for this purpose. Under the terms of this programme, about 80 million quetzales were granted in 
credits through the banks in the system. 
For its part, the Government significantly increased its investments in the construction 
sector, partly through the construction of buildings —hospitals and schools— to make good the 
losses caused in the 1976 earthquake. Other projects, such as the civil engineering works for 
hydroelectric plants, highways, and the port on the Pacific, required more capital-intensive 
techniques, so that it may be assumed that on balance the construction sector offered fewer 
productive jobs in 1981 than in previous years. Unfortunately, however, there are not sufficient 
indicators to confirm this assumption. 
Table 6 
GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Area constructed 
(thousands of m2) 
Total 
Dwellings 
Production of cement 
(index 1972 = 100) 
Employment' 







































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"January-October 1981 compared with the same period in 1980. 
Refers to construction permits issued in the capital. Does not include reconstruction programmes. 
^Members of the Guatemalan Social Security Institute. 
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(v) Other sectors. The services sectors, including transport, commerce and finance and 
private services, evolved at rates in line with that of economic activity in general. A noteworthy 
feature was the pronounced drop in the growth rate of commerce, which must undoubtedly have 
had adverse repercussions on urban employment. Another services activity which suffered a sharp 
contraction for the second year running was tourism, which was influenced by the recession in the 
industrialized countries and the climate of violence prevailing in Guatemala. 
(c) Employment and unemployment 
There are very few statistics on employment in Guatemala, but there are numerous indicators 
which suggest that the level of productive employment went down in 1981 and that open and 
concealed unemployment increased, probably to a significant extent. 
The most important item of information is the number of workers who are members of the 
Guatemalan Social Security Institute. In the past, this membership has grown very rapidly, partly 
through the expansion of the labour force and partly through the extension of social security 
arrangements. In 1981, however, the number of workers who are members of the Institute went 
down by 1.3% in absolute terms compared with the year before, while the decline in the case of 
members of private firms was even greater (2.5%). 
The Government's response to this phenomenon was to try to increase the job opportunities 
in various kinds of public works. Thus, according to information from the Guatemalan Social 
Security Institute, the number of permanent workers employed by the State increased by 9-5%, 
while the number of temporary workers employed on specific projects rose by 5%. As already 
noted, however, it would appear that the criterion of creating employment was not considered one 
of the most important in the selection of public works. 
3. The external sector 
In 1981 Guatemala was seriously affected by the economic recession in the main 
industrialized countries, as well as by the financial policy followed by the monetary authorities of 
the United States, which was reflected, inter alia, in high rates of interest in the main international 
financial centres. Thus, Guatemala was faced with declining external demand for its main export 
products (especially coffee, cotton and nickel) and for certain services (particularly tourism). This 
phenomenon was aggravated by the deterioration in the level of trade with the Central American 
countries, and in spite of the relatively modest growth rate of the value of imports, 1981 closed 
with the biggest current account deficit recorded in the country's history. 
On the capital account side, for various reasons which will be analysed below, Guatemala only 
mobilized a modest flow of net public and private external financing, so that the authorities were 
obliged to resort to short-term lines of credit and to the International Monetary Fund, from which 
it obtained financing totalling US$ 110 million. This was not enough to cover the current account 
deficit, so that there was a loss of US$ 295 million for the international currency reserves, leaving 
the country in a much less comfortable position to face the continuing ups and downs of the 
international economy in 1982 than it had enjoyed the year before. 
(a) Merchandise trade 
After its big expansion during the period 1972-1980, the value of exports of goods went down 
by a little over 14% in 1981. This decline reflected the contraction in external demand for the main 
export items (coffee and cotton), the total disappearance of another item (nickel) which had been 
of some importance in the previous two years, and the non-fulfilment of the expectations that 
there would be a significant increase in exports of petroleum (whose volume actually went down 
due to a modest increase in domestic consumption of hydrocarbons). The drop in the value of 
external sales was due both to the reduction in their volume (-7%) and the decline in their unit 
value (-8%) (see table 7). In the case of some items such as coffee, the drop in unit prices was very 
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significant, thus further discouraging efforts to increase efficiency in the cultivation and 
harvesting of this product. The price of bananas, however, improved quite substantially. 
Exports of most of the traditional commodities other than coffee —sugar, frozen meat and 
bananas— grew fairly rapidly, since their value increased by between 12% and 23% (see table 8). 
The efforts made in previous years to diversify and expand exports also continued to show a 
moderate degree of success, as the value of non-traditional exports to the rest of the world, other 
than those of cardamom, nickel and petroleum, rose from US$ 170 million in 1980 to US$ 205 
million in 1981. This group of products is made up of a wide range of goods which includes 
foodstuffs, fresh vegetables and pulses, flowers, essential oils, textiles and other manufactures. 
Nevertheless, the relative share of this group of exports in the total did not amount to 16%. 
Finally, the value of exports to the other Central American countries went down by 14% as a 
result of a drop of over 20% in their volume. Although this decline did of course adversely affect 
the Guatemalan manufacturing sector, three comments need to be made. Firstly, exports to 
Central America had been abnormally high in 1980 due to the extraordinary import requirements 
caused by the process of reconstruction in Nicaragua. Thus, if the figure for exports in 1981 is 
compared with the figures for the last years of the 1970s, it represents a continuation of the 
upward trend. Secondly, the drop in the value of exports to Central America was less than the drop 
in sales to the rest of the world, so that intra-regional trade continued to play its role of offsetting 
to some extent the adverse effects caused by the rest of the world economy. Thirdly, Guatemala's 
imports from the rest of the Central American market also went down —from nearly US$ 220 
million in 1980 to a little over US$ 190 million in 1981— so that the surplus which Guatemala has 
traditionally achieved in its trade with the rest of the region was practically maintained, thus 
helping to avoid a more serious deterioration in the overall trade account of the country.4 
The value of total imports of goods, for its part, rose by a little over 7 % as a result of an 
increase of nearly 3% in their volume and almost 4.5% in their unit value. This latter increase, 
however, was much less than those recorded in the previous two years, and indeed was the lowest 
Table 7 
G U A T E M A L A : M A I N F O R E I G N T R A D E I N D I C A T O R S 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981° 



































































Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports of goods - - „ . . _
Purchasing power of exports of goods
 U(¡Q 1 5 6 g u ^ l4QJ 1 4 3 9 n 4 9 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
••Another indicator of the importance of regional demand for the Guatemalan export sector is that in both 1980 and 
1981, 20% of the total exports of goods went to the other Central American countries, while the corresponding figures for 



































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary data. 
in the last 10 years. An example of this trend towards a slackening in the growth rate of the average 
price of imports was that of hydrocarbons, whose unit price rose much more slowly ( 17 % ) than in 
previous years, due to the excess supply of petroleum on the world market, especially during the 
second half of the year.5 Even so, because of this increase in unit value the incidence of imports of 
fuels and lubricants in the total value of imports grew from 21% in 1980 to 24% in 1981, which 
shows that the rise in prices of liquid energy sources, as in previous years, continued to exert 
substantial pressure on the country's balance of payments in 1981. 
The evolution of imports of goods in the other groups was in line with the general economic 
picture. The value of imports of raw materials grew by only 3.5%, while imports of capital goods 
increased by 5%, meaning the volume of both these items was less than in the previous year. The 
contraction in the general level of economic activity was also reflected in the fact that the nominal 
value of imports of consumer goods remained constant (see table 9). 
Altogether, because of a deterioration in the terms of trade and the drop in the volume of 
exports of goods, the purchasing power of the latter went down by about 20% compared with the 
year before. 
The main measures taken by the authorities to correct the growing current account deficit 
were aimed at facilitating exports. Thus, in mid-year the tax base for taxes on exports of coffee and 
cotton was reduced, and some missions were also carried out to Caribbean countries to promote the 
sale of non-traditional products. No measures were taken, however, to contain imports of goods, 
although an effort was made to contain the spending of foreign exchange to acquire certain 
services. 
'During 1981, almost the whole of Guatemala's hydrocarbon imports came from Mexico and Venezuela, under the 
energy co-operation programme established by those countries. As will be seen below, the financing of 30% of these 
imports provided for under the programme became an important item in the financing of the capital account. 
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Exports to Central 
America 
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(b) The services trade and factor payments 
Exports of services went down even faster than those of goods, in both nominal (20%) and 
real terms. Since, in contrast, imports of services went down much less (2 %), the negative balance 
on services became the main source of the deficit on the balance-of-payments current account. 
The drop in exports of services was due primarily to the continued decline in the income from 
international tourism, attributable both to the economic recession in the main countries of origin 
of the tourists and to the acts of violence associated with the non-economic factors prevailing in 
Guatemala.6 The number of visitors went down by 30% compared with the already low level of the 
previous year, and the index of occupation of the main hotels was less than 50%. Secondly, it is 
probable that various items in the services account (and the transfers account) conceal a continued 
flight of foreign exchange, encouraged no doubt by the uncertainty accompanying the non-
economic factors already mentioned. The abnormally low surplus on the transfers account and the 
extremely high deficits on the "miscellaneous" and investment income accounts suggest that the 
foreign exchange associated with these categories ceased to flow into the country and went partly 
to supply a small but growing currency black market which arose with the introduction of 
exchange controls in 1980, which were modified in September 1981.7 
Precisely in order to relieve the pressure on the balance-of-payments current account, in 
September the monetary authorities adopted some additional restrictive measures regarding the 
sale of currency for travel, remittances to family members and medical and educational expenses 
abroad. 
(c) The current account position and its financing 
Both the trade account and the current account showed record deficits: the deficit on the latter 
account came to somewhat over US$ 590 million and was equivalent to 40% of the total value of 
exports of goods and services and 6.8% of the gross domestic product. In addition, the country lost 
international currency reserves for the second year running: this time for a total of US$ 295 
Table 9 
















































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
6In August 1981, the State Department of the United States of America even issued a warning to citizens of that 
country regarding the risks involved in visiting Guatemala. 
'Because of the very nature of these transactions, however, it is impossible to estimate their total amount. 
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million, or half the deficit referred to. The rest of the deficit was covered by IMF compensatory 
financing (US$ 110 million) and official loans (see table 10). 
The only positive item with regard to private capital income was that regarding direct 
investment, basically associated with the oil prospection and exploitation activities. 
The accounts for private sector credit —both long-term and, especially, short-term— also 
showed negative balances, which is attributable firstly to the differences between the interest rates 
prevailing in Guatemala and those on the international market —which encouraged pressure on 
domestic intermediaries and discouraged the procurement of credits abroad— and secondly, to the 
growing difficulties encountered by both public and private borrowers in mobilizing external 
finance because of the deterioration in the country's image owing to factors of a non-economic 
nature.8 
To sum up, the deficit on the balance-of-payments current account in 1981 was mainly 
financed by compensatory loans, lines of credit from the Central Bank, and the loss of reserves, so 
that the absolute level of the latter at the end of the year came to US$ 345 million, which was barely 
sufficient to finance 10 weeks' imports at the levels prevailing in 1981, while the net reserves 
showed a deficit of some US$ 98 million.9 
(d) External indebtedness 
As already noted, in spite of the record deficit on the balance-of-payments current account: the 
mobilization of net external credit during 1980 was relatively modest. The private sector preferred 
to use domestic credit, and the main capital flows were recorded under the heading of direct 
investment. 
The Guatemalan public sector, for its part, had only a relatively small external debt up to 1980 
and its structure was very favourable because the great majority of it came from official sources of 
finance, frequently on concessional terms. Consequently, Guatemala has traditionally had one of 
the lowest coefficients of the whole of Latin America (around 3 % ) for its external debt servicing as 
a percentage of exports. In 1981, the tendency towards prudent external public indebtedness was 
maintained, but some negotiations for supplier credits were initiated which would tend to cause a 
deterioration in the external public debt structure in the future. Even so, however, at the end of the 
year the external public debt indicators continued to be among the most favourable in the region 
(see table 11). 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices and anti-inflationary policy 
The Government did not have any occasion to resort to conventional anti-inflationary 
policies in 1981, since the accent was placed on policies aimed at maintaining a minimum level of 
economic activity in view of the fact that the inflationary pressures originating in the external 
sector —which have traditionally borne much of the responsibility for rises in domestic prices— 
tended to slacken in 1981. As already noted, the Government followed rather an expansive policy 
in public spending, and the way in which this policy was financed might well have helped to 
generate inflationary pressures through excess demand. Because of the degree of openness of the 
economy, however, these pressures tended to be absorbed through the external sector by way of 
imports, rather than through changes in the level and structure of domestic prices. 
Thus, the general consumer price index rose by 8.8% in December 1981 with respect to the 
same month in the previous year, while the variation in this indicator annual averages came to 
11.4%. This rate was slightly higher than the inflation figures for most of the industrialized 
8The capital account, like the current account, probably also conceals some flight of capital. 
'However, these reserves include gold valued at 1970 prices. If this gold were revalued at the prices prevailing in 1981, 
this would provide approximately an extra US$ 150 million. 
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Table 10 
GUATEMALA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 




Profits and interest 
Profits 
Interest 
Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 


































































































































































































































































































































I l l 
Source: 1975-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; (magnetic tape, March 1982); 1981: 
ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
cIn addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




economies (the rise in the import price index was nearly 8% in 1981), and it was similar to the 
rates observed in the previous two years (see table 12). The evolution of food prices was somewhat 
below the general index, perhaps because of the adequate supply of domestically produced food. 
The wholesale price index, for its part, rose by only 4% in December 1981 with respect to the same 
month in 1980, while its increase in terms of annual averages was 12%. 
Some measures aimed at reducing the impact of inflationary pressures which had been 
adopted in previous years were maintained in 1981. Thus, for example, a subsidy continued to be 
paid to urban public transport, at a cost to the central government of some 10 million quetzales, 
and maximum prices were maintained for a limited list of articles which included milk, sugar, 
cooking oil, some raw materials and cement. The tendency during the year, however, was to adjust 
these maximum prices upwards in order not to discourage production. Maximum prices were also 
maintained for petroleum products, but the cost of hydrocarbons was transferred selectively to the 
final products, with the price of gasoline being raised proportionately more than the average and 
those of diesel oil and kerosene, which are the fuels of highest incidence in the spending of the 
poorest strata, being increased much less than the average. 
Table 11 
GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980" 1981" 
Total external indebtedness 
Public debt and State-guaranteed 
private debt 
Servicing of external debtc 
Amortization payments 
Interest payments 
Servicing of external debt, as a percentage 






























2.0 1.6 2.1 2.0 3.0 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Estimates. 
Disbursed. 
'Includes public and private external debt. 
Table 12 
GUATEMALA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food 




Consumer prices index 
Food 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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(b) Wages 
In order to understand the significance of the scanty data available on the evolution of wages 
in 1981, it is necessary to recall some important events which took place in this field in the 
previous year. Although the organized worker movement had been weakened by confrontations 
which were not always devoid of violence, in March 1980 there was a large-scale strike by 
agricultural workers on cotton and sugar plantations, and after a period of negotiations, it was 
agreed to raise the minimum legal wage from 1.12 quetzales per day to 3-20 quetzales: a measure 
which affected some 600 000 workers. At the same time, it was agreed to grant substantial 
increases in urban minimum wages. Although these increases were applied gradually, and were 
not always complied with in all enterprises, it would appear that by the end of 1980 most of the 
agricultural and urban enterprises were complying with them. This means that when comparing 
the calendar year 1981 with the whole of 1980, it would be reasonable to expect increases in 
average wages, even if the wages had not been adjusted during the period covered by this study. 
This, indeed, is what the data suggest. The figures supplied by the Guatemalan Social Security 
Institute indicate that despite a reduction in the number of workers who are members of the 
Institute —because of the lower level of economic activity and perhaps also because of the increase 
in minimum wages referred to, which caused many enterprises to eliminate what they considered 
to be redundant labour— the total wages for which official figures are available grew by 39% in 
nominal terms and nearly 25% in real terms (see table 13). 
Unfortunately, no other indicator is available for measuring the evolution of wages in 1981. It 
may be noted, however, that during the entire year there was no variation in the minimum wages 
established by the central government, while the adjustments in the wages of public employees — 
the so-called "emergency bonuses"— were much lower than those of previous years. 
Table 13 
GUATEMALA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES" 
Indexes (1970 = 100) Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979 1980 Ü i í 1977 1978 1979 1980 Ü i í 
Wages and salaries 
Nominal 120.3 136.2 154.6 170.1 236.1 -4.2 13.2 13.5 10.0 38.8 
Real 64.3 67.4 68.6 69.2 86.2 -14.9 4.8 1.8 0.9 24.6 
Source: ECLA, on che basis of official daca. 
"Refers to daca from the Guacemalan Institute of Social Security on the number of social security contributors and the 
wages and salaries declared in the period concerned. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policies 
(a) Fiscal policy 
The financial situation of the central government, which has been deteriorating for some 
years past, got considerably worse in 1981 because of the drop in revenue and a moderate 
expansion in operating expenses, accompanied by very rapid expansion of capital expenditure. 
Thus, while fiscal income stagnated, total expenditure rose by more than 17%, so that the central 
government deficit increased to the record level of nearly 730 million quetzales, equivalent to 
6.5% of the gross domestic product (see table 14). As a result, the tax burden went down for the 
third year running, sinking to 7.5%: one of the lowest in the whole of Latin America, and two 
points below the 1978 level. This was due partly to the progressive nature of export taxes, which 
reduces the incidence of these duties on the products in question more rapidly than the drop in 
international prices. Moreover, in mid-year the Government decided to relieve further the 
situation of the coffee and cotton growers by reducing the tax base on which the taxation they have 

















































































































GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
2. Current expenditure 
3. Saving on current account (1 - 2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit (or surplus) (1 - 5) 
7. Financing of deficit 
Domestic financing 
External financing 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Including other capital expenditure. 
1980).10 As a result of the drop in the world price of coffee and of this change, tax revenue on 
exports of this product alone went down by over 80 million quetzales —almost half the amount 
collected in 1980— thus offsetting the additional income generated by the increase in the rate of 
stamp tax from 2 % to 3 % , which came into force on 1 January 1981. Revenue from this tax, which 
is applied on transactions "in cascade", only increased by 60 million quetzales (see table 14). 
The other types of tax revenue evolved in line with the slowing down of the economy already 
described, except in the case of revenue from business income tax, which increased by 18% over 
the abnormally low level of 1980. Official sources attribute this increase —which was partly offset 
by the drop in the collection of personal income tax— to improvements in tax administration. 
Revenue from import duties went down in absolute terms, and its average incidence in relation to 
the value of imports declined from 6.9% in 1980 to 6.2% in 1981, perhaps because of the larger 
weighting of public sector imports —which are duty free— in the total. The only category which 
showed some dynamism was that of the royalties which the Government receives in respect of the 
incipient exploitation of petroleum, the yield of which almost doubled, rising from 13.6 million 
quetzales in 1980 to 26.6 million in 1981. 
Operating expenditure increased at a relatively slow pace, especially in comparison with the 
immediately preceding years. The nominal increase of 6% included a modest wage increase 
("emergency bonus"), an increase of 4 million quetzales for payments of interest on the public 
debt, the expansion of some programmes —especially in the branches of education, health and 
security— and increases in transfers to the muncipaiities of the country, financed through 50% of 
the real estate tax. 
10The taxes on exports of coffee and cotton are applied at a progressive rate on the basis of the FOB export value. The 
changes made in the tax tables for cotton (injune) and coffee (in August) raise the FOB value above which the tax is applied. 
Thus, for example, under the previous tariff the first 70 dollars per 46 kg bag of coffee were free of tax, whereas under the 
new table this threshold figure is raised to 90 dollars (and to 110 dollars in the case of exports outside the quota system to 
countries which are not members of the International Coffee Organization). 
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As a result of the stagnation of current revenue and the moderate growth in operating 
expenditure, the saving on current account virtually disappeared, sinking to less than 30 million 
quetzales: not even enough to cover the amortization of the public debt, which required 92 million 
quetzales in 1981. In other words, almost the whole of capital expenditure—including most of the 
commitments in connexion with the amortization of the debt— were financed through further 
indebtedness. 
This capital expenditure grew very rapidly not only because of the need to continue the 
investment programme which the Government had established in previous years, but also as a 
deliberate policy aimed at offsetting the drop in private investment, especially in the construction 
sector, so as to help to maintain a minimum level of economic activity and employment. At the 
same time, however, the authorities showed a certain propensity for large-scale projects —in 
electrification, transport and communications— which were not always characterized by their 
capacity to create jobs and which did not in all cases reflect an effort to optimize social benefits. 
Thus, an ambitious programme of electrification on the basis of hydroelectric power generation 
absorbed almost 30% of the capital budget, while the construction of the new port on the Pacific 
coast absorbed another 13%. On the other hand, the private corporation which had received a 
concession from the Government in 1980 to build and manage highways did not make any 
significant investments in 1981 because of difficulties in mobilizing external financing, in spite of 
the fact that it had undertaken to the State to guarantee such financing. A large amount of building 
was promoted, especially of schools and hospitals, and including the "San Juan de Dios" hospital in 
Guatemala City, at a total cost of over 5 5 million quetzales. Many of these buildings formed part of 
the reconstruction programme to make good the damage caused by the February 1976 earthquake. 
The Government financed all this expenditure through an increasing flow of credit. 
According to the budget of income and expenditure approved for 1981, approximately one-third of 
this financing came from bilateral and multilateral external official sources. The loans obtained 
were not disbursed at the planned rate, however, while other projects which it had originally been 
expected to finance with external resources were finally financed with domestic resources. Thus, 
the Government used domestic financing to cover nearly 90% of the deficit, almost entirely 
through securities sold to the Central Bank. 
Apart from the changes in the taxes on exports of coffee and cotton, the main fiscal policy 
measure taken during 1981 was connected with the agreement concluded by the Government with 
the International Monetary Fund. According to the letter of intent signed by the authorities 
responsible for the country's finances, a more prudent expenditure policy would be followed than 
in recent years and some measures would be taken to improve tax collection through stricter tax 
administration. At the same time, the Government declared its intention to raise the degree of 
utilization of external financing for public investment projects, as a way of keeping the expansion 
of domestic monetary assets within limits compatible with the level of economic activity. 
Finally, although no detailed figures were available on the rest of the public sector, it may be 
assumed that since the central government accounts for approximately 65 % of the current income 
and expenditure of the public sector as a whole, the trends and amounts described above would 
probably not be significantly changed in the light of a global analysis of the financial situation of 
the public sector. 
(b) Monetary policy 
Two facts attract attention when analysing the monetary picture in 1981. The first one is the 
sharp fall in the international monetary reserves as a result of the series of phenomena described 
in preceding pages, and the second is the big expansion in domestic credit, destined to a large 
extent to the public sector. In other words, the reduction in external monetization was replaced by 
an expansion in domestic liquidity; the factors of expansion as a whole evolved at almost the same 
rate as the growth of the gross domestic product. 
As already noted, the gross monetary reserves of Guatemala went down from US$ 526 
million at the end of 1980 to US$ 345 million at the end of 1981. At the same time, the external 
liabilities grew substantially —from US$ 175 to US$ 443 million— due to the short-term official 
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and compensatory credits obtained in 1981, so that the loss of net reserves during the year came to 
almost US$ 450 million and the net reserve position at the end of the year showed a deficit of 
US$ 98 million (see table 15). 
The counterpart —and to some extent the reason— of this phenomenon of monetary 
contraction was a relatively liberal credit policy, at least as regards financing of the public sector. 
Credit activity as a whole grew by 36% with respect to the preceding year: i.e., three and a half 
times more than the expansion of the gross domestic product at current prices. To a large extent, 
this policy was aimed at financing the activities of the central government, for the rest of the public 
sector was a net creditor of the system: that is to say, its deposits exceeded its level of indebtedness. 
Thus, for the second year running there were spectacular increases in the amount of credit granted 
by the consolidated banking system to the public sector, to such an extent that the latter's relative 
share in total credit activity rose from a little under 6% in 1978 to almost 21 % in 1980 and nearly 
35% in 1981. The Banco de Guatemala provided some 90% of this financing. 
It may be assumed that this large-scale access by the public sector to domestic credit took away 
credit resources from the private sector. At all events, the expansion in credit activity to the latter 
sector was very moderate (12%), at a time when the private sector was encountering growing 
difficulty in gaining access to external credit. Nevertheless, the Banco de Guatemala took some 
measures to raise the level of liquidity of the banks in the system, both through its policy of 
advances and rediscounts,11 and through the more flexible application of the compulsory reserve 
policy. Although the legal reserve was not changed during the year, the reserve coefficient went 
down slightly from 18.8% at the end of 1980 to 17.8% at the end of 1981. 
In contrast with the rapid expansion of credit, the amount of resources procured by the 
intermediation system grew at only a moderate rate: demand deposits rose by less than 2%, and 
term deposits increased by nearly 16%. Currency outside banks, for its part, increased by a little 
over 6%. The slow increase in deposits and in currency outside banks, together with the sharp 
contraction in external monetization, explain why, in spite of the strong expansion in domestic 
credit, the means of payment only increased by a little over 11%, which was a very similar rate to 
that of the expansion of the gross domestic product in nominal terms. 
Table 15 
GUATEMALA: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 




Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings 
and time deposits) 













Balance at end of year 









































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
1
 'This was applied, for example, in order to promote the construction of housing and to give credit support to certain 
export and food crops. 
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Obviously, the policy followed by the monetary authorities was only viable as long as 
international monetary reserves were available. As these were depleted, it became necessary to 
seek access to external financing and to review the expansive policy followed with regard to public 
expenditure and credit. Thus, it was decided, within the framework of an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund, to follow a more prudent policy in these matters as from 1982, with 
drawing of compensatory and regular credits to the value of the equivalent of US$ 110 million.12 
At the same time, it was agreed to reduce the gap between the interest rates in force in 
Guatemala and those prevailing in international financial markets, with the aim of encouraging 
deposits within the country, discouraging the flight of capital, and generally improving the level of 
competitiveness of the domestic intermediation system with external sources of financing. Thus, 
at the beginning of the last quarter in the year the legal ceiling for interest on loans was raised from 
11 % to 15 %, and it was assumed that likewise the rates of interest on deposits would rise by up to 4 
percentage points. This new policy of interest rates was applied only gradually, however, in 
proportion as existing loans were renewed or new ones were granted, and at the end of the year the 
interest rates on deposits were still at their previous level. 
"Specifically, a total of 19.1 million SDR units was drawn on the first tranche of the stand-by loan and a total of 76.5 
million SDR units was drawn under the compensatory financing facility. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The Guyana economy continued to deteriorate in 1981. Preliminary estimates show that in 
real terms the GDP fell by around 20%. This followed continuous negative growth since 1976 with 
the exception of 1980 (when there was a 1% increase in real terms). The economy also suffered 
from a 22% rate of inflation (see table 1). 
1976 with the exception of 1980 (when there was a 1% increase in real terms) (see table 1). 
The physical output of the key foreign exchange earning sectors was far below the projected 
targets, and this situation was compounded by the prevailing low world prices for sugar and 
bauxite, unsure markets and high internal costs of production. These factors resulted in the lower 
levels of export earnings when compared with 1980. During the year, the country suffered from an 
acute shortage of hard currency to purchase raw materials and other supplies for local industries, 
resulting in overseas suppliers insisting that transactions be on a cash basis, thereby effectively 
shutting off credit to local importers. As a result of its foreign exchange difficulties, a 3-year 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement was reached with the IMF to grant an increase of 50 
million SDR units early in 1981. This grant was conditioned on an increase in local taxes and a 
reduction in government spending, and the Fund also recommended a devaluation of the currency. 
This was accordingly devalued by 18% as part of the effort to correct the country's external 
imbalance, but this action was insufficient to correct the worsening economic situation and a 
request for a further increase in SDR grants was denied. This led to the Government having to 
borrow heavily from the domestic banking system, and at the end of 1981 the public debt was an 
estimated G$ 3.1 billion,1 with the net foreign assets of the banking system standing at minus 
G$ 483 million. 
Real income accruing to the agricultural and mining sectors was estimated to be respectively 
21% and 63% lower than in 1980. The agricultural sector was affected by the considerably lower 
world prices for sugar and the rising cost of producing the commodity. Added to the difficulties in 
sugar, the rice industry faced an internal problem when local rice farmers refused to harvest the 
grain because of the low prices being offered for the crop. This situation was checked by year-end, 
however, preventing a further decline in its real earnings for 1981. In the mining sector, the advent 
of a world recession, heavy foreign competition for existing markets, substitute materials, lower 
productivity levels and the soft international markets for aluminium resulted in lower volumes of 
production and reduced earnings for the sector. 
In 1981 it was evident that the economy continued to feel the effects of having to depend on 
the narrow base of traditional exports supported by a small group of resources which have been 
showing declining and unstable levels of output over the years. This has had severe effects on the 
volume and value of exports. There continued to be heavy demand for imported goods, mainly 
food and fuel. The failure of the key sectors to increase the level of export earnings has led to an 
acute shortage of foreign exhcange, making it impossible for the Government to settle overdue 
payments on international transactions, resulting in commercial creditors remaining unpaid. 
However, in addition to the IMF's increase in its SDR allocation, some relief came from the G$ 170 
million foreign exchange support obtained from the Caribbean Aid Council through the Trinidad 
and Tobago oil facility and a US$ 23 million medium-term structural adjustment balance-of-
payments support scheme with the World Bank. Even so, however, the deficits on merchandise 
•The exchange rate of the Guyana dollar was fixed at US$ 1.00 = G$ 3.00 as from June 1981. 
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trade and services widened in 1981, with the net position being a continued worsening of the 
balance-of-payments current account deficit, while the overall balance also recorded a deficit of 
US$ 10 million. 
The central government financial operations continued to deteriorate in 1981 despite the 
24% increase in current revenue, since the increasing current and capital expenditure contributed 
to the net fiscal deficit of G$ 700 million. Nevertheless, increases in both current and capital 
expenditure were considerably slower than in 1980. More than half of the deficit financing came 
from external sources, with the remainder being realized through the issuing of short-term 
Treasury bills. 
It was expected that as a result of the deteriorating foreign exchange position there would 
have to be cuts in public expenditure, higher taxes and rising prices, large-scale public sector 
layoffs, major cuts in essential imports with severe curbs on hard currency outflows and an overall 
reduction in subsidies. Added to this serious position it may be necessary to devalue again, since the 
initial devaluation was made against an appreciating US dollar. It is apparent that there is a need to 
re-assess the economy and think about structural changes, all the more so because of the 
deterioration in the level of foreign reserves and the increasing unemployment caused by the 
downturn of activity in the principal sectors. 
Table 1 
GUYANA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981° 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at factor cost 
('millions of Guyana dollars at current prices) 
Population (thousands) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(Guyana dollars at current prices) 
Gr. 
Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at current prices 
Per capita gross domestic product at 
current prices 
Current value of exports of goods 
Current value of imports of goods 
Consumer prices index 
Annual average variation (all Guyana) 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
















































































19.7 49.6 37.4 38.0 49.8 59.0 55.6 
Millions of US dollars 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in net international reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 

































GUYANA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
GUYANA 
Millions of current 
Guyana dollars 
Percentage 
breakdown Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1981° 1977 1981° 1978 1979 1980 1981° 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
2 118 2 333 2 778 3 160 167.0 
1 268 1 326 1 508 1 600 100.0 
197.5 2.1 10.2 19.1 13.8 
100.0 12.7 4.6 13.7 6.1 
850 1 007 1 270 1 560 67.0 97.5 -10.4 18.5 26.1 22.8 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross fixed investment 
Public 
Private 




Exports of goods and services 














































































































Source: Statistical Bureau, Ministry of Economic Development, Guyana. 
"Preliminary figures. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global supply and demand trends 
According to estimates given by the Statistical Bureau, global supply at current prices 
increased by 14% in 1981 as compared with a 19% increase in the previous year. Imports of goods 
and services mainly led this increase, since they grew by 23 %, while the GDP rose by 6% (see table 
2). 
With respect to global demand, domestic demand increased by 19% as against a 13 % increase 
in 1980. Gross fixed investment rose by about 22%, mainly reflecting the fact that the public sector 
investment increased very rapidly (23%). Total consumption, whose contribution to the GDP was 
88% in 1981, showed an 18% increase, while exports of goods and services decreased by about 1%. 
(b) Growth of the main sectors 
(i) Introduction. Total domestic production in 1981, at current prices, rose by 1% over the 
1980 level, but since there was a 22% inflation rate, this performance actually reflected the serious 
continued downturn in economic activity. When consideration is given to the higher prices of 
factors contributing towards the overall production, economic growth in real terms was estimated 
to be about -20% in 1981. The 11% decline in the current value of exports of goods and the failure 
of the traditional foreign exchange earning sectors of the economy —agriculture and mining— to 
achieve better levels of performance in 1981 contributed towards these disappointing results. 
Whereas the current value of output in the agricultural sector declined by 4% in 1981, the 
decline in real terms was even greater (about 21%). This substantial movement resulted from the 
decline in earnings from the very important sugar subsector. Earnings accruing to the mining and 
quarrying sector decreased rapidly in 1981 due to low production, the effects of the current world 
recession and strong foreign competition for existing markets. The disastrous performance of the 
sector was evident in lower volumes and values of exports than in previous years. Indeed, the 
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current value of export earnings fell some 54% from 1980, with the value in real terms decreasing 
by 63%. As a consequence of these developments, the contributions of the mining and quarrying 
sectors to the total GDP fell considerably, accounting for 7% of the current GDP respectively —well 
below the 1980 levels. Despite the disappointing performance of the leading sectors of the 
economy, present current value estimates indicate good performances in the manufacturing and 
service sectors. Government and other service sectors contributed almost 30% of the total current 
GDP, while the manufacturing sector accounted for 15% and the construction share of the GDP was 
8%. Activity in other manufacturing sectors (except sugar and rice) resulted in a 45.6% increase, 
and represented an 11.1% contribution to GDP at current factor cost (see table 3). 
(ii) Agriculture. Current earnings in agriculture, while amounting to over G$ 300 million in 
1981, were about 4% lower than in 1980, since although all other major agricultural subsector 
showed considerable improvements in earnings during the period under review, the value of 
output of the sugar subsector declined by 19%. Together, sugar, rice and livestock contributed 69% 
of agriculture's earnings and 15% of the total GDP at current prices. 
The sugar industry's physical output performance improved appreciably during the year in 
spite of labour shortages, work stoppages, indiscriminate burning of cane, and the lower yielding 
Table 3 
GUYANA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
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varieties of cane presently harvested. The average ratio of tons of cane per ton of sugar was about 
14 to 1. Although the actual current value of output is estimated to have declined by about 20% in 
1981 because of falling sugar prices, the industry continued to be a major contributor to the 
national economy, accounting for some 9% of total GDP. Sugar-cane output rose some 26% to 
4 128 000 in 1981, the third highest in the last decade (see table 4). This increase in production 
came as a result of a variety of improvements implemented in the industry, such as more controlled 
harvesting and planting techniques through improved drainage and tillage and planting pro-
grammes. Nevertheless, the increase in production did not result in the anticipated higher 
earnings because of a number of extraneous factors, such as the lower external prices for the 
commodity (G$ 750 per ton), contrasting with the increasing local cost of production (more than 
G$ 1 200). This has resulted in a substantial loss of earnings to the industry. 
On the other hand, earnings from rice (paddy) were estimated to have increased by about 5 % 
in 1981 in spite of a 2 % drop in physical output. The production of rice during the early part of the 
year was hampered by the rice farmers' refusal to harvest the commodity for a return which they 
considered unreasonable. The Government subsequently offered to increase prices to offset 
incurred production costs, but nevertheless rice production up to the end of the year fell to about 
169 000 tons. During the year, the industry was plagued with the problem of a shortage of foreign 
exchange, making it difficult for farmers to obtain tractors and threshers/harvesters and necessary 
spares for repairing and maintaining equipment and plant. 
In contrast, the performance of the other agricultural subsectors continued to improve, 
resulting in an increase in their current value of output by about 12% over the 1980 level, so that 
they accounted for almost 46% of the total agricultural GDP. Earnings of non-traditional export 
crops, such as root crops, rose 16% in 1981, mainly due to the Government's continued drive 
towards self-sufficiency in food, with the aim of reducing the high cost of food imports. Indications 
are that there was a drop in the livestock population and that production of meat, dairy products 
Table 4 


























































































































Source: Statistical Bureau, Ministry of Economic Development, Guyana. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Estimates. 
'Thousands of tons. 
Millions. 
'Tons. 
and poultry in 1981 continued to decline due to shortages of animal feed and hatching eggs and the 
dwindling herds. As regards the forestry subsector, there was a rapid growth of about 27 % in its 
current value GDP in 1981, following the 29% growth reported in 1980. This good performance 
came as a result of a better transportation system from the interior, and improved sawmills and 
related techniques. Added to this, more use is being made of wood waste and renewed efforts are 
being made in charcoal production, while further encouragement is being given to the use of 
timber in the building industry, especially for housing. 
(iii) Mining and quarrying. The current value of output in the mining and quarrying sector 
decreased by 54%, so that it generated only 7% of the GDP in 1981. However, the real value of 
output was estimated to have declined by more than 63%. This decrease resulted from the reduced 
output of the bauxite industry due to the weak foreign markets and persistent labour, technical and 
management problems. Whereas earnings from bauxite and alumina fell considerably, those from 
other mining and quarrying activities, mainly gold and diamonds, rose appreciably during this 
period. Nevertheless, the mining sector has failed to achieve the targets set. 
Overall production in the bauxite industry fell some 9% in 1981, continuing the unstable 
pattern of production since 1977; output for 1980 rose only marginally (see table 5). On recent 
times the low level of demand and low world prices for bauxite products have resulted in relatively 
lower levels of production. All areas of bauxite production declined substantially with the 
exception of dried bauxite: calcined bauxite output went down 15%, alumina fell some 19%, the 
output of cement-grade bauxite fell by 47%, and there was little or no production of alumina 
hydrate during the year. The persistent shortage of foreign exchange to purchase the much-needed 
inputs, spare parts and fuel, low prices on the international market, and the soft world market for 
aluminium have pushed the estimated loss of earnings of the sector into the region of G$ 192 
million. This represents about 15 % of the country's import expenditure and a considerable loss of 
foreign exchange earnings. 
The poor performance over the years has caused a shift in the supply side of the refractory 
products industry, with Guyana being unable to satisfy the constant market demand for calcined 
bauxite, a technically preferred material for making heat-resistant bricks and linings for kilns and 
furnaces. Competitors have made significant inroads into the market, in most cases supplying an 
inferior ore which has caused many users to adapt their technology to handle this new grade of ore. 
Added to the new suppliers, the industry is faced with the problems raised by the introduction of 
alternative refractory materials, one of which is a non-bauxite refractory substitute called 
'Andalusite', a South African metal ore. The Guyana bauxite industry has faced problems due to the 
Table 5 
















































































lower price offered by its competitors for the traditional refractory ore, and also the lower prices of 
the substitutes. Though the Guyana ore is the technically preferred material, its share of the world 
market for calcined bauxite fell from a near-monopoly supply of 85% to less than 57% in 1981. 
The industry has also suffered from loss of overseas demand for its other bauxite products, 
due to poor production resulting from technical difficulties and manpower and management 
problems. The global recession has caused the demand for aluminium to drop sharply, resulting in 
much reduced demand for primary inputs, while indicators have shown a marked increase in the 
recycling of aluminium scrap, mainly in the United States. The depressed price for aluminium has 
so far resulted in the closure of several smelter plants around the world and has caused a general 
cutback in bauxite production in other producing countries. The situation has now reached the 
point where 'futures' buyers have decided to cancel orders and pay the monetary penalties thus 
incurred rather than accept delivery. 
Whereas the bauxite industry had a poor year in 1981, the reported production of gold rose by 
almost 73% to 19 000 ounces. This has resulted from the setting up of the Gold Board, where all 
gold mined or found must be reported. However, it has been estimated that this figure is only 25 % 
of what was actually "extracted during the year. This figure does not necessarily mean that past 
production was low, but rather that it was not reported. It is noteworthy that over G$ 3 million 
worth of mining equipment was imported without the necessary release of foreign exchange 
during 1981. On the other hand, there was a slight drop in the reported production of diamonds. 
diamonds. 
During 1981 the Government of Guyana continued its exploration for other materials and 
ores. There have been searches for uranium, molybdenum and other base metals, and prospection 
is continuing for new deposits of gold, diamonds and semi-precious stones. The country is shortly 
to receive a loan from the International Development Association (IDA) in order to continue its 
search for oil deposits. At present, the Home Oil Corporation is continuing its exploratory tests 
both in the interior and offshore. 
(iv) Manufacturing. Despite reduced earnings from the sugar subsector, the current value of 
output from manufacturing and processing rose by 24% and accounted for almost 15 % of the GDP 
in 1981. This resulted mainly from the increase in earnings from milled rice and other manufactur-
ing subsectors. In real terms, however, there was a 7% decline. 
Joint earnings from rice and sugar in 1981 fell by more than 14% following the 25 % growth 
the year before, because although the value of output of milled rice rose 10%, that of sugar fell 
18%. These two subsectors jointly contributed 25 % of the sector's GDP for 1981. Earnings from all 
other forms of manufacturing rose by 46% compared with 1980. This indicates the greater role 
being played by the non-traditional manufacturing sectors. 
The output of manufactured sugar recovered moderately to a production level of some 
306 000 tons in 1981, an increase of 12% over 1980 (see table 6). On the other hand, the physical 
output of milled rice fell some 2 % after showing signs of recovery the year before. The production 
of rice has been hampered by bad weather and the failure of the rice buying agencies to pay farmers 
more for the rice paddy, thus making it less profitable to produce the grain. This situation was 
being examined late in the year. 
The current value of output in the other manufacturing subsectors showed an increase of 45% 
in 1981, despite falling physical production of most manufactured items. The devaluation of the 
currency had led to a moderate growth in exports, thus pushing up the actual size of the subsectors 
earnings. 
Only soap and cigarettes experienced any growth in production during 1981, with increases of 
17% and 6% to 2 279 tons and 602 million cigarettes respectively. The physical output of 
margarine fell by 17% to 2 370 tons in 1981 after record production of 2 847 tons in 1980. 
Production of edible oil, for its part, fell by some 1 259 tons in 1981, so that it was about 47% lower 
than the figure of 2 700 tons in 1980. The output of rum fell slightly after relatively good 
production in 1980, while the production of stockfeeds and flour continued to decline in 1981. 
Total output fell as a result of difficulties in obtaining much-needed inputs for the expansion of the 
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industrial sector. The lack of these imported resources, coupled with frequent electrical outages 
and lack of skilled technicians, contributed to the lower-than-expected levels of production. 
During the year, the country experienced an acute shortage of foreign exchange, making it difficult 
to pay for imported inputs, and foreign creditors curtailed the extension of credit to Guyanese 
importers and are now operating on a strictly cash basis. In another area, limited production 
continued in the textile industry and indicators suggest that there were improvements in the 
manufacture of gas stoves and refrigerators. An attempt has been made at assembling traaors for 
the local industry. 
(v) Energy. This sector has remained the single most important constraint on the long-term 
development prospects of the country. The high cost of imported fuels and other raw materials 
have rendered most manufacturing concerns uneconomic and also affected the efficiency of other 
energy-based industries, such as electricity. The increase in fuel prices has adversely affected the 
local prices of petroleum products, which have more than doubled since 1977. In addition, the 
development of the major hydropower project in the Western part of the country and exploration 
for oil reserves have been disrupted by the unresolved border dispute with Venezuela. 
In 1981, the National Energy Unit was established to manage the country's energy resources. 
This Unit monitors the progress of the energy conservation programme and contributes towards 
the efficient use of thermal energy. It also oversees petroleum exploration and development of 
renewable energy resources. During the year, much work was done in compiling an energy audit 
and studies were completed on conservation methods. Some of the national corporations made an 
effort to maximize energy efficiency and sought new methods to conserve energy. GUYSUCO is at 
present using bagasse for fuel and GUYMINE is looking into the use of a special kiln in order to 
maximize production efficiency. Other conservation methods include the development of biogas 
as a substitute for kerosene and LPG, and the use of wood waste in the manufacture of clay blocks, 
rice husks for steam generation, and solar driers for the rice industry. 
Table 6 





























































































































* February-December 1980. 




GUYANA: VALUE OF IMPORTS OF SELECTED HYDROCARBONS 
(Thousands of Guyana dollars) 
Commodity 
Crude petroleum 







Liquefied petroleum gas 
Other Gasesc 
Bunker 'C fuel oil 
Subtotal 







































































Source: Energy Unit, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Guyana. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes gas oil. 
c
 Liquid butane and propane. 
Evidently, the local price of fuel has fully reflected the increased import cost and has 
encouraged the Government to look for oil in its own territory, with concessions given out for both 
inland and offshore explorations (see table 7). 
During the year there continued to be frequent periods of power failures. This was partly due 
to the lack of proper maintenance schedules and the continued use of unreliable equipment; 
evidently, the shortage of adequate foreign exchange affected the purchase of new equipment and 
other materials needed for the efficient operation of plant and machinery, while fuel was also in 
short supply. 
In addition, the electricity corporation suffered high levels of distribution losses and found it 
difficult to collect arrears of rates, contributing towards the weakening of its finances for future 
development (see table 8). 
(vi) Other sectors. The expansion in the Government's capital expenditure programme, 
together with the rising level of imports has generated greater demand for basic services. The 
services sector thus continued its favourable growth, accounting for over 47% of total GDP at 
current prices in 1981. Preliminary estimates indicate a 20% increase in the contribution of the 
distributive trades to the GDP in 1981 after a 2% decline in 1980, and increases of 20% and 8% 
respectively in the transport and financial services sectors. Earnings from rent went up some 28% 
during 1981. Government investment policy continued to be geared towards the improvement and 
expansion of both the industrial and agricultural sectors, and it was expected to achieve improved 
efficiency and self-sufficiency. At the same time, despite the limited resources available and taking 
into account the inflationary process, these services have had some effect on construction 
activities, where earnings rose 16%. These rates of increase in terms of current prices must be 
interpreted, however, against the background of the combined effects of the devaluation of the 
currency and the ongoing inflation. 
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3. The external sector 
(a) Merchandise trade 
(i) Exports. The current value of exports of goods declined by 11% as against a 33% rise in 
the previous year. This deceleration was mainly due to heavy reductions in the volume of the 
traditional items exported. 
The bauxite industry, which had performed well in 1980, suffered major setbacks in 1981 
which resulted in a lower volume and value of exports. The total volume of bauxite and its by-
products exported is estimated to have declined considerably in 1981, with its value falling by 
almost 11%. The decline in demand for alumina and aluminium on the international markets and 
the introduction of substitute refractory materials contributed to the drop in production and 
exports of dried and calcined bauxite. The volume of sugar exported was expected to be at about the 
same level as in 1980, with export earnings rising slightly to G$ 309 million, but this forecasted 
growth did not materialize, because of a lower volume exported and the declining price of the 
commodity on the world market. On the other hand, the reverse occurred in respect of rice. 
Despite lower volumes exported, the export earnings have kept on rising: since 1978 the volume 
of exports has been on the decline, falling from 107 000 tons in 1978 to 72 000 tons up to 
November 1981, yet earnings rose from G$ 96 million to G$ 110 million in the same 4-year period 
(see table 9). 
The indicators point to a noteworthy improvement in the volume and value of non-
traditional exports. Rum exports were expected to be higher than the 2 800 000 proof gallons 
exported in 1980 and molasses exports above the 70 000 tons exported in that year. However, the 
quantity of timber exported was expected to show a marked decline in 1981, after two years of 
improved performances, due to increased local consumption. 
(ii) Imports. The value of total imports is estimated to have grown by over 10% in 1981, 
representing about a 7% increase in real terms. The price of fuel imports weighed heavily in the 
import bill of the country, accounting for almost 31% of the total. Total payments for raw 
materials and intermediate goods showed a 26% rise over the 1980 figures, although this rise was 
somewhat slower than that experienced in the previous year. The value of fuel imports amounted 
to approximately G$ 389 million in 1981. At the same time, consumer goods, including food, rose 
by almost 20%, reversing the trend of 1980, when a decline of 12% compared with 1979 was 
reported. Although the rate of growth of capital goods imports was only 9%, their share was about 
17% of total imports, making them the second biggest category (see table 10). 
Preliminary information on trade with CARICOM countries indicates that most of Guyana's 
imports continue to originate in Trinidad and Tobago. During the period January-June 1981, more 
than G$ 218 million was imported and approximately G$ 30 million exported to Trinidad and 
Tobago. The trade with Guyana's other CARICOM neighbours continues to remain small in relation 
to-total trade (see table 11). 
Table 8 
•NERAT 
(Hundreds of thousands of kWh) 
G U Y A N A : ELECTRICITY GE ION A N D CONSUMPTION"* 










































Source: Statistical Bureau, Ministry of Economic Development, Georgetown, Guyana. 
"Data exclude sugar estates and small privated plants. 





GUYANA: VALUE AND VOLUME OF SELECTED EXPORT PRODUCTS 
(Millions of Guyana dollars and thousand tons) 
Total value of exports 





























Other exports and re-exports 
Source: Statistical Bureau, Ministry of Economic Development and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Volume figures refer to period January-November. 
'Includes total value for bauxite, alumina and alumina hydrate. 
Thousand gallons. 





































































































































(iii) Terms of trade and purchasing power of exports. The terms-of-trade index increased by 
3.5%, registering an improvement for the second year running. This was obtained because the 
export unit value increased by 7.6% while the import unit value rose by only 3.8% in 1981 (see 
table 12). 
The value of exports of goods declined by 11 %, mainly because of a 17% decline in volume. 
The index of the purchasing power of exports of goods registered 80.3 (1970 = 100), as against 
96.1 in the previous year. This was the lowest level recorded since 1975, when it hit a peak of 134. 
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(b) The current account position and its financing 
The current account position showed a further deterioration, with a deficit of more than 
US$ 210 million as compared with US$ 126 million in the previous year. This leap was mainly due 
to the large trade deficit, since the services account showed a slight decline in its deficit, as in the 
previous year. To finance the current account deficit official borrowing rose more than four times 
as compared with the previous year. However, the overall balance of payments registered a deficit 
of US$ 10 million as against a deficit of US$ 43 million in the preceding year (see table 13). 
As a consequence of the falling purchasing power of the Guyana currency and the country's 
increasing external debts, the IMF increased the allocation of SDRs to Guyana by 50 million SDRs to a 
total of 150 million SDRs. This is about three times the normal drawing rights of Guyana. However, 
this was to be accompanied by increases in local taxes, a devaluation of the currency by 18% and a 
reduction in government spending. Nevertheless, economic activity continued to decline, with the 
public external debt rising to US$ 620 million at the end of 1981. In October 1981 the IMF refused 
Total goods imported 
Consumer goods 
Food 











Tab le 10 
GUYANA: IMPORTS OF GOODS 
































































G U Y A N A : T R A D E W I T H MAJOR C A R I C O M C O U N T R I E S 






















































































GUYANA. MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 

















13.1 -1.6 -5.6 99.1 
4.1 -12.8 -7.1 6.2 
8.7 12.9 1.6 87.4 
0.4 7.1 23.7 44.5 
-3.2 2.5 8.5 2.7 
3.7 4.5 14.0 40.7 
















Terms of trade 100.0 104.2 112.6 101.0 135.2 140.1 113.3 118.4 109.2 106.3 114.3 118.3 
Purchasing power
 m Q 1 Q g 4 m Q g 5 y U4A 1 J 4 l 1 Q 4 5 9 1 Q 9 9 Q g g ? %A g Q 3 
of exports of goods 
Purchasing power of 
exports of goods 100.0 106.8 102.2 87.4 119.1125.2 97.1 85.6 93.1 83.5 89.6 75.5 
and services 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
to grant a further increase in SDRs and this led to a severe shortfall in the availability of foreign 
exchange to pay debts incurred overseas by local importers, leading the overseas suppliers to 
discontinue any lines of credit made available to Guyana in the past and to sell goods to the country 
on a strictly cash basis. Debt payments at the end of 1981 stood at US$ 104 million -about 60% of 
estimated revenue and 30% of total exports, the result at the end of 1981 was the Government's 
inability to meet payments to foreign creditors and to pay debt installments to commercial banks 
and other creditors. 
The large current account gap was not sufficiently covered by the net capital inflow, so that 
about US$ 7 million was drawn from the international reserves in 1981. 
4. Prices and wages 
The level of domestic prices, as measured by the All Items Guyana Price Index for urban areas, 
was about 22% higher than in 1980. This reflects the price increases of imported goods brought on 
by the recent devaluation of the Guyana currency. This considerable increase came after a 
somewhat slower rise in 1980. The categories which showed heavy increases clearly indicate the 
high cost of imported goods: there was a 36% increase in clothing prices, with food prices rising by 
about 28% in 1981. During the year there were acute shortages of rice and flour and the absence of 
these staple items forced up the prices of local substitutes. This position reversed the pattern of 
1980, when price rises were held down by the Government's attempts to monitor the mark-up 
policy on some basic items. Apparently the overall lower levels of local production of basic items, 
the shortages of foreign credit for imports and the lower prices to farmers for rice have created an 
unusually short supply of basic commodities, resulting in higher prices. However, a sharp drop in 
the increase rate of the housing category was observed because of the Government's attempts to 
provide housing on a self-help basis with the use of local timber and also the relocation of families 
into the interior (see table 14). 
The rising cost of imported fuel continued to be reflected in the level of domestic retail prices 
















-13.3 -11.6 13.9 33.8 11.0 
-18.2 -15.8 2.6 4.0 6.9 
5.9 5.0 11.0 28.6 3.8 
4.5 -7.8 -2.7 7.5 3.5 
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Table 13 
GUYANA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Trade balance (goods) 
Commercial balance 
Profits and interest 
Profits 
Interest 
Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official information. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions. 
'In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. 
' Includes counterpart items in respect of monetization or demonetization of gold, allocation or settlement of Special Drawing Rights, and 
variations due to revaluation. 
460 
GUYANA 
Council, through the Trinidad Oil Facility, in paying the increased oil prices (see table 15). In 
effect, the cost per imperial gallon of domestic kerosene rose some 20% in 1981, reflecting the 
2 5 % increase in the import cost of this item. Despite the 12% rise in the unit cost of diesel fuel 
imports, the domestic retail price rose by about 2 1 % , although this was somewhat lower than the 
price increases over the last two years. The price of fuel oil rose moderately (5%) in 1981 in 
contrast with the large increases of 58% and 52 % in 1980 and 1979 respectively, after two years of 
controlled prices the cost of LPG to the consumer rose by 29% toG$ 79.32 per 100 pounds in 1981. 
The last price increase had been in 1979, when the price rose 58% to G$ 63 per 100 pounds; The 
rise of about 21 % in the cost of imports of motor gasoline in 1981 did not have the same effect on 
the internal price of the commodity, since both premium and regular gasoline prices rose by about 
17% per gallon. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary developments 
While the total monetary resources placed with the banking system moved up by G$ 255 
million or by some 24% in 1981, the 24% expansion in credit toG$ 1 812 million was in excess of 
monetary growth and resulted in the running down of net foreign assets of the banking system by 
some 22% (see table 16). 
Table 14 
GUYANA: EVOLUTION OF THE URBAN CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(ALL GUYANA) 




































Source: Statistical Bureau, Ministry of Economic Development, Guyana. 
"Includes beverages and tobacco. 
Table 15 
GUYANA: RETAIL PRICES OF SELECTED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS" 























































Source: CEPAL, Energy Unit, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Guyana. 
"Prices represent last price in the year in question. 
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The money supply expanded rapidly in 1981, increasing by about 17.3% over 1980. This 
growth in the banking system came mainly from placements by the private sector. The 
contribution of the public sector was expected to be less significant, since most public sector 
enterprises hold only working balances with the banking system. In June 1978 the Bank of Guyana 
introduced a policy whereby importers were given the option to hold bank resources in the form of 
deposits (arrears deposits) for the payment of commercial arrears pending the availability of 
foreign exchange reserves for the release of such payments. Their amount increased from G$ 57 
million in 1978 to about G$ 75 million in 1980; no figure is yet available for 1981 but estimates 
indicate that the level could now be in excess of G$ 100 million. The huge increase of G$ 351 
million in credit demands outpaced the level of resources placed with the banking system during 
1981, and this excess of credit led to the continued decline of the net foreign assets. 
The 18% devaluation in June 1981 has had far-reaching implications for the economy. One 
effect was the rapid rise in the level of interest rates, making it difficult to obtain bank credit; 
another was to encourage savings. The major element in the growth of the money supply was the 
continued growth in the amount of quasi-money. The holdings of time and savings deposits rose 
by G$ 118 million or over 22% over the 1980 level, the main reason being that higher interest 
rates are now offered for such deposits. The interest rate on savings deposits rose from 3.5% in 
1977 to 10.5% at the end of 1981, whereas the rate on fixed deposits grew from 5.5% in 1972 to 
12.5% in 1981. 
The growth rate of the money in circulation declined during 1981, when it expanded by just 
over 9%. In 1980 the working balances of currency and demand deposits increased by almost 14%. 
However, for both years the rate of increase has been considerably slower than that of quasi-money 
evidently due to the widening of the differential between the non-interest-bearing deposits and 
the quasi-money holdings. Within the category of 'narrow' money, the rate of increase of currency 
was about 11%, whereas the less influential demand deposits grew by 6%. The growth in these 
deposits indicates an improvement in national financial savings and a preference for holding bank 
deposits. Total deposits grew by 19% in 1981. 
Table 16 
GUYANA: MONETARY BALANCE 
(Millions of Guyana dollars) 
Money (Mj) 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





































































































































Source: Bank of Guyana, Statistical Bulletin, December 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 




GUYANA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
(Millions of Guyana dollars) 





2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other 
3. Saving on current 
account (1 - 2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure 
( 2 + 4 ) 
6. Fiscal deficit surplus 














Source: Bank of Guyana Report, 1980, 
"Preliminary figures. 














































































































Domestic credit extended by the banking system during 1981 rose by almost 24%, compared 
with 35 % in 1980. The bulk of this credit was extended to the central government and amounted 
to G$ 1 163 million or 12% more than in 1980; public corporations and other official bodies took 
up G$ 386 million in 1981. The slower rate of growth of private credit due to increased 
government borrowing from the domestic banking system meant a reduction in the level of 
investment. Government borrowing from the domestic system, despite efforts to contain this 
continued dependence on the domestic banking system, has been mainly due to the shortfalls in 
public finances caused by the drop in net external borrowing below the targeted level. 
(b) Fiscal developments 
Preliminary estimates show a considerable growth of 24% in current income, while the level 
of current expenditure rose 11%, resulting in a deficit of about G$ 271 million on the current 
account, which was somewhat smaller than that experienced in the previous year. The overall 
deficit, measured before allowing for external borrowing, was G$ 770 million or about G$ 110 
million more than was anticipated, owing to the 15% increase in total expenditure to about 
G$ 1 257 million (see table 17). 
The substantial growth in current income was the result of the change in the tax structure 
reported last year, which gave rise to a 25 % rise in tax revenue. At the end of 1981, indications are 
that there was an increase of G$ 108 million in current income, derived mainly from higher 
receipts from income and consumption taxes, which rose 11% and 41% respectively. At the same 
time non-tax revenue increased some 16% from 1980 as a result of the G$ 10 million growth in 
the Bank of Guyana surplus. Current expenditure increased by approximately 11 % over the 1980 
level, a rise of 8% in personal emoluments and increases in debt charges being the factors 
responsible for this considerable growth. Expenditure on debt servicing rose 12% in 1981, 
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representing 67% of current revenue and 38% of total export earnings. Interest payments were 
about G$ 65 million and defence spending amounted to G$ 43 million. The net result of these 
increases was the continued deterioration of the current account, which showed a deficit of G$ 271 
million in 1981, representing about 20% of the GDP at current prices. 
Provisional estimates indicate growth of about 23% in capital expenditure in 1981, despite 
the need to cut government expenditure. This situation has worsened as a result of the low revenue 
accruing to the public sector corporations. Since almost 80% of the industries are State-owned, the 
Government must offer financial support. Income from these corporations was expected to fall 
from G$ 263 million in 1980 to minus G$ 54 million in 1981. This has forced the Government to 
borrow heavily from the domestic banking system and on the external markets. As a result of this, 
total expenditure was budgeted to increase by 15% in 1981, leaving a fiscal deficit of G$ 700 
million. 
Because of the poor performance of the fiscal sector, the Government had to seek financial 
help from the IMF and other external sources, causing the external receipts to rise to an estimated 
G$ 400 million at the end of 1981. At the same time borrowing from the internal markets was 
expected to amount to G$ 294 million, pushing up the public debt to over G$ 3.1 million. Total 
capital receipts in 1981 were expected to amount to G$ 688 million, but the Government was 
forced to default on overseas payments and is now seeking revised payment arrangements with 
creditors (see table 18). 
Table 18 
GUYANA: GOVERNMENT CAPITAL RECEIPTS 




























































Source: Bank of Guyana Report, 1980. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes government debt in respect of nationalised debts. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The Haitian economy went through a particularly adverse period during 19811 because of 
both external and internal factors. As in most of the countries of the region, the recession in the 
central countries had a negative effect on the performance of the economy, and Haiti was 
particularly vulnerable in this respect because of its high degree of openness to the exterior. The 
marked fall in the price of coffee —which is the country's main export product— was aggravated 
by a still larger drop in the amount of coffee exported,2 which led to the worsening of the 
difficulties as regards external payments, public finances, and flows of money and credit. 
At the domestic level, the poor performance turned in by agriculture —which is the main 
support of the Haitian economy— was due to cyclical factors which were aggravated by the 
consequences left by Hurricane Allen when it passed through the south and west of the country in 
August 1980. Thus, the direct and indirect effects of the bad agricultural season and the recession in 
the world economy led to a drop of 3 % in the gross domestic product after three years of relatively 
satisfactory economic growth (around 5% per year). This meant a drop of 5.4% in the per capita 
gross domestic product, which fell to a similar level to that of 1978, thus wiping out the progress 
made in the two-year period 1979-1980 (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The decline of nearly 19% in the terms of trade —which was due not only to the drop in the 
price of coffee but also to slumps in the prices of other export products— meant that the gross 
income went down by around 4.5%. 
This unfavourable picture had been foreseen to some extent even before the beginning of the 
fiscal year 1980/1981, since because of the deterioration in the balance of payments registered at 
that time and the financial difficulties of the Government, practically zero growth of public 
investment was programmed for 1981. This contrasted with the great dynamism shown by this 
item over the last ten years. Private and foreign investment, for their part, still displayed some 
dynamism in 1981, but it was notably less than in previous years. 
The global economic recession was reflected likewise in a generalized manner in activities at 
the sectoral level, except for the greater dynamism observed in electric power generation and the 
significant growth in the construction sector (although this growth was less than in previous 
years). The government sector and ownership of dwellings were the other two categories where 
some progress was registered. In contrast, the other sectors suffered contractions in real terms, 
some of them very substantial, such as the decline of 5% in agriculture and the drop of 46% 
suffered by the mining sector before the foreign enterprise responsible for running the main 
bauxite mine completely abandoned its operations. 
The deterioration of the external accounts played a leading role in this context. In spite of the 
highly satisfactory performance achieved in 1980 as regards exports of goods and services, the loss 
of international reserves suffered that year provided a shaky foundation for developments in 1981. 
This was aggravated by the drop in export income and some possible flights of capital at the 
beginning of the year which led to a significant shortage of foreign exchange and even to the 
'Unless otherwise indicated, the period covered by this report is the Haitian fiscal year 1980/1981, which ran from 1 
October 1980 to 30 September 1981. 
2The average price of the coffee exported went down by 33 % and the volume fell by 45 %, so that the foreign exchange 
received for these exports diminished by 64%. 
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emergence of an unofficial parallel rate for the dollar, which is something that has rarely happened 
in Haiti.3 
Against this background, negotiations were resumed with the International Monetary Fund 
with a view to reaching an agreement in the framework of the Expanded Facility. This involved 
some changes of policy, especially as regards import control, tax revenue, the credit policy of the 
Bank of the Republic, and both budgetary and extrabudgetary public expenditure. It did not prove 
possible to reach such an agreement, however, and it was postponed for 1982; moreover, the small 
drawings made under this facility in the last quarter of 1980 were quite insufficient to cover the 
very large trade deficit of US$ 215 million with which the fiscal year closed. 
The decrease of 6% in tax revenue (which depends to a large extent on taxes on foreign trade) 
and the increase in Government spending resulted in substantial expansion of the fiscal deficit, 
which rose to a level equivalent to 10.7% of the gross domestic product, compared with 7.5% in 
1980. This took place even though public investment remained static in real terms.4 
Table 1 
HAITI: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
15.2 
21.9 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
September to September 
Variation between annual average 
Money 
Wages and salaries' 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in net international reserves 
Disbursed external public debt 
Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 











































































































































'The exchange rate of 5 gourdes per dollar has been kept fixed since 1919. During 1981, however, there were cases of 
the purchase of dollars at 6 gourdes or even, exceptionally, at higher rates. 
4The increased deficit was partly due to purely statistical reasons, such as the inclusion in the budget of expenditure 
items which were previously classified as extrabudgetary. 
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Although this deficit was largely financed with external resources —many of them consisting 
of donations or loans on concessional terms— an increasing part was financed with domestic 
credit from the Central Bank. Thus, the monetary situation showed important changes, since on 
the one hand credit was oriented primarily towards the central government, and on the other, the 
money in circulation increased far more than was needed for the purposes of transactions. This 
was due partly to the need to make up with national currency for the shortage of dollars, which 
circulate freely in Haiti because of the openness of its financial system. 
The imbalance between the supply of and demand for money helped to raise the rate of 
inflation from 16% to 18% on the basis of the difference between annual averages of the 
consumer price index and from 9.5 % to nearly 18% on the basis of the difference between the end-
of-September figures for each year (see table 1). In response to this, the minimum wages in 
manufacturing (basically assembly industries) and the public service were increased by 20% in 
October 1980, thus following the trend in the evolution of their purchasing power observed in 
recent years, and now stand at between US$ 2.64 and US$ 3.12 per day. The decline in agricultural 
and industrial activity and in the economy in general, however, probably meant higher 
unemployment and underemployment, and led to an effective drop in private consumption of 
2.4%. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global supply and demand trends 
Against this predominantly depressive background, imports (on the supply side) and private 
investment and government consumption (on the demand side) prevented the contraction in the 
economy from being still greater (see table 2). 
After a prolonged period of expansion, global supply went down in 1981 by nearly 2% as a 
result of a 3% drop in the gross domestic product, partly offset by the relative dynamism of 
imports, which grew by nearly 4% in real terms despite the balance-of-payments restrictions. A 
decisive role was played in this respect by the notable slackening in the growth rates of import 
prices. 
As regards global demand, both its domestic and external components registered decreases. 
The drop in exports was most marked (3.8%) and was due to the reduction in exportable supply 
and in unit prices because of conjunctural factors both in the Haitian economy and at the world 
level. Domestic demand, for its part, went down by 1.7% as a result of a 2.2% drop in total 
consumption, which was brought down by the 3.0% reduction in private consumption. 
Government consumption, in contrast, registered a significant increase (6%) which reflected the 
higher current operating expenses. Gross investment grew only by an insignificant amount 
(0.7%) as a result of the stagnation of public investment, which offset the relative dynamism of 
private investment (2.8%). The latter was favoured by the government development policy and 
was also partly due to the satisfactory behaviour of foreign investment, which continued to enter 
Haiti in spite of the international recession. In contrast, 1981 s'aw the end of the dynamic growth of 
public investment, which is responsible for three-quarters of total investment. This stagnation 
was due to the financial difficulties already mentioned, but it should be noted at the same time that 
it occurred at the relatively high level reached in recent years (see table 2). 
(b) Growth of tbe main sectors 
The 3% contraction in the gross domestic product was the result of a fairly general drop in 
activity in all the productive sectors of the economy except electricity (which increased by over 
9%), construction (which grew by 5%) and government services (which expanded by 4%) (see 
table 3). Because of the heavy weighting which agriculture has in total activity (42%), however, 
the 5 % contraction suffered by it proved decisive as regards the evolution of the economy as a 
whole, on account of the direct and indirect effects this sector has on the rest of the economy, the 
financial resources which it provides for the Government, and the import capacity which it 
generates through exports. 
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Figure 1 
HAITI: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1970 71 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. 
^Percentage variation, September - September. 
cMillions of dollars. 
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HAITI 
Manufacturing, which is of increasing relative importance, shrank by 1 %; mining continued 
to decline sharply as a result of the foregoing, and the rest of the sectors of the economy were also 
affected by depressive trends. 
(i) Agriculture. The performance of agriculture in 1981 suffered from the negative effects of a 
number of structural and conjunctural factors which led to a 5% drop in production, export 
products being those which showed the greatest deterioration. 
Thus, coffee suffered directly as a result of the damage caused by Hurricane Allen, which 
swept across the southern part of the country, where the main coffee-growing areas are located. 
This led to a drop of 45 % in the volume exported, aggravated by the effects of the sharp decline in 
the international price of coffee, which went down by one-third. There were also substantial drops 
in the exportable supply of sugar (almost 60%), sisal (over 70%) and essential oils (20%). Cocoa 
was the only export crop which showed some improvement (10%), but in the stock-raising 
subsector there was a substantial increase in beef production (almost 80%), probably because of 
the reduction in the exportable supply from certain Central American countries which 
traditionally supply the United States market. 
As in previous years, Haiti was once again obliged in 1981 to import rice, maize and beans, 
which are the basic foodstuffs of the population. In addition, although efforts are being made to 
control African swine fever through a national eradication programme, this disease continued to 
wreak havoc among the swine population, with the imminent peril of having to sacrifice a large 
part of it. Because of the hardiness and rapid growth of pigs, pork is a popular food among the rural 
population, and the presence of swine fever has thus had the effect of causing an even greater 
deterioration in protein consumption and the quality of life in rural sectors. 
Many and varied efforts are being made by the governments of different countries and by 
international organizations to carry out agricultural development activities in Haiti. Thus, 71 
projects spread over 13 programmes and involving resources of the order of 260 million gourdes 
were executed during 1981. Of these, over 50% were part of the integrated rural development 
programme. This programme, which is being carried out in various regions of the country, is based 
on the belief that only by simultaneously attacking on various fronts (education, housing, social 
and economic conditions, etc.) will it be possible to solve the problems of underdevelopment 
affecting the country. 
The rest of the projects cover a variety of activities ranging from the improvement of coffee 
plantations, the development of forests in eroded areas and the development of the valley of 
Artibonite, to the provision of funds for agricultural credit, research, etc. 
An agricultural development policy based on the organization of projects and programmes, 
however, requires a substantial body of technical and administrative workers which is apparently 
beyond the present capacity of the country. Thus, of the expenditure budgeted for the agricultural 
sector in 1980, only 64% was actually used. In addition to holding up the execution of the projects, 
this situation raises serious doubts as to the possibility of organizing new development projects in 
this field. 
(ii) Mining. Within this activity, which plays only ah insignificant part in the Haitian 
economy, production of bauxite (entirely for export) continued its downward trend of the last five 
years, going down this time by 16% (see table 4). Indeed, the United States enterprise responsible 
for this activity announced that in view of the unprofitability of the mine due to the low aluminium 
content of the ore and the rising extraction costs it would be closing down operations and 
definitively withdrawing from the country in 1983. The authorities continued their prospection 
work for bauxite, copper, marble, coal and even oil, but the only substantial advance made was in 
respect of marble quarrying, in connexion with which an incipient industry is growing up. In the 
other cases no significant advances were made. 
(iii) Manufacturing. Various factors adversely affected the evolution of manufacturing in 
1981. On the one hand, the recession in the United States had a direct impact on the assembly firms 
which re-export their production to that market, and on the other, the depressive situation 
reigning in Haiti itself had negative effects on industries oriented towards supplying the domestic 
market, in view of the reduction in demand and especially of consumption. The contraction in the 
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amount of credit in real terms also played a crucial role in this respect. Moreover, the shortage of 
foreign exchange due to the drop in export income and the climate of speculation prevailing in 
connexion with the external situation of the country became a serious obstacle to efforts to ensure a 
continuing flow of imported inputs. Thus, the relative deterioration which the growth rate of 
manufacturing had begun to show in 1980 after several years of rapid growth culminated in 1981 
in a contraction of 1 % in real terms.5 
As may be seen from table 4, production of the majority of industrial items showed declines, 
some of them of considerable magnitude, as in the case of cigarettes and shoes, which went down 
by 33%. Flour milling, however, showed an exceptional growth rate of 54% due to the special 
attention given to this product in development projects in recent years. 
In general, the Government's industrial policy seeks greater integration between agriculture 
and industry, the use of local raw materials and the decentralization of industry through the 
establishment of industrial parks outside metropolitan Port-au-Prince at Cap Haitien and Les 
Cayes. Although there are various industrial development projects which combine public and 
private sector interests,6 the conditions prevailing in 1981 led to a delay in them because of the 
shortage of financing, which came on top of the negative factors already referred to and the 
problems which have traditionally hindered the formulation and execution of development 
projects in Haiti. Foreign investors and the Government still maintain interest in setting up 
assembly firms, however, because of the advantages offered by Haiti as regards wages and its 
closeness to the United States. 
Table 2 
HAITI: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 






Exports of goods and services 












































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Planning and the Haitian Statistical Institute. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The values of exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars at 
current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLA for the purpose. 
'In the 1970s, manufacturing expanded very quickly, with the total of 125 industrial firms recorded in a survey in 1971 
rising to 219 in 1975 and 449 in 1981. In the last two years, there has above all been a proliferation of small artisanal 
enterprises rather than larger-scale ones. The most numerous factories are in the textile industry (126plants), followed by 
the food industry (99 plants). See Ministry of Planning, Main-d'oeuvre, emploi et ressources humaines, Port-au-Prince, 
January 1982, p.9. 
6See in this respect the various industrial projects listed in Ministry of Planning, Plan Annuel, Exercice Fiscal 1980-




HAITI: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 




Electricity, gas ar I water 
Transport, storage and comunications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail commerce, 
restaurant and hotels' 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and personal 
services 
Government services 




























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Planning. 
"Preliminary figures. 
6
 As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond exactly 
with the latter. 
'Including financial institutions, insurance and real estate, except ownerships of dwellings. 
Including restaurants, hotels and business services. 
Among the measures applied in February and March in order to defend the balance of 
payments, there were some which represented changes in industrial policy, since they offered 
greater protection to domestic producers. Thus, with the aim of containing imports, it was 
forbidden to purchase abroad certain types of goods also manufactured within the country, and 
subsequently other products were subjected to a system of import licences and a 20% increase was 
ordered in duties on luxury articles and foods and, later, in the tax on alcoholic beverages. These 
protectionist measures were not enough, however, to offset the current adverse conditions facing 
domestic industry. 
In contrast with most of the other sectors of the economy, the electricity industry generated 
320 million kWh during 1981 and thus continued the expansion begun in 1980 which has signified 
the achievement of growth rates of over 8.5% per year (see table 4). This was due to the 
continuation of a large number of small projects and some larger projects, among which special 
mention may be made of the expansion of the Varreux power station. In spite of this, however, 
there are still serious deficiencies in the access of the population to this source of energy, as is 
shown by the fact that 9 2 % of the electricity is consumed in Port-au-Prince, 6.5% in four other 
large towns, and less than 2 % in the rest of the country. 
(c) Population and employment 
It is estimated that in 1981 the economically active population (defined in this case as that 
aged 10 or more) came to 2 585 000 persons, of whom 22% were young people between 10 and 19 
years of age and almost 9 % were between 10 and 14. Of the total economically active population, 
6 8 % is engaged in agriculture, 10% in the secondary sector, and the remaining 22% inservices.lt 
is also estimated that while open unemployment amounted to 11.5% in 1981, nearly 4 0 % of the 
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available labour force was affected by underemployment deriving, inter alia, from the long-
standing problems of low productivity and over-population.7 
Agricultural activities shpw the highest rates of underemployment —between 50% and 
75%—8 and also have least potential for absorbing labour. In contrast, manufacturing has shown 
great dynamism both as regards the creation of jobs (37 000 per year between 1976 and 1981) and 
their productivity (25 % oí them correspond to the formal sector). Finally, commerce and services 
are branches with a relatively large informal component (after agriculture) and provide incomes 
below the level needed to satisfy basic needs. 
3. The external sector 
In an economy like that of Haiti, which is open both as regards trade (imports represent 
almost 20% of the gross domestic product) and finance (there is free domestic circulation of the 
US dollar), the recession in the world economy naturally had harmful internal effects. The most 
significant fact in connexion with external relations, however, was the marked drop in the price of 
coffee, which coincided with an even larger drop in the exportable supply of this product. This 
caused a serious deterioration in the external transactions account, with the deficit on current 
account rising to US$ 185 million and a loss being recorded in the international currency reserves 
for the second year running, this time in the amount of almost US$ 50 million. 
Table 4 




Index (1959-1960 = 100) 
Flour 
Sugar 






Footwear (thousands of pairs) 
Cement 
Cotton textiles (millions of yards) 
Toilet soap (tons) 
Essential oils (tons) 
Electricity output 



























































































































Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry and General Customs Administration. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Figures refer to exports, since the entire output is exported. 
'See Main d'oeuvre, emploi et ressources humaines, op.cit., pp. 1-22. 
"These underemployment figures are estimated in terms of the numbers of days worked (fully-employed workers are 
considered to be those who work 300 days per year), and not as a function of the value added per worker, which averaged 




HAITI: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of export 
of goods 
Purchasing power of exports 




































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
(a) Merchandise trade 
During 1981 export income went down by almost 20% as the result of a 5 % contraction in 
the volume exported and a. 15% drop in export prices (see table 5). In contrast, the value of 
imports increased by 9% and their volume by 5 %, although their unit value rose by a little under 
3-5 %, which is a much lower rate than in any of the preceding eight years. This was due to the drop 
in inflation in the United States, the reversal in the international oil price trends, and the 
devaluation vis-a-vis the dollar of the currencies of the main european countries with which Haiti 
trades. As the unit prices of exports suffered a drop of 15%, however, the terms of trade 
underwent a deterioration of nearly 19% which offset the gains recorded in the last six years and 
reduced the purchasing power of exports (see table 5). 
(i) Exports. In 1981 the value of exports of goods came to US$ 170 million, compared with 
US$ 210 million the year before. There were substantial drops in the value of practically all 
exports of primary commodities. The most serious of these, however, was the drop in coffee sales, 
which went down by 64% because of a decline of 33% in the unit price and a drop of 45% in 
volume. In contrast, although there was a considerable (27%) drop in the value of exports of cocoa, 
this was due entirely to the lower prices, since the volume exported increased. During the year 
there was a reduction of around 15 % in external sales of oils and bauxite, the value of exports of 
sisal went down by 47%, and exports of sugar practically disappeared (see table 6). As already 
noted, although there was a drop in the price of cocoa, there was an increase in the volume 
exported. In contrast, sales of meat more than doubled in value, both because of the larger quantity 
exported and the higher prices received. The value added by assembly industries increased by 5 % 
according to initial estimates, but in real terms it went down, because of the recession in the United 
States. 
(ii) Imports, Although the shortage of foreign exchange and the recessive domestic situation 
tended to check the growth of imports of goods, their value nevertheless rose from US$ 295 
million in 1980 to US$ 320 million in 1981 (see table 7). The measures put into effect in the early 
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months of the year to defend the balance of payments did have some effect as regards moderating 
the growth of imports, and apart from the protectionist policies which benefited industry, there 
were increases in the duties on automobiles and gasoline. 
According to data for the first half of the year, high import growth rates were maintained only 
for hydrocarbons and oils and fats (21% and 45%, respectively), and for beverages and tobacco 
(16%). 
(b) Services and factor payments 
Income from tourism came to US$ 70 million, or nearly 8% more than in 1980, which 
actually signified a small reduction in real terms. Because of Haiti's great tourist potential, the 
Government has made efforts to attract tourists and has promoted various projects to develop 
tourism, but in 1981 the world recession made these efforts fruitless. Outward tourism by Haitians, 
for its part, which involved an outflow of US$ 30 million, registered a considerable decline in real 
terms compared with 1980 as the result of the shortage of foreign exchange, the increase in the tax 
on airline tickets of Haitian travellers and the economic situation of the country (see table 8). 
Altogether, the trade in goods and services showed a deficit of US$ 215 million, or 50% more 
than the negative balance registered the year before. This deficit was partly offset by the 
remittances of Haitian emigrants, which amounted to nearly US$ 45 million and thus exceeded 
the value of coffee exports. External factor payments, for their part, totalled the low figure of only 
US$ 13 million, partly because the interest payments are very small on account of the preferential 
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Source: General Customs Administration. 
"Preliminary figures. 
fcThe totals do not coincide with the figures given in the balance of payments because different sources envolving non-
equivalent concepts were used. 
'Including molasses. 




HAITI: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total ' 
Food products 
Beverages and tobacco 
Raw materials 
Hydrocarbons 
Oils and fats 
Chemical products 
Manufactured articles 



















































































































Source: General Customs Administration and Banque de la Republique d'Haiti. 
"Preliminary figures. 
''Period October 1980 - March 1981. 
'Period October 1980 - March 1981 compared with period October 1979 - March 1980. 
The totals do not coincide with the figures given in the balance of payments because different sources involving non-
equivalent concepts were used. 
(c) The current account position and its financing 
As a result of the foregoing, the current account deficit came to US$ 185 million, which is 
equivalent to 73% of export income and represents a big increase on the figure of a little over 
US$ 130 million registered the year before. 
In order to help to cover this deficit, Haiti received official donations amounting to US$ 66 
million, which meant that these payments recovered their upward trend after the decline suffered 
in 1980. The same occurred in the case of foreign investment, which brought in an income of 
US$ 21 million. In contrast, the official loans received (US$ 60 million) showed only a slow 
growth rate of 5%,'largely on account of the shortage of domestic counterpart resources for 
development projects, while amortization payments on these loans went down to US$ 4 million. 
In short, the capital income was not enough to cover the current account deficit, so that the 
international monetary reserves suffered a serious loss of US$ 50 million, causing them to drop to 
a level of only US$ 19 million at the end of the fiscal year. 
(d) External public debt 
At 30 September, the total external public debt came to a little over US$ 300 million, or 14% 
more than one year before. Because of the donations received by Haiti (which amount to more than 
the loans), the country has not had to resort to external indebtedness to an excessive extent. 
Nevertheless, its external indebtedness is already equivalent to 20% of the gross domestic product, 
which is a significant proportion, even though not one of the largest in Latin America. Likewise, 
because of the preferential treatment given to Haiti by the international financial community, the 
debt servicing (US$ 13 million in 1981) represented no more than 5% of exports of goods and 
services, which is one of the smallest proportions in Latin America and shows that the country still 
has some room for manoeuvring as regards the use of foreign capital (see table 9). 
'This amount includes about US$ 14 million provided by the IMF under the Expanded Facility arrangements, which 
however, were not continued, as explained below. Without this amount, this item would have suffered a substantial decline. 
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Table 8 
HAITI: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance' 
Total variation in reserves' 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 





























































































































































































































































Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
'The difference between the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign) and the global balance represents counterpart items-, 




H A I T I : I N D I C A T O R S O F E X T E R N A L I N D E B T E D N E S S " 
(Millions of dollars) 
HAITI 
Total external public debt 
Government 
Public enterprises 
Servicing of external debt 
Amortization payments 
Interest payments 
Servicing of external debt, 
as a percentage of total 
















































Source: Banque de la République d'Haiti. 
"Balance of disbursed debt with a term of more than one year as at 30 September of each year. 
4. Prices and wages 
Inflationary pressures persisted in 1981, when the growth rate of prices rose to nearly 18% 
compared with 16% the year before10 (see table 10). This occurred in spite of the marked 
slackening in imported inflation. 
Indeed, the inflation rate was due largely to the increase in food prices (21%), which have a 
weighting of nearly 70% in the general index. The scanty supplies of basic foods due to the bad 
agricultural year and the rigidity in the supply of these goods were among the causes of the 
persistence of upward pressures on the prices of primary commodities. According to data for the 
first half of the year, the biggest increases were in the price of sugar (96%), maize (49%) and 
plantains (43%). The rise in the prices of clothing and rents, however, was below the growth rate 
of the general index. 
In October 1980 minimum wages were increased by 20%, thus benefiting the formal sector of 
industry (consisting basically of assembly activities), the public service and some select groups in 
commerce and services. Although these increases were largely neutralized by inflation, they gave 
rise to a 2% increase in real wages in the fiscal year 1980/1981. Nevertheless, this rise was 
substantially smaller than in the previous period (see table 11). No changes were made in wages in 
October 1981. Thus, the minimum wages paid in the modern sector stood at between US$ 2.64 and 
US$ 3.12 per day in certain branches of the assembly industry. The rest of the population remained 
outside the scope of these measures, however, and in view of the poor performance of agriculture 
and of the economy in general, it is estimated that there was a significant drop in the consumption 
of the poorest sectors and a further deterioration in the unequal distribution of income in Haiti.11 
10For purposes of analysis it is preferable to use the variation between the annual averages for the consumer price index 
rather than the variations as at September, because of the high variability shown by this index. Thus, taking the variations 
in the index between the months of July, inflation would have more than doubled (from 13% in 1980 to 27.1% in 1981), 
whereas if we take the variations between the months of August inflation would barely have increased, rising from 17.7 % in 
1980 to 20.3% in 1981. Finally, if we take the variation between the September figures, these once again show a substantial 
rise from 9.5% in 1980 to 17.8% in 1981. 
"In 1976, 0.4% of the population received 44% of the national income, while the poorest 80% of the population had 
an income of less than US$ 100 per year, according to the Haitian Statistical Institute, Etiquete a buts multiples, 1976. 
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5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
The deterioration in the external accounts and the big imbalance in the public finances were 
the main reasons why the monetary picture showed some disequilibria in 1981. 
As already noted, the trade deficitand the climate of uncertainty which grew up in the country 
and led to some flights of capital in the early months of the year caused an unusual shortage of 
foreign exchange, to such an extent that an incipient parallel market temporarily arose in which 
the dollar came to be quoted at over 20% above its official value. This phenomenon is particularly 
significant in Haiti because the dollar and the gourde circulate freely together at an exchange rate 
of 1:5 which has not been changed for the past 62 years. 
In spite of the drop in the net international reserves to levels which were even negative in 
certain months, the amount of money in circulation grew by 32%, which was considerably more 
than the rise in the gross domestic product at current prices (14%) and of course much more than 
the 11 % increase recorded in the means of payment in 1980 (see table 12). In essence, this increase 
reflected the strong growth in the issue of money, which was designed partly to finance the 
enormous public deficit and partly to make up for the dollars taken out of the system. 
The central government was the sector which asborbed the largest volumes of credit —50% 
more than in 1980— while credit channelled to the private sector grew by less than 13%. This 
figure actually represented a slight reduction in real terms, and had a negative effect on industry 
and commerce. Public institutions, for their part, obtained 10% less credit in 1981 than in 1980 
(see table 12). 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Table 10 
HAITI: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
1976 1977 1978 
Variation from September to September 
3.3 5.0 2.3 




Variation between annual averages (fiscal years) 
6.3 7.4 -2.9 













Source: Haitian Statistical Institute. 
Table 11 
HAITI: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 






























Source: UCLA, on the basis of figures from the Banque de la République d'Haiti and the Haitian Statistical Institute. 




HAITI: MONETARY BALANCE 
Balance at end of September 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) 
Long-term foreign borrowing 








































































































Source: Banque de la République d'Haiti. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes allocations of Special Drawing Righs and allocations from the IMF trust fund. 
Because of the financial openness which characterizes Haiti, interest rates moved in line with 
those abroad, which fluctuated at high levels. This was not sufficient stimulus to procure greater 
resources, however, since savings and term deposits grew by only 10%, which also represented a 
reduction in real terms. Long-term external loans performed in a similar manner. Altogether, total 
procurement of resources, which increased by 9%, was not enough to cover the increase in the 
factors of expansion, whose most dynamic element was public financing, which rose by nearly 370 
million gourdes. In fact, even before the end of the financial year this variable had exceeded the 
limits agreed with IMF in the context of the negotiations aimed at obtaining substantial credit from 
that organization under the Expanded Facility, and this was one of the reasons why the 
negotiations in question were temporarily abandoned. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
In Haiti, fiscal income is closely linked with the performance of external trade, for taxes on 
external trade represent more than 40% of total current income and therefore the reduction of 
nearly 22% in revenue from such taxes in 1981 meant that the Government suffered a loss of 
income of nearly 5% (see table 13). The tax burden, which is one of the lowest in the region, went 
down to 8% in 1981. 
In contrast with this deterioration in income, total expenditure went up by 22% as a result of 
the even more rapid expansion (33%) in current expenditure, outstanding among which was the 
rapid increase in miscellaneous purchases and expenditure (48%) as part of the operating budget, 
of which the Department of Finance, the Department of National Education and the Armed 
Forces receive the largest shares after the Central Amortization Fund. It should be noted that this 
year the figures included items which had previously been classed as extrabudgetary, and this 
increased the total and thus raised the growth rate of current public spending. Public service 
remunerations as a whole increased by 20%, entirely as the result of the wage increases referred to 
earlier, since there was no substantial additional hiring of personnel nor was there any perceptible 
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increase in the State machinery. In contrast, investment expenditure increased by only 12 %, which 
means that it probably went down in real terms.12 
In fact, from the very beginning the 1980-1981 investment budget envisaged very modest 
growth, 40% of which was to be financed from domestic resources and 60% from external 
resources. The national priorities were industry, agriculture and transport, while external 
assistance, although placing emphasis on the latter two areas, gave priority to the development of 
energy and transport, increased the emphasis on education and community development, and left 
industry completely on one side. Altogether, the expenditure budgeted for investment finally went 
mainly to transport arid agriculture (each of which sectors received 16% of the total), energy 
(15%) and industry and education (9% each), the remaining 35% being distributed among the 
other sectors. 
At all events, as has usually been the case in Haiti, the investment programme was only 
fulfilled to the extent of 60% or 70% because of the internal difficulties in carrying out certain 
development projects and the lack of national counterpart resources. This is why, although the 
development budget provided for a contribution of 185 million gourdes, in reality only 83 million 
were disbursed, so that total public investment amounted to 719 million gourdes instead of the 
figure of 1 094 million budgeted. 
Table 13 
HAITI: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
1. Current income 
Tax revenue 
Direct and indirect 
On foreign trade 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other current expenditure 
3. Saving on current account (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit (1-5) 





























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures provided by the Department of Finance and Economic Affairs of the Ministry of 
Planning and the Banque de la République d'Haiti. 
a
 Preliminary figures. 
Excludes food imports from the United States on concessional terms under that country's law on agricultural surpluses 
(P.L.480, Title 1), and donations by non-governmental organizations. 
12It is important to note that there are a number of non-identifiable items which make it impossible to know exactly 
whether these represent consumption expenditure (other than remunerations) or investment expenditure. Moreover, the 
heading "other current expenditure" includes the expenditure made through the Central Amortization Fund. In addition, 
these items include extrabudgetary outlays which make it difficult to carry out any calculations and which persist in spite of 
the continuing efforts to eliminate them. Within the framework of the efforts to put public finances on a sounder basis, 
however, an important step forward was taken in 1981 with the limitation of the fiscal functions of the Tobacco and 
Matches Monopoly (Régie du Tabac et des Allumettes). 
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HAITI 
In spite of these restrictions on investment expenditure, the central government fiscal deficit 
nevertheless came to somewhat over 800 million gourdes, or 57% more than in 1980. This deficit 
was equivalent to 10.7% of the gross domestic product, compared with 7.5% the year before. In 
order to cover it, resort was had to donations from abroad, which showed rapid growth to 328 
million gourdes; foreign loans, in contrast, went down to 106 million gourdes. Total external 
resources thus amounted to 434 million gourdes and financed 54% of the deficit: a considerably 
smaller proportion than the 66% covered the year before. Domestic financing, however, more 





1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
After growing significantly and systematically during the four-year period 1976-1979, the 
gross domestic product increased by only 2.5% in 1980, and in 1981 it actually fell slightly (see 
table 1 and figure 1). 
Both external and internal factores were responsible for this trend. The former included in 
particular the drop in external demand for the country's main export commodities, the 
deterioration in the terms of trade, and the rising rates of interest in the international financial 
markets. Internal factors included primarily the sharp drop in fixed capital formation, due above 
all to a severe contraction of public investment and also to a reduction in private investments 
owing to the atmosphere of uncertainty surrounding the election process and the political 
situation through which neighbouring countries were passing. Both groups of factors lent weight 
to each other: the climate of uncertainty aggravated the deterioration in the balance of payments, 
since it led to the flight of a considerable amount of foreign exchange, while the drop in public 
investment limited the capacity to mobilize external financing from official sources in amounts 
comparable to those received in past years. The recessive effects of those phenomena were 
reflected in imbalances in the monetary, financial and budgetary areas. 
The limitations originating in the external sector were reflected in a loss of international 
monetary reserves of rather more than US$ 70 million. This situation was attributable first to the 
drop in the value of exports as a result of the widespread recession in the world economy, the 
problems related to the banana supply, and the growing restrictions on Central American trade. 
Nevertheless, the decline in the value of imports was such that it not only compensated for the 
contraction in exports but even enabled a smaller trade deficit to be achieved than in the preceding 
year. In addition to the drop in exports, however, another negative factor which had a decisive 
effect on the current account deficit was the substantial increase in interest payments brought on 
by the rise in interest rates in the international financial markets and the deterioration in the 
structure of public debt, which is referred to below. Finally, in 1981 the country attracted a smaller 
amount of external capital than in the two preceding years, due on the one hand to the deceleration 
in the public investment programme, which receives a large share of external financing, and on the 
other hand, to the increasing difficulty experienced by the Central American countries in obtaining 
credit in the international financial markets and to the flight of capital mentioned above. 
The drop in investment was basically due to the deterioration in the structure of public 
expenditure caused by the increase in operating expenses (not always in connection with 
development activities) and the decline in income, which reduced the resources needed to continue 
with the ambitious public investment programme initiated in past years. Thus, while in 1980 41 % 
of the central government's disbursements were for investment, in 1981 this proportion fell to a 
little over one-third. 
Financial imbalances were also observed in a large number of decentralized enterprises and 
entities, mostly on account of increases in operating costs, declines in income and, in the case of the 
official banks, difficulties in recovering their loans. For example, the financial restrictions of the 
National Investment Corporation (CONADI) were partly responsible for the sluggishness shown by 
private investment. 
In addition, because of the financial imbalances in the public sector, more recourse was had 
than in the past to short-term external financing on rather unfavourable terms, which caused a 
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deterioration in the structure of the external public debt. This had immediate adverse 
consequences which were reflected in the substantial increase in the factor payments of the 
exterior —a trend which, for the reasons indicated, will become more marked in the future. On the 
other hand, the reduction in long-term external financing from official sources may be attributed 
to the delay mentioned above in the execution of the public investment programme, which was due 
in some cases to obstacles of an administrative nature (such as occurred in the construction of a 
new port on the Atlantic) and, in others, to financial restrictions on expenditure in local currency.1 
Table 1 
HONDURAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981° 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Real gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
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December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government' 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 







































































1 4 3 9 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product at market prices plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Variation November-November. 
Variation between average indexes for January-November. In 1980 the variation of the average index for this period was 
18.7%. 
'Percentage. 
Total disbursed public and private external debt. 
'The drop in external financing associated with this phenomenon was accompanied by a decline in imports of goods as 




The growing needs of the public sector for financing also led the monetary authorities to give 
high priority to domestic credit for both the central government and decentralized entities, to such 
an extent that bank credit to the private sector was restricted. This put heavy pressure on the 
financial intermediation system, which was reflected in a severe shortage of liquidity even though 
deposits continued at a normal rate. 
In view of these factors, the economic policy in 1981 was basically aimed at coping with the 
disequilibria in the balance of payments and the fiscal accounts and at ensuring an adequate 
domestic supply of food. 
Thus, during the second quarter of the year the Government applied a surtax of 5 % and 10% 
on imports, depending on the type of goods, for the dual purpose of containing their growth and 
generating additional tax revenue. External sector policy was aimed at reducing imports by 
supplementing the taxes mentioned above with a very flexible system for controlling the sale of 
foreign exchange for some external purchases especially those related to services such as tourism. 
An attempt was also made to retain the foreign currency derived from external sales through a 
system of export licences, although the system was not very strictly controlled, and some indicators 
suggest that the flight of foreign exchange took place primarily through the placing of assets in the 
exterior. 
In the monetary and financial areas, measures were adopted to raise internal savings by 
increasing the interest rate. Although savings increased (for other reasons as well), these larger 
resources were not reflected in bigger investments in the private sector, mainly because of the 
uncertainty already referred to, and were channelled by the public sector in order to cover some of 
its operating expenses. In the fiscal area, the remaining measures were confined to reducing 
expenditure (especially capital expenditure), as noted above. 
During the year, the domestic supply of basic grains increased significantly as a consequence 
of the combination of larger amounts of credit and technical assistance and higher guaranteed 
prices. This resulted in a decline in the purchases of these commodities abroad and in a slackening 
of the growth rate of consumer prices, which rose by 9%, compared with the rate of 11.5% 
recorded for the preceding year. 
In brief, the adoption of a policy aimed at containing expenditure in conditions of economic 
stagnation reduced the magnitude of some financial disequilibria and kept others from getting out 
of hand. However, this policy increased the depressive effects of the situation in the external 
sector, led to a rise in the levels of unemployment, and made disparities in income distribution 
more acute, despite a relative improvement in the real minimum wage which was not, however, 
reflected in an increase in total wage payments. 
Against this background, it should be noted that in the last months of the year a process of 
democratic institutionalization took place, and the first elections in the last ten years were held. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global supply and demand trends 
During 1981, the gross domestic product declined slightly (-0.4%), after having risen by only 
2.5% in 1980. This contrasted significantly with the dynamic growth during the, four-year period 
1976-1979, when an average growth rate of nearly 8% was achieved. The fuïther deceleration of 
the economic growth rate caused a drop of 4% in the per capita product, on the heels of a drop of 
1 % in 1980. Furthermore, the drop of nearly 10 % in the terms of trade resulted in a decline of 3 % 
in the gross income: a situation only comparable in recent years with that which occurred in 1975. 
The drop of 3 % in global supply was the result of the slight decline in the production of goods 
and services already mentioned and of the marked reduction of 12% in imports. The drop in 
external purchases, however, in the light of the virtual stability of the product, meant that the 
import coefficient fell to 28% in 1981, compared with 34% the preceding year (see table 2). 
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Figure 1 
HONDURAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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With regard to demand, the growth rates of all its components, with the exception of external 
sales, fell by comparison with the preceding year. The drop in gross domestic investment (-20%) 
was particularly marked. Moreover, although exports did expand slightly, their growth was not 
sufficient to recover the 1979 level. 
Public investment, whose growth rate during the preceding year had more than compensated 
for the negative growth of private investment, contracted by 25% owing to the high price of 
financial resources, although the most important public projects continued to be implemented in 
the fields of forestry, energy and roads. Private investment, which had already fallen in absolute 
terms in 1980 compounded this fall by dropping nearly 9% as a result of the recessive climate of 
the economy and especially the tension existing in the Central American area. It should be noted 
that the increase in the supply of credit for the private sector barely matched the growth of the 
product in current values and that the cost of capital soared, following the trend of interest rates in 
the international markets. 
Although no estimates are available for investment broken down in terms of construction and 
machinery and equipment, the drop in the construction product and the decline in public 
investment (in which the construction sector plays a prime role) makes it reasonable to assume 
that the construction sector deteriorated further. 
The decline in investment at a time when the product was stagnating reduced the total 
investment coefficient from 27% in 1980 to 24% in 1981. This decline was due to a reduction in 
the coefficients of public investment (from 10% to just under 8%) and private investment (from 
17% to 15%). 
Although private consumption remained at a similar level to the preceding year, in per capita 
terms it fell by nearly 3%, basically because of a decline in the total wages paid. Government 
consumption, for its part, fell by 2% as a result of the austerity policy adopted. 
Exports of goods and services, which had experienced a significant drop of 7% in 1980 after 
growing vigorously (at an average of 13% annually) during the previous three-year period, 
recovered slightly in 1981 (see table 2). 
(b) The growth of the main sectors 
(i) Introduction. The gross domestic product remained virtually the same (-0.4%), whereas 
the preceding year it had increased by 2%. Among the goods-producing sectors, agriculture and 
manufacturing grew slightly (by 1% and 2.5%, respectively), but construction declined by 9% asa 
result of the drop in investment. The services sectors, in line with the slackness of the economy, 
stagnated or declined by between 1% and 2% (see table 3). 
(ii) Agriculture. The slight recovery in the agricultural product ( 1 %) after a decline of 3 % the 
preceding year was attributable entirely to the expansion of production for domestic consumption, 
since production for the external market dropped (see table 4). In 1981 basic grains were 
particularly dynamic. Maize production experienced a notable increase (25%), which more than 
compensated for the drop of 3% suffered in 1980. Similarly, the significant expansion in the 
production of sorghum (37%) meant that the level achieved in 1978 was exceeded by 11%. A 
similar situation occurred as a result of the increase in the production of beans (8% ), which made it 
possible to recover.from the fall which had occurred the preceding year, although the level of 
production was still 11 % lower than in 1978. Finally, while rice experienced only modest growth 
(3%), it nevertheless continued the upward trend of recent years. 
These results were due to the favourable climatic and rainfall conditions and to the 
agricultural policy followed in connection with basic grains, which combined more ample 
provision of technical assistance, larger amounts of credit and higher guaranteed prices. Thus, the 
credit disbursed by the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA) to purchase basic 
grains was expanded by 30%, while the support prices for maize, beans, rice and wheat rose by 
13%, 37%, 19% and 10%, respectively. 
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The increase in the production of this kind of food has made it possible to reduce purchases in 
the exterior from US$ 38 million in 1980 to only ÜS$ 7 million in 1981. At the same time, the 
larger domestic supply has resulted in slower growth of consumer prices. 
Another commodity for domestic consumption whose production grew more rapidly than the 
preceding year was the African palm. The entry into production of the plantations established in 
1977-1978 and the increase in the yield of the areas planted in the years immediately prior to that 
season resulted-in production increases of the order of 41% and 32% in 1980 and 1981, 
respectively, making it possible to achieve a level of production twice as high as that of 1978.2 The 
programme for expanding this crop has been carried out mainly in the Bajo Aguan valley and is 
part of the Concentrated Rural Development Project organized to aid beneficiaries of the agrarian 
reform programme. 
In production for the external market, the analysis by individual commodities reveals a 
different kind of behaviour. Thus, production of bananas, which constitute the country's most 
important export and which had already fallen by 3% in 1980, fell again—this time by 1.2%—asa 
result of the floods,3 failure to control the sigatoka disease, labour disputes in the banana 
companies and social, economic and administrative problems in the banana co-operative 
(Empresa Asociativa Campesina de Isletas). 
Cotton was another commodity whose production fell (-22%), although this came after a 
substantial rise during the preceding year (19%). It has not been possible to do anything about the 
erratic performance of cotton production, due in part to the farmers' lack of experience with this 
crop and the failure to control insects and pests, even though prices in the international markets 
have risen slowly but surely and ample financial support has been made available. 
Table 2 
H O N D U R A S : TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public 
Private 




Exports of goods and services 
Millions of dollars 
























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLA for the purpose. 
2lt should be noted that the African palm begins to produce about five years after it is planted. 
'To tackle this problem, the Tela Railroad Co. has offered to make resources in the amount of 120 million lempiras 




HONDURAS: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels 
Ownership of dwellings 




























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
'These growth rates differ from those given in tables 1 and 2 because they measure different concepts of the product: at 
factor cost in this table but at market prices in tables 1 and 2. 
Includes financial institutions, insurance and real estate, except ownership of dwellings. 
'Includes restaurants, hotels and business services. 
Crops for the external market whose production expanded include coffee, which grew by 7%. 
The preceding year it had fallen by 9%, but in 1979 it had reached the highest level in the country's 
history. In this case, the increases in the volume produced were entirely due to the favourable rains, 
since the international prices fell markedly and the flow of credit slackened. 
Sugar cane production also rose (6%), although the rate was slower than in 1979 and 1980 
(21% and 12%, respectively). The loss of dynamism of this crop was due to the incidence of pests 
and diseases, such as rust and smut, since conditions in the external market were still encouraging. 
The continual increase in the production of this commodity, however, meant that the level 
achieved in 1981 was nearly 22% higher than that recorded in 1978. 
Although no official estimates are available for the livestock sector as a whole, it may be noted 
that the production of both beef (of which a larger share went to the domestic market) and of milk 
grew by about 4%, continuing the upward trend of recent years. This was not enough, however, to 
satisfy domestic consumption, and imports were therefore necessary. Egg production, for its part, 
registered a slight rise of 3% which, in view of the rise of only 5% in 1980 and the drop of 27% in 
1979, was not enough to regain the 1978 level. 
During 1981 agriculture experienced tensions of various kinds. On the one hand, pressure to 
speed up agrarian reform continued through mass invasions of land, particularly in Olancho, on 
the northern coast and in Copan. The awards of land, which in the period 1973-1975 amounted to 
about 32 000, 47 000 and 37 000 hectares, respectively, were reduced to only 5 000 and 6 000 
hectares in 1978 and 1979, despite pressure from the peasantry, which in 1979 formed the United 
Peasants Front of Honduras (FUNACAMH). Agrarian reform policy has increasingly come to favour 
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those farmers who are organized in co-operatives, rather than continuing grants of land as 
practised in the beginning of the agrarian reform process some years ago. 
In addition, growing differences emerged between the Honduran Banana Corporation 
(COHBANA) and the co-operative already referred to (EACI), which has been exploiting the land 
acquired from Standard Fruit after the 1978 hurricane. The financial problems of COHBANA, which 
claims that it is running at a loss because of its high administrative costs, have caused a decrease in 
the assistance and the financial resources provided to the co-operative, which itself is passing 
through a difficult financial situation since it has had to work at a loss due to the unequal evolution 
of banana prices and production costs. This situation meant that when it took over in December 
1980, the new management of the co-operative decided to cut its links with the Corporation, which 
sharpened the differnces in the managerial policy of the enterprise to such a point that the 
Government intervened. This dispute was settled at the cost of splitting the co-operative, one part 
of which remained associated with COHBANA. 
Finally, the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA) also met with financial 
difficulties owing to the fact that many of its customers were slow in paying their debts. This 
situation forced it to have recourse to the Central Bank in order to remain in operation. 
(iii) Manufacturing. In 1981 the growth rate of the manufacturing sector shrank to 2 .3%, 
compared with 5.6% the year before. This deterioration in the evolution of the manufacturing 
product is attributable to the recessive situation prevailing in the economy, the decrease in the 
external demand (especially that of the Central American market), and the lack of financing to 
meet the requirements for working capital. 
The traditional industries had a combined growth rate of close to 3 % , while the branches 
producing intermediate goods and metal products and machinery showed decreases of 6% and 
10%, respectively. Among the traditional industries, food and beverages production, whose 
weight in total manufacturing output is over 40%, grew by 4%. Sugar production and the 
Table 4 
HONDURAS: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural production 
(1975 = 100) 
Crop farming 
Stock-raising 
Production of the main crops 










Indicators of stock-raising 
production 
Beef (thousands of tons) 
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HONDURAS: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing production 


















Non-metallic mineral products 
Machinery and metal-working 
Other indicators of production 
Consumption of electricity by 






















































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from CONSUPLANE and the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. 
processing of marine products, under the incentive of good external market conditions, showed 
growth rates of 2% and 6%, respectively, while cattle slaughtering achieved a growth rateof 4%, 
in spite of the fact that sales to the exterior fell, and timber production rose by 9%. The textile 
industry, 20% of whose output is exported to the Central American subregion, showed a decline in 
production of 5% (see table 5). 
The branches producing inputs were affected by the stagnation of economic activity (in the 
case of paper and the refining of petroleum) or else by the reduction of trade with the Central 
American countries (chemicals and rubber goods). Only the production of non-metallic minerals 
achieved a high growth rate of (11 % ), due to the entry into operation of the Piedras Azules cement 
factory, part of whose production will be exported. 
The metal products and machinery industry, which accounted for barely 3% of total 
manufacturing production, suffered a sharp (10%) drop in activity because of the contraction in 
internal and external demand. In this case, the adverse situation affecting these branches, together 
with financial problems, led to the suspension of activities in two of the steel-rolling plants. 
During the first half of the year, the industrial sector experienced financial restrictions, 
although to a lesser extent than in 1980, since the flow of new loans granted by the commercial 
banks shrank by 9%, and that from the development banks by 11%. Thus, in the first six months 
of 1981 the commerical banks increased their credit by nearly 6%, while that derived from 
development banks decreased by 30%. 
The decline in the financing provided by the development banks was due to the difficulties 
being experienced by the National Investment Corporation (CONADI), the leading public finance 
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institution for the industrial sector. Thus, the long-term financial support provided by the 
Corporation for large private projects and the delay in the repayment of loans by a large number of 
the beneficiaries (with the result that the loans had to be refinanced) reduced the capacity of this 
agency to enter into new transactions. To this was added the problem of the high interest rates 
prevailing on international capital markets and the difficulty in obtaining loans from the 
international banking system because of its reluctance to lend money in the political conditions 
prevailing in the Central American subregion. Consequently, of the slightly more than US$ 40 
million in loans received by this agency from abroad in 1981, 75% was to be earmarked for the 
payment of its debts with various international financial institutions and only the remaining 25 % 
was to be made available to industrial enterprises. 
The National Industrial Development Fund (FONDEI), which serves small and medium-sized 
industry but has much smaller resources than CONADI, increased its loan disbursements by over 
50% to nearly US$ 9 million. Because of the nature of the Fund, the credit was intended for 
investment, with only 24% going to supplement working capital.4 
The Honduran Forestry Development Corporation (COHDEFOR), which finances the 
development of the primary and secondary timber industry, reduced its flow of credit by 11 %. Of 
the total amount of its resources used for credit purposes (US$ 17 million), over 50% went 
towards the implementation of the Olancho Forest Industries Corporation (CORFINO), and the 
remainder was used to provide working capital for the sawmills. It should be noted that the 
implementation of the CORFINO projects was not obstructed by shortage of financing, since 
investment resources are available to them from the international banks. During the year, these 
resources (together with those from COHDEFOR) amounted to US$ 30 million. 
Among the projects being carried out by this Corporation, it is expected that the main sawmill 
in Bonito Oriental will start operation at 30% of its installed capacity in mid-1982, increasing to 
70% of its installed capacity in 1983. The entry into operation of the sawmill will be held back 
somewhat by the delay in the port infrastructure works, although the primary and secondary road 
Table 6 




San Pedro Sula and La Ceiba 
Residential 
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San Pedro Sula and La Ceiba 
Non-residential 
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2 951 6 785 7 229 8 005 129.9 6.5 10.7 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Permits requested between 1 October of the previous year and 30 September. 
4A loan for US$ 30 million is being negotiated with the World Bank with a view to increasing the resources of this 
institution, which has been operating quite effectively. 
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infrastructure projects have been implemented on time. Thus, the project for the construction of 
Puerto Castilla, which was awarded to a foreign firm in 1978, has been stopped making it difficult 
to unload the machinery and equipment for the sawmill. This has not only represented a greater 
risk for the equipment but has also raised the costs considerably. 
(iv) Construction. Primarily as a result of the substantial drop in gross fixed investment 
(-15%), the value added by this activity dropped sharply (-9%) after the decline already 
experienced the preceding year (-3%). The notable decrease in public investment(-25%) had a 
decisive effect on the drop in construction. 
The construction indicators show that the total area constructed decreased by about 28% 
(87 000 square metres). The decline was similar in both residential and non-residential building, 
although in the latter it came on top of the market decline (-36% ) experienced the preceding year 
(see table 6). 
Construction trends varied in the main urban centres. Thus, San Pedro Sula and La Ceiba 
suffered an appreciable drop in building (-57%), which was the same in both of the sectors 
referred to. On the other hand, in the Central District the construction sector expanded by 15%, 
although this was not enough to compensate for the 30% decline registered the previous year. 
Despite the fact that both production and external purchases of building materials 
diminished as a result of the downturn in the construction sector, cement production rose by 10% 
to nearly three times the 1978 production figure after the contraction the preceding year, thanks to 
the opening of a new plant, some of whose output will go to the external market. 
During the year under review, because of the financial limitations of the public sector, public 
works policy was focused on the continuation of works already under way and financed, and the 
initiation of new works was postponed. Thus, the forest and energy projects and the related 
infrastructure works (highways and ports) continued to be implemented, while work also 
continued on the construction of the trunk road system and on maintenance. 
Sirice housing construction did not have sufficient financial resources available to it, it is 
estimated that the accumulated deficit rose to nearly 400 000 units. On the one hand, the National 
Housing Institute (INVA) —the main public sector institution responsible for constructing and 
financing dwellings— had to cope with a difficult financial situation because of the low rate of 
recovery of the loans granted, while on the other, the municipalities of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro 
Sula, which have played an active role in the solution of housing problems, also encountered 
financial limitations, which made it necessary to suspend both housing construction and urban 
infrastructure projects. 
3. The external sector 
In 1981, as in the preceding year, the external sector continued to suffer from the various 
pressures due to the combination of the traditional structural imbalance and the effects of the 
political situation prevailing in Central America. 
With regard to exports, the reduction in the external demand for bananas, the country's main 
export product, together with a drop in the exportable supply of this fruit, caused a decline in 
foreign exchange earnings. Although imports, for their part, tended to be contained because of the 
stagnation of the economy, there were negative repercussions caused by the factor payments 
related to direct investment and to the external indebtedness contracted, and this was aggravated 
by the rise in interest rates on international financial markets. All this meant that although the 
deficit on current account fell by 12%, it was still of considerable scale, representing 31% of the 
current foreign exchange earnings compared with an average of 25% for the period 1976-1979. 
This imbalance on current account was compounded by the effects of the climate of 
uncertainty due to the political tension prevailing in Central America, which gave impetus to the 
flight of capital, whose amount is not precisely known, and had a negative effect on the credit flow 
from the exterior, thus finally causing an impact on the country's monetary reserves. 
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During the year the foreign trade policy was concentrated on overcoming the external 
imbalance by containing imports and limiting the amount of foreign exchange leaving the country. 
In April, as one of a number of measurestaken under the Emergency Plan, a 10% tax was imposed 
on all foreign purchases, except in the case of machinery and equipment, raw materials, semi-
finished goods and packaging, to which a tariff of only 5% was applied. Although there were other 
factors which did more to restrain the growth of imports, this tax made it possible to increase the 
amount collected in respect of foreign trade. On the other hand, this tax caused similar measures to 
be taken in response hy some other Central American countries. 
In September, in order to control the foreign exchange derived from exports, the Central 
Bank laid down regulations for the granting of export licences, establishing among other 
requirements, that the Bank must be presented with proof of the sale in Honduras of the foreign 
exchange derived from exports carried out previously. In addition, priority criteria were set, in 
accordance with the destination of the exports, for the purchase of the foreign exchange needed to 
pay for imports. Controls were also established to ensure that the exports declared in the licences 
and the amount of the imports for which foreign exchange was requested were not undervalued in 
the first case or overvalued in the second. Permits for external financing were also made subject to 
the obligation of selling to the Central Bank the foreign exchange collected by the borrowers. 
Finally, limitations were placed on sales of foreign exchange for travel expenses and other 
disbursements. 
It should be noted that in spite of the shortage of foreign exchange (which made it slower to 
obtain) and the restrictions on its purchase, no large parallel market emerged, perhaps because it 
did not prove possible to enforce the provisions described above very strictly. 
(a) Merchandise trade 
(i) Exports of goods. During 1981, the current value of exports fell by nearly 2% compared 
with the preceding year. This was due to the 6% decline in the unit value, which was not 
compensated for by the 4% increase in the volume of exports (see table 7). 
The main traditional exports were most strongly affected, since as a group they fell by 8%. On 
the other hand, external sales of other goods (non-traditional and other categories) rose by 14%, 
although this growth rate was lower than that of the preceding year, when they rose by 30%, on 
Table 7 
HONDURAS: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. 
average. This performance led to a change in the composition of the value of exports in favour of 
non-traditional goods: a trend which had been in progress since the preceding decade and which 
meant that the share of traditional exports fell from 78% in 1970 to 68% in 1981 (see table 8.) 
Exports of bananas and coffee, which occupy first and second place in the list, being 
responsible for nearly 50% of the total value of exports of goods, experienced reductions of 6% 
and 9%, respectively. In the case of bananas, the decline in the value exported was due to a drop in 
the volume sold, since the unit value increased by 7%. Coffee beans, however, experienced a 28% 
drop in price which was only partly counteracted by the increase in the amount exported. During 
the year, the quota assigned to Honduras by the International Coffee Organization was reduced by 
10%, which meant that the surplus produced had to be sold to countries not members of the 
Organization, which pay lower prices. 
Other agricultural commodities whose export values dropped were meat (-22%) and ginned 
cotton (-13%). With regard to the former, the decline was due both to a drop in prices and the 
reduction in sales to the United States, the main purchaser of meat, while in the case of cotton, 
sales were limited because of the contraction in the exportable supply. 
Minerals performed unevenly. The value of zinc exports rose, by 10% as a result of a rise in the 
volume sold and in the price, but the current value of silver exports fell by 28%, owing primarily to 
the sharp price drop on the international market, since the volume exported rose compared with 
the previous year. 
Timber, whose prices were more stable and even tended to rise, achieved a growth rate of 
15% owing to the combined effect of an increase in the volume exported and in prices. Sales of 
shrimp and lobster to the exterior also developed positively, experiencing a rise of 9%, basically as 
a result of an increase in the volume sold. 
As regards exports of manufactures, on the whole they showed positive growth, but the 
performance of each of the main products was dissimilar. Wood manufactures fell by 27%, as the 
trend of the preceding year grew more marked, while exports of soap to the Central American 
market fell by 34% in response to the contraction in external demand. On the other hand, the 
value of sugar exports increased by 50%, basically as a consequence of a rise in the unit value, since 
the volume grew by only 6% owing to production limitations. 
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Finally, the "others" category experienced a significant rise of 18% (higher than all goods but 
sugar) to US$ 200 million. This figure, which represented 23% of total exports, was twice the 
value achieved as recently as 1978. 
To analyse the exports of Honduras to Central America, data were available only for the first 
half of 1981. A comparison of these with the data for the same period in the preceding year 
indicates that there was stagnation, although the situation varied by countries. Sales to Guatemala 
grew by 9%, those to Costa Rica remained at the same level as the preceding year, and those to 
Nicaragua fell by 12%. This performance is to a large extent explained by the economic 
circumstances of each of the Central American countries, but some influence also seems to have 
been exerted by the 10% tariff on imported goods put into force by Honduras in May 1981, which 
gave rise to some reprisals on the part of other Central American countries. Thus, Nicaragua 
immediately applied similar taxes in respect of Honduran exports. Guatemala, for its part, took 
more drastic measures in that, as from 25 May, it applied the external tariff plus a 30% "economic 
stabilization" surcharge, which caused honduras to prohibit the entry of Guatemalan goods. These 
goods were, however, admitted once again as from 15 June 1981, although Guatemala had neither 
withdrawn the measures taken nor made them more flexible. In the case of Costa Rica, that 
country's financial difficulties, compounded by the sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate, resulted 
in a decline in the level of Honduran sales. 
(ii) Imports of goods. The value of imports of goods, which had risen by about 45% over the 
preceding two years, fell by 8% as a result of a 13 % drop in the volume, since the unit value rose by 
6% (see table 7). This reduction was related to the stagnation of economic activity, the drop in 
investment, the lack of growth of consumption and, to a lesser extent, the tariff increases adopted 
and the increase in the production of basic grains. Thus, 54% of the absolute drop in imports 
(US$ 84 million) was attributable to smaller purchases of machinery and equipment, 19% to 
manufactures, 15% to foodstuffs and 12% to fuels and lubricants (see table 9). 
Purchases of fuels and lubricants, as in the preceding year, represented 17% of total imports 
of goods, as compared with 11 % in 1978. The composition of this group changed, with a reduction 
in imports of crude oil and a rise in those of processed products. During the first six months of the 
year, the price of petroleum increased by close to 13%. 
During the first half of the year, imports from Central America increased by 15% in 
comparison with the same period in the preceding year. This pattern was in contrast with that 
Table 9 
HONDURAS: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Millions of dollars , , , ° Growth rates 








































































































Beverages and tobacco 
Inedible raw materials 
Fuel and lubricants 
Animal and vegetable 
oils and fats 
Chemicals 
Manufactured articles, 
classified by material 






followed by purchases from the rest of the world which, during the same period of time, fell by a 
similar proportion. All the Central American countries with which Honduras trades managed to 
increase their sales to this country (Guatemala, 10%; Nicaragua, 35%; and Costa Rica, 17%). 
Since imports evolved more rapidly than exports, the trade deficits of Honduras with Guatemala 
and Costa Rica increased by 16% and 68%, respectively, while the trade surplus with Nicaragua 
fell by 27%. 
(iii) Terms of trade and purchasing power of exports. After having remained in 1979 and 
1980 at a similar level to that attained in 1970, the 1981 terms of trade in goods were 11% lower 
than the preceding year (see table 7). 
This deterioration was the result of a decline in the unit value of exports (-6%) and a similar 
rise in that of imports, basically as a reflection of the drop in coffee prices on the international 
market, which was prevented from having a still greater effect by the increases in the prices of 
bananas and, to a lesser extent, timber and sugar. The purchasing power of exports of goods and 
services, for its part, which was also negatively affected by the drop un the volume exported, fell by 
7% in comparison with the preceding year. 
(b) Services trade and factor payments 
The balance of trade on services improved slightly in that there was a decrease of 3% in the 
traditional deficit of Honduras. This was due to the decrease in the volume of trade, which affects 
the amount oí freight and insurance paid, and the levelling out of travel expenditure, which ill 
previous years had shown negative growth (see table 10). 
Factor payments rose by 19% —a similar figure to the 20% rise of the preceding year— as a 
consequence of an increase of close to 60% in interest payments, since remittances of profits 
declined by 19%. The marked growth of interest payments abroad, which more than doubled 
between 1979 and 1981 to reach US$ 110 million, was due to the growth of public sector 
commitments and the increase in interest rates in international markets. 
(c) The current account position and its financing 
The deficit on current account, which in 1980 was twice what it had been in 1978, fell by 12%, 
amounting to nearly US$ 300 million. Its relative size in relation to exports of goods and services 
thus fell from 36% to 32%. 
The flow of long-term capital, which had amounted to US$ 240 million the preceding year, 
experienced a fallof close to 23% in 1981, mainly attributable to a 25 % contraction in the "other 
long-term capital" item, since direct investment increased. This reduction was reflected in an 
increase of close to 6% in the basic balance, which had been in deficit since 1979 (see table 10). 
Consequently, in order to supplement the financing of the net current account expenditure it was 
necessary to draw on the country's reserves, which decreased by rather more than US$ 70 million. 
The International Monetary Fund granted credit support to Honduras for the equivalent of 
US$ 23 million, 55% of it in net drawings on the ordinary credit tranches and the rest under the 
Expanded Facility. In the middle of the year the agreement with the International Fund, which had 
come into operation in 1979 for a duration of three years and was for a total of over US$ 50 million, 
was renegotiated. The use of these resources is subject to the obligation to put a number of 
measures into effect with a view to lessening the disequilibria in the balance of payments and 
public finances. 
(d) The external debt 
In spite of the comparative rigidity of the international markets in recent years, the resulting 
rise in the cost of loans, and the reticence of private and public creditors due to the tension existing 
in the Central American subregion, the total external debt rose by 14%. Although this rise was not 
so high as that which occurred the previous year (26%), it brought the debt up to twice its 1978 
level. For this reason, the coefficient of debt servicing to exports of goods and services rose again, 
this time to 24% (see table 11). 
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Table 10 
H O N D U R A S : BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 




Profits and interest 
Profits 
Interest 
Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves' 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 















































































































































































































































































Source: 1976-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, (magnetic tape, March 1982); 1981: 
ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
'In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




4. Prices and wages 
The average variation of the consumer price index during the months between January and 
November 1981 was 9-4% —a much lower rate than the 18.1% recorded the previous year. In 
spite of this slackening in the growth of prices, the level reached was still higher than that of the 
period 1974-1978 (6.8% on average), which seems to point to the presence of a permanent 
inflationary dynamic difficult to overcome in the short term in view of the high degree of 
dependence on external variables (see table 12). 
The decisive element in this drop in the growth rate of prices was the slowdown in the rise of 
food prices to 7.5%, compared with 17.1% the year before. This served to offset the faster 
increases in the prices of other categories with significant weight in the general index, such as 
clothing and housing, which grew faster than the overall average (14.4% and 10.4%, 
respectively). 
During the first five months of the year, the gradual but steady rise in the prices of food and 
housing, which together account for 72% of the overall index, was responsible for the increase of 
close to 6% in the global indicator. As from June, food prices began to show negative growth, 
which slowed down the increase in the general index, but in the last two months of the year their 
growth again became positive. The slower rise in prices is largely attributable, in the case of food, 
to the increase in the production of basic grains encouraged by the government policy to develop 
these crops. 
Table 11 
HONDURAS: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS" 
(Millions of dollars) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
1. Total external indebtedness' 
Public debt and State-guaranteed 
private debt 
Private debt not guaranteed by 
the State 
2. Servicing of external debt 
Amortization payments 
Interest payments 
3. Servicing of external debt, as a 
percentage of exports of goods 
and services 





































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"End-year balance of debts having a term of over one year. 
Preliminary figures. 
'Corresponds to the disbursed debt. 
Table 12 
H O N D U R A S : EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Consumer price index 
Food 
1976 1977 1978 
Variation December to December 
5.6 7.7 5.3 
4.5 10.5 5.5 
Variation between annual averages 
5.1 8.4 5.7 
















Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Variation November 1980 - November 1981. 
Variation between average index January - November 1981 with respect to index January - November 1980. 
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It should also be noted that during 1981 the unit value of petroleum imports rose quite 
moderately: by 15% in contrast with 37% the previous year. 
There were, however, some elements which helped to drive prices up, the most important of 
them being the application, as of May.of a 10% tax on imports of manufactures and 5% on those 
of inputs, about 40% of which was reflected in the basic basket of goods from which consumer 
prices are calculated. 
At the beginning of the year, in the face of the pressure exerted by merchants and producers 
for suppression of the controls on basic commodity prices, the Government installed a mechanism 
known as the "automatic price fixing system based on the profitability of own funds", which, in 
addition to making it easier to pass on increases in costs, determined the magnitude of price 
increases on the basis of the profit ratio.5 
As of May, the Government decreed a rise in the official minimum wages by different 
amounts for each of the productive sectors. This rise, which in all cases exceeded the growth in 
consumer prices, permitted an increase of nearly 9% in the average real wages. By sectors, the 
situation was very uneven, however: the real wage in the agricultural sector rose by 17%, which 
represented a total improvement of nearly 40% over the past five-year period, but in the 
handicrafts sector, trade and services the increase was close to 8%, and in manufacturing, mining 
and construction it was about 5% (see table 13). 
The improvement was, however, only relative, since in 1978 there had been a real 
deterioration in wages which later increases did not succeed in counteracting. This was true of 
manufacturing, mining, commerce and services, where real wages in 1981 were still lower than 
those in 1976 (by 6% in the first two sectors and by 8% in the last two). In handicrafts and 
construction, the real wages were barely equal to those of 1976. Only in the case of agriculture, 
where the trade union organizations play a more important role, were real wages higher than 
those of 1976, and even so it must be borne in mind that in absolute terms they are the lowest in the 
national scale (15% lower than the average wage and 27% lower than the maximum wage). 
Table 13 
HONDURAS: EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL MINIMUM WAGES" 
Official minimum wages 
Nominal 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing and mining 
Handicrafts 
Construction 
Commerce and services 
Real 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing and mining 
Handicrafts 
Construction 





























































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official decrees on minimum wages. 
"The estimated minimum wages correspond to the average for each year in the Central District and San Pedro Sula. As 
from 1974, updating of minimum wages was decreed in december 1978, May 1980 and May 1981. 
'This automatic system eliminated the need for the economic studies which the Department of Domestic Trade used 
to prepare, thus avoiding delays which meant losses for those selling goods. The mechanism consists of setting a 




HONDURAS: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings 
and time deposits) 
Bonds 
Long-term foreign borrowing 













































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"End-November figures. 
Growth rate November 1980 - November 1981. 
No information was available which could be used to determine the evolution of the real 
wages of workers whose wages are not subject to government control. Some indirect indicators, 
however, such as per capita consumption (which fell by 3%) make it reasonable to assume that 
they fell. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
During 1981 the monetary and financial system of Honduras reflected the recession outside 
and the downward trend in investment as well as the negative impact of these factors on the level 
of economic activity and on the fiscal balance. 
The drop in international reserves was due to a combination of exogenous factors which were 
reflected in a considerable imbalance of US$ 295 million on the current account (although this 
imbalance was not so big as that of the previous year) and in a decrease in the flow of long-term 
capital for financing this deficit (see table 14). 
The indebtedness of the public sector evolved in different ways. Thus, while thé Government 
continued to increase its indebtedness considerably (66%), the public institutions drastically 
reduced theirs (-51 %). In the case of the Government, the growth referred to is attributable to the 
increase in the public deficit (although at a much lower rate than the preceding year), since the 
external aid received was not sufficient. It should be noted that the demand of the public sector for 
credit has become much larger in recent years, with its share rising from 12% of total credit in 
1977 and 1978, to 16% in 1980 and 20% last year. 
In spite of the fact that, during the year, the credit granted to the private sector was limited by 
the greater demand for credit resources on the part of the Government and thus only grew by 10% 
(similar to the growth rate of the product at current prices), this nevertheless does not seem to 
have been a factor of prime importance in the decline in investment, although it may have affected 
the demand of enterprises and individuals for working capital. 
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In 1981 savings and time deposits grew by 13%, i.e, twice as fast as the previous year. This 
was the result both of the greater increase in the money supply and of the preference on the part of 
the public for financial rather than real investments, in view of the climate of uncertainty 
prevailing because of the political situation in Central America. 
In order to solve the problems arising from the current situation, a number of monetary and 
financial measures were taken with the objective of limiting public sector credit, preventing the 
flight of capital, promoting savings, rationalizing the use of credit and increasing the flow of 
external loans. 
In May a limit of 110 million lempiras was set on the financing provided to the central 
government by the banking system, but this measure had no effect since in the subsequent months 
the Government had an overdraft in the Central Bank. In addition, the net increase in the 
utilization of external loans with a term of less than 10 years on the part of the public sector and its 
financial institutions was set at US$ 50 million, and a minimum increase of US$ 59 million was 
laid down for net financing of the banking system by the Central Bank during 1981, including 
rediscounts for productive purposes. 
In order to increase savings and time deposits, the limits on the interest rate and on the 
amount of savings deposits were eliminated. 
The rate of interest for loans granted by the banking system using resources from the exterior 
was set 3.5 points above the base rate (LIBOR). The maximum rate authorized for loans made by 
banking institutions with domestically-obtained resources was set at 19%. Towards the end of the 
year, however, in view of the fact that the margin between the cost of capital in the international 
market and the interest rate applicable to loans made with external financing was too small to 
provide a satisfactory profit, the interest rates for this type of transaction were allowed to float. 
Also in the last months of the year, the Central Bank decided not to enforce the conditions laid 
down previously for the authorization of external loans to the private sector (enterprises and 
banks). 
Finally, with the objective of encouraging the granting of credits to basic activities, 
differential rediscount rates were set. For basic grains, this rate amounted to 10%, while the 
maximum rate of interest applicable was set at 16%. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
The fiscal deficit, which had increased by the very large amount of 73 % during the preceding 
year, rose by a little over 2% in 1981 to 496 million lempiras (see table 15). 
The whole-year results are attributable to a slight decrease in income (2%), occurring at the 
same time as a slight drop in total expenditure. This decrease, which was the first in real terms for 
the past seven years, highlighted the fact that little was done by the public sector to compensate for 
some of the loss of dynamism suffered by external commerce and for the drop in private 
investment. 
The contraction experienced by current income was due to a decrease of 21 % in revenue from 
direct taxes as a result of the changes in the system of collecting the tax on profits.6 This had 
increased income in 1980, but in 1981 this returned to its normal level. As for indirect taxes, these 
rose by 10% (a slightly higher rate than that of the previous year) thanks to foreign trade tax 
revenued, whose growth rate (12%) was higher than in the preceding year (8%). Since the value 
of foreign trade fell in 1981, this increase is attributable to the application of the 10% import tax. 
Current expenditure, for its part, grew by 9% owing to a 22% increase in salaries and wages, 
the remaining expenses having fallen by 2%: much less than the 64% decrease of the preceding 
year. It should be borne in mind that interest payments, which have been acquiring increasing 
importance, are included in this category. 
6In December 1979, when the profits tax law was reformed, changes were made in the system of collection. Thus, 
when the mechanism for the advance payment of taxes on the basis of the income declared in the three preceding years was 
put into effect, the authorities received almost all the taxes for 1979 and 1980 in a single year. When the new system settled 
down, however, the amount collected in 1981 fell. 
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The dissimilar growth of current income and expenditure resulted in a serious deterioration 
in current savings. Thus, during the year savings fell by 85 million lempiras, resulting in a year-end 
deficit of over 50 million lempiras. 
The sharpest restriction on expenditure occurred in connection with capital expenses, which 
fell by 14% in contrast with an increase of 34% in 1980. Real investment, which had grown by 
27% the preceding year, fell by 3 1 % , and transfers to quasi-autonomous agencies of the public 
sector, which had doubled in 1980, decreased dramatically. Only the expenditure for interest 
payments on the debt increased (15%), trebling the growth rate of the preceding year. 
To finance the fiscal deficit (496 million lempiras), recourse was had to external resources for 
over 50% of the amount. 
Real public investment was concentrated in infrastructure projects, of which nearly 40% 
related to energy and nearly 2 5 % to transport. The remaining productive activities received only 
7%, nearly all of which went to the agricultural sector. The social sectors received 18%, 70% of 
which was earmarked for health, 2 3 % for education and the remainder for housing construction. 
In 1981 the restrictions on public sector resources aggravated the financial problems of some 
of the quasi-autonomous institutions, since their inadequate savings meant that their new 
investment projects were dependent on transfers from the central government. With regard to the 
financial institutions, the increase in uncollected loans and the size of their liabilities caused them 
to decrease their loan operations (as in the case of the Honduran Industrial Development 
Corporation (CONADI)) or to have recourse to the Central Bank, which was the expedient resorted 
to by the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA). It should be noted that at the end 
of the year, the State took over the unpaid loan commitments of the quasi-autonomous 
corporations with financial institutions abroad. At the same time consideration began to be given 
to the application of reforms for improving the financial situation. In addition, an office was 
created to supervise the operations of the independent and quasi-autonomous agencies. 
Table 15 
HONDURAS: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other current expenditure 
3. Current saving (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2+4) 











































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Rate of variation November 1980 - November 1981. 
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The measures adopted by the Government to cope with the financial difficulties were 
basically directed towards reducing public expenditure, which rose only slightly. The increase in 
operating expenses was nearly compensated for by the decrease in capital expenditure. In order to 
increase income, the only measure taken apart from the application of the 10% tariff on the value 
of imports and the 5% tariff on external purchases of machinery and inputs was a sales tax reform, 
under which the tax on alcoholic beverages and manufactured tobacco products was increased to 
6%. It should be noted that at the end of 1981 the income tax law was modified by instituting, inter 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981 the Jamaican economy showed a modest but definite reversal of the continued decline 
in output which it had suffered since the early 1970s. The gross domestic product (GDP) expanded 
2% in real terms —the first such increase since 1973 (see table 1), and at the same time inflation 
decelerated sharply, from almost 30% in 1980 to less than 5% in 1981, while unemployment also 
went down, even if only slightly. 
Though the 1981 recovery was slight indeed, especially in view of the wide gap to be closed, it 
is certainly impressive given the systematic decline in virtually all indicators which had beset the 
economy for the previous seven years (see figure 1). 
Thus, as of 1973, after 15 years of close to 3% growth in per capita income, the Jamaican 
economy entered into a tailspin, with per capita income falling for eight consecutive years, at an 
average rate of 3% per year, so that in 1980 per capita income was one-fourth below its 1972 peak, 
or virtually where it had stood 20 years earlier. 
Moreover, whereas in the earlier 1970s domestic savings were equivalent to 20% of the gross 
domestic product, in 1980 they had fallen to 6%, less than external savings. 
The composition of external capital flows in turn shifted heavily from direct investment in 
the early 1970s (principally related to the cycle of bauxite expansion) to official borrowing in the 
period after 1973. As a result, the level of foreign debt, which in 1972 was actually less than the 
international reserves, increased eightfold by 1980, exceeding 50% of GDP (as opposed to just over 
10% in 1972). At the same time, the level of foreign exchange reserves fell from the equivalent of 
2.4 months of imports in 1972 to 0.8 months in 1980. Finally, the central government's fiscal 
deficit rose from 5% of GDP in 1972 to over 12% in 1980, having reached 19% in 1976, while 
inflation (which was under 10% in 1972) was almost 30% in 1980. In short, a moderately robust 
economy in the early 1970s had gone into a tailspin after 1972, showing disequilibria on the 
principal fronts: negative growth of output, sharp declines in savings, heavy indebtedness, and 
high inflation. 
It is with this negative backdrop in mind that the 1981 experience is especially remarkable. 
Yet important as is the reversal —especially as regards growth and inflation— there are also signs 
that it may be due to transitory factors (IMF lending) rather than to structural changes which would 
permit strong sustainable growth. 
There is some consensus that at the root of the failures of thejamaican economy from 1973-
1980 was the over-expansion of public sector expenditures, which grew from 15% of GDP in 1972 
to over 30% in 1980. Given Jamaica's heavy dependence on the external sector (imports and 
exports each account for some 50% of GDP), a strongly expansive domestic policy would have 
short-lived benefits for consumption (these peaked in 1975); rather it would quickly tend to 
generate balance-of-payments deficits and inflation. Since subsequent efforts at stabilization 
succeeded in controlling imports via quantitative restrictions but failed to curb public sector 
growth, private sector growth and exports were hamstrung. 
To the extent that private sector growth was limited by supply bottlenecks arising out of 
quantitative restrictions, the elimination of the latter in 1981 contributed to this turnaround. 
Similarly, to the extent that uncontrolled government deficits adversely affected private sector 
activity and fired inflation, their reduction in 1981 no doubt contributed to the sharp decline in 
inflation. 
Nevertheless, two structural problems remained. The balance of payments was strongly in 
deficit in 1981, with the negative balance on current account equalling almost 14% of GDP, close to 
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double the 1980 deficit. Obviously, without the IMF credits import bottlenecks would have 
continued to plague the economy, for net private capital flows to Jamaica were far less than 
expected and the volume of exports contracted. More significantly, though the fiscal deficit was 
reduced, public sector savings were nonetheless negative; ominously, private savings fell to a 
historic low of 4 % of GDP in 1981, considerably down from 1980s 8.5%. In short, the 1981 rise in 
investment was wholly due to the increase in external savings, since domestic savings fell by 50% 
to only 3 % of GDP. Consequently, it may well be doubted whether private sector confidence has 
been restored, for IMF funding clearly took the place of domestic savings rather than generating an 
increase in them, thus suggesting that the private sector adopted a wait and see attitude rather than 
risking its own resources. 
Table 1 
JAMAICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at factor cost 
(millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer price index 
December-December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries' 
Rate of unemployment 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 

































































































































Millions of dollars 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 






























Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
cReal wages and salaries. 
Percentage. 














































Gross domestic product 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 137.4 153.4 158.8 -4.9 4.8 
Domestic demand 104.2 103.8 109.4 -12.9 7.5 
Gross domestic investment 31.6 15.7 17.0 -22.9 10.2 
Gross fixed investment 




Exports of goods and services 33.2 49.6 49.4 22.1 -1.3 
Source: World Bank and IMF. 
"Provisional figures. 
The external sector data used in this table differ from those used in the table on balance of payments because the base 
years differ. 
1
 Reconciled with growth rates obtained from the balance of payments. 
In short, important as was the turnaround of thejamaican economy in 1981, and significant as 
was the greater control exercised over government deficits and inflation, sustainable growth calls 
for considerable increases in exports and domestic savings, neither of which was yet forthcoming. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global trends 
Three trends characterized the period of the 1970s (see table 2): (i) as a consequence of the 
expansive policy of the period and the decline in GDP, the share of public sector consumption in 
GDP rose sharply, from 12% in 1970 to 21% in 1980; (ii) correspondingly, domestic savings 
plummeted (falling from 20% in 1970 to 6% in 1980), as did investment (which fell to below 16% 
in 1980: half its 1970 share); and (¡ii) there was a strong increase in the share of both exports and 
imports in the economy, reflecting not so much growth in their volume as the rise in their relative 
prices and the decline of the GDP. 
In 1981 the increase in public sector consumption was reversed, as was the decline in 
investment. Yet, significantly, domestic savings declined even further, while the trade deficit 
clearly worsened: both phenomena which reflect the impact of the IMFS lending programme. 
Though the recovery was not at all strong, every sector of the economy expanded (see 
table 3). Because of its immediate sensitivity to the level of domestic demand, which grew 7 1/2% 
in 1981, the fastest growth was shown by the commerce and finance sector (7%), followed by 
agriculture (4%), real estate and business services (3%), and construction (2%). 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
(i) Agriculture. After two years of negative growth, by approximately 10% and 7% 
respectively, agricultural GDP grew 4% in 1981. Although an improvement on the previous year's 
output, this was well below the potential of the sector. This underutilization of potential is all the 
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Figure: 1 
JAMAICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Unemployment rate^ 
Balance on current 
account 
J L 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
^Annual growth rate. 
Average annual rate. 
^Percentage variation December to December. 
dMillions of dollars. 
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more serious given the relative scarcity of land in Jamaica and the fact that well over one-third of 
the labour force is employed in agriculture. 
Agricultural output for domestic consumption grew between 3% and 4%, with vegetables, 
pulses, spices, potatoes and fruit contributing significantly to this expansion (see table 4). Export-
oriented agriculture showed a far more varied performance, since pimento, coffee, and cocoa grew 
strongly, but the two principal export crops (sugar and bananas) did poorly. Similarly, livestock 
production was mixed, with beef and poultry production declining, whereas hog production 
increased smartly. 
All in all the performance of the agricultural sector, though improved, continued to be 
hampered by recurring problems: adverse weather conditions (including residual setbacks arising 
from the 1980 Hurricane Allen), unsatisfactory cultivation practices, praedial larceny, and 
inadequate transport facilities. The shortage of transport units to guarantee an uninterrupted flow 
of raw materials to the factories and inadequate milling operations continued to militate against 
increased sugar production. 
Banana production suffered setbacks due to the late execution of the Jamaica Development 
Bank's credit programme to banana farmers, rejection of a high percentage of fruit at boxing 
plants and the delay in the commencement of regular shipments. 
Several new agricultural policy initiatives were introduced during the year. These include the 
development of a national agriculture and food marketing policy, the establishment of incentives 
to encourage increased production, the introduction of a new system of zoning, the enactment of a 
major soil conservation and afforestation programme, the enlargement of inland fisheries, 
Table 3 
JAMAICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Millions of 1974 Percentage „ , 
, . • ,, i_ i j Growth rates Jamaica dollars breakdown 































































































































Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, National Income and Product, 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes miscellaneous services and household and private non-profit institutions, less imputed service charges. 








Electricity and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Commerce and finance 
Real estate and business 
services 




improvement in dairy, beef and small livestock, the development of an efficient irrigation 
programme in conjunction with the Ministry of Local Government, the institution of the freehold 
system of land ownership, the rationalization of the agricultural credit scheme, and the 
organization of a comprehensive rural development programme. 
(ii) Mining. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of bauxite and alumina in the 
economy. These activities account for three-quarters of Jamaica's merchandise exports, one-third 
of government revenues, and one-seventh of GDP. Moreover, Jamaica ranks fourth in the world in 
terms of bauxite reserves, which are equivalent to well over 100 years of production at current 
extraction rates. 
In 1981 the mining GDP grew 1.3%. Though the production and export of bauxite declined by 
3 % and 13 % respectively, the industry as a whole remained buoyant thanks to the increase in the 
volume (4%) and value (10%) of alumina exports (see table 5). Consequently the value of exports 
for the industry as a whole rose 5% (see table 12 below). Total revenue from the production levy 
and royalties is estimated to have declined by 0.5%, with royalties falling by 8.8% and the 
production levy by 0.3%. 
The contraction in bauxite production may be largely attributed to the reduced demand for 
bauxite and alumina in international markets and to a prolonged industrial dispute between 
bauxite and alumina companies and hourly-paid employees. These two situations combined to 
produce a significant build-up of bauxite inventories. 
The reduction in bauxite prices and profits, plus increased inventories, stimulated the 
Government to arrange the sale of 1.6 million tons of bauxite to the US Government. Moreover, 
Table 4 
JAMAICA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(1970 = 100) 
Index of agriculture, forestry 







Production of some important 
export cropsc 





























































































































Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, Production Statistics, 1980; World Bank, Jamaica: Development Issues and 
Economic Prospects, January 1982. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Exports only. 
'Thousands of metric tons. 








































Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, Production Statistics, 1980 and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 6 
JAMAICA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY 










Indicators of manufacturing production 
Electricity sales to industry by 
public utilities' 
Industrial employment 
Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, Production Statistics, 1979, and Statistical Digest, February 1982. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Data relate to production of large manufacturing enterprises. 
'Millions of litres. 
Thousands of metres. 
'Millions of kWh. 
Thousands. 
*Annual data are averages of April and October, except 1980 (average of April and November). 
the increase in alumina production greatly helped to offset the negative impact of the cutback in 
bauxite production. 
Within the quarrying subsector, there was a continuation of the upward trend in production 
which had been evident since 1980. Improvement during 1981 was particularly noteworthy in the 
case of gypsum production, as a result of renewed activity in the construction sector. The trial 
quarrying of marble was carried out during the year. 
(iii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing output increased by less than 1% in 1981: a meagre 
result, but one which nevertheless reversed the persistent decline of the past six years, including 
the 12% decrease in 1980. The slight recovery in manufacturing was largely due to the increased 
output of paints, cement and steel, demand for which grew because of the renewed activity in 

























































































the food, beverages and tobacco subsector, together with a contraction of about 20% in the output 
of petroleum products, due to the curtailment of activity at the refinery as a result of the new 
processing arrangements under the Venezuela/Mexico Oil Facility. Nevertheless, as a result of the 
expansion and greater confidence, employment grew 7% in manufacturing as a whole. 
Chronic problems affecting output in the manufacturing sector have continued to be the 
shortage of foreign exchange and tight procedures regarding the acquisition of import licenses. 
The Government adopted several measures in an effort to revitalize the manufacturing sector, 
expand capacity utilization to 80% of existing productive capacity in 1981-1984 and provide 
additional capacity for the production of export items. These measures included (i) allocation of 
increased foreign exchange to industry; (ii) easing of procedures for obtaining import licenses and 
foreign exchange; (iii) encouragement of direct foreign investment to supplement local 
investment through various recently-formed organizations including the Jamaica National 
Investment Promotions Limited, which was established to generate additional investment 
throughout all sectors of the economy, with particular emphasis on manufacturing; (iv) upgrading 
of the skills and technology available to local industries, and (v) formulation of a new package of 
measures to stimulate the production of export goods. Through the Export Development Fund 
(EDF), US$ 46.8 million was provided in 1981 to exporters who utilized US$ 40.5 million of this 
total. Comparative figures for 1980 were US$ 41.2 million granted to 77 exporters who utilized 
only US$ 24.6 million. 
(iv) Construction. With the exception of 1978, the construction sector had experienced a 
steady decline in output since 1974. In 1980, in particular, the fall was a calamitous 29%. Finally, in 
1981, this decline was reversed, and construction output increased by well over 2%. One indicator 
of the renewed activity within the sector was the growth in the construction of private sector 
housing projects financed by developers. Even more evident, however, was the spurt in the 
construction of commercial establishments and office buildings. The upturn in construction 
activity was facilitated by the increase in loans and advances made by the commercial banks to the 
construction sector. Such loans increased by approximately 42%, while new mortgage loans 
extended by building societies grew by about 20%. As a result of this renewed activity, overall 
employment in construction grew steadily during the year (some 15%). 
In an effort to meet the rising demand of the reactivated construction sector, the production 
of a number of building materials increased considerably, with cement production growing 14% 
(see table 7), its first increase since 1975. The additional output was due in part to the re-
Table 7 
JAMAICA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 

























































Source: Jamaica, National Planning Agency, Economic and Social Survey, 1980 and 1981, and Statistical Digest, 
February 1982. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Thousands of metric tons. 
'Thousands of litres. 





JAMAICA: INDICATORS OF TOURIST ACTIVITY 
Total visitorsc 
Long stay 
Short stay e 
Other67 
Hotel room occupancy rate 
Average length of stay8 












































































Source: Jamaica, National Planning Agency, Economic and Social Survey, 1980 and 1981, and Bank of Jamaica, 
Research Department, Statistical Digest, February 1982. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands. 
'Excludes nationals residing abroad. 
Three or more nights. 
'One or two nights. 
Includes cruise-ship passengers and members of the armed forces. 
"Nights. 
Millions of current dollars. 
'Ministry of tourism estimates. 
'Units. 
In hotels, guest houses and cottages. 
equipment of the plant, funds for which were obtained from the Inter-American Development 
Bank. An additional loan of US$ 60 million will be used to expand the plant's capacity from 
200 000 tons to 630 000 tons. There was a substantial increase in the production of gypsum and 
steel throughout the year as well. Although steel production rose significantly, it was unable to 
satisfy local demand due to the shortage of local scrap and the late availability of reasonable 
quantities of imported raw materials, whose importation was delayed by difficulties in obtaining 
licenses before procedures were liberalized in April 1981. Consequently, the value of imports of 
construction materials rose 42%, but even so several items needed for the termination of housing 
projects, including lighting fixtures and fittings, remained in short supply. 
Despite the pickup of activity in 1981, construction was still way below its level of 10 years 
before, since several problems continued to severely hinder growth in the sector, among them the 
shortage of foreign exchange, the high cost and deficient supply of raw materials, high interest 
rates, and inadequate financing to the private sector for construction and land development. 
(v) Tourism. Next to bauxite and alumina, tourism is the most important foreign exchange 
earner of the economy, accounting for one-sixth of Jamaica's exports of goods and services, directly 
employing some 11/2% of the island's labour force in hotels and tourist lodges alone, and with a 
much broader impact on the economy at large, once its effect on commerce, transportation, 
restaurants and services is taken into account. 
Because of the boom in hotel construction, especially from 1968 to 1973, and the slowdown in 
tourist arrivals, hotel room occupancy rates fell below 40% in the mid-1970s. Recovery since then 
has been very slow, and tourist arrivals in 1981 were but 4% higher than in 1978 (see table 8). 
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The recession in the United States and Great Britain, as well as the rise in transportation costs 
as a result of the 1979 oil price hike, have contributed to this marked slowdown in tourism in 
general and in the Caribbean in particular. The tension and violence associated with the recent 
election in Jamaica must also have played their role, however, for, while tourism to Jamaica fell 
almost 9% in 1980, it actually increased elsewhere in the Caribbean (for example, 9% in the 
Bahamas and 3% in Barbados). Consequently, the pickup in real tourist expenditures and in the 
number of visitors in 1981 (as compared to a fall elsewhere in the Caribbean) suggests that Jamaica 
will tend to recover its share of visitors to the Caribbean, as the image of violence and tension, 
which came to be associated with it, begins to fade. 
(c) Employment and unemployment 
One of the most serious manifestations of the slow but steady decline of the Jamaican 
economy from 1973 onwards was the high and growing rate of unemployment, characteristic of 
the period. To be sure, Jamaican statistics tend to overstate the magnitude of the problem as 
compared to other countries: firstly, because Jamaica includes among its unemployed those who 
are without work and desirous of work, even if they did not in fact seek work that week, which 
raises unemployment rates at least 50%; secondly, for reasons peculiar to Jamaican society, the 
proportion of the population of working age actually in the labour force (especially among 
women) is considerably higher than elsewhere. Be that as it may, the problem is clearly serious, 
and undoubtedly worsened in the past few years as the economy declined. In this light, the decline 
in the rate of unemployment during 1981 (of 11/2 percentage points), the growth in employment 
(over 4%), and very especially the growth of employment in construction, commerce and 
manufacturing (see table 9), are worthy of note. 
Table 9 
JAMAICA: EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT" 
(1969 = 100) 






















































































































Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, The Labour Force, 1980 and National Planning Agency, Jamaica, Economic 
and Social Survey; and the World Bank. 
"Annual data are averages of April and October, except 1980 (average of April and November). 
Includes forestry and fishing. 
'Includes quarrying and refining. 
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3. The external sector 
(a) Introduction 
Jamaica, like all other oil-importing developing countries, was racked by the energy crisis of 
the 1970s. Nevertheless, this alone could only account for some deceleration in its previous solid 
rate of growth (as it did in other countries). The persistent decline in output must rather be 
attributed to the pursuit of an overly expansive domestic policy, which exacerbated rather than 
ameliorated the initial balance-of-payments disequilibrium (the deficit on current account 
exceeded 11% of GDP in 1976) induced by the oil crisis. Subsequent stabilization programmes 
aimed at dealing with such deficits —which included massive devaluation as well as import 
controls, but failed to curb public spending— succeeded in reducing the deficits, but at the cost of a 
severe restriction in the quantum of imports rather than through expansion of exports. Thus, at 
the end of 1980 the quantum of exports was still 1 % below the 1976 level (when the stabilization 
programme was initiated) and almost 25 % below the 1972 level (when the expansive public sector 
policy was set in motion), while the 1980 volume of imports was 27% less than in 1976 and less 
than half the 1972 level. Small wonder, then, that with increasingly severe import controls (even 
greater for non-fuel imports), such serious supply bottlenecks brought on a persistent decline in 
production in the period 1973-1980. 
The inability to reduce current account deficits except at the cost of severely restricting 
output, coupled with the failure adequately to control public sector expenditures, accelerated 
inflation on the one hand and induced the flight of capital on the other, all of which complicated 
the pursuit of a policy aimed at restoring internal and external equilibria, notwithstanding IMF 
support. 
In April 1981 a new stabilization programme was adopted backed by a new three-year 
Extended Fund agreement with the IMF which provided Jamaica with 500 million SDR units (about 
US$ 650 million over the three years), 40% of which would be provided the first year. The terms 
of the arrangement included both short and long-term measures. 
The long-term strategy involves the attraction of direct foreign investment, the 
establishment of export-oriented production, and the increasing of income derived from tourism. 
Short-term measures included a more liberal import policy in order to assure productive sectors of 
a steady and adequate supply of key imported inputs. Import licensing procedures were relaxed and 
certain items were released from the list of prohibited imports, with the importer given sole 
responsibility for obtaining the required foreign exchange. It also exempted from licensing 
requirements those importers who utilized retained funds to import goods not included on the 
prohibited list or imports financed through the Export Development Fund. 
It was also proposed that, by fiscal year 1983/1984, the level of net international reserves of 
the Bank of Jamaica should be equivalent to at least three months of imports. The official exchange 
rate was to be maintained at J$ 1.788=US$ 1.00, (which implied the need to assure wage 
moderation and a sharp reduction in the rate of inflation to keep exports competitive). 
Moreover, it was agreed that arrears on current international payments and transfers for 
current international transactions were not to exceed US$ 170 million for fiscal year 1981/1982. 
The realization of these measures necessitated additional financial support from donor countries 
and multilateral financial institutions and refinancing from commercial banks. A group of 
multilateral agencies and donor countries operating under the aegis of the Caribbean Group for 
Co-operation in Economic Development, and co-ordinated by the World Bank, pledged balance-
of-payments support amounting to approximately US$450 million during 1982/1983. An 
agreement was reached with a steering committee of commercial banks for the deferment and 
refinancing of 100% of all principal payments to foreign commercial banks in respect of direct 
guaranteed debts of the Government of Jamaica maturing during the fiscal years 1981 and 1982. 
The sums falling due in the two years amounted to US$ 47 and 41 million, respectively. The 
commercial banks also agreed to support a syndicated loan of US$ 70 million to be floated by the 
Government of Jamaica; this was effected in July and oversubscribed by US$ 1 million. 
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(b) External sector performance in 1981 
Notwithstanding these efforts, the balance-of-payments situation deteriorated sharply in 
1981, with the current account deficit nearly doubling. To be sure, thanks to the IMF agreements 
and the subsequent relatively easy foreign exchange availability, imports of goods and services rose 
21 % (see table 10), with imports of goods alone increasing by 2 5 % . This eased supply bottlenecks 
and so permitted the turnaround in economic activity. The sharp upturn in imports also 
undoubtedly reflected the pent-up demand for imports from the previous years of stringency, and 
the need to renew production capacity. Thus, the imports of consumer and capital goods, which 
taken together had been compressed to less than 30% of all imports in 1980 as opposed to close to 
50% in 1970-1974, grew by around 50% in 1981 (see table 11). 
Not unexpectedly, in view of the generally negative international situation, exports of goods 
and services grew poorly, increasing by only 3 % in nominal terms (see table 10). This was because 
the decline of over 10% in bauxite and sugar exports almost completely cancelled out the gains in 
alumina and other exports (see table 12). Exports of services increased more than those of goods, 
but this was solely due to the much faster rise in the prices of services (12%) compared with goods 
(less than 1%). 
Table 10 
JAMAICA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
(Annual growth rates) 




















































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data 
"Preliminary figures. 
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Source: Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 12 
JAMAICA: SELECTED EXPORTS OF GOODS 
Total 

































































Source: Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, December 1981; World Bank, Jamaica: Development 
Issues and Economic Prospects, February 1982. 
As a result of this very disparate movement in exports and imports, the trade deficit for 1981 
was just over US$ 280 million, a tenfold increase over 1980. Though inflation in Jamaica 
decelerated sharply in the course of the year, it nevertheless exceeded the increase in the price of its 
imports, with the result that as the exchange rate remained fixed, the competitiveness of Jamaica's 
domestic production with respect to its imports deteriorated 4 % in 1981 (see table 13). To be sure, 
there is no certainty that the exchange rate prevailing in 1978-1980 was the correct one. Yet in 
view of Jamaica's balance-of-payments desequilibria in recent years, and furthermore given the 
liberalization of imports in 1981, it would have seemed reasonable for the exchange rate to suffer a 
devaluation and not a revaluation, as actually occurred in order to improve Jamaica's 
competitiveness. This is all the more so considering the evidence1 indicating that Jamaica's 
'Mahmood Ayub, Made in Jamaica, World Bank Occasional Paper, 1981. 
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Table 13 
JAMAICA: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE 
RATES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS" 
(1980 = 100) 
. , , Index of effective nominal Index of effective real Annual and , . .
 r 





















































































Source: Statistical Appendix. 
"For a detailed explanation of the methodology used, see the introduction to the Statistical Appendix. 
These indexes are the result of multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the indexes of the nominal 
exchange rate. The products are then added together to give the indexes of the effective nominal exchange rate. 
CA similar procedure to that described in note b is employed using tables 1 and 2. 
manufactured goods in this period cost 34% more than world prices. Consequently, it is to be 
doubted whether the trade balance can be significantly improved in the shortrun unless the 
currency is devalued or Jamaica's inflation falls well below that of its major trading partners. 
In the short run, heavy capital flows will be needed to cover the trade and current account 
deficits. The agreements with the IMF, private banks and donor countries were aimed at doing just 
that. 
Capital flows in 1981 were virtually the same as in 1980, once the IMF credit of US$ 160 
million is included; thanks to this, debt repayments were increased from US$ 94 million in 1980 to 
almost US$ 260 million in 1981 (see table 14). Overall, 1981 concluded with a balance-of-
payments deficit of close to US$ 220 million, financed either by the IMF credit or by a drawing 
down of reserves. As a result, the overall level of foreign debt rose substantially in the course of the 
year, reaching nearly US$ 1 800 million (see table 15). The composition of the debt shifted 
significantly: the proportion due to commercial banks and other commercial sources declined, 
whereas that due to international institutions and bilateral sources rose considerably. 
Nevertheless, despite the decline in the proportion of debt due to commercial sources, there was a 
significant shortening of the debt maturity, inasmuch as a substantial proportion of long-term 
debts contracted in earlier years began to bunch up. 
4. Monetary and fiscal policy 
Monetary and fiscal developments during 1981 were strongly influenced by the three-year 
Extended Fund Facility arrangement between the IMF and the Government of Jamaica. As noted 




JAMAICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
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Transport and insurance 
Travel 
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Balance on capital account 
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Total variation in reserves' 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
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Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 









































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1973-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook (magnetic tape, March 1982); 1981: 
CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
"Services also include other official and private transactions, but not factor services. 
In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
c
 The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 
monetization of gold, allocation of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to revaluation. 
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to Jamaica over a three-year period, 40% of which is expected to be provided during the fiscal year 
1981/1982. In order to receive this foreign exchange, Jamaica committed itself to concrete limits 
on net banking system credit to the public sector, to ceilings on the net domestic assets of the Bank 
of Jamaica, as well as to restraint on new foreign borrowing by the public sector or by the private 
sector with public sector guarantees. 
(a) Fiscal policy 
The fiscal measures outlined in the Extended Fund Facility arrangement were designed to 
speed the attainment of surpluses on the fiscal sectors current account (to make up for the reduced 
inflow of foreign exchange after the big contribution in the first year of the arrangement) and to 
lessen strain on the domestic banking system in order that the maximum volume of domestic 
financial resources be made available to the productive sector. 
The proposed fiscal objectives over the three-year period included the reduction of overall 
central government expenditure to no more than 30% of the grossdomestic product by the end of 
the three-year programme period, with the level of government expenditure expected to be held at 
33% of GDP during the fiscal year 1981/1982; the lowering of the current account deficit to 3-5% 
in 1981/1982 and its eventual conversion into a surplus of 1% of GDP by the 1983/1984 financial 
year; and a tightening of the overall deficit (net amortization) to 10% of GDP. 
In large measure, fiscal sector performance succeeded in adhering to the spirit, if not the 
letter, of its specific objectives. Current revenues were increased by over 40% (see table 16), 
largely thanks to the steps taken to reorganize tax administration and to apply strict tax 
Table 15 
JAMAICA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
Debt (millions of 
US dollars) 
Gross reserves (millions 
of US dollars) 
Debt index (1970 = 100) 
Current prices 
Constant prices 
Debt service as a percentage of:c 
Exports 
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Source: CEPAL, on the basis of data provided by the World Bank, IMF and the Bank of Jamaica. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Disbursed public and State-guaranteed private debt and use make of IMF credit. 
cOn the basis of balance of payments data. 
Amortization and interest payments as a proportion of exports of goods and services. 
^Receipts. 
Interest payments as a proportion of the gross domestic product. 




JAMAICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Current revenue 
Current expenditure 












































Source: Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, December 1981. 
compliance and collection procedures. This increase is all the more impressive in real terms, for 
inflation was only 13% (mid-year to mid-year). On the expenditure side, current expenditure for 
the fiscal year was virtually on target, increasing 8% in nominal terms and consequently declining 
in real terms. This was due largely to wage restraint within the public sector, as well as to careful 
management of discretionary payments. As a result, the fiscal deficit on current account was 
reduced by well over half, falling to 3.5% of GDP (down from over 10% in 1980). Gross capital 
expenditure, including amortization payments, rose 43% in 1981, whereas capital revenues were 
virtually nil. Consequently, the overall fiscal deficit, though down 7% with respect to 1980, was 
still close to J$ 1 billion. 
The major highlight in the area of financing the budget was naturally enough the sharp 
increase in foreign borrowing to cover the deficit. The share of the deficit financed by foreign 
borrowing almost doubled in the course of 1981, rising from 34% in 1980 to 65%. As a result, the 
domestic banking system's resources were freed from the need to give support to the public sector, 
and could hence provide credit for the private sector. 
(b) Monetary policy 
In line with the reduction of the public sector deficit, monetary policy was relatively 
contractive, focussing on the lowering of inflation, the mobilization of savings, and the 
channelling of the available domestic credit to priority sectors. 
The Mj money supply, i.e., currency plus demand deposits, increased but 6% in 1981 as 
compared to the 20% increase in 1980 (see table 17). This increase was so small, notwithstanding 
the large increase in domestic credit, because of the contractive influence of the marked decline in 
net foreign assets of the banking system on the domestic money supply, as well as because of the 
shifting of funds from demand deposits (M,) into time deposits (quasi-money). This substantial 
decline in net foreign assets in 1981 is, of course, the counterpart of the large influx of funds 
acquired under the new IMF agreement for debt servicing and the aforementioned deterioration in 
the balance of trade. The large shift from demand to time deposits was due to the payment of 
higher interest rates on the latter (these rose 3 percentage points in 1981) and to the exemption of 
interest payments from income taxes. 
Indicative of the ample growth in domestic credit and of the efforts to reactivate key sectors of 
the economy was the large increase (37%) in loans and advances outstanding (see table 18), with 
notable increases in loans to agriculture (especially for the rehabilitation programme for sugar and 
bananas) and manufacturing. 
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The slower growth of the money supply (both M, and M2 decelerated), plus the increased 
availability of goods, contributed to the sharp decline in the rate of inflation. Thus, the average 
growth rate of prices fell from 27% in 1980 to under 13% in 1981 (see table 19). 
The decline appears all the sharper (inflation of under 5%) when the 12-month period 
December 1980 to December 1981 is compared with the previous period (see figure 2) or if the 
focus is on food products alone. This sharp deceleration is all the more impressive given the fact 
that in May 1981 price controls were lifted on over 40% of the items previously controlled, while 
other goods were removed to categories involving a lesser degree of control. To be sure, the 
ongoing recession, the high level of under-utilized capacity, and the fixed exchange rate tended to 
put a lid on any sharp rise in prices. 
Table 17 
JAMAICA: MONETARY BALANCE 
1. Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
2. Factors of expansion 
Foreign assets (net) 
Domestic credit 
Government (including official entities) 
Private sector 
Other financial institutions 
3. Factor of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) 
Other items (net) 
Balance at end of: 








































































Source: Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, December 1981. 
Table 18 
JAMAICA: DESTINATION OF CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR, BY KIND OF ACTIVITY 
(Millions of Jamaica dollars) 
Commercial bank loans and advances 
outstanding, of which: 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Construction and land 
development 


































































JAMAICA: SHORT-TERM EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICES 
Monthly variations 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
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Table 19 
JAMAICA: EVOLUTION OF INTERNAL PRICES 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Variation between annual averages 
Total 17.5 9.7 11.2 34.9 29.1 27.3 12.6 
Food and beverages 17.8 8.9 9.4 36.8 33.4 33.4 10.3 
Variation December • December 
Total 20.6 15.7 14.1 49.4 19.8 28.6 4.7 
Food and beverages 19-8 15.5 12.3 54.1 24.5 33.7 1.3 
Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, Consumer Price Indexes, Annual Review, 1980, and Jamaica Economic and 
Social Survey, 1981. 
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MEXICO 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981 the Mexican economy registered a high rate of growth (a little over 8%) for the 
fourth consecutive year. This meant that the per capita product increased 23% over this period and 
there was a continued reduction in unemployment and underemployment, which have 
traditionally constituted one of the country's most serious problems. This performance is even 
more heartening if consideration is given to the conditions experienced by nearly all the 
industrialized economies, which perceptibly affected the growth rate of most of the Latin 
American countries. 
In the above results an important role was played by the Government's economic policy. In 
recent years this has been designed to expand and diversify the production apparatus and to create 
employment at a faster rate than the growth of the active population. Because of the internal and 
external conditions prevailing, however, this policy also generated some increasing disequilibria 
which will be commented on later. 
The policy measures or instruments used to achieve these objectives included in particular an 
increase in public expenditure, particularly on investment; the promotion of domestic and foreign 
private investment, mainly through an expansive monetary and credit policy directed at 
stimulating saving and also through the selective use of incentives and subsidies; and the 
accelerated growth of exports of both the petroleum sector and the rest of the traditional and non-
traditional activities. 
On evaluating developments in 1981, it may be concluded that the expected results were 
obtained as regards converting public expenditure, in particular public capital formation, into one 
of the basic levers for increasing production and employment. At the same time, considerable 
increments were achieved in private investment, although not always in activities with high social 
returns. The results with respect to the promotion of exports followed opposite trends, since 
although they increased considerably in value —a not insignificant achievement in view of the 
recession in the world economy and the difficulties affecting the petroleum market which, in the 
middle of the year, led to a substantial drop in Mexican sales— the increase was below the target 
which the Government had set at the beginning of the year. Furthermore, non-petroleum exports 
continued to contract in real terms for the second year running. Thus, hydrocarbons accounted for 
73% of the total value of external sales of goods, compared with only 16% in 1976, when the 
exceptional growth of petroleum exports was just beginning. 
The bases for growth in 1981 were not unlike those which, with similar results, prevailed in 
the preceding year: accelerated growth of fixed capital formation, which came to represent the 
unprecedented proportion of 25% of the gross domestic product; rapid growth of current 
government expenditure, despite the lower rate in the second half of the year; and lastly, the 
continued dynamism —although at a decreasing rate in relation to previous years— of 
hydrocarbon exports. 
Moreover, the expansion for the third year in succession of the purchasing power of external 
sales at a much higher rate than that of their volume —a result in its turn of the rise in average unit 
values of exports owing to the large-scale incorporation of petroleum— gave Mexico a large gain 
deriving from the terms-of-trade effect which was reflected in more rapid growth of gross income 
than of the domestic product. Thus, gross income increased at an average annual rate of 9.5% in 
the period 1978-1981 (see table 1 and figure 1 ). In the last of these years, the increase of nearly 6% 
in per capita income gave vigorous impetus to household consumption, which rose by around 
8.5%, 
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This evolution of domestic expenditure acted as a spur to the accelerated growth of nearly all 
the production sectors and was in turn supported by it. Among these sectors an outstanding feature 
was once again the expansion of petroleum activities and the encouraging results achieved for the 
second consecutive year in the crop farming and fishing sectors. Also outstanding was the growth 
of electric power generation and, to a somewhat lesser extent, that of manufacturing output. 
Within the latter, the boom in the motor-vehicle, capital goods and petrochemical industries 
continued, that in petrochemicals being the result of the heavy investment made by Petróleos 
Mexicanos (PEMEX). Lastly, trade and transport and the provision of public services also expanded 
considerably in the course of the year. 
The Government's development policy made simultaneous progress on several fronts in 
1981. Among the projects and activities being promoted which were of particular importance that 
year may be mentioned: the vigorous agricultural development policy through the Mexican Food 
Table 1 
MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198? 
. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (billions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Real gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
68.7 71.6 74.1 
60.1 62.0 63.9 
1 143 1 155 1 160 
Growth rates 
80.1 87.5 94.7 102.4 
65.8 67.7 69.8 71.8 





























0.4 13.4 13.6 37.0 39.0 54.6 21.5 
10.8 -2.7 -6.8 46.9 47.8 51.4 
Consumer prices 
28.8 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salariesc 
Rate of urban enemployment 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 





















































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Annual average variation of nominal minimum wages. 
''Percentage. 
'Estimates. 
Total external debt. 
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System (Sistema Alimentario Mexicano-SAM), which managed to bring over 2 million more 
hectares into the cultivation of grains, half of which had been idle land; the accelerated expansion 
of the domestic capacity for processing hydrocarbons, through the development of the 
petrochemicals industry; the provision of support for the production of capital goods and the 
execution of several projects in this field; the construction of important industrial ports and the 
expansion of the social infrastructure, particularly in those sectors relating to education,1 
mechanisms for the distribution of basic commodities, and attention to marginal areas or indigent 
population groups. The aim of this set of measures, once they achieve full maturity, is to expand 
the bases of support for the country's economic development, achieve more socially equitable 
development, and progress towards a domestic economy less dependent on external supplies and 
the international situation. 
Nevertheless, the evolution of the economy was not entirely free from difficulties in 1981, 
and these tended to get worse as the year went on. As stated earlier, the achievement of the priority 
goals of growth, diversification and employment through the above-mentioned strategy brought 
into focus and even accentuated certain disequilibria which had carried over from previous years, 
notable among them the increasing negative balance on the external accounts, the heavy external 
indebtedness and its servicing, the disequilibria in the government accounts and inflationery 
pressures. 
The factor which possibly did most to accentuate these disequilibria in 1981 was the 
deterioration in the world market for hydrocarbons, which began to be evident in the second 
quarter and was reflected in a drop in the prices of this product and a sharp decrease in the volume 
exported during a brief period in the middle of the year. These situations contributed to an increase 
in the deficit on the balance of payments trade account, and worsened the already considerable 
financial disequilibrium of the public sector. They also led the authorities to introduce some 
changes in the economic policy, including a 4% reduction in the budgeted expenditure of the 
central government in the second half of the year and more restrictions on imports of non-
essential products, through the system of prior permits. These adjustments may not, however, 
have fully reflected the magnitude of the disruptions caused by the adverse trends originating in 
the external sector. 
Furthermore, the rapid growth of domestic demand, especially that of the public sector, 
combined with a distinctly expansionary credit policy, intensified inflationary pressures, which 
were reflected first in a 28% rise in the consumer price index for the year, and secondly in an 
exceptional growth of imports. 
Since the rate of domestic inflation far exceeded that of the principal countries with which 
Mexico maintains close trade relations, the monetary authorities continued to implement a system 
of regulated floating of the exchange rate, but the gradual adjustments registered in the value of 
the peso with respect to the dollar during the year —which altogether amounted to 11%— were 
insufficient to place it at a level adequately reflecting the external purchasing power of the peso.2 
It is difficult to assess the effect of the gradual overvaluation of the peso in the last few years 
on the final result of the 1981 balance of payments, although there is little doubt that this 
encouraged imports of both goods and services and contributed to the stagnation of non-
petroleum exports. 
At all events, as a result of the aforementioned difficulties affecting the world hydrocarbon 
market, the sluggishness of non-petroleum exports and tourism, the persistent increase in 
imports, and above all the unusually sharp rise in interest rates in the international capital 
markets,3 in 1981 an unprecedented balance-of-payments current account deficit of nearly US$ 13 
'Thanks to the priority assigned to education in the social policy, 72.5% of the school-age population was covered in 
1981 compared with 60% in the period 1976-1977. 
2
 As the year advanced, the exchange rate adjustments were progressively stepped up. Thus, in the first quarter of 1981 
the annual rate of depreciation of the peso in terms of the dollar was 8.4% but in the three following quarters it rose to 
10.7%, 12.4% and 16.2%, respectively (see Banco de México, Informe Anual 1981, p. 43). 
'Owing to Mexico's large external debt, this factor pushed up interest payments in 1981 to approximately US$ 8.2 




MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
a Annual growth rate. 
^Annual average rate in metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara 
and Monterrey. 
CEstimate. 
¿Percentage variation from December to December. 
^Millions of dollars. 
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billion was recorded: a figure equivalent to 6% of the gross domestic product and 45 % of the value 
of exports of goods and services. 
To cover this deficit and also the considerable outflow of capital stimulated among other 
factors by the progressive overvaluation of the peso, recourse was had to net external financing of 
nearly US$ 14.1 billion. This was obtained to a large extent by the public sector and included a 
much higher proportion of short-term credit than in recent years. The significant increase in 
external financing was facilitated by the country's financial standing, based partly on the 
magnitude of its proven hydrocarbon reserves. As a result, however, the public debt increased 
considerably —amounting at the end of the year to nearly US$ 68 billion, or almost 28% of the 
gross domestic product— and its structure deteriorated. At the same time, the incidence of the 
corresponding amortization and interest payments increased sharply, absorbing 54% of the value 
of exports of goods and services. 
As already noted, among the phenomena discussed here an important role was played by the 
public sector's financial deficit, which was basically the result of the policy of heavy spending and 
support for the directly productive sectors, but was accentuated by the decrease in income deriving 
from the exports of hydrocarbons programmed by PEMEX. Thus, the central government deficit 
alone rose from a little over 7% of the gross domestic product in 1980 to 12% in 1981. To cover 
this deficit, recourse was had to both external and internal financing which, together with the 
expansive credit policy in favour of the private sector, constituted the main causes of the monetary 
expansion. 
It is true that there were also substantial increases in the deposits obtained by the 
intermediation system, which were stimulated by the growing sophistication of the Mexican 
financial market and by the policy followed in connection with passive interest rates, which for the 
first time in several years offered real positive returns to savers. There was, however, an increasing 
tendency to prefer deposists in foreign currency, which was undoubtedly encouraged by the 
overvaluation of the peso and expectations of a possible adjustment of the exchange parity. 
Despite the aggravation of some of the problems described here, 1981 was characterized by 
the stability of the political climate and the relative calm in worker-employer relations. In the first 
place, the implementation of the Political Reform initiated in the course of the current 
presidential six-year period followed its course, with the approval of the Federal Law on Political 
Organizations and Electoral Processes (LOPPE) and the legitimization of the existence of several 
opposition political parties. Other factors which must have contributed decisively to this harmony 
were the expansion of employment opportunities deriving from the marked economic growth 
attained for the fourth consecutive year and the small increase in the purchasing power of the 
minimum wage. 
In short, 1981 was a year of important achievements which were reflected in the expansion of 
production (particularly in some traditionally backward activities such as the food industry), the 
creation of job opportunities and the progress made towards a considerable diversification of the 
production apparatus. These achievements were obtained, however, concurrently with the 
accentuation of certain internal and external disequilibria, especially the growing deficit of the 
public sector, the similarly increasing balance of payments current account deficit and consequent 
rise in the external debt, the intensification of inflationary pressures and the loss of external 
purchasing power of the peso. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Global supply and demand trends 
Within a global trend towards a growth pattern more open to the exterior, total supply of 
goods and services showed a high rate of increase of nearly 10%, although this was slightly less 
than that recorded in the last two years. Despite the decline in their rate of growth from 32% in 
1980 to 24% in 1981, imports continued to be the most dynamic variable in the supply and demand 
context, and their share in the gross domestic product rose to 12%, a much higher proportion than 
that registered 10 years previously (see table 2). 
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In addition to the important effect on imports of the accelerated increase in domestic 
expenditure, the rise in the income-elasticity of external purchases shown by these figures 
reflected the increasing subordination of economic growth to the expansion of the country's 
capacity to import. This may be explained both by the higher degree of complexity of the 
investments in the infrastructure and in industry required by the country's present stage of 
development, and by the insufficient degree of intersectoral integration of the economic system. 
The rapid increase in global supply was also due to the very considerable increase in the gross 
domestic product for the fourth year running. This grew by slightly more than 8% as a result of the 
vigorous expansion of all sectors of the economy and thus completed an exceptional increase of 
38% in the last four years. 
As regards global demand, investment expenditure of both the public and private sectors once 
again increased significantly. As a result, gross fixed capital formation rose 15% for the second 
year in succession and in 1981 was practically double the level recorded only four years previously. 
The high level and diversification of public investment were the result of government plans, 
notable among them a large number of construction works which represented two-thirds of the 
total public investment in fixed capital. Outstanding among these projects were those 
implemented by PEMEX for the expansion of the national system of pipelines and the port works 
connected with the petroleum sector. Considerable amounts were also expended on railway and 
electrification projects —in both generation and the transmission and distribution of electric 
energy. At the same time, work continued on road and public transport projects in Mexico City. 
The bulk of public sector investment in machinery and equipment, for its part, went to the steel, 
petrochemical and fertilizer industries. 
Private investment also maintained the high growth rate of about 14.5% registered the 
previous year. As distinct from public investment, most of it (60%) consisted of purchases of 
machinery and equipment, primarily for the expansion of manufacturing, transport, construction 
and mining. 
Table 2 
MEXICO: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public 
Private 

































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Programming and the Budget. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 





MEXICO: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing 
Mining and quarrying 
Oil production 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels 
Financial institutions, 
insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Less: Imputed bank costs 
Millions of dollars 












































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Programming and the Budget. 
"Preliminary figures. 
b
 As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
'Financial institutions, insurance, real estate and business services included in community, social and personal services. 
Total consumption grew by slightly over 8%, which is similar to the rate recorded, on 
average, in the preceding years. This increase is mainly attributable to the rise in private 
consumption (8%) as a result of the higher levels of income and employment, particularly in 
construction, agriculture manufacturing and commerce. The expansion of household expenditure 
was also influenced by the tax reductions effected for redistributive purposes. The increases in 
consumption had a markedly positive effect on the expansion of the manufacturing sector (whose 
products cover 60% of total private consumption), while the growth rate of imported consumer 
goods dropped significantly. 
Public consumption continued to show considerable dynamism, although its rate of growth 
(9%) was slightly lower than that of of the two preceding years. Disbursements on education and 
health services grew most rapidly, altogether absorbing 47% of the expenditure in this category. 
Finally, the dynamic evolution of the volume of exports of goods and services continued in 
1981, although the rate of growth fell somewhat from nearly 12% in 1980 to 8.4% in 1981. This 
drop was partly due to the sluggishness of non-traditional exports and tourism, since external sales 
of crude oil —although below the planned target— were 30% above those recorded in 1980, so 
that the share of hydrocarbons in exports of goods continued to grow. This share, which was 
minimal at the beginning of the past decade but rose rapidly as from 1976, neared 73% in 1981. 
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With due consideration of the differences with other oil-exporting countries (that is to say, bearing 
in mind the relatively much greater progress of Mexico's industrial production), from the strict 
standpoint of the composition of its exports, in 1981 Mexico continued its trend towards becoming 
a "single-export" country. 
(b) Growth of the main sectors 
As noted earlier, the performance of practically all sectors of the economy was satisfactory in 
1981 (see table 3). The agricultural sector, particularly crop farming, once again grew much more 
rapidly than the population. A notable feature was the progress made in the production of basic 
grains, as a result of the government programmes designed to attain self-sufficiency in certain 
foodstuffs. Government policy also contributed to the rise in the growth rate of fishing, a sector in 
which persistent efforts have been made to stimulate because of its potential in improving the 
protein content of the diet. 
As in 1980, mining output grew by 8.5% in 1981 thanks to the increased production of silver 
(among the precious metals) and of copper, lead and iron (among the metals for industrial use). In 
contrast, the growth rate of petroleum production, although very high (20%), was lower than in 
the preceding year owing to the aforementioned international marketing problems. 
Table 4 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 
production (1970 = 100) 
Crop farming 
For domestic consumption 
For export 
Stock-raising 
Indexes of production of the main 































































































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources. 
"Preliminary figures. 




Manufacturing showed promising signs —although its growth rate was lower than that of the 
economy as a whole— owing in particular to the increase in the manufacture of capital goods and 
consumer durables, especially notable being the expansion of the production of motor vehicles. 
The expansion of the domestic market, the industrial development policy and the coming on 
stream of projects initiated in previous years were the main causes of the growth of the 
manufacturing sector. Basic petrochemicals production grew at a higher rate than in the preceding 
year owing to the entry into operation of new plants which form part of PEMEX'S ambitious 
projects to supply both domestic and external markets with these raw materials in widespread 
industrial use. 
In 1981 the construction boom also continued, benefiting from the expansion of the invest-
ment programmes of both the public and the private sector. Basic services, for their part, increased 
by about 11%: a very high rate but nevertheless somewhat lower than that recorded in the two 
previous years. The lessened dynamism of this sector was mainly due to the lower growth rate in 
1981 of transport, storage and communications, which more than offset the increase in the 
production of electricity, gas and water. 
Business services once again showed an increase similar to that of goods-producing activities, 
although lower than that of imports. Finally, public administration continued to expand rapidly, 
although at a slower rate than in the two preceding years, partly owing to the very high levels 
already attained in previous years by medical and educational services and partly to the cuts 
introduced in government expenditure in the last few months of the year. 
(i) The agricultural sector. In 1981 the value added in the agricultural sector increased by 
approximately 6.5%, as the result of increments of 8.5% in the crop farming product, 3% in that 
of livestock production, and nearly 2% in that of forestry. Within crop farming itself, the 
performance was uneven, since for the second consecutive year the harvests of commodities 
destined to satisfy domestic consumption experienced an unusually large increase while those of 
export commodities once again decreased (see table 4). 
Undoubtedly the outstanding fact of the year was that the production of maize and beans, 
which are basic items in the people's diet, reached a volume similar to that of domestic 
consumption of these commodities. According to government sources, this should be reflected in a 
drastic reduction or even elimination of imports of these commodities in the next agricultural year. 
The success achieved in this respect also had favourable redistributive effects because, thanks to 
the support prices established and other measures which are analysed below, there was an increase 
in the income and consumption of the rural population, particularly small-scale farmers on 
non-irrigated land, who produce a significant proportion of these commodities. 
The grain harvests amounted to almost 27 million tons, or 22% more than in the previous 
year.4 This notable increase was due to both favourable weather conditions and to the official 
support provided to farmers by SAM. Prominent items among this support were the substantial 
increase for the third consecutive year in bank credit granted at low interest rates through 
BANRURAL; the 75% reduction in the prices of improved seeds and the wide distribution of these 
and "creóle" maize by the National Seed Production Company; and the risk-sharing programmes 
between the authorities and producers, which encouraged the incorporation of previously unused 
land into production. In 1981 there was also a reduction in insurance premiums and an increase in 
the coverage of agricultural extension services, mechanization and the use of fertilizers.5 
In addition to the firm support of SAM, the results obtained were influenced by favourable 
weather conditions which, altogether, permitted a significant increase in the area under 
cultivation. In 1981 the rainfall was timely and sufficient, and thanks to the collection of water in 
dams it was possible to sow second crops on previously unused land. As a result of this and the fact 
that there were fewer early frosts, new previously unused land was brought under cultivation. 
*Total production of food crops was over 28 million tons, or 20% higher than in 1980. 
'It is estimated that agricultural extension services reached farmers cultivating a little over 9 million hectares, the 
mechanization programme covered about 1.5 million hectares more than in 1980, and prices of fertilizers and pesticides 
dropped by around 30%. 
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Thus, the area harvested exceeded 18 million hectares, or a little over 1.5 million hectares more 
than in 1980. In particular, the measures described above meant that the area destined for basic 
crops increased to 80% of the total crop farming area, compared with 75% in the previous year. 
Thus, while the area used for the cultivation of grains andoilseeds increased by 12%, that used for 
export crops decreased by 5%. 
Maize production rose by approximately 20% to a volume of nearly 15 million tons (see 
table 4). In addition to the aforementioned measures, other factors responsible for this were the 
increase of slightly over 45% in the support price and the reduction of harvesting losses. 
Production of beans was 50% higher than in 1980 and amounted to nearly 1.5 million tons: 
the highest figure ever recorded. This exceptional increase, which in its turn was largely due to the 
fact that this crop was sown on highly productive land in the north-west of the country, was also 
partly due to the 25% rise in yield. 
The production of over 640 000 tons of rice (40% more than in 1980) also sufficed to cover 
domestic consumption. The increase is largely attributable to the extension of the area sown in 
very rainy regions situated in the south-east of the country. With the harvesting of slightly over 3 
million tons of wheat (15% more than in the previous year), self-sufficiency was nearly obtained 
in this crop too. The increase of approximately 30% in the sorghum harvest was to a great extent 
due to the possibility, already noted above, of sowing second crops on previously unused land in 
view of the high water level of the dams. 
Production of oilseeds showed a very unequal performance, although altogether it increased 
14%. The decrease in production and areas sown in the case of such seeds as sesame and saff lower 
was probably due to the uncertainty concerning their future prices and the replacement of these 
crops by basic grains, in view of the preferential incentives provided for these crops. In the case of 
sesame, another influential factor was the drop in world prices in the sowing season, a fact which 
also affected the production of other export crops such as tomatoes, chickpeas, cocoa and tobacco. 
With the exception of coffee and cotton, output of the rest of the export crops dropped 
sharply. This situation, which had already been observed in 1980, gave rise to manpower surpluses 
in the growing areas and a fall in the inflow of foreign exchange. The area used for the cultivation 
of export crops in the north-west of the country was reduced as a result of the limitation of access to 
the traditional export markets for chickpeas and vegetables and the significant increase in their 
production costs. 
In contrast, in 1981 the production of coffee, which had declined in the two previous years, 
pmrtially recovered. This increase, however (obtained partly through the favourable rainfall), was 
not sufficient to regain the level of output achieved in 1978. 
Production of cotton followed a similar trend: after having suffered continual reductions in 
the previous threeyears.it increased by a little over 4.5% in 1981, but was also far from attaining 
the volume harvested in 1977. 
In contrast, the tomato harvest declined for the second year running, this time very 
significantly (25%), and thus fell back to a level below that of 1977. This was largely the result of 
the lack of competitiveness suffered by this crop in comparison with the United States production 
because of the increase in domestic costs. The production of all vegetables destined for export, 
together with that of melons and watermelons, likewise decreased. Also affected by increased 
costs, the strawberry crop dropped by 30%, and the sesame, garlic and cocoa harvests also declined. 
In addition to the causes already mentioned, other factors in these decreases were the government 
policy of restricting the production of sesame to the level needed to cover domestic demand and the 
fall in the world price of cocoa. 
The performance of livestock production in 1981 was uneven. Total production of carcass 
meat (beef, pork, mutton, goat and poultry) was over 2 million tons in 1981, bringing the annual 
per capita average to slightly over 32.5 kilogrammes. Production of beef increased at the very high 
rate of over 9% ; in contrast, output of other important items such as eggs rose by only 3 % and that 
of milk by a little over 1.5%: a rate well below that of population growth. 
The recovery of cattle production was stimulated by the increase in demand, the rise in 
domestic prices, and the rainfall, which was beneficial to pastures. For the second consecutive year, 
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however, exports were low, owing partly to the differential between domestic prices and those of 
the United States market. 
The very small increase in the production of eggs, which made external purchases necessary, 
was due to increased costs, and in particular the price-fixing policy, which discouraged investment, 
and led to the insufficient replacement of flocks and a decline in the number of laying hens. These 
factors were also the main causes of the still smaller increase in the production of milk. 
The value of total exports of agricultural commodities dropped by 5%, thus accentuating the 
deterioration in their share in total external sales. The uneven trends of external sales and imports 
of agricultural commodities caused a negative balance in international trade in these goods of over 
US$ 760 million, which is 90% higher than the previous year's deficit. The deficit for the 
agricultural sector as a whole, for its part, came to over US$ 900 million. 
Agricultural purchases from abroad maintained their volume, although owing to the rise in 
prices they increased by over 20% in value. Basic food commodities (grains and oilseeds), which 
represent over 90% of agricultural imports, were mainly responsible for this increase. Purchases 
of grains were made with the aim of having sufficient reserves to guarantee domestic consumption 
in 1981, but, as noted earlier, in view of the harvests in the latest agricultural year they should 
diminish or disappear in 1982. Purchases of oilseeds increased in value by about 80% in 1981. 
Lastly, imports of certain industrial products of agricultural origin, such as sugar (US$ 360 
million), powdered milk (US$ 110 million) and evaporated milk (US$ 115 million), were also 
very high. 
Table 5 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Index of mining production 
(1970 = 100) 
Precious metals 
Non-ferrous industrial metal 
Metals and minerals for 
the steel industry 
Non-metallic minerals 
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(ii) Fishing. Basically as a result of the support policy envisaged in the National Fisheries 
Development Plan, catches registered an average annual growth of over 20% in the period 1977-
1981. This raised the production volume over that period from 670 000 to 1.5 million tons. The 
species whose catch grew most included squid, tuna, sardines and monkf ish, all of which more than 
doubled in volume over that period. 
In 1981, the gross domestic product of the fisheries sector rose by over 10% which, combined 
with its diversification and the increase in employment generated, made it one of the most 
dynamic activities of the economy, particularly if compared with that of the livestock sub-sector 
which is the main provider of animal proteins. 
In 1981 the industrial fish processing capacity increased by 60% and the production of canned 
sardines and tuna —in which the share of para-State enterprises was 70%— grew by 75% and 
80%, respectively. 
This expansion, however, has not been accompanied by similar dynamism in the 
consumption of these products, mainly owing to insufficient refrigeration capacity and bottlenecks 
in the distribution apparatus, both public and private, which limit the marketable volume and raise 
the prices for the final consumer. Marketing continues to be one of the most difficult problems 
affecting fishery activities, despite the efforts made and the Government's aim of establishing 
mechanisms to ensure a permanent supply of fishery products for the whole population.6 
On the other hand, the development of fishery activities and, above all, the diversification of 
the catch, permitted exports to rise steeply. Thus, the value of external sales —of which shrimps 
represented nearly two-thirds in 1980— grew between 1977 and 1980 at an average annual rate of 
35%, resulting in a trade surplus in these products of nearly US$ 420 million in 1980. In 1981, 
however, the surplus dropped to US$ 365 million, mainly owing to the 10% drop in the value of 
shrimp exports. This decrease was partly due to the institutional problems arising over the 
transfer of ownership of the shrimp fleet from shipowners to members of co-operatives. This 
transfer, however, made it possible to programme the diversification of the catch in the close 
season for shrimp, so as to make full use of the industrial plant. 
(iii) Mining and petroleum activities 
Mining. In spite of the various obstacles to the development of mining, such as the 
contraction of external demand, the drop in world prices of most mining products, the increases in 
domestic production costs and the difficulties in the country's railway and port operations, mining 
activities maintained the dynamism which characterized them in 1980, growing by 8.5% (see 
table 5). 
Some factors in this expansion were, in the first place, the effects of the big demand for 
fertilizers and cement, and in general the increased purchases for the construction, steel and 
motor-vehicle industries, and, secondly, the entry into operation of new mines and the increased 
capacity of processing and refining plants as a result of the substantial investment in this sector in 
the past few years and the constant government support for this activity, which included, among 
other incentives, the supply of electric power at low prices. 
Despite the appreciable drop in world prices of several mining products, the growth of 
mining output also permitted the value of exports of these commodities to increase by nearly 40% 
in 1981. 
As a result of investments in 1981, the capacity for processing natural ore to obtain silver, lead 
and zinc increased by 5 350 tons per day, while the capacity for producing copper ore rose by 2 000 
tons per day. During the year a new plant was also completed for the production of 600 000 tons of 
sulphur annually, the barite production capacity was increased by 240 000 tons annually, and the 
capacity for producing zinc and silver-containing lead concentrates was raised by 30 000 tons and 
4 000 tons, respectively. In addition, a ferro-alloy plant was expanded and a coal-washing plant 
was built. 
6As part of the official policy of financial support for the fisheries sector, BANPESCA raised the credit provided 
between 1980 and 1981 from 5 to 9 billion pesos, 80% of which was granted on preferential terms. 
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After two years in which the production of precious metals fell by over 3 %, it increased by 6% 
in 1981. This was mainly due to the dynamism shown by the production of silver (of which Mexico 
continues to be the main world producer), which rose 7% thanks to the exploitation of more 
productive deposits.7 This offset the effects of the drop in the world price which, in contrast, 
caused the production of gold to fall by 3%. 
The group of non-ferrous industrial minerals registered the largest increase (13%), although 
the rate of growth was slightly below that of the previous year. The biggest impetus observed was 
the 38% growth of copper output and the rise of over 9% in the production of lead, which more 
than compensated for the effects of the considerable decreases in the extraction of zinc, bismuth 
and cadmium. The notable increase in copper production originated mainly in the La Caridad mine 
and was also partially linked with the closure in the United States of one of the biggest smelters 
and refineries in the world.8 The dynamism shown by the extraction of lead for its part, was 
stimulated by the increase in domestic demand, since external demand contracted significantly: a 
situation which also affected zinc (because of the new substitutes) and bismuth and cadmium, 
whose world prices fell sharply. 
The group of minerals and metals for the steel industry grew by 8.5 %, which was slower than 
in 1980. Production of both coke and iron ore, which expanded by 3% and 9% respectively, failed 
to satisfy domestic demand. However, progress continued on important projects which will start 
operating in 1982, with the joint participation of State and private steel enterprises, and in some 
cases with the support of PEMEX.9 Notwithstanding the increment of over 25 % in the production 
of manganese ore, of which Mexico possesses one of the biggest deposits in the world, this was of 
low metal content (27%) and was sent for export, so that high-grade manganese ore (50%) had to 
be imported. 
Non-metallic minerals as a whole showed no increase at all in production, since although 
sulphur and varite grew by 6% —the latter thanks to the development of a new mine in the west of 
the country— the production of fluorite (in which Mexico occupies first place in the world) 
contracted by 12%. This decline was due to the fact that South Africa and China have tended to 
displace Mexico from its principal market (the United States). On the other hand, the increased 
production of sulphur made it possible to achieve the SAM goals as regards the manufacture and 
export of fertilizers. 
Finally, in 1982 nearly 6 million tons of salt obtained from the biggest salt deposit in the 
world, in Lower California, were produced and exported. This volume represents about 40% of 
total world trade in this commodity, making Mexico the leading exporter of salt in the world 
market. 
Petroleum activities. Production of crude petroleum once again showed a considerable 
increase (20%) in 1981, attaining a daily average of 2.3 million barrels. Nevertheless, its rate of 
growth was lower than the 27% achieved on average in the three-year period 1978-1980. Thanks 
to the higher output it was possible to increase exports by 33% and at the same time to supply the 
11% increase in domestic demand (see tableó). Prospecting activities also continued to be 
promoted in 1981. The production and export goals established at the beginning of the year, 
however, were only fulfilled to the extent of a little over 80% and 70% respectively, owing to the 
problems arising in the world market for hydrocarbons in the middle of the year. 
7In addition to the expansion of the facilities for processing natural ore undertaken in 1981, a noteworthy 
development was the entry into operation in 1982 of the Real de Angeles silver mine, the biggest open-cut silver mine in 
the world. 
'Apparently due to the rise in production costs generated by legal requirements in connection with environmental 
pollution. 
Thus the State group SIDERMEX is developing the Hércules mine with a capacity of 3 million tons annually, and in 
the north of the country a pelletizing plant with the same capacity will be completed in 1982. The State enterprise 
S1CARTSA, for its part, will expand the existing mines adjacent to the Las Truchas steel plant to supply a new 3 million ton 
pelletizing plant which will enter into operation in 1983. Finally, the private HYLSA company will raise its production of 
concentrates to supply a new pelletizing plant with a capacity of 1.5 million tons annually. 
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The changes in the structure of both domestic and external demand caused prospecting to be 
directed primarily towards the fields of light and extra light oils. As a result, the volume of proven 
reserves increased by nearly 20% to 72 billion barrels, giving a useful life of 60 years at the current 
rate of output. This increment derived mainly from the 14 volatile oil, gas and condensate deposits 
found in the Reforma area. 
In 1981, world consumption of petroleum pursued its downward trend owing to the 
industrialized countries' economic stagnation, the measures adopted to conserve energy, and the 
replacement of petroleum by other energy sources. All this, combined with the utilization of the 
substantial reserves stored in the industrialized countries, led to a surplus supply which gave rise to 
a market in which purchasers had greater influence. This caused a declining trend in world prices, 
especially of heavy crude, and this also affected the light oils. 
These changes in the world market had repercussions on the development of petroleum 
activities in Mexico,10 where it was even necessary to close down some wells, partly because of the 
decrease in sales from June onwards and partly on account of the limited storage capacity. PEMEX 
consequently modified its original production programme, which envisaged an average volume of 
2.8 million barrels a day and would have meant a growth of 44% over the previous year's figure. In 
practice, crude output between March and June came fairly close to this goal with an average of 2.5 
million barrels a day. In July, however, when some external sales contracts were cancelled, 
production fell drastically to 460 000 barrels a day, and even though in the ensuing months a trend 
towards a recovery was observed, the level of the first few months of the year was not regained." 
Table 6 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF PETROLEUM ACTIVITY 
Index of petroleum production 
(1970 = 100) 
Production of main items 
Petroleum 
Crude and condensate 
Gas liquids 
Natural gasc 





















































































































Source: Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). 
"Preliminary figures. 
''Millions of barrels. 
'Millions of cubic metres. 
''including kerosene, jet fuel, lubricants, asphalt, liquefied and dry gas, paraffin wax and greases. 
10The price of Mexican crude had to be adjusted in the following manner: the 24" Mayan crude dropped from 
US$ 34.50 per barrel in March 1981 to US$ 32 in April and US$ 28.50 from August onwards, while the 34° Isthmus crude 
fell from US$ 38.50 per barrel in May to US$ 34.50 in June and remained around that figure for the rest of the year. 
1
 'The international situation described above is compelling the Government to review the future growth rates of this 
activity in several respects, including that related to the policy of external indebtedness followed hitherto in order tó 
expand production and refining capacity. This policy had been justified, in spite of the increase in nominal interest rates in 
the world market, because of the marked upward trend that had been observable in world prices of crude and, in general, the 
prospects of increased exports of this product. 
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The southern zone, where the major part of production is generated, maintained its share in 
1981, producing 92% of national output. In this zone, production in the Gulf of Campeche 
continued to increase its share and even exceeded that of the mainland Cretaceous area, which had 
been responsible for the increases achieved in previous years. 
Production of natural gas totalled 42 billion cubic metres, or 14% more than the year before, 
thus reaching the goal set by PEMEX in the National Energy Programme. Of this output, 75 % was 
associated with the production of crude and came almost entirely from the southern zone. A bigger 
proportion of gas was flared off than in 1980 and equalled 16% of total output. The proportion of 
gas flared off from the underwater wells was still 96%, but it is hoped that this percentage will be 
drastically reduced when it is possible to feed the gas into the national pipeline system. Exports of 
natural gas to the United States remained practically at the same level as in 1980, i.e., 290 million 
cubic feet per day, or the equivalent of 7% of the national output. 
Owing to the aforementioned world market trends, it was decided to process a bigger volume 
of crude locally and some headway was made in studies aimed at improving techniques so as to 
obtain higher quality petroleum products and at making fuller use of the heavy crude from the Gulf 
of Campeche. In 198Í the volume processed increased by 10%, which permitted an increase in 
production of the main petroleum products; consequently, stocks of these rose towards the middle 
of the year. In view of the rapid growth of domestic consumption, however, inventories declined 
and distribution problems arose at the end of the year. In addition, the growth of the consumption 
of gasoline for automobiles at rates higher than that of the gross domestic product necessitated the 
restructuring of the system of prices of these petroleum products in December. Within the 
processing activities, the volume of gas was a little over 10% greater than in 1980, while the daily 
average of liquids recovered from natural gas increased by 24%. Finally, investment during the 
year amounted to 230 billion pesos, or 90% more than in 1980, and was destined mainly for 
continuing the programmes of construction of petrochemical plants, recovery plants and 
pipelines. 
(iv) The manufacturing sector. In 1981 the growth of the manufacturing sector lagged 
slightly behind that of the economy as a whole for the second year in succession. The gross 
manufacturing product rose 7.5%, while the total domestic product increased by rather more than 
8%. 
This fact is somewhat surprising, since it has long been a characteristic of the Mexican 
economy that this sector's growth-elasticity with respect to the total product has been considerably 
higher than unity. It is probably a conjunctural phenomenon seemingly influenced by several 
factors, notably: specific problems of various branches of industry which caused their growth to be 
very slow in relation to the whole; the decrease owing to certain problems indicated below with 
respect to the volume of exports of manufactured products, which, although representing only 5 % 
to 10% of the value of manufacturing output, have a significant incidence incertain sectors; the 
relatively erratic and below-normal production of consumer goods, particularly foodstuffs and 
textiles; and the considerable inflow of imported consumer goods —some of them unregistered— 
promoted to some extent by the relative cheapening of these products owing to the overvaluation 
of the peso. 
At all events, the manufacturing sector's performance in 1981 reflected the persistence of a 
process of rapid expansion following the critical situation experienced in 1976 and 1977. The main 
factors in this growth were: the dynamism shown by the global economy for the fourth consecutive 
year; the consequent rise in the level of domestic demand, which was supported in 1981 by the 
increase in the purchasing power of the middle- and lower-income population strata due to the 
reduction in taxes; the 12% growth of real expenditure on construction, which stimulated demand 
for certain intermediate goods and generated new income and employment; and, .lastly, the 
increase in employment in other sectors of the economy. 
There were also some positive factors on the supply side, influenced on the one hand by the 
coming on stream of many of the investments and expansions effected under the incentives 
provided by the "Alliance for Production", and on the other hand by the intensification of the 
import substitution process, especially with respect to capital goods (involving substantial joint 
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investment by the State and foreign enterprises) and some intermediate goods (petrochemicals, 
cement, fertilizers, motor-vehicle parts and copper products). 
Furthermore, the selective fiscal incentives at the level of branches of industry within the 
context of the Industrial Development Plan continued to operate, as also did those provided by 
SAM, in support of the production of basic goods. The manufacturing sector also received a 
significant increase in credit (43%). 
Other factors, however, adversely affected the sector's development. Among those of external 
origin may be noted the difficulties in placing an increasing volume of manufactures abroad as a 
result of at least four factors: the boom in the domestic market, which reduced exportable 
surpluses; the lower competitive capacity as a result of the overvaluation of the peso; the 
protectionist restrictions and measures imposed by importing countries; and the decrease in 
investment resources due to the increased remittances of liquid funds abroad in the face of 
devaluation expectations. Among the factors of domestic origin (in addition to the persistence of 
inflationary pressures) the limitations in the capacity of transport and storage facilities continued 
—although on a lesser scale than in the preceding year— and because of the general boom in the 
economy the lack of skilled personnel at all levels was felt more keenly, despite the persistent 
efforts made in the last few years to alleviate this problem. 
Table 7 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 
production 





Printing and publishing 
Rubber products 
Basic petrochemical products 




Machinery, equipment and 
metal products 
Transport equipment 
Production of some 
important manufactures 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official figures. 
'Preliminary figures. 
'Billions of KWH. 
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As a result of these factors and the accelerated growth of demand, the deficit on trade in 
manufactured products with other countries rose by 35% in 1981 to nearly US$ 17 billion. This 
deficit originated mainly in the metal products, machinery and equipment sector, whose negative 
balance totalled US$ 11 billion. 
Continuing the trend of the last few years, the branches of manufacturing production 
showing the biggest increases were capital goods (18%) and durable consumer goods (8%). In 
contrast, intermediate goods and ordinary consumer goods rose by only 7% and 6% respectively. 
Among non-durable consumer goods, there was a 6% increase in the production of 
foodstuffs, notably meat, fisheries products, soluble coffee, biscuits, beer, soap and edible oils. In 
contrast, the production of sugar and of fruit and vegetable preserves contracted by 6% and 5%, 
respectively, while that of tobacco remained at the same level. The textile industry, for its part, 
continued the erratic performance that has characterized it in recent years, this time registering an 
increase of close to 7% (see table 7). 
The rise in production of consumer durables was determined mainly by the increase in the 
manufacture of automobiles (14%), notably that of 8-cylinder cars, which rose by 30%.12 
Production of household electrical appliances grew by 11%, the dynamism of refrigerators, gas 
stoves, washing machines, compressors and electric motors being particularly notable; among the 
smaller appliances, a sharp increase was recorded in the manufacture of electric irons, juice 
extractors, fans, mixers and water purifiers. In contrast, the manufacture of radios, television sets 
and record players fell by 1 %, possibly as a result of the illegal introduction of these goods into the 
country. 
Output of non-metallic intermediate products grew by 7% and the sectors related to 
agricultural production increased at a higher rate, encouraged by the demand generated by SAM. 
Thus, the production of fertilizers, which is carried out wholly by the State through FERTIMEX, 
expanded by 2 3 %. This growth was due to the completion of projects started in previous years, the 
construction of new plants and the increased efficiency owing to the elimination of certain 
technical problems, as well as the expansion of some ammonia and sulphur plants by PEMEX. 
Nevertheless, production was still insufficient to supply the whole of domestic consumption, 
because of the high demand for these goods deriving from the vigorous growth of the agricultural 
sector, so that the value of imports of these products rose by 64%. 
In response to the continuing growth of the construction industry, the sectors providing 
inputs such as cement, asbestos cement, sheet glass and glass fibre grew at a higher rate than the 
average for the group of non-metallic intermediate goods. Production of cement, in which the 
country is almost self-sufficient, rose by 11 %, thanks to the maturity of substantial investments in 
new plants and expansions in response to the incentives provided by the Cement Industry 
Development Programme, which was reflected in an increase of over 30% in installed capacity. 
In spite of the contraction of external demand for yarn, both natural and artificial, production 
rose by 7% and 9% respectively as a result of the considerable expansion of domestic demand; 
something similar occurred in the case of henequén yarn, production of which rose by 5%. In 
contrast, because of the problems arising in some enterprises producing pulp and paper, this sector 
grew by only 4%: a lower rate than demand. In turn, production of paper declined and it was 
necessary to import large quantities. 
In line with the large crop increases, production of wheat flour, starch, farinaceous products 
and yeast grew by 13% each, but there was a significant drop of 3% in the output of maize flour, 
used mainly in the production of tortillas, which rose 6% in response to the incentives and 
subsidies provided within the context of SAM policies. 
Production of animal feed stagnated owing to the shortage of fish meal, since the species with 
which this is manufactured were used primarily for human consumption, in keeping with the 
guidelines laid down by SAM. 
"Owing to the low degree as yet of national integration, especially in the case of luxury automobiles, this sector 
continued to show the biggest external deficit in manufacturing. 
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Production of tyres and inner tubes not only failed to meet the heavy demand generated by the 
motor-vehicle industry but actually decreased by rather more than 5 % as a result of labour disputes 
in the producing enterprises and the insufficient production of butadiene, an essential material in 
their manufacture. The result was that imports of these products almost tripled. 
Production of cellulose and artificial fibres stagnated, despite the greater availability of raw 
materials deriving from the boom in the basic and intermediate petrochemicals industry, because 
for reasons of fashion and price the consumption of these fibres by the textile industry has been 
going down. 
Finally, within the group of non-metallic intermediate products particular dynamism was 
shown by the basic petrochemicals industry as a whole (a strategic activity belonging entirely to the 
State), which grew by 16%. Notwithstanding this and the substantial investments made, the 
supply of petrochemical products in general remained a factor of disequilibrium in the balance of 
payments. 
For its part, the production of basic chemicals rose by almost 5% and that of other chemical 
products by nearly 9%. As regards petroleum products, output of liquefied gas, gasoline and diesel 
oil increased by approximately 12%, that of fuel oil by 10% and that of petroleum liquids by 26%. 
Production of intermediate metal products grew by 7%, mainly owing to the increased output 
of steel, steel tubes, copper products, and bodies and chassis for the motor-vehicle industry; in 
contrast, aluminium goods, tin cans and crown caps declined. 
The recovery of crude steel production (7%) after its stagnation, in 1980, directly benefited all 
branches of steelmaking, although their production rose by only 4%. This recovery was due to the 
substantial investments made and the elimination of the bottlenecks which had occurred in 1980 
on account of technical and labour problems, inadequate availability of electric energy, and the 
insufficiency of iron ore and coke production. On the other hand, there were decreases in the 
production of steel castings and ferro-alloys, while problems persisted in the secondary rolling of 
iron and steel, which grew by only a little over 1%. 
Production of seamless steel tubes also increased very little and substantial imports were 
necessary in order to meet the great demand generated by PEMEX and the construction industry. 
On the other hand, the manufacture of seamed steel tubes increased by 14%, that of tubular 
profiles by 44% and that of engineering tubing by nearly 19%, giving an overall growth rate of 
nearly 14%. The strong demand for steel products once again necessitated substantial imports of 
steel tubing piping and fittings, bars and ingots, slabs, wire and cable, bearings and plates. 
Output of copper products grew by 16%, in spite of the difficulties in the manufacture of 
electrolytic copper owing to the fact that the blister produced locally does not meet the technical 
refining requirements. During the year, large amounts were invested in smelting and refining, so a 
substantial improvement is expected. Although the production of eletrolytic copper fell by more 
than 40%, the substantial imports of this item permitted the output of products manufactured 
from copper (wire and cable, sheet and brass) to grow at an exceptionally rapid rate, although 
production of tubing and shapes decreased. 
The growth rate of the capital goods group was the highest of the whole manufacturing sector 
(18%) and its share in total manufacturing output rose from 7.7% to 8.5%, although it still lags 
far behind the position occupied by this item in Argentina and Brazil. The terminal motor-vehicle 
industry and those producing railway equipment, electronic equipment and apparatus and office 
machines made most progress, with 29%, 33%, 36% and 8%, respectively. 
Production of trucks and tractors for hawling trailers registered unprecedented growth rates 
(38% and 27 %, respectively), which largely helped to alleviate the transport sector problems. The 
manufacture of automobile spare parts increased in line with the vigorous dynamism of the 
terminal motor-vehicle sector, while that of passenger, and freight bodies for trucks increased 
14%. In contrast, the production of both buses (-25%) and trolley-buses (-58%) decreased during 
the year. At the end of 1981 a plant for the manufacture of 4-cylinder automobile engines started 
operating with a production capacity of 270 000 units per year, of which 80% will be exported. 
In the railway equipment industry, the construction of railway wagons dropped by 12%, 
while output of materials rose by nearly 80% and work continued successfully on the construction 
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of carriages for the underground transport system. The manufacture of these carriages was 
initiated in 1981, and they incorporate national technological improvements. 
In the electronic equipment and apparatus industry the production of telephone exchanges, 
switchgear and transmission channels grew at a very rapid rate (36%) and adequately supplied 
Teléfonos de México and the private sector. 
In contrast, the moderate expansion of the industry producing agricultural machinery and 
implements (4%) was somewhat surprising in the light of the growing needs in this connection 
deriving from the agricultural policy. There was however a 13% increase in the production of 
medium-power agricultural tractors (60-80 HP). 
In 1981, as a result of the promotion efforts and direct action by the State to put into execution 
the Programme for the Promotion of Capital Goods, important joint investment enterprises were 
set up with majority contributions of State capital and minority contributions from foreign 
companies which in addition contributed the technology. This programme comprises the 
following items: steel, steam turbines, alternating current electric generators, heavy machinery in 
general and construction machinery, large-diameter tubing for the transmission of gas, hydraulic 
turbines for the generation of hydroelectricity, equipment for generating electric energy from non-
conventional sources, gears and reduction gear assemblies, crown wheels and agricultural tractors. 
The industrial policy measures decreed in 1981 were mainly directed at providing fiscal 
incentives for specific sectors (capital goods, basic commodities, processed foodstuffs, cement, 
shipbuilding and bicycles) and to the sectors related to the construction of low-cost housing. 
Among the industrial promotion instruments, those with most impact during the year were public 
funds and trust funds. Another factor was the reintroduction of prior import permits —mainly for 
manufactures— due to the large trade deficit and the role the previous liberalization process had 
played in it. On the other hand, the export promotion policy did not manage to prevent the 
stagnation of external sales of manufactures, which were restricted by factors such as the boom in 
the domestic market, the recession in purchasing countries, strong foreign competition, the 
increase in protectionist tariff barriers and the drop in prices. 
A noteworthy feature of the manufacturing sector as a whole was the impetus given to small 
and medium-scale industries, which, although they only generate around 30% of the 
manufacturing product, absorb a great deal of manpower. Thus, in 1981 the financing provided by 
the Guarantee and Development Fund for Small and Medium-Scale Industry (FOGA1N) rose by 
150% to 17.5 billion pesos. Preferential attention was also given to the provision of incentives to 
the priority economic areas defined in the National Industrial Development Plan, and to branches 
of industry operating with national capital and producing foodstuffs, metal products, footwear and 
leather, machinery other than electrical, clothing, rubber and plastics, non-metallic minerals, 
textiles, wood products and furniture, books, chemical products and transport equipment. 
(v) Construction. For the fourth year in succession the construction sector attained a high rate 
of growth (12%). This notableexpansionwaspartly the result of the assignment of a considerable 
volume of resources to projects connected especially with the development of the petrochemicals 
industry and the construction of industrial ports and other infrastructure works, and partly 
reflected the accelerated growth of the construction of dwellings, in particular for the upper-
middle and upper strata. The rapid development of construction was accompanied by that of 
industries providing it with inputs, which guaranteed timely and sufficient supplies, at controlled 
prices, of cement, non-flat steel products, copper, glass, wood, non-metallic minerals, and 
equipment for installation. In 1981 construction was also stimulated by the implementation of the 
new Public Works Law and its accompanying Regulations.13 
"Among other positive aspects of this Law may be mentioned its flexibility as regards the system for contracting 
prices, since it allows them to be adjusted according to expected increases and contractors to be classified, among other 
criteria, according to their location in the country, thus tending to promote entrepreneurial development at the regional 
level. This Law also provides for advance payments for building work without interest charges, thus reducing the financial 
costs and enabling builders to capitalize their profits in order to work with more resources of their own than of third 
parties. 
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As in the previous three years, the construction boom generated a notable expansion of 
employment. In 1981 the sector employed nearly 1.9 million persons, thus creating more than 
200 000 new jobs, mainly for unskilled and semi-skilled workers (see table 8). 
Thanks to the 40% increase in its value, public construction represented more than 57% of 
total construction and thus became the most important factor in the sector's development. The 
most noteworthy projects were undertaken in the petroleum, petrochemicals, electric energy, 
steelmaking and fertilizer industries, together with infrastructure works for industrial ports, 
railways, airports, highways and rural roads, sewerage, drinking water and urbanization. There 
was also a significant increase in expenditure on social works such as the building of rural medical 
units, schools, parks and gardens and lighting. The sector's expansion was likewise stimulated by 
the progress made in the work of extending the underground railway in Mexico City to a length of 
60 km, and the deep drainage system, also in Mexico City, to a length of 80 km. 
As regards the execution of low-cost housing projects within the context of the national 
Housing Programme, the Decree and Regulations on which were promulgated at the end of 1980, 
the two most important official bodies concerned with this activity financed the construction of 
nearly 90 000 units (36% more than in the preceding year): 54 000 by the National Workers' 
Housing Fund Institute (the highest figure achieved since the Institute was established) and 
36 000 by the Bank Operating and Discount Fund for Housing. 
(vi) Basic services 
Electricity. The policy of expanding this activity continued in 1981. The completion of works 
initiated in previous years increased the total installed capacity by 19%, representing an additional 
supply of 2 800 MW. These works included the Chicoaén hydroelectric plant initiated in 1974, 
whose installed capacity is 1 500 MW, and thermal plants constructed by various federal bodies, 
with a capacity of around 750 MW. 
For its part, electricty generation increased by 10%, thus exceeding its growth rate of the 
previous year (6.5 %) and regaining its average growth rate for the last 10years. This increase was 
due to the intensive use of the capacity of several plants, the solution of technical problems 
connected with the maintenance of equipment which arose in the first half of the year, and the 
entry into operation of the José López Portillo coal-fired plant.14 
Table 8 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1981° -
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
"This plant which started to operate with the inauguration of a first unit, represented an important achievement in 
the policy designed to diversify primary sources of energy, since it meant less dependence on hydrocarbons. It is the first 
large-capacity plant in the country to use non-coking coal as a primary energy resource. In addition to the unit that has been 
brought into service there will be three others of equal size (300 MW each), which altogether will give an installed capacity 
of 1 200 MW in 198}. 
Index of volume of production 
(1970 = 100) 
Production of main construction 
imputs (thousands of tons) 




Grey and white cement 
Refractory pricks 
Flat glass 
Employment (thousands of persons) 
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At the same time, progress continued towards greater technological independence through 
the import substitution policy and the stimulation and orientation of the capital goods 
programme, which has resulted in the manufacture in the country of a large number of goods 
destined for the electricity industry, including highly complex technical equipment. 
Transport. Although in 1981 there was a slight slackening in the rate of growth of the 
transport sector, its expansion ( 10% ) was in any case very high, particularly if the difficulties it has 
been facing, which became very serious at the end of the 1970s, are taken into account. 
The high investment in infrastructure for the mass transport media —railways, pipelines and 
ports— which far exceeded that made in the highway system, continued in 1981. Thus, investment 
in the construction of industrial and fishing ports and the laying of electrified railway track were 
the priority items, while the expansion of the national pipelines system for the transport of 
petroleum and petroleum products continued to be the most important item in terms of resources 
utilized. Substantial funds were also assigned to the construction of rural and local roads, while 
investment in arterial highways went, mainly for their conservation. 
At the same timer, the efficiency of freight transport improved owing to the decongestion of 
the service through improvements.in organization and the distribution of priorities, the entry into 
operation of the pipelines system (whereby PEMEX reduced the amount of cargo previously carried 
by railway and truck) and the slower rate of growth of imports. The efficiency of the system was 
also stimulated by the fiscal incentives given to industries to develop their own distributive 
transport apparatus. 
The cargo carried by rail increased 5%, while the amount moved in terms of ton-kilometres 
rose by 6%. 
In the case of Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico, a notable feature was the increase in cargo 
consisting of agricultural commodities ( 13 %). In contrast, the number of passengers carried fell by 
almost 4%. 
Port movements in 1981 registered a total of 133 million tons and thus rose 7%, a much lower 
rate than that observed in the previous year (29%). A basic factor in this was the smaller increase 
in exports and in coastal shipping. On the other hand, the Shipbuilding Promotion Programme 
showed good results in 1981 with the expansion and construction of shipyards in which vessels of 
medium tonnage will be built, especially for fishing. Nevertheless, heavy imports were still made 
to meet cargo and fishing requirements. 
Transport of cargo by road was also given considerable impetus, an example being the fact 
that the production of trucks increased by 38%. In contrast, passenger transport was affected by 
the contraction in the production of buses. A noteworthy event was the take-over by the 
Municipality of urban transport in Mexico City in the last quarter of the year, when concessions to 
private operators were withdrawn and the Government assumed full responsibility for the service. 
This measure was adopted because of the deterioration the service had suffered in recent years, the 
poor state of many of the units in service and their irregular schedules. On assuming responsibility 
for it, the Government froze fares, reorganized the routes, acquired new units and gave drivers the 
status of public employees. Nevertheless, owing to organizational problems, the lack of units to 
satisfy demand (4 000 obsolete units were obtained from theprevious owners and 1 500 new units 
were purchased, but the real needs amounted to 8 000) and labour disputes in connection with the 
institutional change, the problems affecting the service given to users continued, although tending 
to diminish. 
(vii) Domestic trade. Commercial activities turned in a dynamic performance in 1981, slightly 
more so than in the previous year, owing mainly to the expansion of the domestic market with the 
increase in employment and income in both urban and rural areas. Other factors contributing to 
the increase in purchasing power were the reductions made in income tax for redistributive 
purposes and also the fact that as from January 1981 foodstuffs were exempt from payment of the 
value added tax, thus joining the 29 manufactured products included in the "workers' basket", 
which had been freed from tax in September 1980. 
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Furthermore, the continued increase in imports of goods (whose volume rose 22%) and the 
expansion of the manufacturing sector, combined with the unfavourable evolution of exports in 
this sector, led to an increasing flow of all types of manufactures to the domestic market. 
Inflationary expectations, which tended to increase in the course of the year, probably helped to 
stimulate the expansion of sales, particularly of consumer durables. The significant increase in 
sales over the previous year's level was also favoured by the credit support given to workers 
through the national Workers' Consumption Fund (FONACOT). 
Although it is estimated that in 1980 retail trade conducted by the State through the 
distributing body (DICONSA) of the National Popular Supply Company (CONASUPO) amounted to 
only about 10% of the total volume of products marketed in the country, its role became 
increasingly important, and in 1981 this distribution system substantially raised its sales (by 43%) 
to a total of 37.5 billion pesos. As in the previous year, about 80% of this total represented sales to 
the urban population and the rest to the rural sector. The number of commercial establishments of 
CONASUPO practically doubled to around 10 500 units, the majority (80%) of the shops being in 
rural areas. This substantial increase in the distribution network was partly due to the role played 
in it by the Co-ordination Bureau of the National Plan for Depressed Areas and Marginal Groups 
(COPLAMAR), since under the joint programme of these two institutions nearly 5 300 units were 
established in 1981, all located in rural communities.15 
3. The external sector 
In 1981 the economy was subject to strong pressures in its relations with other countries. 
Various factors contributed to the increase in the trade deficit and to the fact that it was necessary 
to have increasing recourse to external borrowing. 
As noted earlier, in March and April hydrocarbon exports were attaining the average goal 
established for the year (1.3 million barrels a day). From then on, however, they fell drastically and 
had still failed to regain that level at the end of the year. This shortfall and the drop in sales prices 
meant that both the volume and value of petroleum sales grew at much lower rates than those 
expected at the beginning of the year.16 
As a result of this, of the unfavourable evolution of non-petroleum exports and the persistent 
growth of imports, from the middle of the year onwards an attempt was made to set limits on the 
policy of opening up the economy which had been followed in previous years. The re-
establishment of prior import permits as from June, combined with the establishment of quotas 
for each type of product, helped to bring the growth of external purchases below the rate of the 
previous year, although it was still very high.17 
Furthermore, the low level of integration of domestic components in national industry, which 
(among other factors) is responsible for the high income-elasticity of demand for imports, 
contributed jointly with the overvaluation of the peso to the fact that the reactivation of the 
economy as a whole was reflected in a further rise in the import content of global supply. The 
maintenance of a relatively low exchange parity also stimulated tourism to other countries and 
discouraged foreign visitors to Mexico. 
Because of the situations described above, a considerable deficit (US$ 4.4 billion) was 
recorded on the balance-of-payments trade account. In addition, factor payments increased 
dramatically with respect to previous years, owing to the incidence of the high interest rates 
prevailing in the international capital markets and the considerable increase registered by the 
"Notwithstanding the considerable expansion of the distribution network in rural areas, its share in the value of sales 
did not increase, since the average volume of sales of rural shops fell by one-third owing to the fact that the additional shops 
established that year served communities with less population density. 
,6It is estimated that the amount received was some US$ 7 billion less than originally expected. 
"This was partly due to the fact that the effect of the prior permits was only relative, since one-third of total imports 
originated in the public sector's investment programmes, which had already been decided upon beforehand. 
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external debt. Thus, the current account deficit rose to nearly US$ 13 billion, a record figure more 
than double the negative balance recorded only two years earlier and almost four times the 1978 
figure. 
Moreover, the growing expectations of a sudden change in the parity of the peso, the advance 
payment of external liabilities against that possibility, and the high level reached by interest rates 
in world markets were some of the factors responsible for the fact that the uncontrolled outflow of 
capital reached an unusually high level. 
In short, the inflows of foreign exchange required to meet payment commitments abroad and 
to maintain the exchange rate reached a level without precedent in the country's economic history. 
Thus, the official sector contracted debts for nearly US$ 15 billion, a notable feature being the 
significant increase in official short-term inflows, which was an expedient little used in the past. 
Altogether, capital inflows exceeded the deficit on current account and permitted the international 
reserves to increase once again by about US$ 1.1 billion. 
(a) Merchandise trade 
In 1981, trade in goods registered a dynamic performance compared with other economic 
variables, although there was a certain slowing-down with respect to the previous year in both 
external purchases and sales. The latter experienced a growth in real terms of 12%, compared with 
25% in 1980, while the volume of imports rose by 22% after having grown at an average annual 
rate of 33% in the previous three years. This was partly because the unit value of external 
purchases increased much less than in the three preceding years, which, linked with the rise in the 
price of oil, permitted a further improvement, although somewhat slighter, in the terms of trade 
(see table 9). 
(i) Exports. The rapid growth of sales of hydrocarbons to US$ 14.4 billion raised their share 
to 73% compared with 63% in the previous year (see table 10). Accordingly, a determining factor 
in the slowing-up of the growth of total external sales was the decline recorded in the growth rate 
of exports of hydrocarbons, which fell from 155% in 1980 to 41% in 1981. 
The unit value of exports continued to rise, although much more slowly than in the preceding 
year. This slackening was due not only to the performance of the price of hydrocarbons, but also to 
the fall in the price index of exports by the mining sector and the stagnation of that of agricultural 
commodities. 
Table 9 
MEXICO: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 





















































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data 
"Preliminary figures. 
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Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
and services 
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Despite the fact that for the reasons already given the volume of petroleum exports declined 
sharply in the middle of the year, for the whole year they exceeded the 1980 level in real terms by 
32%. Furthermore, and notwithstanding the fall in the price of hydrocarbons from the second 
quarter onwards, the unit value of total petroleum exports rose by an average of about 7 % over the 
preceding year. 
In contrast with the considerable increase in the value of petroleum exports, that of the rest of 
external sales declined by 8%. This reflected a considerable deterioration in their volume, 
particularly in the case of agricultural and fisheries exports, despite the relatively satisfactory 
increase in production in these two activities. 
Sales of basic commodities of agricultural origin dropped by 5 % to a value of US$ 1.4 billion. 
Sales of coffee beans fell drastically (-20%) owing to the dual effect of the decrease in both export 
price and volume which was reflected in an increase in inventories within the country. Inflows of 
foreign exchange from sales of melóos, watermelons and cocoa also declined. In contrast, in 1581 
the value of exports of tomatoes and pulses and green vegetables rose, in spite of the fact that the 
quantities sold diminished appreciably. These shortfalls, however, were more than offset by the 
sharp increases in the prices of these commodities on the United States market owing to frosts in 
that country. 
Table 10 
MEXICO: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB" 
Millions of dollars . ¡.J Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1981* 1970 1981* 1979 1980 1981* 
Total 
Hydrocarbons 













Main non-traditional exports 
Mechanical and electrical 
machinery and equipment 
Parts for motor-vehicles 
Automobiles and trucks 


























































































































































































































Iron and steel sheet products 
Automobile and truck 
spare parts 
Sorghum 
Parts for electricial 
installations 
Chemical products for industry 






Aircraft and aircraft parts 
Agricultural tractors 
Unclassified goods 
Total imports, FOB 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Insurance and freight 






























































































































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de Mexico, S.A. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Mining exports improved in 1981, in particular owing to the higher income obtained from 
copper, zinc ore, barium sulphate, manganese and sulphur. On the other hand, the value of sales of 
silver and gold dropped by 33%. 
For their part, exports of manufactures remained static. Only sales of some chemical products 
and plastic and rubber products increased. 
The authorities' efforts to increase external sales continued in 1981 through promotional 
measures adopted by the Mixed Advisory Commission on External Trade Promotion. Thus, new 
fiscal support was provided by means of a substantial improvement in Tax Return Certificates 
(CED1S), and additional financial support was provided, in particular by the Fund for the Promotion 
of Exports of Manufactures. 
(ii) Imports. In 1981 the value of imports of goods rose by 25 %. Because of this increment and 
the even bigger ones registered in the previous two years, such imports thus almost trebled in 
value between 1978 and 1981 (see table 11). The increase recorded in 1981 was largely due to 
purchases of capital and intermediate goods in connection with the growth of public and private 
investment, which still has a high import content. 
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Although the share of purchases of consumer goods in the total was only 12% in 1981, 
compared with 57% and 31% for intermediate and capital goods, it was nevertheless double the 
figure recorded only three years previously. Even so, its growth rate, which had reached 
exceptionally high levels in 1979 and 1980, dropped sharply in 1981 and was much lower than the 
growth rates of imports of intermediate goods and, in particular, capital goods. In fact, the latter 
rose by over 40% for the second year in succession. Owing to this and the even more rapid increase 
registered in 1979, their value in 1981 was equal to 3.6 times that recorded only three years earlier. 
From an institutional angle, public sector imports represented 35 % and increased by US$ 1.4 
billion, mainly because of the purchase of capital goods and intermediate products required by the 
investments of para-State enterprises. The rest of the public sector's imports consisted of 
consumer goods of agricultural origin (expecially beans, wheat, sorghum, soya beans, oilseeds and 
dairy products), pursuing the policy of "full warehouses" aimed at maintaining sufficient reserves 
to satisfy demand. In contrast, as a result of the favourable harvest the year before, maize imports 
declined considerably in volume. 
Purchases by the private sector, for their part, reached a total of 15 billion pesos, which is 27 % 
higher than the previous year's figure. As in the case of the public sector, the increases were mainly 
due to the purchase of capital and intermediate goods. 
At the level of industrial branches, the largest purchases continued to be concentrated on 
metal products, machinery and equipment, which came to US$ 12 billion or 50% of total imports. 
Of these, US$ 2.6 billion was accounted for by the motor-vehicle industry, a fact which caused the 
government to adopt measures —not as yet reflected in the year's results— to restructure its 
production by means of stricter control of the foreign exchange budget, limitations on the 
production of large luxury automobiles and an increased level of integration of the motor industry 
with the rest of the manufacturing sector. 
(b) Services trade and factor payments 
The services balance, which had traditionally registered a surplus, changed from a positive 
balance of US$ 200 million in 1980 to a deficit of nearly US$ 1.1 billion in 1981, the first in living 
memory (see table 12). 
The increasing overvaluation of the peso was one of the factors most responsible for this 
situation, since it encouraged bigger growth of outflows than inflows of foreign exchange under 
the head of tourism, and even though the net balance under this head remained in Mexico's favour 
(at only about US$ 200 million, the lowest level in the last few years), it was running a deficit in the 
second half of the year. This contraction was due both to a decline in the tourism subsector and to 
the appreciable increase in expenditure on this item incurred by Mexicans abroad. 
The former is mainly attributable to two factors: (i) the economic recession in the United 
States —the principal country from which tourists visit Mexico— which had direct repercussions 
on the inflow of visitors and their length of stay and expenditure, and (ii) the increasing 
overvaluation of the peso, which made the price of tourist services for visitors more expensive (see 
table 13 and figure 2). As a result of this situation, the levels of hotel room occupation and the 
income generated thereby dropped considerably this being practically the only economic activity 
which experienced slow growth in Mexico in 1981. 
At the same time the increased expenditure by Mexican tourists abroad is attributable to the 
contrary effects of the overvaluation of the peso, together with the economic boom which Mexico 
experienced for the fourth consecutive year and which enabled a larger proportion of the 
population to go abroad. These effects were mutually reinforcing and contributed to the fact that 
while income from tourism (US$ 1.76 billion) rose by only 5 %, which in fact meant a contraction 
in real terms, the outflow in respect of tourism (US$ 1.5 billion) increased by nearly 50%.18 
18A surprising fact recorded in 1981 was that the average expenditure by Mexican tourists abroad was 35% higher 




MEXICO: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
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Balance on capital account 
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Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates and increase) 
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Source: 1976-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of official 
data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Services also include other official and private transactions, but exclude profits and interest. 
cIn addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
''The difference between total variation of reserves with contrary sign and the global balance represents counterpart 
items: monetization or demonetization of gold, allocation or settlement of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to 
revaluation. 
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Furthermore, border transactions also suffered the adverse impact of the overvaluation of the 
peso and for the first time turned in a negative balance.19 Income from assembly activities grew by 
27%, a higher rate than in the previous year, but failed to regain the rapid growth rate recorded 
two years previously, owing to the recession which continued to affect the United States economy 
on whose evolution this activity depends. 
Income and expenditure under the head of transport services increased more slowly in 1981 
(11% and 23%, respectively), in keeping with the lesser dynamism shown by foreign trade in 
goods and the minor adjustment in maritime freight rates in 1981. 
The factor which did most to accentuate the deficit on current account, however, was external 
factor payments. Interest payments amounted to US$ 8.2 billion, 50% higher than in the previous 
year and more than double the total disbursements effected under this head only two years 
previously. About 70% of these disbursements corresponded to payments by the public sector. 
This expenditure together with remittances of profits by foreign companies operating in the 
country, accounted for two-thirds of the current account deficit (see table 12). 
(c) Financing of the current account position and external indebtedness 
In 1981 short- and long-term capital inflows together exceeded US$ 19.4 billion, which is 
84% higher than the 1980 figure. These inflows, together with the use of Special Drawing Rights 
to the value of US$ 30 million, made it possible to finance the current account deficit, increase 
international reserves and deal with the considerable outflow of uncontrolled capital, which was 
partly reflected in the US$ 5.5 billion total for "errors and omissions" (see table 12). 
Table 13 
MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF INDEXES OF EFFECTIVE REAL 
EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS A N D IMPORTS" 






















































Source: Statistical Appendix. 
"These indexes are obtained by multiplying the share of exports or imports by the indexes of the real exchange rate 
(table 4). The sum of these product gives the indexes of the effective real exchange rates. For further details, see 
Introduction to the Statistical Appendix and tables 1 to 5 of the section dealing with Mexico. 




MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF INDEXES OF EFFECTIVE REAL 
EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(1980= 100) 
1970 71 72 
Source: Table 13. 
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The inflow of long-term capital increased in absolute terms by more than US$ 7.9 billion over 
the previous year, while short-term capital inflows rose US$ 1.9 billion. In the latter case, the 
expansion was basically due to the notable increase in short-term liabilities of the official 
sector —US$ 2.9 billion— which had never before been utilized to such a large extent and to which 
it was necessary to have recourse because of the financial difficulties experienced by the public 
sector in the middle of the year on account of the decrease in the volume of petroleum exported. 
Net long-term capital inflows, for their part, totalled US$ 15.2 billion, which was more than 
double the figure for the previous year. This exceptional increase was mainly due to the larger 
amounts borrowed by the public sector in connection with the large-scale investment programme 
carried out during the year, which totalled over US$ 11.5 billion or nearly three times the amount 
registered in 1980. 
These movements of capital stepped up the total cumulative external public debt at the end of 
the year to nearly US$ 49 billion, and within this total the short-term debt went up from US$ 1.5 
billion in 1980 to US$ 8.7 billion in 1981. In its turn, the private debt rose from a little under 
UáJ 15 billion in 1980 to approximately USÍ19 bill ion in 1981, thus more than doubling in the 
last two years. In these circumstances, the total external debt rose from less than US$ 49 billion at 
the end of 1980 to nearly US$ 68 billion in 1981 (see table 14). 
Service payments on the external debt increased significantly in 1981, mainly owing to the 
rise in interest payments, with the result that interest and amortization payments absorbed 54% 
of the value of exports of goods and services. This proportion, although much larger than that 
registered in 1980, was nevertheless well below those recorded in the previous three years (see 
table 14). 
Table 14 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 







































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de México, S.A. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Including financial intermediation. 
'Estimates on the basis of the net annual increases, based on the 1981 balance. 
Outflow of foreign exchange under the head of net short-term assets (capital account). 
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4. Prices, wages and employment 
(a) Prices 
Owing to the big growth of global demand and the magnitude of the fiscal deficit, the rate of 
inflation remained at a very high level for the second consecutive year. Thus, the variation in the 
consumer price index between December 1980 and December 1981 was nearly 29%: only just 
below the 1980 figure, which in turn, was the highest registered in the past 30 years. Wholesale 
prices rose by 27%, thus slightly exceeding their increase in the previous year (see table 15). 
In general, official prices registered considerable increases, the most significant adjustment 
(150%) being in fuels; strictly speaking, these increases represented a reduction in the subsidies 
which the Government had been granting through the prices of the products distributed by State 
enterprises, which also include services such as household gas and electric light. Prices of clothing, 
footwear and accessories, fuels, lighting and gross rentals recorded higher than average increases, 
with significant repercussions on the living levels of the lower-income families. The public sector 
tried to counteract them by means of fiscal policy measures such as income tax relief, exemption 
from the value added tax on basic commodities and incentives to their production and marketing, 
as well as support for the programmes of the National Workers' Consumption Fund (FONACOT), 
which granted credit at highly subsidized interest rates to over 1 700 000 persons. 
(b) Wages 
To protect the income of the population, minimum wages were raised by a higher percentage 
than the variation in the consumer price index: a policy departing from the trend followed since 
1977. Partly as a result of this, real minimum wages rose by rather more than 2% in 1981. 
Nevertheless, this increase was insufficient to compensate for the 11 % loss in their purchasing 
power between 1977 and 1980 (see table 16). 
At the beginning of the year the nominal minimum wages for rural and urban areas were 
made equal as part of the demographic policy designed to retain the population in their place of 
origin; at the same time, the number of categories of wages and their differentials was reduced 
from 18 areas to only 8, and the differences between maximum and minimum wages were brought 
down from 100% in 1980 to 55% in 1981. 
At the same time, stronger support was given to marginal areas through COPLAMAR, whose 
resources were increased by 37%,20 and the Intersectoral Commission for the Promotion of Co-
operatives began operating, its terms of reference being to co-ordinate the work of all the 
departments of the central government and federal bodies in this field. Training and Co-operative 
Employment for the Promotion of Natural Resources in Marginal Areas was the main 
programme which entered into operation. 
Wages in manufacturing increased by approximately 40%. Furthermore, certain reforms 
were put into effect which enabled the number of workers covered by the Mexican Social Security 
Insticute to be increased for the third consecutive year, this time by 11 %, thus bringing its coverage 
up to 30% of the workers employed in the country. 
(c) Employment 
Apart from the improvements in wages and benefits of different kinds received by the 
workers, the number of jobs increased significantly as a result of the general expansion of the 
economy and the implementation of the policies seeking to reduce both open employment and 
underemployment, in line with the Employment Plan adopted in 1980. Thus, it is estimated that 
employment grew by 5.4%, after having risen 6.3% in 1980. This meant that the open 
unemployment rate among the active population dropped from 5.3% in 1980 to 4.5% in 1981, 
20Thus, continued support was given to specific efforts in connection with social security, distribution of low-cost food, 
training, extension of primary education in rural areas, drinking water supply, and improvement of dwellings. 
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which is equal to only two-thirds of the level recorded four years earlier (see table 17). The natural 
increase in the economically active population, which has represented an annual average of 
900 000 persons in the last four years, was also absorbed in 1981, and this provides good reason for 
assuming that underemployment went down, although it is difficult to assess in what proportion. 
In 1981 there was a marked accentuation in the disequilibrium in the labour market between 
the structures of labour supply and demand in terms of level of training and area of residence. This 
disequilibrium, which had been growing up in previous years and is caused by the requirements of 
an increasingly complex productive apparatus and the high and sustained rate of production 
growth, meant that in a number of cases it was difficult to find suitable skilled personnel for 
specialized work. 
Concurrently with the rise in the coefficients of labour turnover, income expectations 
increased and some distortions in the organization of production were accentuated and began to 
have repercussions on manufacturing processes (reduction in the number of shifts for want of 
specialized manpower, poor quality and unsatisfactory finish of products, etc.). 
Table 15 
MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index" 
Food 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"National. 
In Mexico City. 
Table 16 
MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 
Minimum wages and salaries 




Annual averages Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
127.9 145.1 169.5 199.5 261.2 27.9 13.5 16.8 17.8 30.9 
99.0 95.7 94.4 88.1 90.2 -1.0 -3.4 -1.3 -6.7 2.4 





MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
1978 1979 1980 1981° 
I II III IV I II III IV I II HI IV I II III IV 
Rates of open unemployment 
Main cities 
(metropolitan areas) 
Mexico City 7.4 6.8 7.0 6.4 6.1 5.1 6.0 5.5 4.3 5.1 6.0 3.5 4.2 4.5 4.9 ... 
Guadalajara 6.6 6.0 5.7 5.8 6.2 5.4 6.5 4.8 4.0 5.4 6.5 6.2 6.2 4.0 5.9 ... 
Monterrey 8.5 7.5 8.1 6.2 5.7 5.6 6.6 5.5 6.0 5.6 6.6 3.4 4.5 5.8 6.3 ... 
Average, metro-
 ? 4 6 g &9 6 ? fi 5 fi ? 4 4 4 5 2 6J 3 g 4 ? 4 f i 5 
politan area 
Annual averages,
 6 „ „ 4 „ 4 g* 
metropolitan areas 
Indexes (1976 = 100) 
Employment 113.4 134.9 143.4 151.1 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Programming and the Budget. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The construction industry continued to act as a great generator of employment. Of the million 
new jobs created in 1981 it is estimated that construction absorbed nearly 20%, agriculture 24% 
and services almost one-third. In the manufacturing sector employment grew by 5.4% in 1981 
(representing about 130 000 new jobs), with some differences between the various branches of 
industry, reflecting the situations arising in their production activities or the effects of the 
modernization processes implemented. Thus, in the food, beverages and tobacco industries, which 
provide over a quarter of industrial jobs, employment rose by 6%, and in steelmaking the growth 
was even faster, the most dynamic subsectors being those producing motor vehicles, motor-vehicle 
bodies and railway equipment, where employment rose by between 15% and 25%. 
In the year under review regional and State employment programmes were formulated, 
supported by transfers of resources from the Federal Government to the employment services of 
federal units. Steps werealso taken to raise productivity jointly with training programmes,partly 
because of the need to avoid any great disparity in the income of wage-earners caused by the 
tendency of the wages of unskilled personnel to lag behind. Thus, the National Productivity 
Programme, aimed at the training of over 50% of the workers, came into effect during the year. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
The basic objectives of monetary and credit policy in 1981 continued to be to encourage the 
formation and procurement of liquid resources and savings and to ensure a sufficient amount of 
credit with the aim of promoting the basic activities for future development, especially the 
production of essential consumer goods. In this respect, notable aspects of the implementation of 
credit policy in 1981 were the achievements in adapting the financial apparatus (mainly of the 
national banks and State trust funds) to the needs of public sector bodies and programmes 
responsible for promoting the production of foodstuffs and other essential products. 
Nevertheless, the banking system's promotion capacity was limited by the increases in 
financial costs deriving from two principal factors. The first was the continuation of the rising 
trend in the rate of interest on sight or very short-term financial instruments in the international 
markets and the sharp fluctuation of those rates: a phenomenon from which Mexico cannot 
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divorce itself because of the free movement of capital it has traditionally enjoyed. The second 
factor which made credit more expensive was the bigger increase in the cost of procurement of 
bank resources in national currency than in foreign currency, a rise designed to attract capital to the 
financial system and encourage its holding in Mexican pesos. This gap widened still further as 
from October 1980, when the monetary authorities began to put into practice a faster rate of 
depreciation of the peso in relation to the dollar under the system of controlled floating in force 
since 1976. The value of United States currency thus increased by about 11% in 1981 —with a 
progressive acceleration of the trend throughout the year— leading to a corresponding adjustment 
of the passive interest rates in the national banking system. 
Accordingly, it is estimated that the average cost of procurement of bank resources in national 
currency (taking into account the different instruments used by the system) increased by about 
30% in 1981. As a result, the active rates rose steadily throughout the year. This increasing cost 
hindered the use of credit by the private sector, especially from July onwards when the real passive 
rate became positive. A considerable change thus took place with respect to the typical situation 
prevailing in 1979 and especially in 1980, both years having been characterized by the persistence 
of real negative rates for saver's. 
The other priority objective —promotion of economic activity by selective support— was 
pursued by means of the diversification of credit mechanisms at preferential rates through the 
increased supply of credit by development bodies which lend money at less than the current market 
rate. From another standpoint, the monetary authorities formulated a policy that would not help 
to encourage inflationary pressures through excessive monetary expansion: an objective which it 
Table 18 
MEXICO: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de México, S.A. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Including the Federal Government, state and municipal governments and the Department of the Federal District. 
'Comprising instruments with a term of less than three months. 
Comprising instruments with a term of three months or more. 
'Comprising instruments with a term of less than three months, plus checking accounts in foreign currency. 
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was sought to achieve by establishing relatively high rates of legal reserves and extending the 
maturity of the special deposits agreed on between the Banco de Mexico and private banks. In fact, 
the money in circulation grew by 33% during the year, which was less than the 39% increase in the 
gross domestic product at current prices. 
The factors of expansion did not register a similar performance, however. On the one hand, 
the international reserves continued to rise (by 42%), owing partly to the heavy procurement of 
external loans. On the other hand, total bank credit grew by 53%, the biggest increments being in 
financing granted to the Federal Government (72%) and public institutions (49% ), with a smaller 
increase in that granted to the private sector (38%) (see table 18). 
On analysing the percentage structure of the procurement of resources by private and mixed 
banks, a notable feature is that together with the smaller share of liquid liabilities (precisely a 
consequence of the high rates of interest and of alternative investment possibilities with a high 
degree of liquidity) there was an increase in the share of long-term liabilities (one year or more), 
jointly with a rise in "dollarization" (coefficient of procurement of resources in foreign currency 
vis-à-vis total procurement). Thus in the course of 1981 the public's preference inclined towards 
medium- and long-term instruments, and progressively towards those in foreign rather than 
national currency.21 This situation was to a great extent due to the higher rates of interest offered 
by the Mexican banks on instruments in dollars rather than in other foreign currencies and the 
expectations of a sharper devaluation. 
It was probably for these same reasons that in the course of the year the private sector 
followed a trend towards the advance liquidation of debts with other countries, using funds 
obtained from the domestic banking system. This substitution of liabilities influenced in some 
degree the considerable dynamism of demand for domestic credit during the year and apparently 
stimulated the increasing recourse to external credit by the public sector in order to increase the 
supply of foreign currency in the foreign exchange market. 
This impetus, however, was not so great as to alter significantly the salient characteristics of 
credit support in terms of amounts and orientation. Thus, a notable feature was the preferential 
attention given to agriculture producing for the domestic market, and to low-cost housing. 
Specifically, the credit channelled to SAM increased by nearly 160% and the support given to basic 
commodities rose by approximately 120%.22 From a different angle, the priority attention to basic 
items of production was evident too in the rapid growth of State bank credit to the private and 
social sectors, which exceeded that of private banks. In view of the fact that a large proportion of 
State bank credit is granted at preferential interest rates, this expansion lessened for the economy 
as a whole the inflationary effects which might have derived from a sharp rise in interest rates on 
the market. 
Monetary and credit policy also developed within the context of a growing diversification and 
specialization of procurement instruments and of the banking system's actual operations. In this 
respect, mention may be made of various institutional adjustments which have intensified the 
integration of different types of bank activities in a single unit (the so-called "multibank" 
system).23 Similarly, efforts were made to modernize the legislation governing financial 
institutions and to increase the role played by the stock market, for which purpose steps have been 
taken to issue Stock Exchange Promotion Certificates which can be placed in enterprises 
21The level of dollarization' reached 16.4% at the end of 1980 and 23% a year later. It was stable in the first four 
months of 1981, then increased steadily, except for a sharp rise in July when procurement (marginal) of resources in 
foreign currency amounted to three-quarters of the total. 
22To ensure the best possible implementation of the policy of selective support for basic products, in 1981 a special 
trust fund was set up, using resources from the Federal Budget, to supplement other credit measures and programmes 
within the same context. 
"Furthermore, in order to improve the structure of the State banking system, Nacional Financiera S.A. and the Banco 
Internacional were merged; Somex was merged with the Banco Mexicano, and authorization was given for the Banobras 
Group to operate as a multibank. The banking and finance authorities also propose to merge the Banco Nacional de 
Comercio Exterior with the Banco del Pequeño Comercio, to establish a Banco de Turismo and to authorize the Banco 
Nacional de Crédito Rural to operate as a multibank. 
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incorporated in savings and pension funds. The promotion of saving by manual and non-manual 
workers is part of the idea behind this proposal. As regards the improvement of procurement 
instruments and the provision of additional guarantees that will result in the expansion of the 
financial market, mention should be made of the proposal to establish a system of protection for 
deposits in banking institutions, which would be implemented mainly through a joint fund setup 
by the banks.24 
Finally, some changes were observed with respect to the previous year in relation to the 
sectoral allocation of credit. There were notable increases in the credit assigned to mining 
(especially in the private sector); to the metal products and machinery industry (especially public 
and private steelmaking enterprises and the production of capital goods); and to the construction 
of low-cost housing (see table 19). 
(b) Fiscal policy 
As noted earlier, the general economic process was affected by the pressures deriving from 
the outflow of funds because of the high rates of interest paid abroad and fears of a devaluation, and 
from the sluggishness of the prices of certain export items. In this context, fiscal policy continued 
to be characterized by high public expenditure designed to strengthen the economic structure, 
compensate for declines in the growth rates of some sectors, increase the supply of foodstuffs and 
other basic products and intensify redistributive measures through the provision of subsidized 
goods and services. At the level of State institutions subject to budget control, the expansion of 
total expenditure was once again very high —53% in 1981 compared with 50% in the previous 
year— and outlays of the central government almost doubled (see table 20). Servicing of the 
public debt played an important part in this increase, but even so operating expenditure grew by 
50% and investment by 95%. 
In contrast, the procurement of resources developed at a much slower pace, since the tax 
burden remained constant, and revenue growth rates were lower than in previous years. This 
phenomenon was due, inter alia, to the fact that significant tax relief was approved in addition to 
Table 19 
MEXICO: B A N K CREDIT RECEIVED BY ENTERPRISES 



















































































Services and other activities 104 216 287 392 107.7 32.9 36.6 
Commerce 95 140 208 314 47.4 48.6 51.0 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data from the Banco de Mexico, S.A. 
"Including public and private enterprises. 
Preliminary figures. 
"See, inter alia, "Iniciativa de Ley de Ingresos de la Federación 1982", El Mercado de Valores, Vol. Xll, No. 48, 30 
November 1981. This article contains the analysis of the recent evolution of the Mexican economy made by theMinisterof 




MEXICO: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
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4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
CETES 
Others 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit(l - 5) 

























































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 
"Preliminary figures. 
the reductions granted in 1980 in order to support investment and employment, and also to the 
aforementioned measures designed to protect the disposable income and purchasing power of 
wage-earners and, in general, of the lower-income groups. Within this context, mention should be 
made of the reduction in taxes on income from work and the increase in the profits tax, and also of 
the tax relief and tax incentives given in respect of the basic commodities programme, the 
exemption from income tax for the lowest-paid strata and the establishment of a system for 
refunding taxes on inputs used in the manufacture of those foodstuffs which are exempt from sales 
tax ("zero rate" system). 
Despite the tax relief decreed at the beginning of the year in relation to foodstuffs, however, 
revenue from the value added tax rose considerably thanks to the administfative reforms 
introduced and the greater experience gained in handling it. Returns from taxes on exports of 
hydrocarbons, however, showed an appreciable reduction in their growth rate. Altogether, central 
government current income grew by 3 8 % compared with 65% in 1980 (see table 20). 
The large volume of expenditure, pushed up also by the improved wages of public employees, 
combined with the tax relief decreed in order to stimulate the reactivation of the economy or to 
support social objectives, plus the loss of dynamism in the tax yield from petroleum sales, led to a 
considerable increase in the deficit of State institutions. The disequilibrium in the public sector 
accounts was two-and-a-half times that of 1980 and rose to the equivalent of 27% of total 
expenditure, compared with approximately 16% in 1979 and 1980.25 In the central government 
sphere the budget deficit tripled, equalling 55% of expenditure compared with 36% in 1980. 
"Banco de México, Informe Anual 1981, Sixty-Fourth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders. 
RR1 
Although these maladjustments are basically explained by the pursuit of the important 
economic and social development objectives mentioned earlier, they also reflect some weaknesses 
as in the public finances. Fiscal disequilibria, supported to a greater extent than on other occasions 
by domestic bank credit, tended to accentuate the external sector deficit, and this led to the mutual 
reinforcement in the short term of the fiscal and payments imbalances, the most notable 
consequences of which were the rapid increase in the public sector's external indebtedness, the 
increase in the corresponding financial service costs, and the lesser dynamism of the tax sources 
associated with sectors of activity which since 1980 had been more and more exposed to 
competition from imports. 
Approximately in the middle of the year an attempt was made to check the effects of this 
situation on the fiscal accounts through a measure which provided for a selective reduction of 4% 
in the expenditure approved and the re-establishment of prior permits for a significant group of 
imports of goods. Difficulties seem to have been experienced in the implementation of this fiscal 
measure, however, since it did not manage to restrain the increase in total expenditure for the 
year, which, as noted earlier, grew twice as fast as in 1980. 
In order to strengthen fiscal revenue, increases in the domestic prices of gasoline were also 
decreed. Thus, at the end of December 1981 it was decided to raise the price of regular gasoline 
from 2.80 to 6 pesos per litre, that of high-octane gasoline from 4.20 to 10 pesos, and that of diesel 
fuel from 1 to 2.50 pesos. 
Finally, in 1981 action was taken to issue Fiscal Promotion Certificates in respect of 
agricultural investment and the CEDIS for the promotion of exports were increased, although as yet 
with little result. At the same time, a large-scale programme of financial support for basic products 
was prepared, with the participation of State, private and mixed banks, and further income tax 
relief measures were proposed in order to reduce the burden on taxpayers with incomes between 
one and three times the minimum wage. All this was additional to the efforts being made to 
strengthen the economies of the State and local governments and to bring about greater regional 
equilibrium between federal bodies with a view to using this as an instrument for the 
decentralization of economic activities. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981 the Nicaraguan economy turned in results which may be considered as relatively 
favourable in view of the domestic situation and the world economic conditions prevailing at the 
« Thus, the p s domestic product i n e r t bj 8.9%, continuing the trend of the previous 
year, when it rose 10% after the sharp contraction of 33% suffered during the two-year period 
1978-1979 (see table 1 and figure 1). 
As in 1980, this growth was based, on the expenditure side, on a marked increase in gross 
domestic investment in both construction and in machinery and equipment, as well as on the 
partial recovery of exports. From the sectoral angle, it was the agricultural sector which was the 
main basis for this overall performance. The results obtained in agriculture, however, primarily 
represented a recovery from the losses suffered in the previous two years, and were due almost 
entirely to the efforts made through agricultural policy —the supply of inputs and technical 
assistance— and the endeavour made to reorganize production units through associations and co* 
operatives. 
At all events, the 1981 results must be considered within a larger time horizon, for the rate 
and nature of Nicaragua's economic evolution in 1981 were determined both by the prevailing 
conditions themselves and by the consequences of the structural changes initiated after the civil 
war which ended in July 1979 with the establishment of the present government. 
Moreover, the economic results must be appraised within a context which is qualitatively 
different from that of the past, in view of the economic policy objectives of the new authorities. 
Consequently, it is necessary to bear in mind, on the one hand, that the indicators on average per 
capita relationships are now more representative than in the past and, on the other hand, that 
more resources have been devoted to the improvement of social conditions, especially in the fields 
of health and education, and the fruits of these will be borne in the medium and long term. 
When the new government took over the running of the country, the national economy was 
sunk in a profound depression. Almost all activities were paralyzed, and severe decapitalization 
had taken place, both in directly productive activités (through the destruction of installations or 
the removal of capital goods to the exterior during the war) and as regards the economic 
infrastructure. Moreover, the monetary reserves had been exhausted, while in addition there were 
heavy financial commitments with the exterior deriving from a large external debt, part of which 
had been contracted on very burdensome conditions, both as regards maturity and interest rates. ' 
In view of this situation, the first efforts of the new government were aimed at satisfying the 
most urgent needs of the population with the aid of the international community, and a series of 
measures in line with the general objectives set forth were taken, giving rise to profound changes 
in a number of the structures which had previously characterized the economic system of 
Nicaragua.2 
'See CEPAL, Nicaragua: Repercusiones económicas de los acontecimientos políticos recientes (E/CEPAL/G.1091), 
August 1979. 
2See the section on Nicaragua in Economic Survey of Latin America,1980. 
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Against the background of these restricting factors and imbalances inherited from the past,3 
in 1980 the Government formulated a plan of work in which it was proposed to overcome the 
economic emergency through the operational restructuring of the State and the reconciliation of 
the interests of the workers, the Government and private enterprise in a mixed economy system.4 
Various adverse conjunctural economic factors at the international and Central American levels, 
together with some internal obstacles (especially the reluctance of a part of the private sector to 
accept the new economic policy lines), prevented the achievement of complete success through 
this plan, although important advances were made which represented the beginning of the 
recovery of the economy. 
Against this background, the Government put into practice an economic programme for 1981 
whose main objectives were: (a) to raise the standard of living of the population within the 
framework of the process of economic reactivation; (b) to advance along the road towards 
economic independence, and (c) to organize and consolidate the set of enterprises taken over by 
the Government which make up the Area of Public Ownership, while at the same time raising 
their efficiency and productivity, in order to restructure and reorient the national economy.5 
In order to achieve these objectives, economic activities were defined within a context of 
austerity and efficiency whose general consequences were designed to be the reduction of non-
essential consumption, a substantial increase in fixed capital investment, the rebuilding of stocks, 
improvement of the State finances, and reduction of the external sector deficit. 
However, growing difficulties deriving from the domestic economic situation as well as the 
international crisis, together with increasing obstacles and tensions whose presence and 
importance cannot be ignored when analysing the economic performance in 1981, gradually 
caused the short-term economic policy objectives to be modified. Thus, part of the policies 
envisaged in the Economic Programme of Austerity and Efficiency designed at the beginning of 
the year had to be reoriented as various adverse events, some of them of a non-economic nature, 
took place. Furthermore, in seeking to increase production account also had to be taken of the 
measures needed to strengthen the national defence system, which called for heavy expenditure 
and organizational efforts, to the detriment of other objectives of the programme. For this reason, 
certain production policies were reoriented: for example, towards the end of the year the measures 
designed to support the development of the northern Atlantic area of the country were intensified. 
Nevertheless, almost all the variables reflected some progress —even though to a lesser extent 
than planned— towards the established objectives, the most outstanding exceptions being the 
further increase in the current account deficit of the balance of payments, which reached a record 
level of US$ 570 million, and the aggravation of the fiscal imbalance (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The overall results registered in 1981 were achieved in spite of a number of adverse factors 
which had been gathering since the previous year. Firstly, the external sector continued to give 
negative indications. On the one hand, the instability of the international prices of the main 
commodities, together with a further increase in the unit price of imports, led to a deterioration in 
the terms of trade and largely neutralized the efforts made to improve the country's external 
position. On the other hand, although a positive balance continued to be maintained in capital 
inflows and the renegotiation of the external public debt was completed on very favourable 
conditions as regards maturity and cost, the shortage of foreign exchange became one of the most 
serious limitations on the functioning of economic activities. 
5
 Among these negative factors, mention may be made of the severe disruption of the productive system; the 
decapitalization and deterioration of production equipment; the inadequate supply of essential products (food, consumer 
goods in general, medicines, spare parts and other inputs); unsatisfactory agricultural results because sowing had not been 
carried out on account of the war; intense inflation; an excessive fiscal deficit; high internal indebtedness, together with a 
firm tendency towards the flight of foreign exchange and a poor outlook for external sales; high rates of unemployment and 
underemployment, and lack of sufficient qualified human resources. See in this respect CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1979. 
4
 See Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua, Programa de Emergencia y Reactivación en Beneficio del Pueblo, January 
1980. 




NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
c
 Nominal wages and salaries of members of the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute. 
Percentages. 
'Public and State-guaranteed external debt contracted. 
Moreover, despite the efforts made it was not possible in 1981 to overcome the tensions 
existing between the Government and part of the business sector, which were reflected inter alia, 
as in the previous year, in the marked reluctance of these business groups to play an active part 
within the context of the new economic policy lines. Nevertheless, towards the end of the year 
some encouraging changes began to be observed, especially in the sectors producing items of basic 
consumption. 
Furthermore, the generalized economic crisis of the Central American countries also had 
negative effects on the Nicaraguan economy. Because of the interdependence achieved by the 
economies of the area, which had been reflected in the past in the growth of trade, the depressive 
tendencies likewise mutually reinforced each other and were interiorized into the national 
economies. The consequences of this crisis were, on the one hand, a reduction in the possibilities 
for exports because of the decline in demand in the rest of the region and, on the other hand, 
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Figure 1 
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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-L I I ± I I 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. 
bPercentage variation, December - December. 
CMillions of dollars. 
78 79 80 
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difficulties in acquiring Central American products —most of them industrial products having 
links with the mass consumption "shopping basket"— because the lack of international liquidity 
of the countries of the area meant the exhaustion of the financing which had been available the 
previous year. 
At the domestic economic level, in spite of the objectives announced by the Government and 
implicit in the economic policy measures, imbalances and tensions among the most important 
economic and financial variables continued, and inflationary pressures, although more moderate 
than in the previous two years, continued to introduce some distortions into the price system and 
to reduce the real value of wages. 
In addition, the shortage of foreign exchange made it necessary to establish a strict set of 
priorities for its allocation, and this encouraged the formation of an illegal parallel market with an 
exchange rate far above the official one, thus introducing additional distortions into the general 
system of prices and making the handling of the financial area even more difficult. 
Although various measures were taken to improve the efficiency of public administration and 
the management of the Area of Public Ownership, and although substantial improvements were 
indeed achieved in some activities, important deficiencies persisted and limited the achievement of 
certain objectives. In public administration, there was some under-implementation of the budget, 
primarily in the area of investments which already had external financing, and this delayed the 
progress of a number of projects. In the production area, as well as the scarcity of foreign exchange 
for the importation of inputs, the shortage of management professionals and middle-level staff 
was another element which prevented a greater degree of recovery, especially in the industrial 
sector. 
Finally, among the internal obstacles to growth, mention must be made of the difficulty in the 
short-term in reconciling the production structure with the new social and economic priorities. 
Thus, as well as trying to overcome the reluctance of the private business sector to make 
investments, so as to recover the previous levels of working capital and production, it will also be 
necessary to make significant adjustments in some sectors —manufacturing and private 
construction, for example— in line with the demand patterns connected with the new economic 
policy lines aimed at satisfying the basic needs of broader groups. 
In the face of this mass of obstacles, economic policy was aimed at compensating for the 
adverse effects of the current situation and proceeding with the implementation of the changes 
already begun the year before. Some contradictory results were registered, however, in this 
endeavour. 
Because of the sluggishness of private investment and the urgent need to expand and 
reconstruct the infrastructure of the country, as well as to tackle the deficiencies in the field of 
social services, the public sector continued to play a stimulating role in total demand, and increased 
its expenditure to levels beyond its financial capacity. This considerably increased the fiscal deficit 
and exerted pressure on domestic credit, affecting the monetary variables in an expansionary 
manner. In order to protect the real income of wage-earners, however, the policy of applying price 
controls and production subsidies, as well as expanding the distribution network for an important 
group of mass consumption product, was intensified. 
At the same time, the application of the agrarian reform process was pursued with some 
vigour and agricultural services and technical assistance continued to be supplied, while work 
proceeded on the organization of collective enterprises to ensure the supply of basic grains, all this 
against the background of favourable climatic conditions. It was also sought to improve the 
situation of smallholders by providing them with better production and financial resources. 
To sum up, the overall results for 1981 were relatively encouraging in view of the set of 
internal and external depressive factors which had to be faced. It did not prove possible, however, 
to recover the levels already reached by the economy seven years before or to solve the mass of 
problems which had dragged on from the past, to which were added new obstacles to development 
arising in the course of the application of policies aimed at securing a transition to a different type 
of economic structure. In this respect, certain imbalances grew worse in 1981, especially in the 
financial area, and further limited the field of action of economic policy in the immediate future. 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
After the very sharp drops suffered during the most difficult period of the armed 
confrontation (1978 and 1979), total supply registered an appreciable recovery of close to 17% in 
1980, followed in 1981 by a more moderate increase of 8% (see table 2). It thus returned to 95 % of 
the maximum level reached before the conflict. Although this was partly due to the recovery of the 
product, the fundamental reason was the spectacular growth of imports, which gave rise to a sharp 
change in the composition of total supply. This significant fact, which had considerable 
repercussions on the balance of payments, was due firstly to the demands deriving from the most 
pressing needs of the population and the difficulties in reactivating production, both because of the 
seasonal nature of work in the agricultural sector and the state of disintegration in which the 
manufacturing sector had been left, while secondly the growth of imports was due to the need to 
replace stocks and begin the process of recapitalization of the economy through the importation of 
machinery and equipment. 
After their marked drops in 1979, the components of total supply grew considerably in 1980, 
although none of them regained the absolute levels achieved before the conflict. In 1981, this same 
tendency continued, at rates more in keeping with the economic capacity of the country and with 
greater emphasis on capital accumulation. 
Thus, fixed investment rose by 69% after having almost trebled in 1980. It consequently 
reached an absolute level close to that of 1977, while as a share of the product it rose from 21 % in 
that year to close to 23% in 1981. This was partly the direct consequence of the efforts which the 
public sector had been making to reconstruct and expand the economic and social infrastructure, 
while to an even greater extent it was due to the installation and renewal of machinery and 
equipment in the Area of Public Ownership. 
Table 2 
NICARAGUA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total suppply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures from the Central Bank and the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 




The private business sector, for its part, in spite of all the efforts made and the definitions of 
an economic nature formulated by the Government, continued with the cautious attitude which it 
had assumed since the change in the political leadership of the country. This situation even gave 
rise to certain practices of decapitalization of enterprises, with consequent effects on the 
production system and the balance of payments, for movements of capital to the exterior persisted 
in 1981, although with a clear downward trend. It was precisely for this reason that the economic 
measures taken by the State included provisions for the possible confiscation of private businesses 
when there was clear evidence that such decapitalization was being carried out. Nevertheless, a 
certain degree of favourable reaction was noted from part of the private sector in response to the 
economic incentives granted and the support measures adopted by the Government. 
In spite of the authorities' efforts to maintain an austerity budget, government consumption 
—the only variable which has shown an uninterrupted upward trend— once again showed 
excessive dynamism (21%). This increase, which was nevertheless moderate compared with the 
pitras p . us associated lidi ¡ M i l expansion of k social serai K W I halth 
and education, and certain programmes connected with the production or distribution area, such as 
the marketing of a "basket" of basic consumer products through the establishment of People's 
Shops. The maintenance of a substantial defence force and the mass mobilization of the People's 
Militia also exerted pressure on the level of public spending. 
The further drop in private consumption partly reflected the deterioration which had taken 
place in the real income of workers as a result of the faster rise of prices than of nominal wages. 
Because of this, private consumption —which had already gone down by 30% in the previous two 
years— fell by a further 7% in 1981 (see table 2). Through an intensive programme of direct 
supply of grains and other foodstuffs, however, basic consumption expanded by a further 5 %, thus 
helping to keep up the average living conditions of an extensive sector of the population. In 
contrast, non-basic consumption —concentrated in the middle and upper levels of society and 
having a marked influence on imports— went down by 23% as a result of the limitations on the 
availability of foreign exchange for direct importation and for the purchase of inputs abroad. 
Finally, thanks to the recovery of agriculture, the volume of exports registered a significant 
increase of 9% in spite of the discouraging prospects which the international prices of the main 
export products continued to show. 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
With the exception of manufacturing, all economic activities showed growth rates in line 
with the overall evolution of the economy, particularly noteworthy being the increase of 10% for 
the goods-producing sectors as a whole, which contrasts with their stagnation in the previous year 
and the drop of 23% suffered in 1979. Basic services, for their part, which had been almost back to 
normal since the previous year, began to resume the rate of evolution of the rest of the activities in 
1981. Finally, the group made up of the remaining services grew slightly faster than the product, 
its behaviour being largely determined by the performance of government services (see table 3). 
(i) Agriculture. One of the most important features of the economic results for 1981 was the 
partial recovery of agricultural production. This sector generates a little under 30% of the product, 
over 80 % of external sales and approximately 40 % of total employment, and its results ultimately 
have great influence on the behaviour of the remaining productive activities. Moreover, it was one 
of the sectors most seriously affected not only by the destructive consequences of the war, but also 
by the state of disorganization and disruption in which the production units were left. 
In 1981, the agricultural product grew by 14% as a result of a number of measures adopted by 
the new administration when it took office and subsequently consolidated during this year. In this 
respect, mention may be made of the efforts as regards the provision of inputs, technical 
assistance, equipment and financing, the reorganization of the production units grouped together 
in the Area of Public Ownership, and the more recent establishment of co-operatives on estates 
confiscated because of their abandonment. In the crop-farming subsector, production "of 
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exportable goods rose by 29% and that of products for domestic consumption by 18%. In contrast, 
livestock production went down for the third year running as a result of the drastic reduction in the 
herds. 
Production of cotton, which is one of the most important activities in the agricultural export 
economy, more than doubled with respect to the very low level reached in 1980, which had been 
due to the irregularity of planting work during the war period in 1979 (see table 4). The level of 
production achieved in 1981, although below that reached on average in the years before 1979, 
represented an important recovery, above all when it is borne in mind that some problems of 
labour availability at harvest time persisted —although to a lesser extent than in 1980— and that 
part of the agricultural private sector still maintained a negative attitude. In spite of these 
obstacles, the Government adopted a set of measures to encourage production. Thus, it established 
a guaranteed price per quintal for the producer, which was raised in the course of the season in line 
with the evolution of costs and international prices; it eliminated the taxes on exports and financed 
the whole of the costs, and it guaranteed the foreign exchange needed to acquire inputs. Thanks to 
these incentives, the area under cultivation rose to 130 000 manzanas in the period 
1980/1981 —four times more than the previous season— and the average yield per manzana 
increased by approximately 35%.6 Although a significant proportion of the production (18%) 
came from the enterprises in the Area of Public Ownership, the majority continued to be 
accounted for by the private sector, which received the incentives already mentioned and also 
benefited from the measures limiting the rent of land used to cultivate export products to 300 
córdobas per manzana per year. 
Table 3 
NICARAGUA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fisheries 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Retail and wholesale commerce, 
restaurants and hotels' 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and personal services 
Government services 
Millions of dollars 




























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 
"Prelimianry figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
'Includes financial institutions, insurance and real estate (except ownership of dwellings). 
Includes restaurants, hotels and business services. 
6The figures for the area cultivated and the yields refer to the agricultural year, so that they do not coincide with the 




NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Production of main cropsc 



















































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Ministry of Planning. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
'Thousands of quintals. 
J
 Thousands of head. 
"Thousands of pounds. 
•^Millions of gallons. 
'Million dozen. 
As already noted, cotton producers —like those of other traditional export products— 
continued to receive a minimum support price, determined on the basis of the cost structure, plus 
the difference between this price and the average international price, when the latter was higher. 
Although up to 1981 this policy did not cause any losses to the State marketing enterprise, the 
support price was a great incentive for the production sector (mostly private), which was thus not 
so directly exposed to the risks involved in the instability of international prices 
The performance of coffee production —another item of prime importance among the 
export crops— has been more regular, because this is a permanent crop. Nevertheless, because of 
the lack of attention in the first part of the 1979/1980 season and difficulties over both finance and 
the availability of the necessary labour for harvesting, the 1980 production dropped by over 9%. In 
1981, an increase of 5% was achieved even though some problems persisted, particularly as 
regards the availability of labour. In view of the impossibility of mobilizing paid labour for the 
coffee harvest in line with traditional patterns, the Government promoted broad programmes for 
increasing the rate of participation of the peasantry and achieving the mobilization of new 
categories of temporary workers such as urban wage-earners, students, office workers, etc. 
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Moreover, the coffee producers were protected, like cotton growers, from the instability of 
international prices because the national marketing company guaranteed them a minimum 
support price. Furthermore, coffee growers also had the option of selling at any time at the 
prevailing price on the spot or futures market. 
One of the adverse factors which coffee growers have had to face has been the rust disease, 
which broke out some four years ago and has tended to spread. Since a considerable part of the 
harvest comes from small producers, the State has assumed responsibility for financing a large 
proportion of the programmes to control this disease, the cost of which is very high. In this 
connection, it may be noted that production was kept relatively stable in spite of the fact that 
10 000 hectares of plantations which were lost in 1979 as a result of the effects of this disease have 
still not recovered their production. 
Sugar cane production rose by 13% and thus almost regained the 1978 level. As a result not 
only was it possible to satisfy domestic consumption, but sugar also became the third most 
important export product. This was aided by a broad support policy on the part of the 
Government, which took shape at the beginning of 1981 in the Sugar Production Development 
Programme. For this purpose the Government set up the Sugar Industry Investment Fund, which 
includes among its objectives the promotion of sugar cane cultivation and which is financed by a 
State contribution of 17 córdobas for every quintal of refined sugar destined for domestic 
consumption. The final objective of the Programme is to guarantee and stabilize the rate of 
investment in the sector. 
Finally, production of bananas —another export crop— also made a notable recovery (25%) 
in the context of a new agreement reached between the foreign company involved and the 
Government. 
As regards products for domestic consumption, great efforts have been made to promote the 
production of basic grains so as to ensure supplies for the population and thus moderate 
inflationary pressures. Satisfactory results were obtained for the second consecutive year, 
especially in the area of agrarian reform and the expansion of the agricultural frontier. In the case 
of maize, it was possible to maintain the level of the previous year, while actual availability for 
human consumption increased because of the steady expansion of the production of sorghum, 
which increasingly covers the demand for animal feed. Production of beans almost recovered its 
1978 level, while that of rice grew rapidly for the second year running (see table 4). 
Among the set of measures aimed at promoting the production of basic grains, special 
mention may be made of the broad financial support given by the National Development Bank to 
small individual producers and agricultural co-operatives and other associations producing these 
crops. Likewise, the National Food Programme (PAN) set minimum guaranteed prices for various 
crops which represented increases of 140 córdobas for beans and 45 córdobas for maize. This 
important stimulus could have had even more positive results if the excessive rain towards the 
middle of the year had not adversely affected the yields from the first harvest. 
In contrast with crop-farming production, livestock raising continued to decline, mainly 
because of the drop in production of meat and beef products. Traditionally, this activity had had a 
fair amount of significance in the sector, its performance being dictated by external demand. As 
from 1979, some changes began to be observed in these trends, firstly because during the long 
period of conflict cattle were slaughtered indiscriminately for export (this was one of the forms 
which the flight of capital assumed) or for domestic consumption; secondly, because there was 
some degree of abandonment and disruption of productive activities, which also affected the 
livestock herds; and finally, because livestock on the hoof was continually moved to neighbouring 
countries, as another manifestation of the flight of capital. Thus, the stock of animals went down 
considerably, and this decline is bound to have adverse repercussions because of the long period 
needed to make good these losses. At all events, the protection policies applied point the way to 
some degree of recovery of the herds. 
Poultry production, for its part, continued the notable recovery registered since 1980 as a 
result of a broad policy of support for small producers, the financing of new installations and, in 
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particular, the organization of big enterprises in the Area of Public Ownership, where there was 
also significant growth of pork production. 
(ii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing is one of the sectors which has been most affected by the 
recent events and which faces most problems in its reactivation. Firstly, it was practically paralysed 
by the destruction of installations and equipment, the exhaustion of stocks, and the disruption of 
the financing-importation of inputs-production process-distribution-export chain. Secondly, the 
lack of trained personnel to take over specialized posts in production, administration and 
management has made it more difficult to reactivate the enterprises taken over by the State and 
grouped together in the Public Industrial Corporation (COIP). Thirdly, part of the private 
industrial sector, together with the commercial sector, has resisted following the new economic 
policy lines and this has been reflected in a passive attitude to both production and investment, 
while in some cases it has even taken the form of processes of decapitalization. Furthermore, the 
reactivation of the sector was made more difficult in 1981 by the shortage of foreign exchange for 
the purchase of inputs. 
A certain proportion of the industrial sector depends fundamentally on imported inputs for 
its final production, which is aimed at a small market for goods which are in many cases of a non-
essential nature. It ¡s consequently very difficult to see how this sector could return to normal until 
it completes its process of readaptation to operating efficiently in a new market where the 
shortage of resources —especially foreign exchange— makes it necessary to establish strict 
priorities. 
For the above reasons, inter alia, the industrial sector registered the lowest growth rate in the 
whole economy (2.7%), after the partial recovery achieved in the previous year (see table 5). 
Within the sector, however, some important changes were to be observed. On the one hand, the 
overall growth rate reflected a considerable increase (20%) in the volume of production of the 
industries managed by COIP, and although these form only a relatively small part of total activity 
(around 22%), they nevertheless managed to offset the drop of rather more than 2% in the 
production of the private sector. The most significant increases were registered in lines of 
production connected with the mass-consumption "shopping basket": textiles (38%), footwear 
and clothing and paper and paper products (10% in each case), and miscellaneous petroleum 
products (12%). 
(iii) Construction. Continuing its trend of rapid recuperation, this activity registered the 
highest growth rate in the economy (35%). Even so, because of the enormous drop which took 
place in 1978 and 1979, its level was still 55% lower than in 1977, while the total area of new 
constructions in Managua was almost 75% below the figure for the latter year (see table 6). 
Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that construction generates a smaller proportion of the 
total product than any other sector except mining, its impact on both employment and on sectors 
such as transport, manufacturing and commerce was substantial. 
The reactivation of construction has been basically due to the State, either directly, through 
public investment, or through a broad programme of support and financing for the construction of 
low-cost housing. 
Public construction activity continued to be concentrated in the key sectors of the economic 
and social infrastructure. In the transport sector, the main highway to the Atlantic (Puerto 
Cabezas) was almost completed, and work was pursued on the construction of minor roads for 
bringing out agricultural production, especially in subsistence farming areas. Work also continued 
in the energy sector and the construction of hospitals and schools in the interior of the country, 
together with the reconstruction of the centre of Managua. 
In order to meet the growing need for mass housing, the Ministry of Housing organized a 
programme of low-cost mass-produced dwellings in marginal areas of the city of Managua and in 
the interior of the country, with a long-term repayment programme which means that 
beneficiaries only have to make small payments. A broad programme on the basis of self-building 
activities was also organized under the Department of Municipal Affairs. This body provides basic 
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Footwear and clothing 
Wood and cork 
Furniture and fittings 
Paper and paper products 
Printing publishing and related industries 
Leather and leather products 
Rubber products 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua and the 
Nicaraguan Energy Institute. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
'According to figures of the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute. 
Table 6 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Area constructed17 
(thousands of m2) 
Total 
Dwellings 
Production of certain 
building materials 
Cement (thousands of 




























































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Ministries of Industry and Planning of Nicaragua. 
"Preliminary figures 
Growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
' Register of authorizations in the city of Managua. 
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(iv) Other sectors. The remaining economic activities evolved rather more slowly than in the 
first year of the recovery process (1980), but on a smoother and more harmonious basis. 
Particularly worthy of note was the growth of the electricity sector (16%), which thus fully 
recovered the level reached before the conflict. A noteworthy performance was also turned in by 
public administration, which has had to meet the very large demands of the population in the areas 
of health and education and has also had to maintain a substantial defence force. 
(c) Employment and unemployment 
In proportion as productive activities have settled down, there has been a reduction in the 
severe unemployment, which reached its most critical level in 1979- Thus, the national 
unemployment rate has dropped from 23% in that year to 18% in 1980 and a little over 13% in 
1981 (see table 7). 
This result reflected a relatively low rate of open unemployment in urban areas (8%) and a 
higher one in the rural sector (20%), including underemployment. The reduction of the former 
was due to the reactivation of economic activities, in which the services and intermediation sector 
played an important part in absorbing labour, but the persistence of the latter was due largely to 
the structural characteristics of the agricultural export sector, which requires a large amount of 
labour at times of sowing and harvesting but does not use so much the rest of the time. At all 
events, it is only in the long term that it can be hoped to overcome such a high level of 
unemployment and underemployment.7 
Finally, social security coverage evolved more rapidly than the growth of the economically 
active population and national employment, possibly indicating better organization of the labour 
sector,8 more rapid growth of the formal sector of the economy, or a combination of both factors 
representing, in any case, a substantial improvement in the well-being of this group. 
Table 7 
NICARAGUA: EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
1978 1979 1980 1981° 





Indexes (1976 = 100) 
National economically active population 
National employment 

























Source: ECLA, on the basis of Ministry of Planning, Evolución del programa de empleo 1981, February 1982. 
"Preliminary figures. 
ECLA, Nicaragua: repercusiones económicas de los acontecimientos recientes (E/CEPAL/G.1091), August 1979; 
estimated based on the assumption that the 1976 figure for productivity per employed person remained constant. 
cRate of under-utilization: includes both under-employment and open unemployment. 
Open unemployment: does not include under-employment. 
'Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC), Empleo en Nicaragua: Situación 
actual y líneas de acción futura, issued in November 1979 on the basis of a survey conducted in October 1979. 
Based on the household surveys conducted by the Instituto national de Estadísticas y Censos de Nicaragua in August-
September 1980. 
'Estimated on the basis of data supplied by the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute (NSSI). 
'According to PREALC estimates, the agricultural labour force amounted to 342 000 persons, while the level of 
employment came to around 290 000 full-time jobs, representing a degree of under-utilization of the labour forceof 16%. 
This gives grounds for assuming that towards the end of 1981 the historic levels of rural employment were recovered. See 
PREALC, Nicaragua, disponibilidad y utilización de la fuerza de trabajo agropecuario. Panama City, 1981. 
8One of the ways in which the income of workers has increased has been the expansion of social benefits. 
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3. The external sector 
The external sector was an important element which limited efforts to reactivate the 
economy in various aspects. Because of the decline in the prices of exports and the upward trend in 
the prices of imports, the terms of trade deteriorated for the fourth consecutive year, thus 
weakening the purchasing power of external sales and neutralizing the efforts made to improve 
the country's external position. Moreover, although an appreciable amount of capital entered the 
country and thus made it possible to increase the monetary reserves, the constant shortage of 
foreign exchange throughout the year prevented the normal functioning of productive activities 
which require imported inputs. Finally, the critical situation of the other Central American 
economies and the defensive measures which they took to reduce their imports made it difficult to 
sell Nicaraguan products in these markets. 
(a) The terms of trade 
As already noted, the terms of trade played a decisive role in the trade deficit and, 
consequently, in the lack of international liquidity which affected a large part of economic activity; 
thus, while the volume of exports increased by almost 15 %, their current value rose by only 11 % 
because of a drop of a little over 3% in their unit value. In view of the financial difficulties faced by 
the country, the authorities took a number of measures to ration the sale of foreign exchange as a 
function of national priorities, so that the volume of imports only increased by 7 %, although their 
value rose by close to 12% because of the increase of 4% in their unit price (see table 8). 
These opposing trends were responsible for almost the whole of the increase in the trade 
deficit compared with the previous year, and the deterioration in the terms of trade brought the 
growth rate of national income down to only 88% of that registered by the product. 
(b) Merchandise trade 
The value of exports came to US$ 500 million, representing an increase of 11 % over the low 
level registered in 1980. This result was influenced by the increase in external sales of cotton and 
the noteworthy expansion in exports of sugar, which rose from US$ 20 million to US$ 50 million. 
In contrast, as a result of the problems already referred to in connection with livestock production, 
the marked decline in meat exports continued, and there was also a downward trend in the case of 
the other products, mainly because of lower prices. The value of exports of coffee also went down 
Table 8 
NICARAGUA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) FOB/CIF 
Terms of trade (goods) FOB/CIF 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 























































































NICARAGUA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'The percentage breakdown and growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
during the year, in spite of the fact that the volume exported increased by 13%, since this increase 
was more than offset by the sharp decline of 27% in the average price (see table 9). 
Sales to the Central American Common Market, which in their most flourishing periods had 
represented 25% of total exports, came to US$ 70 million, meaning that they were 4% below the 
already low level of 1980 and only accounted for 14% of total exports. Three elements were 
responsible for this behaviour. Firstly, there were the difficulties faced by the country in 
reactivating its production for export, much of which consisted of products of the metal 
manufactures and machinery, chemicals, and powdered milk industries, which were rapidly 
obtained from other sources by the buyer countries. Secondly, part of the production was diverted 
to satisfy national demand as first priority, as in the case of powdered milk. Finally, the exchange 
rate adjustments and defensive measures adopted by the neighbouring countries, together with a 
probable overvaluation of the córdoba, lowered the competitiveness of Nicaraguan products. 
The value of imports came to US$ 990 million, representing an increase of almost 12 % after 
having more than doubled in 1980. 
During 1981 there were some important changes in the trends shown by the components of 
external purchases. After their spectacular expansion by 165% in 1980, the value of imports of 
consumer goods went down by 11% as a result of the increase in domestic production of non-
durable goods, especially basic grains, fven so, the absolute level of these imports continued to be 
far above the historical average, this being explained by the fact that the manufacturing sector has 
not yet fully recovered (see table 10). 
The value of imported inputs rose by 6%, thus indicating that in 1981 stocks built up in the 
previous year were used, since in terms of volume the external supply of intermediate goods was 
less than the amount corresponding to the real growth of the economy as a whole. Imports of 
petroleum and fuels increased by 16% over the already high purchases of the previous year, this 
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being due almost exclusively to the increased volume, since the price remained stable. Imports of 
other inputs rose at nominal rates lower than those corresponding to the growth of the user 
sector's, particularly noteworthy being the decline in imports of agricultural inputs (11%) as a 
result of the accumulation of stocks in 1980, when the value of such imports trebled. 
Finally, mention should be made of the sustained increase in imports of capital goods, in line 
with the recapitalization efforts made by the enterprises of the Area of Public Ownership, 
especially in the transport and manufacturing sectors. 
(c) The services trade and factor payments 
Continuing the trend of the last three years, the value of exports of services went down by 
12%, while payments under this heading rose by 3%, so that the deficit on the services account 
increased by US$ 11 million. 
As regards income under this heading, the most noteworthy feature was the stagnation at a 
very low level of income from transport services. This occurred because such revenue practically 
disappeared when the ships were moved abroad at the end of the armed conflict. Moreover, the 
only national aviation company remained almost without capital, so that its international 
operations were reduced. In contrast, income in respect of travel gradually recovered to a point 
very close to the 1978 values. 
On the expenditure side, services connected with merchandise trade expanded at a similar 
rate to that of trade, while outlays in respect of travel abroad continued to go down in response to 
the austerity policy and the limitations on the availability of foreign exchange already mentioned. 
Finally, the net balance of foreign factor payments continued to show an upward trend which, 
together with the imbalance on the merchandise trade, helped to expand the deficit on current 
account. This was due entirely to the higher payments of interest —in spite of having renegotiated 
the external debt— since remittances of profits and dividends of foreign enterprises went down 
for the third consecutive year. 
Table 10 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The percentage breakdown and growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
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(d) Tbe current account position and its financing 
The combination of the various trends on both the merchandise account and the services 
account, including a drop in transfer payments received, gave a record balance-of-payments 
current account deficit of rather more then US$ 570 million (see table 11). 
In order to face up to this imbalance, the Government had to mobilize approximately 
US$ 680 million of external capital —likewise an unprecedented amount— which enabled it to 
increase the monetary reserves by US$ 115 million. The most outstanding elements in this 
financing, because of their size, were the loans granted by international organizations (US$ 120 
million),9 the loan granted by the Libyan Government to the national financial system (US$ 100 
million), lines of credit with foreign official banks (US$ 43 million), financing from OPEC (US$ 10 
million) and a loan from the Netherlands Government (US$ 9 million). 
Although almost all this capital (except for US$ 39 million of the non-tied balance) was 
mobilized by the public sector, 85% of the total funds was allocated, through the national financial 
system, to quasi-autonomous bodies, State public service enterprises, and productive enterprises 
from both the private sector and the Area of Public Ownership. 
(e) External indebtedness 
The external sector imbalance made it necessary to procure and use a record amount of 
external financing. Official disbursement came to US$ 480 million, this amount being obtained at 
maturities and interest rates which were reasonable when compared with the prevailing current 
rates on the international capital market. The public debt contracted by the previous government 
and payable in the short term was also successfully renegotiated. 
Because of the interest of the authorities in keeping open their access to international 
financing as a resource for supplementing domestic efforts to recapitalize the productive sectors, it 
was announced from the end of 1979 that it was intended to pay off these liabilities. As the 
international reserves had been practically exhausted, however, it was decided to renegotiate and 
to try to consolidate the debt. The first negotiations were successfully concluded towards the end of 
1980 and covered a total of US$ 582 million. This represented some relief for the balance of 
payments, as approximately US$ 85 million which should have been paid that year was spread 
instead over a period of 12 years, with 5 years' grace. At the beginning of 1981, the second stage of 
the renegotiation of the short-term external debt continued, and its successful completion 
represented, together with that of the first stage, the postponement of a total of US$ 223 million 
of payments, which was reflected in an increase in the net reserves. 
The new disbursements increased the total external debt by 36% from US$ 1 570 to 
US$ 2 140 million. The results of the renegotiation increased payments of principal from US$ 22 
million to US$ 86 million, while the external debt servicing as a proportion of the value of exports 
rose from 13% to 37% over the last two years10 (see table 12). 
To sum up, the amount of the external public debt has arrived at really alarming levels, and 
the burden of payments of interest and principal in respect of it weighs heavily on the country's 
payment capacity. Thus, in spite of the success of the renegotiations, in 1981 the external debt 
servicing represented a high percentage of exports and the total amount of the debt was equivalent 
to almost four times the value of external sales of goods and services and to 84% of the domestic 
product. 
'This figure is made up of disbursements in respect of loans granted to the public sector by the Work Bank-
International Development Association (IDA), Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE). 
10If the renegotiation had not been carried out, the latter figure would have risen to 77%, thus seriously aggravating 
the country's external situation. 
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Table 11 
NICARAGUA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 































































































































































































































































Source: 1976-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1981 : ECLA, on the basis of official 
data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
c\n addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
''The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 





NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS" 
(Millions of dollars) 
1976 1977 1978° 1979 1980 
Total external debt 
Servicing of external debt 
Principal 
Interest 
Servicing of external debt, as a 
percentage of total exports 



























Source: ECLA, on the basis of information from the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 
"End-year balance of debts having a term of over one year. 
°On 31 December 1978, the short-term debt amounted to US$ 131 millions; commitments, in respect of guarantees to 
US$ 36 millions, private debt not guaranteed by the State, to US$ 264 millions and State-guaranteed private debt, to 
US$ 6 millions. 
'Preliminary figures. 
Figures correspond to the public debt contracted. 
4. Prices and wages 
In spite of the economic policy measures aimed at moderating inflationary pressures, the 
consumer price index registered an increase between annual averages of almost 24%, which, 
although representing a reduction of inflation compared with the previous two years, was 
nevertheless well above the increases historically observed in prices (see table 13). This was due 
firstly to the high degree of monetization to which the real area of the economy has been subjected; 
secondly, to the difficulties still persisting in the intermediation system for the smooth circulation 
of goods, which have caused temporary price rises of a speculative nature; and finally to the 
limitations imposed by the shortage of foreign currency, which made it impossible to satisfy 
possible excess demand through imports. 
In these circumstances, the Government adopted a number of measures to reduce the effects 
of inflation on the income of wage-earners. Thus, in spite of the opposition of the commercial 
sector, it continued to develop the programme for the distribution of basic consumption products 
through an increasing number of mass supply shops in both urban and rural areas. This 
programme —which in reality constitutes a. form of subsidy to the consumer and has important 
repercussions on the public finances— succeeded in moderating and in some cases even avoiding 
increases in the prices of foodstuffs and some industrial products of very broad consumption 
(milk, sugar, etc.). Furthermore, thanks to the policy of promoting the production of basic 
grains —especially rice, beans and maize— it was possible to achieve better supply of these goods 
and to reduce the practices of hoarding and speculation observed in the commercial sector in the 
past. 
In addition, controls continued to be applied in the private distribution network in order to 
ensure observance of the maximum prices to the public of a large number of products, thus also 
influencing the behaviour of consumer prices, although there were temporary shortages of some 
goods whose profit margins, implicit in the authorized prices, were too small in the view of the 
commercial sector. 
This set of actions helped to keep down the prices of the popular consumption "shopping 
basket", which rose more slowly than the cost of living index, thus partially protecting the real 
income of wage-earners and peasants. 
Because of the inflationary tendencies, and in order not to increase pressures on costs, a 
cautious wage policy was followed. The average minimum wage was only raised by 19%, 
which was less than the average increase in the consumer price index. In consequence, real 
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wages —which had already dropped by 34% in the previous two years— suffered a further decline 
of close to 4% in 1981 (see table 14). 
Nevertheless, there are indications which make it possible to conclude that real family 
income, at least, suffered a much smaller deterioration, and that in some strata there was even a 
certain improvement in terms of general well-being. 
Firstly, as already noted, the price of the basic family "shopping basket" increased a good deal 
less than the consumer price index, thanks to the participation of the State in intermediation and 
distribution. Secondly, there was a substantial increase in the non-monetary income of workers 
through the effect of such factors as special shops, sales of products at low cost, collective dining 
rooms, medical attention for the whole family in the enterprises, life insurance, public transport, 
etc. Thirdly, the increase in employment must have been reflected in an equivalent increase in 
family income. Finally, part of the private sector, competing with the enterprises in the Area of 
Public Ownership, gave wage rises higher than the adjustments made in the minimum wage, 
especially for semi-skilled labour. 
This phenomenon is only to be seen in a diluted form in the social security statistics —the 
basis for the indicators referred to so far—, which have temporarily ceased to be comparable with 
the past because of the rapid changes made in the system of social security. Thus, in the last two 
years the coverage of the Nicaraguan Social Security and Welfare Institute was extended to cover 
enterprises whose wage levels are in the lower strata. Moreover, some enterprises have 
disappeared, while other have merged. Finally, through collective bargaining agreements workers 
have obtained benefits which are not taken into account in the statistics. 
Table 13 
NICARAGUA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES" 
Consumer price index 




Consumer price index 



































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 
"Consumer price index for the metropolitan area of Managua. 
Table 14 
NICARAGUA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES A N D SALARIES 



































NICARAGUA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
(Millions of córdobas) 




On foreign trade 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other current expenditure 
3. Current saving (1 - 2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 

































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures. 
'Includes interest in the amount of 888.0 million córdobas. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
(a) Fiscal policy 
Because of the important promotional role assumed by the public sector and the efforts 
made to reduce the big deficiencies existing in the field of social services, the public sector 
deficit —together with the external sector imbalance and the monetary variables— became one of 
the imbalances which it was most difficult to handle, since it generated or aggravated imbalances in 
the financial area. 
Although since 1980 the tax burden has been one of the highest in the region (17%), the 
evolution of tax revenue during 1981 was much slower than the increase in expenditure. 
Consequently, the fiscal deficit widened significantly and rose to the equivalent of around 10% of 
the nominal domestic product. 
With the exception of revenue from income tax and from taxation on production and sales, 
which grew for the second consecutive year at higher rates than that of income, revenue from the 
remaining taxes rose more slowly, and duties on external trade showed considerable declines. 
There were two types of causes behind these phenomena: on the one hand, because of the drop in 
the international prices of the main products it was sought to stimulate the export sector through 
the reduction of certain taxes, while on the other, although imports of goods grew in nominal 
terms by 12%, this growth was due to an increase in the purchase of capital goods and inputs, 
which are normally subject to only a low level of taxation. The result was that tax revenue 
increased by 17%, which was less than the increase in the nominal product and in expenditure (see 
table 15). 
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Operating expenditure, for its part, rose 40% above the particularly high level of 1980, 
because of the incentives for production already referred to, subsidies to consumers of the basic 
"shopping basket", and the expansion of social services and public administration in general.u 
This uneven behaviour increased the negative balance on current account saving, the negative 
trend of which began in 1978. Indeed, as from that year the Government's financial capacity to 
generate current saving disappeared, and in 1981 fiscal revenue only permitted the financing of 
79% of operating expenditure. 
In addition, there was a considerable increase for the second year running in outlays on the 
payment of both the internal and external debt, thus limiting the financial possibilities for 
continuing to raise the level of investment of the central government. 
The scantiness of resources, together with a number of limitations in administration and 
execution, caused government investment to drop by 5 % compared with the high level reached in 
1980, which was over three times that of the year before. Investment expenditure continued tobe 
concentrated on the sectors which had already been receiving special attention for the last two 
years. Outstanding among the projects was the construction of the northern highway, which will 
have big repercussions on future productive activity, as it will incorporate a considerable amount of 
new production resources, especially in the areas of agriculture and mining. Substantial efforts 
were also made in the development of national energy sources, and the civil engineering works 
were begun on the projects known as COP ALAR, Y-Y and Mojolka, while work continued on the 
Momotombo geothermal project, the first phase of which is scheduled to be completed in 1983. 
The entry into operation of these projects will relieve the balance-of-payments position by 
reducing the demand for hydrocarbons. Finally, work also continued on the projects for the 
construction of a number of hospitals, outstanding among them being those at Bluefields and 
Matagalpa, because of their size and the types of health services they will provide. 
As already noted, the budget deficit reached the unprecedented level of rather more than 
2 900 million córdobas and this result was projected onto the monetary variables, since in order to 
cover this gap the central government made use of domestic financing to a majority extent (almost 
70%). In contrast, most of the external public financing was used by the quasi-autonomous 
institutions, the State public service enterprises, and the national financial system. 
(b) Monetary policy 
Monetary policy in 1981 was aimed at making more selective use of credit after the 
indiscriminate access given in 1980 in respect of any initiatives for restoring the economy. Thus, 
the objectives proposed were: "(i) promotion of priority activities such as small-scale production, 
non-traditional exports and the substitution of mass consumption imports; (ii) the stimulation of 
long-term saving, and (iii) the reversal of the present trend towards the definancing of the 
national financial system because of its unsuitable operating margins".12 
In order to achieve these objectives, a number of operating regulations were laid down which 
were to be fulfilled by all enterprises using credit, regardless of whether they were from the private 
sector or the Area of Public Ownership. 
In general terms, what was planned was an expansionary monetary policy as regards credit to 
the productive sector (an increase of 22%), within the context of the rationalization approach 
alreadyreferred to, and a more moderate growth (approximately 10%) of credit to the public 
sector. 
By the end of the year, however, these objectives had been considerably exceeded. On the one 
hand, credit to the productive sector expanded by 25%, divided mainly between stock raising 
(78%), State marketing enterprises (76%), and to a lesser extent the industrial sector (43%) and 
crop farming (12%). 
"Current expenditure includes the transfer which the central government makes to other public institutions 
responsible for providing services and promoting the development of productive activities. 
12See Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua, Programa económico de austeridad y eficiencia, 1981, January 1981. 
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The public sector also exceeded the domestic credit target, for the reasons laid down in the 
preceding section. Net loans to the central government increased by 34%, which was still a high 
rate, even though a good deal lower than those registered in the previous two years (see table 16). 
This was combined with more intensive growth of financing to public institutions (73%). 
Altogether, domestic credit grew by 30%, constituting a factor of expansion which was further 
strengthened by the improvement in the net international reserves position, so that the factors of 
expansion as a whole increased by 45%. 
The factors of absorption, for their part, also grew rapidly, but for the third year running the 
economy was subjected to a strong monetization process which tended to neutralize the efforts 
made in other areas of the economy to reduce inflationary pressures. Thus, because of the 
monetary expansion, the liquidity coefficient 13 of 20% registered in 1978 rose to 30% in 1979, 
32% in 1980 and 31% in 1981. 
One of the effects of the high degree of monetization of the economy, combined with the 
limitations imposed by the restricted availability of foreign exchange, which prevented the 
external sector from serving as a means of escape from these pressures, was the rise of an illegal 
parallel market for foreign exchange on which the exchange rate was over three times the bank 
rate and 25% higher than the official parallel market. The existence of this market also 
encouraged a number of speculative operations which brought distortions into the price system 
and fostered the appearance and proliferation of non-productive transactions, including the 
possibility of capital transfers abroad. 
Table 16 
NICARAGUA: MONETARY BALANCE" 



































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Planning of Nicaragua. 
"Covers Central Bank, Banco Nacional de Desarrollo, Banco de América, Banco de Nicaragua, Banco Inmobiliario, Banco 
de Crédito Popular, Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements (in respect of financing for house purchase), Fondo 
Especial de Desarrollo (FED), Financiera de Preinversión (F1NAPR1), Instituto Nicaragüense de Seguros (INISER), 
savings and loan and investment companies, and other financial institutions. 
Preliminary figures. 
'Growth rates correspond to real, not rounded, figures: 
Including "other deposits". 
'Including public service enterprises. 
"The percentage relationship between the means of payment and the non-nominal domestic product. 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factor of expansion 




Private sector and rest of 
Area of Public Ownership 
Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (saving and time 
deposits and securities issued) 
Long-term foreign borrowing 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981 the economic growth rate again fell, with the gross domestic product rising by 3-6% 
compared to 4.9% in 1980, giving an annual average growth of 6.1% in the three-year period 
1978-1980. This meant an increase of only 1.3% in the per capita product, substantially lower than 
the annual rate of 3.6% by which it had increased in the three-year period mentioned (see table 1 
and figure 1). 
Due to the high degree of external openness of the Panamanian economy and its strong 
specialization in service activities, the international recession has had a hard impact on it and 
weakened its development. Added to the slow rise in income from services provided to the exterior 
was the loss of dynamism in domestic private activity and investment. This, however, was partly 
counteracted by the greater activity in respect of participation in the trade established in the 
former Canal Zone and port and transit operations connected with the Canal. 
Furthermore, the heavy external indebtedness and the high cost of servicing it limited the 
public sector's possibilities of expanding current expenditure and investment, and hence 
contributing to more rapid growth of economic activity. However, under the new conditions and 
possibilities opened by the treaty signed with the United States on the Canal in 1978, a series of 
projects are being developed and a new productive structure is being created, based on the 
possibilities and natural potential of the country, which will prevent further growth of the 
disparity between the urban economy —highly dependent on the exterior— and the rural 
economy, which is still subject to inefficient productive patterns. 
The poor results turned in by agriculture in recent years not only slowed down growth 
possibilities but also helped produce greater pressures on the balance of payments. In 1981, in 
particular, rigidities appeared in production for domestic consumption, and there were no 
incentives to increase production in traditional export categories. The displacement of labour from 
rural to urban areas thus continued, further aggravating the unemployment problems in the cities. 
In order to offset these trends, agroindustrial programmes were developed for small and medium 
producers, the construction of sanitation and social projects for the rural population continued, 
and the field of action of community programmes designed to strengthen the organization of rural 
families and improve their farm productivity and incomes was extended. 
The generation of jobs remained low, due to the slow growth in economic activity. On the 
other hand, there was an appreciable decrease in inflation and the real wages of workers in 
commerce and industry rose. 
Despite the sluggishness of domestic productive activity and the small increase in prices, the 
International Financial Centre continued to expand its operations and to support —although 
residually— the needs of domestic commerce, which was stimulated in turn by the increase in 
demand from residents of the former Canal Zone. Nevertheless, there was no excessive 
availability of means of payment, due to the high rates of interest paid on savings deposits. 
The balance of payments showed a resurgence of the trade deficit, which was double that of 
1980, although it was lower than that of 1979. A contributory factor in this increase was the heavy 
use made of commercial credit for current purchases, as well as the greater outflow in respect of net 
payments of profits and interest, which meant that the current account deficit grew from about 
US$ 290 million in 1980 to US$ 420 million in 1981: the highest level so far recorded. Besides the 
worsening of the current account situation, there was a sizeable net inflow of capital of US$ 440 
million in 1981 which made it possible to raise the international reserves by US$ 26 million (see 
table 1 and figure 1). 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
The drop for the second consecutive year in the growth rate of the gross domestic product was 
accompanied in 1981 by a small increase of 2.3% —only half of the 1980 growth rate— in total 
imports of goods and services, thus leading to a likewise very small increase (3.4%) in total supply. 
Since 1974 there has been a continual decline in the share of the import component in total supply, 
and the coefficient of imports with respect to the product has droppedsince that year from 30% to 
22% (see table 2). 
On the demand side, the volume of exports of goods and services, of which 82% consists of 
services, fell nearly 3%, after the noteworthy expansion registered in 1980, mainly under the 
Table 1 
PANAMA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Wages and salaries' 
Rate of unemployment 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 
External debtf 
1 749 1 744 
1.68 1.72 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'Real wage calculated on the basis of average nominal wages obtained by a survey of 500 industrial and commercial 
enterprises of Panamá City and Colón. 
Percentages. 
Disbursed external public debt. These figures differ from those presented in table 11, which refer to the contracted 




PANAMA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 




Machinery and equipment 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments figures deflated by using 
price indexes calculated by ECLA for that purpose. 
heading of services (57%), with the incorporation of activities carried out in the former Canal 
Zone. This decline in exports of goods and services made possible a significant recovery in the level 
of domestic demand, which increased by a little under 6% after the contraction of 1980. 
Unfortunately there is no information available on the behaviour of investment and 
consumption in 1981. The only data available show that there was an increase of 14% in nominal 
terms in investment and capital transfers made by the Government, an increase of nearly 9% in 
the value of imports of capital goods —which must not have represented much of a difference in 
their volume— and a drop of about 7 % in construction. Despite the significant decline of the latter 
activity, progress was made during the year in the hydroelectric plant projects and in the laying of 
the 600 000 barrel/day pipeline which will cross the country from coast to coast. 
(ID) Evolution of the main sectors 
On the supply side, the fall in the growth rate of the product was due to the depression of the 
goods-producing sectors, especially manufacturing and construction, since the production of 
services, with the exception of public administration and ownership of dwellings, generally tended 
to expand more rapidly than in 1980 (see table 3). 
The Panamanian economy thus once again showed the structural weaknesses arising from 
the low level of development of directly productive activities, and especially from the low level of 
integration among the different economic sectors. To this was added the lack of dynamism in the 
export of services; those which did grow did so largely due to the incorporation of activities which 
were already in operation in the Canal Zone. 
Thus, the different components of the overall product showed a very similar structure of that 
of 1971, and there were even signs of a regression in the weight of the value added by goods and an 
increase in the participation of both basic government services and of transport, commerce and 
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Figure 1 
PANAMA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Gross domestic product3 
\ 





/ Gross domestic V 
\ / : 
'+ income" 
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J I L _L V 
Consumer prices" 
Balance on current account0 
it ~À—so- ir 1970 71 72 73 75 76 77 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
a Annual growth rate. 
bPercentage variation from December to December. 




PANAMA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. 
6
 As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
'Excluding restaurants and hotels. 
finances: activities which are largely representative of the functional model of the transition 
economy, which has thus become more important in the long-term perspective. 
The persistent weakening of agriculture raises fears that the country may become extremely 
dependent on imports of food, especially if urban development assumes the extremely dynamic 
character implicit in the current development strategy. The same could occur with the industrial 
sector. The current agroindustrial development programmes centered on small and medium-sized 
industries and the promotion of industrial parks in the interior may be an important element in 
offsetting this tendency and improving the well-being of broader sectors of the population. 
(i) Agriculture. According to preliminary estimates, the agricultural sector continued to 
display the relative stagnation observed in recent years. Thus, during 1981 the agricultural product 
dropped by slightly over 1%, compared with the small increase shown the previous year (see 
tables 3 and 4). This situation led to an intensification of the development policy which the 
Government has been applying recently in support of agricultural development. 
The production of basic commodities such as maize and beans in 1981 was once again lower 
than anticipated. This was due to the instability of the rainfall pattern, since there was heavy 
rainfall during the planting period and a serious drought in the growing season, forcing the 
country to import large volumes of these products during the year. Purchases of maize from abroad 
reached a total of one million quintals, or 25% more than in 1980. This grain was destined 
primarily for the production of poultry feed, for because of price considerations the consumption 
of chicken has begun to displace that of beef for the past two years. 
The production of rice, however, increased considerably (20%) due to greater mechanization 
of the cultivation work, and thus recovered its level of four years previously, although it was still 
below that of 1976. Production had been declining, among other reasons, because of the difficulties 
encountered in selling the product abroad on account of the high costs of domestic production. The 
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problem was also aggravated by the smuggling of rice from neighbouring countries, especially 
Costa Rica, since the price is much higher in Panama. 
In the case of bananas, satisfactory, results were obtained despite the labour conflicts which 
occurred during the year and which paralysed production for a month. It is estimated that 
production increased 7.6% and the value of exports more than 22%. 
The production of other less important crops such as lentils, onions and tobacco did not show 
major variations compared' to the levels of recent years, and this situation will continue to be 
reflected in growing amounts of imports. 
The economic authorities are concerned about the pressure which the low level of domestic 
food production is exerting on the balance of payments. On the export side, the lack of 
competitiveness of national products in the exterior continued to grow, both because of reduced 
productivity and high domestic costs, which are influenced by the higher prices of imported inputs. 
On the external purchases side, imports of food increased and the smuggling of Costa Rican 
products was intensified. At the same time, producers increased their demands for higher support 
prices for rice, maize and beans, due to the rise in production costs. 
Cattle slaughtering increased more than 11%, both because of greater domestic consumption 
of beef and because of an increase in sales to the United States.1 This increase in production was 
accompanied by a drop for the third consecutive year in livestock herds which will have negative 
effects later on. Pig slaughtering, for its part, increased 9%, since pork and poultry have displaced 
part of the consumption of beef, due to the high prices of the latter. 
There are large investment projects in the sector. Those for supporting production of basic 
grains, to be carried out in regions of new human settlements, are related to integral social 
programmes. 
The 1981 public investment programme in the agricultural sector, for a value of slightly 
under 72 million balboas, dealt with quite diverse aspects, such as financial investments consisting 
Table 4 
PANAMA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural production 
(1960 = 100) 
Crop-farming 
Stock-raising 
Production of the main crops 






Indicator of stock-raising 






































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. 




PANAMA: INDEXES OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing production 
(1971 = 100) 
Foodstaffs, beverages and tobacco 
Footwear, clothing and leather goods 
Wood, furniture and fittings 
Paper, printing and publishing 
Rubber, chemicals and petroleum 
product 


















































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Corresponding to the period January to September. The rates have been calculated with respect to the same period in 
1980. 
of credit to small and medium-sized producers and associations of producers, earmarked for 
infrastructure works; purchase of machinery and equipment, and agricultural extension services 
and research. 
Noteworthy among the activities carried out during the year were those for protecting natural 
resources and the environment. The Ministry of Agricultural Development (MIDA) continued its 
programme of protection of the hydrographie basins of the Panama Canal and the rivers Caldera 
and La Villa, together with the agro-forestry development programme at Codé and Veraguas. 
As regards livestock, a project was begun on animal health, involving the construction of 
infrastructure to facilitate the provision of services, the establishment of a system of epidemic 
surveillance and disease control, and the adoption of measures for preventing foot and mouth 
disease and swine fever. 
Another important project was that on agricultural marketing. In order to provide the 
Agricultural Marketing Institute (IMA) with greater and more efficient capacity for handling basic 
grains, grain purchase and storage centres were built in isolated regions of the country. In addition, 
with the aid of a loan from IDA, it is planned to construct three terminal plants for receiving, drying 
and storing basic grains. Another project with IMA financing is that for remodelling the Tocumen 
cold storage plant to increase its storage capacity for perishable products. 
(ii) Manufacturing and construction. According to preliminary information, the 
manufacturing added value decreased slightly over 2%, compared with a rise of 4% in 1980. 
Contributing to this drop was the sharp decline in construction and the drop in output of the oil 
refinery, the latter being related to the slow evolution of domestic consumption and the slowdown 
of transport operations through the Canal. 
The manufacturing production index shows that the fall in production in 1981 was common 
to practically all industrial branches, although in varying degrees. The biggest decrease was in 
paper products and printing, while the industries related to the construction sector, such as non-
metallic minerals, lumber and metal products suffered decreases of 8%, 9% and4%, respectively. 
The production of chemical industries and petroleum refineries, for its part, fell 5%. The 
'The consumption of various types of meat was approximately 19 kilogrammes per person in 1981. This represents 
some degree of recovery from the decline in consumption which had occurred since 1977, when the figure was 23 
kilogrammes per person. 
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important food, beverages and tobacco industry, whose output growth rate had already slowed 
down significantly in 1981, showed a further decrease of 3 % ; the clothing industry, however, 
which had behaved similarly in 1980, showed a slight increase (see table 5). 
Among the most significant efforts at reactivation made in the industrial field was that of the 
Banco Nacional de Panamá in its "fourth programme for the financing of small- and medium-
sized industry", designed mainly to encourage various investment initiatives in agroindustrial 
activities. At least 30% of the funds of this programme are oriented towards financing projects 
located in the interior of the country. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, for its part, is 
establishing industrial parks and has made investments in the urbanization of 34 hectares at David 
and Chitré, with a view to setting up small and craft-oriented enterprises. 
Finally, greater resources were provided for the Corporación de Desarrollo Panameño 
(Panamanian Development Corporation) through, inter alia, a new IBRD loan for US$ 15 million, 
in order to continue promoting projects for import substitution and the diversification of 
industrial exports. At the same time, this Corporation continued to make full use of the facilities 
administered by the Pre-investment Fund of the Planning Ministry for effecting feasibility studies. 
As regards construction, the sharp reduction in its product (-7%) had a major impact on the 
production of materials related to this activity and on levels of employment. 
According to preliminary information, the area of new construction in the district of Panama 
City decreased slightly over 6%, although the part of this total accounted for by housing increased 
nearly 20% (see table 6). A significant event in 1981 was the change which occurred in the 
composition of construction, with the increase in construction of popular and middle-level 
housing and a pronounced decline in luxury residential building, commercial premises and offices: 
a tendency which contrasted with the considerable expansion in the latter in 1979 and especially in 
1980. These divergent trends also explain the fall in the construction product, in view of the 
considerable difference in the value per square metre of the two types of construction. 
In response to the depressive situation of private construction, tax measures were taken 
which had some partial effects, although they did not have a decisive impact on the situation. Thus, 
for example, the period of exemption from real estate tax in respect of new constructions was 
extended. 
(iii) Services. In contrast with what occurred with the production of goods, the product 
generated by services achieved a higher growth rate than in 1980 (see table 3). A determining 
factor in this was the intensification of the electricity generation programmes and the extension of 
sewerage services. The hydroelectric programme, which has top priority, has been receiving 
particularly strong support along with that for the electrical interconnection with Costa Rica. 
Another factor contributing to the dynamism of services was the incorporation of activities which 
already existed in the Canal Zone, together with the greater degree of integration achieved in the 
relations with this Zone with the Panamanian economy. Finally, the reactivation of commercial 
and financial activities contributed to the recovery of the operations of the international financial 
centre, which had fallen off in 1980. 
Table 6 
PANAMA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION 
Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1981° ^ ^ ^ 
Surface constructed 
(thousands of m2) 
Total 205 411 401 376 100.5 -2.4 -6.2 
Housing 132 203 208 249 53.8 2.5 19.7 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures provided by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. 




PANAMA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade 
Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
and services 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
On the other hand, the decline in agricultural, industrial and construction output and the 
stagnation or only scanty increase in tourism and international transport had a recessive effect on a 
wide range of services. Moreover, the rate of growth of government consumption expenditures 
was kept low in an effort to prevent too much of an increase in the fiscal deficit. 
3. The external sector 
The Panamanian economy, like those of most Latin American countries, suffered serious 
difficulties in its external relations in 1981, and very diverse factors contributed to the aggravation 
of the trade deficit and the slowdown in the rate of activity in Canal operations. 
The combination of an appreciable drop of 9 % in exports of goods and a scanty increase of 
only 2.8% in sales of services (much lower than the rise of 57% registered in 1980) meant that the 
trade imbalance was double that of the previous year, although the increase of 5.4% in imports of 
goods and services was also much lower than the year before, when it was nearly 2 5 % . Sales of 
services were four times those of goods, and their behaviour was therefore a very important factor 
in the stability of the balance of payments. 
As a result of the international recession, a smaller number of tourists visited the country in 
1981, and shipping traffic through the Canal rose by less than 1%: events which naturally had an 
effect on domestic commercial activity. This situation, however, was partly offset by the increase in 
the former Canal Zone market. Similarly, the greater integration of the ports of Balboa and 
Cristóbal into the national economy —in accordance with the application of the Torrijos-Carter 
Treaty— has had a significant impact on transport activities. 
The stagnation of total exports (including services) was due to a small decline in volume 
(after an increase of 26% in 1980) and a rise of 3 % in unit value (similar to that of import prices). 
However, the unit values of exports of goods suffered a considerable drop (9%), and with the 
above-mentioned increase in imports this led to a deterioration of 12% in the terms of trade 
(whose level has declined 24% since 1976 and 34% since 1970), together with drops of 12% in the 
purchasing power of exports of goods and 3 % in that of exports of goods and services (seetable 7). 
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74.8 75.6 66.2 
88.0 82.6 72.7 
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(a) Merchandise trade 
(i) Exports. Exports of goods suffered an appreciable decline in 1981: something which had 
not occurred since 1976. Between 1976 and 1980 they increased nearly 40%, with very uneven 
variations in regard to prices and volume exported. In 1981 their volume fell slightly (compared 
with 19% in the two previous years), but their unit value decreased by 9%. 
With the exception of bananas, current values of sales of the principal export products fell 
during the year. Exports of petroleum products, which along with bananas and sugar represent 
60% of total exports, decreased by around 24%, due mainly to the drop in prices on the world 
hydrocarbons market as from the second half of the year. Similarly, in line with the worldwide 
economic recession, the demand for fuels by ships in transit remained at similar levels to those of 
the previous year. 
On the other hand, banana exports improved significantly in 1981, since their production was 
favoured by climatic conditions and the solution of labour problems. Even so, this only represented 
a recovery of levels of exports already reached previously (see table 8). 
Sugar sales declined by approximately 5 % after the considerable increase registered in 1980. 
There were production problems during the year in the principal refineries of the country, 
especially that at Santiago, and there was also a shrinking of world demand for sugar, and 
especially in that of the United States. 
Exports of shrimps decreased for the second consecutive year, this time by 7%, although 
prices on the external market improved in the second half of the year. Fish meal sales also declined 
(by 30%) as a result of the smaller catch. 
There was also a 10% decline in the value of coffee sales, which have fluctuated between 
US$ 9 and 10 million for many years, because of the low prices of this commodity which only began 
to recover in the last months of 1981. 
Finally, a large number of relatively less important products, among them cocoa and meat, 
showed a marked decline in 1981, confirming the downward trend of recent years. 
The authorities continued their efforts to increase export during the year. In this respect, an 
agreement was signed with Mexico whereby the latter country will grant preferential treatment to 
imports of 39 Panamanian products. The mechanism administered by the Mexican authorities 
functions quite expeditiously and consists of refunding to the national importer 75% of the ad 
valorem tax paid on imports of these products. It is estimated that the value of preferential exports 
to Mexico totalled some US$ 9 million in the last four months of the year. 
Table 8 
P A N A M A : EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 


































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 




PANAMA: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
Consumer and intermediate 
goods, except crude oil 
Crude oil 
Capital goods 











































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. 
(ü) Imports of goods. In contrast with the rapid expansion registered in the past three years, 
there was a sharp deceleration in imports of goods in 1981, due to a smaller increase in their prices 
(which had increased sharply in 1979 and 1980) rather than to the reduction of less than 1 % in the 
volume imported (see table 7). 
Besides the small increase in the prices of imported products, another influence in the small 
expansion of imports was the slower growth of domestic economic activity, the reduction in 
purchases of crude oil and the weakening of demand for imported consumer goods (see table 9). 
The decrease in petroleum imports was especially affected by the change from the thermal 
generation of electric power to hydroelectricity, which now accounts for 68% of total generation. 
The slower rate of purchases of imported consumer goods, which continued to account for a fairly 
high relative share (around 60%) of total imports, was influenced among other factors by the high 
cost of external credit, difficulties in obtaining it, and the slower development of domestic 
commercial activity. 
(b) Services trade 
In 1981 income from the sale of services was 3% greater than in 1980. The favourable initial 
impact of the Canal treaty on this income, which caused it to rise from US$ 790 million in 1979 to 
US$ 1 230 million in 1980,2 thus slowed down considerably. Under this treaty, Panama receives 
US$ 10 million in compensation for providing public services in the areas used by the Canal 
Commission, a joint body which will continue to be responsible for ship passage operations. In 
addition, it receives a fixed annual amount of US$ 10 million and a variable sum equivalent to 30 
US cents per net ton transported. Another important contribution to the increase in income from 
services was the operation of the installation which became Panamanian property, among them 
three ports,3 the trans-Isthmus railroad and two airports. Furthermore, although the Canal 
Commission remained responsible for the necessary activities for inter-oceanic passage 
operations, all the commercial activities were transferred to Panama. 
According to preliminary figures, income from tourism barely remained at the same level as 
the previous year. This was due both to the effect of the international economic crisis on this 
activity and to the economic difficulties of neighbouring countries with which Panama has 
important trade and tourist relations. Thus, the number of visitors entering by Paso Canoa on the 
border with Costa Rica decreased by 35%, from 65 000 to 42 500 persons. Moreover, the number 
of visitors entering by Panama City International Airport decreased slightly. However, according 
2When analysing the data on the sale of services appearing in table 10, it should be noted that the 1981 figures are not 
strictly comparable to those of previous years, due to methodological differences. 
'The operation of the ports of Cristóbal and Balboa became the responsibility of the National Port Authority. 
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Table 10 
PANAMA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment • 
Portfolio investment 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance^ 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 























































































































































































































































































































"Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
''In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
cThe difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




to figures which go up to the third quarter of the year, there was a recovery in income from 
passengers in transit. 
Expenditures for services, which are much smaller than income under this heading, increased 
by 18% in 1981, so that the services balance of US$ 857 million at the end of 1981 cametoUS$ 27 
million less than in 1980 (see table 10). 
(c) The current account deficit and its financing 
The lower net income from services, plus the bigger deficit on merchandise trade, led to the 
doubling of the trade deficit in 1981. When the net outflow for remittances of profits, payment of 
interests and private transfers abroad is added to this, the result is a large imbalance of US$ 420 
million on the current account of the balance of payments, US$ 135 million (47%) higher than 
that of 1980. 
Although the imbalance on current account was thus increased, there was a net inflow of non-
compensatory capital in the amount of US$ 440 million, US$ 143 million (48%) higher than the 
previous year, which enabled the country's international reserves to be increased by US$ 26 
million (see table 10). 
(e) External indebtedness 
During the year, the public sector disbursed approximately US$ 380 million in external 
credits with a repayment period of over one year, or approximately US$ 35 million less than in 
1980. Thus, after deducting the amortization payments made during the year, the external public 
debt contracted amounted to US$ 2 335 million at the end of 1981, or US$ 124 million more than 
the previous year. 
Debt servicing totalled US$ 537 million, that is to say, it exceeded the amount of 
disbursements and was equivalent to one-third of exports of goods and services. Servicing 
payments came to US$ 83 million more than in 1980, slightly over half the total consisting of 
amortization payments and the rest of interest (see table 11). 
Long-term credits, mainly directed to the official sector, went mostly to finance the 
programme of public investments in the Colón Free Zone, on land returned to the country since 
1979. This project includes the construction of a trade centre, the creation of industrial parks 
designed for the establishment of light industries and re-export, subcontracting industries and the 
building of a tourist centre. 
It is hoped to promote a steady flow of direct private investments (which have fluctuated 
around US$ 40 million in recent years), since in addition to the infrastructure programme in 
progress, there are other incentives such as the absence of exchange problems, the geographical 
situation, the port installations and the favourable tax incentives for developing light export 
industries. 
Table 11 
PANAMA: EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 
(Millions of dollars) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981° 




Debt servicing as a percentage of 































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. 
End-year balance of debt contracted for over one year by thé Central government and decentralized agencies. 
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4. Domestic prices and wages 
(a) Evolution of domestic prices 
One of the important aspects of the way in which the economy evolved in 1981 was the 
appreciable reduction in inflation, which had reached levels hitherto unknown in the country in 
the two previous years. Thus, the growth rate of wholesale prices, which had risen in 1979 and 
1980 by around 16% and 14% (December-to-December variations), fell to less than 9%, and the 
decline in the growth of the consumer price index was even more noteworthy, since it dropped 
from 10% and 14% in 1979 and 1980, respectively, to only 4.8% in 1981. The variation between 
the annual averages for consumer prices was slightly over 7%, however (see table 12). 
Despite the essentially open character of the Panamanian economy, the evolution of the 
import component of the wholesale price index did not reflect the small increase in the prices of 
imports in 1981, among them those of petroleum, a product which is strongly represented in 
imports and has a big influence on the domestic costs and prices. The prices of oil-based fuels 
refined in the country increased nearly 13 % during the year, and although this was much less than 
the increase of 45% in 1980, it still had a strong impact on the prices and tariffs of transport and 
public services and on industrial costs. 
The prices of agricultural products in the wholesale price index showed only a slight increase 
in 1981 (especially when comparing the months of December), as a result of the participation of 
the Agricultural Marketing Institute in the marketing of these products. Most of the products 
marketed by the Institute did not rise in price, or if they did the increase was much lower than that 
of 1980. Thus, for example, the price fixed for rice remained unchanged, although it had risen 37% 
in 1980, and that of maize rose by only 4%, much less than the 20% of the previous year. 
Despite the smaller growth in agricultural wholesale prices, the increase in food costs in the 
consumer price index was greater than that of the index as a whole. This was due to the rigidity in 
the domestic supply of some major food products, whose production had to be supplemented with 
imports, as in the case of milk products and meat. 
(b) Wages and salaries 
During 1981 increases in wages and salaries were authorized under the rules of the system in 
force, which limits collective bargaining and assigns a role in it to the Ministry of Labour. 
Between 1977 and 1980 it is estimated that real wages declined by about 8%. The results of 
the periodic surveys of industrial and commercial enterprises shows a slight increase of 1.5% in 
real wages in 1981. According to this information, the real wage index has recovered its 1974 level, 
but this would still leave it several points below that of 1977. It should be noted that in 1977 the 
country began to come out of the deep recession which began three years before and that the 
application of a wage policy which served as an incentive to private investment helped to speed up 
this recovery. 
Table 12 
PANAMA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Wolesale price index 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Wolesale price index 
1976 1977 1978 
Variation December to December 
4.8 4.8 5.0 
2.9 2.6 9.2 
3.8 9.1 7.0 
Variation between annual averages 
4.0 4.5 4.2 
1.4 3.0 6.2 































Domestic liquid assets 
External liquid assets 
Demand deposits in banks 
Time deposits in banks 

























































































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Balance at end of September. The rates were calculated with respect to the balance in September 1980. 
Excluding operations between local banks. 
5. Financial aspects and the fiscal situation 
(a) Financial aspects 
Time deposits made in the International Financial Centre, which in 1980 felt the 
repercussions of the United States' anti-inflationary monetary policy on the Eurodollar markets, 
again began to behave dynamically, although without reaching the very high growth rates of 
previous years. According to information up to September, these deposits, which were the 
principal source of the resources handled, grew by 22% to over US$ 23 billion,4 compared with a 
decline of 5 % in 1980 (see table 13). 
Investments, which had been affected in 1980 by the absolute decline in general resources, 
registered a growth rate in accordance with their historic trajectory (30%) in 1981. 
••Strictly speaking, the corresponding figure is somewhat lower, because the consolidated balance includes the 
National Bank of Panama, but the importance of this State body is very small in relation to the overall banking activity. 
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Loans destined for the domestic market continued to represent —with slight variations— 
about 15% of total loans. During 1981 they expanded at a rate of 27% until September (last month 
for which detailed information is available), compared to 31% for external loans. The main 
demand for funds came from public sector bodies, with the expansion in loans directed to 
commerce and agriculture once again being most prominent. The rapid increase in the latter was 
related to the financing of the various government programmes. On the other hand, growth in 
bank credit to the industrial sector was very slow, while loans destined for personal consumption 
stayed at about the same rate as the previous year. There was substantial growth in loans to 
housing and construction activities (see table 14). 
Up to the end of September, demand and time deposits by private individuals in banks had 
increased by 22 % —much more than the growth in the gross domestic product in nominal terms 
(14%)— thus registering a performance similar to that of 1980. The much bigger increase in the 
past two years in savings and time deposits by private individuals, as compared to demand 
deposits, reflects the influence of the attractive interest rates in contrast to the fewer opportunities 
for investment. Moreover, the behaviour of individuals has been very sensitive to the high 
opportunity cost implied by the holding of liquid assets. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
Regular resources of the central government, which had increased considerably in 1980 
(42%), showed a much lower growth rate of about 14% in 1981, in line with the evolution of 
overall economic activity. The sharp decline in the growth rate of income, without there being any 
changes in the fundamental lines of tax policy, is attributable less to the weakening in the growth 
rate of the real product and prices than to the fact that the rise in current income in 1980 was 
exceptionally high. In 1980 revenue was favoured by the application during a complete fiscal year 
of the new annual payments and Canal tariffs provided for under the Torrijos-Carter Treaty and 
Table 14 
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Personal consumption 
External loans 
Percentage of domestic 
















































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures provided by the Statistics and Census Office. 
"Balances at end of September. Rates were calculated with respect to the balance in September 1980. 
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PANAMA 
the introduction of a capital gains tax on profits from thfc sale of real estate.5 The most significant 
of the two factors was undoubtedly the first, especially because of the clause which provides that 
the State of Panama will receive 30 US cents per net ton transported through the Canal, and this 
may be seen clearly in the important role played by non-tax sources in total current income. The 
amount of income corresponding to "annual payments in respect of Canal" rose from US$ 15 
million in 1979 to US$ 71 million in 1980 and US$ 76 million in 1981. 
As regards tax income, there was a great disparity in the relative variations in the level of 
direct and indirect taxes (24% and 6% respectively), with a substantial increase in income tax 
which came on top of the achievements registered in the immediately preceding years. It should be 
noted that this tax has been improving its elasticity since a system of advance payments based on 
the business results of the previous fiscal year was established in 1979- In addition, the 
strengthening of Educational Insurance (a contribution by employers and workers to support 
certain social services), along with the support provided by the recent capital gains tax, have 
tended to modify the tax structure and the actual amount of the fiscal burden. Thus, as from 1980 
the yield from direct taxation has exceeded that of indirect taxation, and at the same time the tax 
burden has risen from 14% in 1979 to 15% in 1980 and 1981. 
Apart from the greater equity which these indicators reflect in principle, the objective of 
making direct taxation more flexible has also been determined by the relative inertia of some 
sources of indirect taxes, and especially by the fact that in some cases it is becoming difficult to raise 
taxes without provoking negative effects on production and empleyment. This situation may be 
observed particularly in the case of the specific taxes on the consumption of gasoline and the 
production and sale of petroleum products, where in order to rationalize their use, and also to 
increase tax revenue, tariffs have been raised (especially in 1980) for products used in industry. 
Despite the rather low price elasticity which generally characterizes the demand for these 
products, the yield from these taxes decreased by nearly 10% in 1981. This loss of income, 
although consistent with the general objectives of allocation of resources, also indicates the 
contractive effect caused on marginal activities by the high cost of fuel and other products, and the 
country's productive system has been unable to absorb these activities very quickly in its current 
phase of lower growth rates. 
The expansion of income from taxes on imports has also been very modest both in the case of 
that obtained by the application of sales taxes and that obtained from customs duties. This 
phenomenon is related, as in the case of other sources of taxation, to the slower rate of economic 
activity in 1981 compared with 1980, and to the external effect of this situation. It is also due to 
changes in the composition of external purchases, which were more focussed this year on 
intermediate goods, where the impact of the tax reduction policy, aimed at stimulating private 
investment, continued to be observed. 
Along with the above, it should also be emphasized that the sales tax on domestic transactions 
(ITBM) continued to make a sizeable contribution to public finances, thus reflecting the maturation 
of administrative improvements made earlier, whose clearest effect has been to make it possible to 
increase the tax reaction capacity. This feature was also observed in the case of the tax on cigarette 
production, despite the extremely sensitive external competition in this sector. 
To sum up, certain significant changes may be pointed out in the tax policy of the past two 
years: its apparently favourable impact from the point of view of the social distribution of the tax 
burden; the consolidation, as a means of securing revenue, of a tax which is neutral from the angle 
of the investment decisions of the private sector (the case of the ITBM); and the decrease in the 
relative importance of taxes which, by their structure, are less sensitive to current economic 
conditions. Here, however, as occurs with the tax on fuels, some undesirable secondary effects on 
production and employment begin to be noticeable. 
'To determine the taxable amount, a credit of 10% is allowed against the cost, for each year that the good has been in 
the possession of the seller. In principle, the result is subject to income tax, except when there is reinvestment of profits in 
new construction for more than four times the result attained by the operation, in which case there is no tax on the profit 
(100% exemption). Reinvestment for an amount less than four times the result entitles the seller to an exemption of only 
20%. 
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Although current income grew faster than regular expenditures (14% and 12% 
respectively), it did not prove possible to reduce the amount of dissavings of the central 
government. Expenditures grew, basically pressured by the very large debt servicing commitments 
and the high volume of transfers the Government was forced to make, sometimes to compensate 
for the deficit situation of certain productive enterprises of the State and sometimes to strengthen 
social programmes which could not be postponed. The employment and wage policy of the public 
sector continued to be applied with restrictive criteria. In the longer-term perspective, however, a 
positive element was the reduction of the current imbalance from 1980 onward, partly due, of 
course, to the new situation with respect to the appropriation of Canal profits, but also to a concern 
to increase the flexibility of the tax system and cautiously manage those current expenditures 
which permit some margin of manouevre (see table 15). 
The situation of the public finances appears somewhat more disquieting when the overall 
picture of the budgetary implementation is examined (that is to say, including capital movements), 
since it is then observed that the fiscal deficit, which had been reduced in 1980, rose again in 1981 
(by 15%) to approximately 35% of total expenditure and 11% of the global product. However, 
there were difficulties in containing capital expenditure, mainly due to the high cost of external 
credit and the payment of growing amortization payments, and it was also necessary to contain the 
real decline in government investment in 1980 in order to offset as far as possible a relatively low 
cycle of private accumulation. This latter consideration explains why real investment by the 
central government grew substantially in 1981 (58%) and was a contributing element to the 
increase in the deficit, though less significant when the budgetary implementation of the entire 
public sector is considered. Total public capital formation is estimated to have increased by 11 % at 
current prices, which means that the rate of capital transfers from the central government to 
decentralized executive agencies decreased. The external financing situation and the real cost of 
Table 15 
PANAMA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other current expenditure 
3. Current saving (1 - 2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Amortization of the debt 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 











































































































































indebtedness were the principal limitations for exercising a regulatory function through effective 
demand and for adapting production to social needs. This situation was in contrast with that 
observed during most of the 1970s and in some ways reflected the characteristics of the public 
sector programmes and projects in this new phase of development. 
The public investment programme showed the concern to promote the urban development 
of Panama as a contribution by the State to the greater efficiency of private activities. Thus, along 
with the high priority which continued to be assigned to the installation of hydroelectric capacity 
—especially as regards the execution of the Fortuna project— and the significant channelling of 
funds for the development of renewable natural resources, the programme contained a large 
component of works aimed at helping take greater advantage of the geographic position of the 
country. The most significant projects, in this respect, were the Arraiján-Panama City highway, 
the Container Terminal, the Convention Centre, and especially the expansion of the Colón Free 
Zone. This latter project, which was carried out in an area given back to Panama under the new 
Treaty, made it possible to take advantage of the geographical location and infrastructural facilities 
created in the past in relation to Canal activities. It includes the urbanization of 35 hectares of land 
for renting lots to private enterprises in order for them to construct warehouses for storage and re-
export; the development of an industrial park in order to promote the establishment of light 
industries and export-oriented subcontracting firms,6 and the construction of a tourist trade centre 
which would be rented preferentially to businessmen from the city of Colón for the installation of 
shops devoted to the sale of products of interest to tourists, with facilities for shipping 
merchandise duty free. 
Against this background, some variations are anticipated in the pattern of public investment 
for 1982, which appear to be determined by the need to avoid an excessive lag in the development 
of rural areas compared with that of the urban infrastructure and the growth prospects of the 
services area. Thus, it is planned to initiate a Community Investment Plan designed to meet the 
most urgent needs of certain communities in the interior of the country. Another important 
feature is the fact that the agricultural sector and housing will have proportionally greater 
budgetary allocations than they had in the past two years. In the agricultural sector there will be a 
trend towards greater emphasis on technological research, community development, 
identification of production potential for tropical export crops and the more efficient management 
of natural resources. In the case of housing, besides the social interest implicit in its development, 
specific anti-cyclical objectives will be pursued as regards employment, given the modest rate of 
private construction which will probably prevail in 1982. 
6There is a plan to construct 13 industrial buildings with a surface area of 52 000 square metres to be rented to 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
On the basis of recent experience, but also in the light of relatively reliable information on the 
probable evolution of some key variables such as the outlays in connection with the binational 
projects (Itaipú and Yacyretá), the harvests of the main crops, the industrial sector's investment 
plans and the consolidated public sector budget, it was estimated at the end of 1980 that the gross 
domestic product at constant prices would grow by around 11% in 1981. It was therefore also 
anticipated that there would be a further notable reduction in the already very low rate of open 
unemployment. At the same time, it was expected that inflation would continue to slow down, as 
had been occurring in a marked and systematic manner since early 1980. This, together with the 
expected increase in the tightness of the labour market and the level of the average increases 
prevailing at that time in wage agreements, held out a good possibility that the real wages of the 
labour force would increase considerably. As regards the balance of payments, an overall surplus of 
around US$ 160 million (similar to that registered during the last three years) was forecast. Such a 
surplus would once again have been very considerable in comparison with domestic demand and 
the degree of liquidity of the economy and would also reflect the substantial surplus expected on 
the capital account. 
As in all the years since 1973, when the boom began, the main concern of the authorities as 
regards economic policy was the management of the significant flow of financial resources 
available. For this purpose, two powerful arms continued to be available: the ability to make a rapid 
and substantial increase in the volume of imports, and the rapid growth of productivity. It was 
expected that the inflationary impulses deriving, on the demand side, from the big inflow of 
foreign capital and the high growth rate of monetary income, and on the supply side from the high 
rate of increase in gross costs would be largely absorbed through bigger imports and an appreciable 
further increase in labour productivity. To all these advantages there was added, at the beginning 
of the year, the notable decline in inflation on the international market. 
At the operational level, the authorities once again planned a level of monetary expansion 
which was quite modest in view of the prevailing rates of growth and inflation, the aim being to 
continue to reduce the growth rate of the cost of living and to limit somewhat the expansion of the 
current account deficit. In this connection, it was sought to offset the unwanted expansive effects of 
the expected growth in net foreign assets on the monetary base, mainly through a sharp increase in 
the capital and reserves of the Central Bank. In the area of fiscal policy, the objectives of stability 
were pursued through the small size of the deficit budgeted for the consolidated public sector for 
1981 and the sure knowledge that its financing would not require the creation of domestic credit, in 
view of the availability of substantial surpluses from previous years. The objectives as regards 
growth, for their part, were based at the fiscal level on the considerable increase scheduled in the 
investment plans of the public sector. 
In general, most of the results actually turned in by the economy in 1981 were not appreciably 
different from what had been foreseen. Thus, the gross domestic product grew by 8.5 % instead of 
11 % ; unemployment went down from 4% to about 2% of the labour force (at the end of June), and 
real wages (of manual workers in Asunción) increased by over 6%. On the other hand, the surplus 
of US$ 44 million obtained on the balance of payments was only a quarter of the expected amount, 
while inflation speeded up. Rather than representing a true increase in the growth rate of the cost 
of living, however, this acceleration was due to transitory factors such as the adjustment in relative 
prices which accompanied the raising of the free market exchange rate. The backbone rate of 
inflation —the growth rate of wage costs— actually went down in 1981 (see table 1 and figure 1). 
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However, the evolution of the monetary aggregates and the financial situation of the public 
sector differed in many important respects and amounts from what had been planned. A 
noteworthy feature was the stagnation of the money supply of the economy and the big expansion 
in the fiscal deficit. Because of this and of the reduction in the growth rate of the level of activity, 
the sharp increase in the deficit on current account and the decline in the net inflow of capital, 
some corrections began to be made in the economic policy in the second half of the year. 
As in previous years, the vigorous expansion of the product in 1981 reflected very similar 
increases in the output of goods, basic services and other services. At the sectoral level, the most 
outstanding increases were once again those registered in construction (16.2%), electricity, gas 
and water (13.8%) and crop farming production (8.7%). There was no sector where the level of 
activity did not increase by at least 7% except stock-raising (3.2%) and forestry (4.8%). 
Table 1 
PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at factor cost 
(millions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money (M,) 
Wages and salaries' 
Rate of unemployment 
Current income of central government 
Total expenditure of central government 
Fiscal situation/total expenditure 





































Millions of dollars 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 
Disbursed gross external debt 






























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
' Real wages of manual workers in Greater Asunción. 
Annual average rate in Greater Asunción. 
Percentage. 
Medium and long-term public and State-guaranteed private debt. 
"Disbursed gross external debt, less holdings of net foreign assets in the economy. 
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The increase in production was accompanied by a considerable further drop in the rate of 
open unemployment, which stood at only a little over 2% of the labour force at the end of June in 
Greater Asunción. With this evolution, the economy completed the absorption of virtually all the 
labour force which was unemployed (12%) at the beginning of the present growth cycle, the rate 
of expansion of the supply of labour being estimated at 3-3% per year for this period. Inflation, for 
its part, evolved erratically in 1981. Thus, in the first months of the year there was a marked 
acceleration, with the rate rising from a monthly variation of 0.3% in December to 5.2% and 4.9% 
in January and February, respectively, according to the consumer price index. Subsequently, there 
was a very marked turnaround, since between February and July the level of prices actually 
dropped. This downward trend was reversed, however, as from August, and in the last quarter of 
the year monthly variations of the order of 2% were recorded. Consequently, the total rise in the 
level of prices during the year came to 15%, compared with 9% the year before. The resurgence in 
the rate of inflation was due mainly to the drop in the production of crops for the domestic market 
and the sudden rise in the exchange rate on the parallel market as from June. The growth rate of 
backbone inflation actually went down in 1981, after having risen during the previous three years, 
this being due to the notable slackening in wage increases, especially in the second half of the year. 
Also in contrast with previous years, the evolution of both external prices and the monetary 
aggregates helped to moderate the rise in the general level of domestic prices. 
As regards the evolution of wages and salaries, the strong pressure on the labour market, 
together with an increase equivalent to 15% of the legal minimum wage decreed on 1 May for all 
private sector wages and salaries, resulted for the third year running in an average annual increase 
of 20% in the average nominal wage of manual workers in Asunción and an increase of 12% in the 
average nominal wages of agricultural workers. Furthermore, although inflation speeded up in 
terms of the December-December figures, in terms of the variation between annual averages it 
went down very considerably from over 22% in 1980 to 13% in 1981. Consequently, the size of the 
increase in the average nominal wage of manual workers in the capital meant a significant 
improvement in their real wages. In the case of agricultural workers, however, the reduction in the 
annual average rate of inflation was not sufficient to offset the smaller rise in their nominal wages. 
Since its growth rate began to speed up in 1973, the expansion of the economy has been 
propelled, on the supply side, mainly by the consolidation and intensive expansion of the 
agricultural frontier. Another important influence was the large and sustained increase in imports 
up to 1980. On the demand side, its dynamism has originated mainly in the domestic market, and 
particularly in investment in construction. In financing the acceleration of growth, in contrast, the 
external sector has played a decisive role. In 1981 the expansion of economic activity continued to 
be based mainly on these factors. Thus, according to preliminary data the cultivated area was 
expanded by over 7%, which is a similar rate to that registered in previous years and is sufficient 
alone to account for around 90% of the growth in agricultural production. This, together with the 
increase in forestry activities (whose growth is intimately linked with the expansion of the 
agricultural frontier) and in stock-raising, directly accounted for 25% of the increase in the global 
product. Imports once again grew much less strongly than in the 1970s, however, and this, 
together with the reduction in the growth rate of exports, weakened the dynamism of the trade 
sector, which is the largest in the economy. This was one factor in the slowing down of the overall 
growth rate of the economy; the other was the marked reduction, likewise for the second 
consecutive year, in the growth rate of investment, which declined from almost 16% in 1980 to a 
little over 9% in 1981. This was due both to a reduction in absolute terms in investment in 
machinery and equipment and to the slackening in the growth rate of investment in construction. 
Both results are closely connected with the termination of the construction stage of the Itaipú 
project and the lower level of activity than had been expected on the Yacyretá project, as well as the 
unusually sharp rise in domestic interest rates. 
At all events, investment in construction continued to be a key source of growth, since its 
expansion in 1981 was equivalent to 38% of the increase in the product. As regards the financing 
of investment, the contribution made by external savings once again increased appreciably in 1981, 
according to official statistics. 
609 
Figure 1 
PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Urban unemployment"3 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data 
^Annual growth rate. 
^Annual average growth rate in Greater Asuncion. 
cFirst half of year. 
^Percentage variation, December - December. 
eMillions of dollars. 
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Thus, in 1981 the current account deficit expanded more than domestic investment for the 
fifth consecutive year. This result reflected not only the slowing down of investment but also the 
considerable decrease in the volume of registered exports —which fell below the level already 
reached in 1978— and the increase in net factor payments. The sharp increase in the external gap, 
together with a decrease in the net inflow of capital after eight years of intensive growth, gave rise 
to a considerable reduction in the balance-of-payments surplus. The international reserves hardly 
grew at all in real terms, and they went down slightly in relation to the inflow of imports of goods 
and services. The gross disbursed external debt, for its part, increased by a little over 10%, 
although in relation to the gross domestic product it went down for the third consecutive year. In 
contrast, net external indebtedness increased for the first time in four years, essentially because of 
the smaller accumulation of reserves. Even so, however, it barely represented more than 4% of the 
gross domestic product at the end of 1981.1 
The evolution of registered external trade in 1981 was affected mainly by the significant 
increase in the exchange rate on the parallel market and the considerable deterioration in the 
effective real fixed official exchange rate due to the fluctuations between the currencies of the 
various countries with which Paraguay trades and the maintenance of the nominal dollar parity of 
the official guaraní. These exchange rate movements discouraged the export trade and stimulated 
imports in the areas where the off icial exchange rate prevails. Another factor in the lower growth 
rate of the value of exports was the decline in sales to the binational bodies. 
The net inflow registered on the capital account, for its part, was depressed by the marked rise 
in interest rates abroad and the corresponding exchange instability on international, regional and 
domestic markets, which encouraged the outflow of private capital and discouraged domestic 
demand for external credits. Another factor which helped to reduce the surplus on the capital 
account was the smaller inflow of capital from Itaipú and Yacyretá. 
In the light of the adverse evolution of external events and their domestic repercussions, the 
forecasts made at the end of the previous year when formulating the fiscal and monetary policies 
naturally began to show increasing disparities with reality, especially from the second half of the 
year onwards. Thus, the public sector deficit, and that of the central government in particular, 
reached a much higher level than that budgeted, due mainly to larger expenditure but also to the 
smaller tax receipts, while the money supply did not grow at all, although an increase of the order 
of 20% had been programmed. This result was due mainly to the weak evolution of net foreign 
assets, but it was also considerably influenced by a very large and completely unexpected reduction 
in the demand for money. 
Rather than generating inflationary pressures or leading to excessive appropriation of 
domestic credit, however, the deficit expenditure had essentially beneficial effects, since it helped 
to keep up the growth rate of global demand both directly and indirectly, partly compensating for 
the depressive effects of the stagnation in the net inflow of capital on the growth of the monetary 
base and the money supply, and it ultimately moderated the rise in domestic interest rates. 
Moreover, it should be emphasized that the acute limitation of the growth in the means of 
payment was not accompanied by a comparable reduction in the growth rate of the economy or of 
inflation. This was due, on the one hand, to the existence of an adequate supply of credit and the 
notable reduction in the marginal demand for money, and on the other to the adjustment of 
relative prices because of the rise in the free market exchange rate. 
In reality, the good performance turned in by the economy as regards the growth of the 
product and employment and the fact that inflation remained at a relatively low rate were 
powerful arguments against making any major changes in economic policy, despite the unexpected 
expansion of the fiscal deficit and the stagnation of the money supply. The exchange instability, 
the reduction in the growth rate of the value of exports, and the considerable increase in the 
current account deficit, in contrast, suggested the desirability of making rather larger changes in 
the external trade policies. 
'The external debt statistics do not include the debts of the binational bodies. 
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At all events, towards the middle of the year measures began to be taken to reduce the effects 
of the international recession. Briefly, in the area of trade policy the exchange rate was changed for 
many exports and imports; in monetary policy, the compulsory legal reserves in respect of time 
deposits were reduced and the interest rates were raised on deposits, including time deposits; and 
in the fiscal area a number of laws and decrees were adopted in mid-year to increase the yield of the 
tax system. It was also decided to reduce considerably the growth rate of expenditure in the coming 
financial year. 
These adjustments in trade, monetary and fiscal policies did not show any very significant 
effects in 1981, either because they only came into effect towards the end of the year or because they 
were of relatively marginal impact. Furthermore, the effects of the international recession on the 
dynamism of the economy had not shown themselves in 1981 in their full magnitude. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) The product and income 
Despite the stagnation of the world economy and the depression of economic activity in some 
of its main external markets, the Paraguayan economy once again grew at a very high rate in 1981, 
since the gross domestic product rose by 8.5 % 2 (see table 2). Although this figure was lower than 
Table 2 
PARAGUAY: SOME FIGURES O N THE PRODUCT, 
INCOME A N D EXPENDITURE 
(Millions of dollars at constant 1970 prices)" 



























































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"At parity exchange rate. 
Preliminary figures. 
2The gross domestic product at market prices or at factor cost grew at the same rate in each of the years shown in 
table 2. 
'The small amount of difference between these two variables, and also the way they have evolved in Paraguay, 
represent an exceptional situation in Latin America and in Third World countries in general. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the net external debt —that is to say, the gross external debt less the gross international reserves— is very small. Thus, 
in 1980 the net external debt (medium and long-term) was only a little over US$ 100 million, so that it continued by a very 
big margin to be the lowest in the region both in absolute terms and in relative terms with respect to the gross domestic 
product. In the same year, interest paid to the exterior came to US$ 81 million while interest received from the exterior 
came to US$ 77 million. This situation has also been influenced by the fact that direct foreign investment has played a 
secondary role in this stage of the country's growth. In 1980, for example, remittances of profits abroad were equivalent to 
less than 1% of the gross domestic product, which is likewise an extremely low proportion in the regional context. 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
Indirect taxes, less 
subsidies 
Gross domestic product 
at factor cost 
Net imports of goods 
and services 
Net factor payments 




Gross national product 




PARAGUAY: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 


































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values, using price indexes calculated by ECLA for the purpose. 
the average rate of expansion registered in the previous four years —when the product grew at the 
exceptionally high average rate of 11.4% per year— it was close to the 9.2% registered over the 
period of rapid growth of the economy which began in 1973. .> 
The gross national product, for its part, increased very nearly as fast as the gross domestic 
product, in spite of the very high interest rates prevailing on international markets.3 The growth 
rate of gross national income was also close to that of the gross domestic product, thanks to the 
reversal of the downward trend in the terms of trade registered in the previous three years. 
(b) Supply and demand 
The growth rate of total supply continued to fall in 1981. Thus, after registering average 
growth of over 11% per year in the period 1975-1979, total supply grew by only 96% in 1980 and 
by only 8% in 1981. In contrast with what had happened the year before, however, the decline in 
the growth rate of total supply in 1981 was due to the slackening of the growth of the gross 
domestic product (see table 3). 
On the demand side, the growth of the product was propelled, as in the previous two years, by 
the expansion in domestic demand, which rose by a little over 9% whereas the volume of exports 
of goods and services went down by a little over 7%. In 1981, however, there was an important 
change in the relative weights of the expansion of investment and of consumption in the growth 
process, since the growth rate of gross fixed investment went down markedly from 15.6% in 1980 
to a little over 9% in 1981 (in the previous four years it had averaged around 22%). The growth 
rate of consumption, for its part, rose from 8% in 1980 to over 9% in 1981, this variation being 
due mainly to the higher growth rate of private consumption (see table 3). 
The expansion of domestic demand, for its part, which was somewhat smaller than in the 
previous two years, was due in 1981 mainly to the increase in domestic income and, in particular, 
the appreciable increase in real wages after their reduction in the previous two years, plus the big 
expansion in employment. Furthermore, unlike what had happened in the past, in 1981 the 
growth in the means of payment was not a factor which helped to activate domestic demand. On 
the contrary, in 1981 M, grew by barely 0.1% in nominal terms, whereas in the previous four years 
it had grown by around 30% per year. The expansion in domestic credit came to the moderate 
figure of approximately 18%, but net foreign assets increased very slowly, whereas savings and 
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time deposits grew sharply in response to the rise in interest rates. The latter, in turn, were an 
important factor in slowing down the increase in investment. Fiscal policy, for its part, helped to 
keep a high growth rate of domestic demand and especially of consumption, since the planned 
level of expenditure was appreciably exceeded in spite of the fact that revenue was lower than 
budgeted. 
Side by side with the process of intensive growth which has taken place in Paraguay in the last 
10 years, there have been important changes in the structure of supply and demand (see table 4). 
Particular note should be taken of the great effort of accumulation, which rose from the equivalent 
of less than 17% of the product in 1972 to 22% in 1975 and 30.5% in 1978, reaching almost 35% 
in 1981. Also worthy of note is the evolution of private consumption, which dropped from the 
equivalent of over 76% of the product in 1972 to less than 65 % in 1981, even though it grew at an 
average annual rate of 8% over this period. Another feature worthy of close attention is the 
pattern of evolution of the share of imports and exports in supply and demand, particularly 
noteworthy being the performance of exports, which were equivalent to a smaller proportion of 
the gross domestic product at the end of the period than at the beginning (see table 4). 
(c) Investment and saving 
As in the previous year, the increase in investment reflected exclusively the expansion in 
gross fixed investment in construction, for investment in machinery and equipment went down by 
5% after having stagnated in 1980. In 1981, gross fixed investment expenditure on construction 
came to the exceptional proportion of 21.7% of the gross domestic product. In 1973, before the 
construction of Itaipú was begun, the corresponding figure was a little over 8%. Investment in 
machinery and equipment, for its part, was equivalent to 11.2% of the gross domestic product, its 
peak in relative terms having been reached in 1977, when it was equivalent to 14% of the product 
(see table 5). 
In addition to the depressive effect of the pronounced rise in real interest rates, the slowing 
down of the growth rate of investment was due partly to the approach of the final stages of the 
construction of Itaipú and a lower level of activity than foreseen in the works at Yacyretá. 
Table 4 
PARAGUAY: STRUCTURE OF TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
(As a percentage of the gross domestic product)" 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"At market prices in constant 1970 dollars, using the parity exchange rate. 
Preliminary figures. 
T h e figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 




















































































































PARAGUAY: COMPOSITION, ORIGIN AND FINANCING OF 
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
(As a percentage of the gross domestic product)0 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981* 




Machinery and equipment 
Changes in stocks 
Gross domestic saving 
Net factor payments to 
rest of worldc 
Terms-of-trade effect 
Gross national saving 
Private sector 
Public sector 1.3 4.7 4.7 3.4 3.5 5.4 6.6 7.3 5.2 3.1 
External saving 0.8 1.5 2.7 3.5 2.9 1.9 3.4 4.7 4.8 5.8 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the Ministry of Planning. 
"At market prices in constant 1970 dollars at the parity exchange rate. 
Preliminary figures. 
'Including private non-compensatory transfer payments. 
In 1981, public investment grew more than private investment, in contrast with what had 
happened in the previous four years. Nevertheless, in the last five years public sector gross fixed 
investment expenditure has gone down from the equivalent of 9% of the product to 7.3%, after 
having markedly increased in the previous four years. In contrast, private investment rose from 
the equivalent of 16% of the product in 1976 to over 27% in 1981. 
Gross domestic saving, for its part, continued to grow at a rapid rate, but for the first time in a 
decade it did not increase faster than the gross domestic product, for it amounted to the equivalent 
of 29-4% of the product in 1981, compared with almost 30% the year before. In 1972, the 
corresponding proportion was 16%. Over this period, both the amount and the growth rate of 
gross national saving have been very similar to those of domestic saving, since net factor service 
payments have been more or less compensated for by the gains obtained through the very 
favourable evolution of relative international prices (see table 5). 
(d) Sectoral evolution of the product 
(i) Introduction. The extraordinary expansion of Paraguay's economic activity from 1972 
onwards has been propelled by relatively balanced growth in the production of goods, basic 
services and other services, and even at a more disaggregated level the expansion of the various 
sectors has been not only generalized but also quite balanced. The exceptions to this are electricity 
and construction, which have grown much faster than the rest of the economy. This general 
pattern of expansion was continued in 1981, when the production of both goods and other services 
increased by close to 9%, while that of basic services grew by 10%. The construction product 
increased by 16%, while that of electricity, gas and water rose by almost 14%. All the other sectors 
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increased their activity by amounts varying between approximately 7% and 9%, except in the case 
of mining and quarrying, whose weight in the economy is only slight (see table 6). 
(ii) Agriculture. As in previous years, agricultural activity expanded more slowly than that of 
the economy asa whole, even though it led the region in growth. In 1981, crop farming maintained 
its extraordinary dynamism, since it increased its production by over 8%, thus once again coming 
close to the average rate of expansion of the rest of the economy and doubling the level of 
production of only nine years before. Stock-raising, for its part, grew by 3.2%, which is a little 
below the growth rates achieved in recent years and considerably below the average registered 
between 1972 and 1980. The growth rate of forestry also went down, in this case by a larger 
amount, for after increasing by 11.4% per year in the previous three years (and by 7.9% in the 
period 1972-1980), its product grew by a little under 5% in 1981 (see table 7). 
As in the past, the expansion of crop farming was propelled by the increased output of 
products for the external market.4 Altogether, the value of the output of these crops grew by 17% 
at constant prices: the same amount as the year before and similar to the performance registered 
since the beginning of the previous decade. This performance was once again decisively influenced 
by soya beans and cotton, despite the unfavourable evolution of their respective prices, which went 
down by 3 % and 9%. The volume of production of both soya beans and cotton increased by around 
Table 6 
PARAGUAY: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COTS 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, 
and fishing 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transports, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Commerce (wholesale and retail), 
restaurants and hotels^ 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and personal 
services 
Government services 
Millions of dollars 




























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
'Includes financial institutions, insurance and real estate, except ownership of dwellings. 
Include restaurants and hotels. 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Including hunting and fishing. 
Thousands of head. 
35 %, and between 1972 and 1981 the physical output of these two crops has increased by factors of 
8.8 and 7.8, respectively. Production figures for the other crops which are traded in important 
amounts abroad gave uneven results. Thus, for example, coconuts went down by 2%, castor oil 
seeds and peanuts remained more or less unchanged, tung increased by 5% and coffee by 14%. 
As regards crops which are consumed mainly on the domestic market, there was a slight 
decline in the total value of their harvests in 1981, after two years of very favourable results. This 
decline mainly reflected the considerable drop in the sugar cane harvest, but several crops, 
including for example bananas (-10%), onions (-5%), alfalfa (-3%) and maize (-2%), had smaller 
harvests in 1981. On the other hand, very high growth rates were registered for certain agricultural 
products sold locally, such as wheat (26.4%) and sunflower (35%), which were not produced in the 
country five years ago. A considerable influence in the reduction of output of foodstuffs for local 
consumption was the bad weather, for the drought in the first half of the year adversely affected 
the sugar cane harvest, while the frosts in July, which (together with those of 1975) were the 
severest recorded in the history of the country, did much damage to the maize, sugar cane, 
vegetable and banana crops. 
The small decline in the growth rate of stock-raising activity compared with previous years 
was due to slight drops in the growth rates of several of the main branches. On the other hand, as in 
recent years, the expansion of this subsector continued in spite of the persistence of the crisis in 
cattle-raising activity, thanks to a substantial process of diversification to more profitable activities 
such as the raising of pigs and poultry and the production of eggs, milk and honey. 
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Millions of guaraníes 
at 1977 prices 






















































































































































































The noteworthy drop in the growth rate of the forestry subsector was due almost exclusively 
to the stagnation in the production of roundwood for industrial use, since the other branches grew 
at similar rates to those of the previous year. 
On the supply side, the dynamism of Paraguayan agriculture originally stemmed from and has 
since been sustained by the vigorous expansion of the agricultural frontier. This process has been 
promoted by heavy migration from the traditional area of settlement of the population in the so-
called minifundio zone around Asunción to the periphery of the eastern region and also by large-
scale immigration of settlers from Brazil and other countries to frontier areas. 
Since 1963, when the Agrarian Statute was promulgated and the Rural Welfare Institute 
(IBR) was set up, agricultural policy —supported by the extension of infrastructure and basic 
services— has promoted and facilitated the resettlement of the rural population, although in the 
1970s the settlement and opening up of the agricultural frontier had a rather spontaneous 
character. 
In addition, the expansion of the cultivated area was encouraged for many years by the very 
favourable evolution of the international prices of crops which are highly suited to the soil and 
climatic conditions of the areas of new settlement. More recently, however, the behaviour of the 
international prices in question has been much less favourable, although the sustained increase in 
output in recent years gives grounds for assuming that such crops as soya beans and cotton 
continue to give substantial profits. 
As regards settlement, the IBR issued preliminary title deeds in respect of 4 316 agricultural 
units with a total area of 473 267 hectares. It also delivered 4 054 final title deeds in respect of an 
area of 728 885 hectares. Of this total, 3 338 title deeds in respect of an area of 720 203 hectares 
corresponded to purchase transactions, while the remainder were issued free of charge. With these 
issues, almost 72 000 final title deeds have been delivered since 1963 in respect of an area of over 
5 million hectares. These figures corresponded to approximately 23% of the families 
economically active in the agricultural sector in 1980 and approximately 26% of the cultivated land 
and pastures in the same year.5 
(iii) Manufacturing. According to a preliminary estimate, manufacturing expanded by 8%, 
which although a good deal lower than the 12.6% recorded the year before was nevertheless 
similar to the average growth rate (8.6%) observed since 1972. Although statistics on production 
by subsectors in 1981 are not available, some data on the physical output of certain main 
manufactures suggest that there was substantial growth in two of the most important subsectors. 
Thus, in the foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco subsector the physical output of sugar went down by 
14 % but that of wheat flour increased by 2 3 %, that of soft drinks by 25 %, and that of cigarettes by 
17%, while in the textiles, clothing and leather products subsector, although there was a 4% 
decline in the output of cotton textiles there was significant expansion in the production of cotton 
fibres (see table 8). 
During the year, 213 investment projects were accepted for the fiscal and tariff benefits given 
by law No. 550 on the promotion of investments. These projects envisaged investments totalling 
27.4 million guaraníes, compared with the total of 26.3 million guaraníes for 248 projects 
originally committed the year before. As regards the level of gross domestic fixed capital 
investment, the investments committed in 1981 were equivalent to around 14% of the total gross 
domestic fixed capital investment in that year. The year before the corresponding proportion had 
been 17%. Moreover, 78% of the value of the investments accepted for benefits in 1981 was 
scheduled to be made in the interior of the country, that is to say, outside Asunción. Over 10.5 
million out of the total of 26.3 million corresponds to two projects of the National Cement 
'See Rural Welfare Institute, Memoria (various issues); CELADE; and Ministry of Agriculture, Department of 
Censuses. It should be noted that the title deeds issued include some properties which are not used for agricultural activities, 
but these are only a small fraction of the total. It should also be borne in mind that the total area of land occupied by the 
agricultural units is greater than the area actually devoted to crops and pastures. When the results of the 1981 Agricultural 
Census become available, it will naturally be possible to make a better appraisal of the repercussions of the agrarian reform 




PARAGUAY: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Gross manufacturing 
product (millions of 
guaraníes at 1977 prices) 
Foodstuffs, beverages 
and tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and 
leather 
Wood and furniture 









Output of some of the 
main manufactures 




















































































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Industry. One of them involves the modernization and expansion of the existing plant, while the 
other refers to the installation of a new plant. In the first case, the present plant will be turned over 
from the wet system of production to the dry system, and its installed capacity will be expanded 
from 200 000 tons per year to 480 000 tons. In the second case, a plant with a production capacity 
of 600 tons will be built. On completion of these projects, the total production capacity of the 
country will have increased fivefold. 
Another project, which is already operating, is that for the production of absolute alcohol. At 
the end of 1980, the production of absolute alcohol began in the first of six factories to be 
constructed in line with the national plan for fuel substitution. Production of a 5 % blend with 
gasoline began in March, with the proportion rising by the end of the year to 12%. It is planned to 
arrive finally at a blend of 20% of alcohol with 80% of gasoline. 
(iv) Construction. In 1981, the growth rate of construction went down markedly, for after 
growing at a rate of almost 30% per year in the five-year period 1976-1980, the product of the 
sector increased by only a little over 16% in 1981 (see table 6). 
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The smaller growth of construction reflected the slowing down of the growth rate of 
construction activity on the Itaipú project. At the same time, there was a decline in the growth rate 
of the demand for housing, because of the sharp rise in interest rates. Even so, this sector continued 
to be the most dynamic, since in addition to the work still being carried on at Itaipú there was an 
increase —although to a lesser extent than planned— in the rate of execution of the ancillary 
works for the Yacyretá hydroelectric plant, including the great bridge which will provide the first-
ever land link between Paraguay and Argentina at the level of Encarnación and Posadas. In 
addition, work was stepped up on a number of road projects in various regions of the country, such 
as the Trans-Chaco highway and Route No. 6, which will link Puerto Stroessner (Itaipú) and 
Encarnación (Yacyretá), thus opening up to settlement an extensive and fertile region which has 
so far been little exploited. 
(v) Basic services. In 1981, the total product of basic services increased by 10%, compared 
with growth of 13% in 1980 and 14% in 1979. Both electricity, gas and water production and 
transport, storage and communications grew more slowly than in the last two years. Thus, the first 
of these expanded by 14% in 1981, compared with the increase of almost 19% in each of the 
previous two years, whereas the second grew by 8 % in 1981 after growth rates of 10.5 % in 1976 
and 11.5% in 1979 (see tableó). 
In the course of the year, work continued in line with the schedule of activities for the 
execution of the Paraguayan-Brazilian binational Itaipú project, which will be the biggest 
hydroelectric plant in the world. By the end of 1981, most of the construction of the basic works 
was complete, and in line with the schedule of activities it was planned that the dam would be filled 
by October 1982; the experimental functioning of the first three turbines would be carried out in 
the first quarter of 1983, and the plant would enter into commercial operation in March 1986. 
When the last turbines have been installed in 1989, Itaipú will have a capacity of 12.6 million MW 
and will be capable of generating a maximum of 66 240 GW of electricity per year: twice the power 
of the biggest dam at present in existence. 
Table 9 






































































Source: Department of Statistics and Censuses, Encuesta de hogares. La muestra mano de obra (several issues), and data 
supplied to ECLA. 
"In addition to Asunción, includes Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and the urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo. 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Defined here as the difference between the global balance of payments and the trade balance, plus the use made of IMF 
credit. 
'Deflated by the prices of imports of goods and services. 
Gross international reserves and imports of goods and services for each year. 
'At market prices in 1970 dollars at the parity exchange rate. 
Including the terms-of-trade effect. 
Paraguay will have at its disposal half of the energy which Itaipú is capable of generating. As 
this share will probably be about 20 times the domestic demand projected for 1989, on the basis of 
its present evolution, the country is faced with the challenge of deciding how to make the best 
possible use of this remarkable opportunity for growth and development.6 
Preliminary work also continued on the other binational hydroelectric project, Yacyretá, 
which is being carried out in conjunction with Argentina. At the end of the year, however, it was 
expected that its execution would be delayed, perhaps indefinitely, because of circumstances 
mainly beyond the control of Paraguay. 
(vi) Employment and unemployment. Thanks to the great dynamism of the economy, and 
especially that of the sectors making most intensive use of labour, the rate of open unemployment 
6This matter was analysed in greater detail in last year's Economic Survey. See CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin 
America, 1980, United Nations, Santiago, Chile, 1981, pp. 435-436. 
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went down from around 12% in 1973 to less than 7% in 1976 and 4% in 1978. To judge from the 
results of the household survey carried out in Greater Asunción, it would appear that in the first 
half of 198i;if not before, the economy reached a level of full employment and perhaps even over-
employment of the labour force. Thus, in the first half of 1981 the rate of unemployment in 
Greater Asunción was down to only 2.2% of the labour force, the rates for men and women being 
more or less the same. Furthermore, in the same period the rate of unemployment among workers 
of primary working age (25 and over), did not even amount to 1% (it was in fact 0.6%) (see 
table 9). 
The absorption of the existing unemployment, together with the employment of the 3.3% 
increase in the labour force, took place side by side with estimated expansion of the gross 
productivity of the labour force by an average of around 4.5% per year during the period 1972-
1981. 
3. The external sector 
(a) Introduction 
The evolution of the external sector in 1981 was characterized by the reversal of several of the 
main tendencies which had been observed since the beginning of the stage of rapid growth of the 
economy. Thus, there was a noteworthy drop in the volume of exports of goods and services, which 
fell to a level below that already reached in 1978, and there was also a substantial drop in the new 
inflow of capital, after eight years of uninterrupted rapid growth, so that there was a very 
appreciable decline in the import capacity, which sank to a level of 6% lower than that of 1978 and 
13% below that of 1979 (see table 10).7 These developments, together with an increase in the 
volume of imports of goods and services, meant a further increase in the current account deficit and 
a substantial drop in the balance-of-payments surplus, which went down from an amount 
equivalent to 2.6% of the gross domestic product in 1980 to one equivalent to 0.6% in 1981. The 
gross international reserves barely grew at all in real terms, and actually went down slightly in 
relation to the flow of imports of goods and services, after having risen vigorously year after year in 
the past decade. The gross disbursed external debt, for its part, increased at a relatively modest rate, 
and for the third consecutive year it went down as a proportion of the gross domestic product, 
occupying a level similar to that of 1975 (see table 10). 
The evolution of registered foreign trade in 1981 was conditioned mainly by the significant 
rise in the free market exchange rate of the guaraní, which amounted to 24% between the end of 
the first and last quarters, and by the sharp deterioration in the effective real fixed exchange rate, 
which amounted to over 16% for exports and nearly 11 % for imports, on average, between 1980 
and 1981 (see table 11 and figure 2).8 9 These exchange movements discouraged exports, while 
7The import capacity had already declined in 1980.because of the sharp rise in import prices. 
'Since its establishment in 1973, the free market had determined an exchange rate for the guaran! which was very 
stable and relatively close to the fixed official exchange rate. Thus, between 1973 and 1980 its annual average value did not 
vary by more than 7% between top and bottom levels, and it only exceeded the fixed official exchange rate by 10% in two 
years (1975 and 1977). In 1980, it was only 1.5% more than in 1973. From June 1981 onwards, however, a pronounced and 
erratic upward movement began. Thus, between the beginning of June and the beginning of August it rose from around 140 
guaraníes per dollar to almost 185 guaraníes per dollar. By mid-September it had gone down to 160 guaraníes per dollar, but 
subsequently it rose again to 175 guaraníes per dollar in early November, only to go down again to 160 guaraníes per dollar 
at the end of that month. At the end of the year, it was once again close to 180 guaraníes per dollar. 
9
 It should be noted that the indexes given in table 11 not only take account of the evolution of relative prices, but also 
of all the currencies of the main countries with which Paraguay trades. Furthermore, it should be noted that the marked and 
sometimes contradictory movements occur as a result of imbalances in the geographical distribution of external trade 
between registered and non-registered exports and imports. Much could be said about the evolution of these indexes in 
recent years, but here note should simply be taken of the sharp drop in the effective real (official) exchange rate in 1981, 
when this rate fell to its lowest level in the last decade, and the notable opposing movements between the official and free 
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Source: Statistical Appendix of the present Survey. 
Note: 1 These indexes are obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1A). The products are then added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. These 
indexes were calculated on the basis of the official exchange rate of 126 guaraníes per dollar, for more details, see 
the introduction to the Statistical Appendix at the end of Part Two of this Survey. 
2 These indexes correspond to a weighted average of the real exchange rate indexes for Paraguay with respect to 
Argentina, Brazil, the United States, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germary, Italy and France, according to the 
relative participation of the non-registered trade flows between Paraguay and these countries. In calculating these 
indexes the floating free market exchange rate was used (table IB). 
3 This corresponds to a weighted average of columns 1 and 2, according to the effective participation of Paraguay's 
main trading partners in its exports and imports (registered and non-registered). 
stimulating imports through the official channels, where the fixed exchange rate prevails. The 
evolution of exports of goods and services shown by the official figures was also influenced by the 
marked drop in the growth rate of sales to the binational bodies.10 
Outstanding among the factors which influenced the smaller net inflow registered on the 
capital account in 1981 were the marked rise in international interest rates and the corresponding 
exchange rate instability in the international and domestic markets, which encouraged the outflow 
of short-term private capital and depressed domestic demand for external credits, both directly and 
indirectly through their effects on the demand for foreign credits in connection with imports of 
goods and services. The balance on capital account was also affected by the smaller growth rate of 
the capital flows from Itaipú and Yacyretá and the decline in the expansion of gross domestic 
investment not directly related to Itaipú and Yacyretá. 
Apart from the crucial role played by the revaluation of the dollar vis-à-vis all the other hard 
currencies, the instability and rise of the free market exchange rate for the guaraní were 
considerably influenced by the enormous devaluations of the currencies of the neighbouring 
10As regards the evolution of total external trade, including unregistered trade and the imports generated by Itaipú and 
Yacyretá, it may be noted that despite the marked deterioration in the effective real official exchange rate, perhaps due 
partly to the rise in the guaraní in the free market, the production and supply of agricultural export goods was sufficient to 
more than offset the negative effect of the stagnation and even decline in the levels of activity and demand on the main 
export markets, although the growth rate of total exports went down appreciably. In the case of imports, their lower 
growth rate compared with previous years would appear to reflect mainly the marked flagging in the growth of gross 
domestic investment. Moreover, it should be noted that, as happened in the case of the exchange rate for exports, the 
potential effects of the pronounced drop in the (effective real official exchange rate on the demand for imports were 
partially offset by the marked rise in the effective real free market exchange rate. 
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Figure 2 
PARAGUAY: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
INDEXES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(1980=100) 
Effective real exchange rate index 








Effective real exchange rate index 
(at floating free market exchange rate) 
Exports 

















1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
Source: Statistical Appendix of the presente Survey. 
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countries with which Paraguay carries on active trade.1112 The outflow of domestic private capital 
was also both a cause and an effect of the movements of the guarani on the free market. 
In the face of the international and regional events which were adversely affecting the 
development of external trade and the global balance of payments in 1981, the authorities took 
various compensatory exchange and monetary measures. In the area of exchange policy and 
foreign trade in general, it was decided to increase the exchange rate effectively applied for certain 
export products by reducing the export taxes on some and lowering the appraised value for 
others.13 u Thus, in July the taxes on exports of vegetables, pulses and fruit were reduced by 50%, 
in August the tax on income deriving from exports of meat was eliminated, and in October the 
appraised value of six of the main types of export products was reduced by amounts varying from 
4% for raw cottonseed oil in drums to 10% for raw bulk tung oil.15 On the import side, the list of 
imports channelled through the free exchange market16 was expanded in August, and in 
September the prior deposits in respect of imports financed with foreign exchange obtained on the 
free market were eliminated while at the same time such imports were made subject to an 
exchange tax of 8%. In addition, Law No. 550, which regulates the system of incentives for the 
promotion of domestic economic activity, was modified during the year with a view to increasing 
the effective protection given to certain activities through the elimination of the tax exemptions in 
respect of imported raw materials which are also produced in the country. Another important 
measure was the decision that, from August onwards, the river and ocean transport of the entire 
external trade of the country would be reserved for ships flying the Paraguayan flag or those of the 
other member countries of ALADI. Finally, it may be noted that in September the commercial banks 
were authorized for the first time to operate in the free exchange market, in the hope that the 
greater competition thus generated would reduce the violent fluctuations which had been affecting 
the free exchange rate since the middle of the year. 
"The fact that the official exchange rate for the guaraní was kept fixed with respect to the dollar, which was rising 
sharply on international markets, meant a marked reduction in the real official exchange rates for the guaraní with respect 
to almost all the main world currencies. These variations ranged from 7% with respect to thejapanese yen to 24% with 
resp'ect to the Deutschmark and the Dutch guilder (see the Statistical Appendix at the end of the Survey). 
12Argentina, which during the five-year period 1975-1979 absorbed 15% and 4% of the registered and non-registered 
exports of goods of Paraguay and provided more than 17% and 20% of the registered and non-registered imports of goods 
by this country, devalued its currency by over 59% with respect to the dollar (and to the guaran! at the official exchange 
rate) between 1980 and 1981. Brazil, which during the same five-year period purchased 7 % and 18% of registered and non-
registered exports of goods and provided 21% and 56% of registered and non-registered imports of goods by Paraguay, 
devalued its currency by over 43% with respect to the dollar (and the guaraní at the official exchange rate) between 1980 
and 1981. At the regional level, however, it was the devaluation of the Argentine peso which had the main effect in the 
Paraguayan exchange market, since the magnitude of the rise in the exchange rate in Argentina markedly exceeded the rate 
of inflation of that country in relation to the rate of inflation of Paraguay, whereas the increase in the exchange rate in 
Brazil was somewhat less than the Brazilian rate of inflation with respect to the Paraguayan rate. Thus, between 1980 and 
1981 the real (official) exchange rate index for the guaraní with respect to the Argentine peso went down by over 22%, 
whereas the index with respect to the Brazilian cruceiro rose by 2 % (see the Statistical Appendix at the end of this Survey). 
"Exports are subject to various types of taxes, including customs duties and customs surcharges, the exchange tax, and 
the tax on sealed paper and stamps. The total amount of these taxes varies from a minimum of 4.6% (for wooden 
mouldings, wooden cases, parquet, mosaics, panel doors, turned and varnished rollers, and basketwork) to a maximum of 
17.6% (for sawnwood) of the appraised value of the export products. 
MThe appraised value determines the amount of foreign exchange which an exporter is legally obliged to deliver at the 
official exchange rate for each unit sold abroad, as well as the total taxes to be paid. 
"The six types of products favoured by this measure were tung oil, cottonseed oil, cottonseed cake or expeller, 
cottonseed meal or pellets, copra meal or pellets, and cotton fibres. 
,6This expansion represented a considerable increase in the number of products subject to the Regional Trade 
Régime. Under this special régime, imports of selected products from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay are subject to a flat 
rate tax of 15%, which not only simplifies but may appreciably cheapen the imports of these products in relation toother 
imports subject to numerous taxes at higher rates. This cost advantage was partially or wholly offset, however, depending 
on the particular case, by the rise in the free market exchange rate, where the foreign exchange to buy these products has to 
be obtained. This measure represented a de facto change in the average exchange rate prevailing in the economy, and may 
have had effects on inflation and on fiscal revenues. 
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In the area of monetary policy, two main measures were taken to offset the effects of the 
unfavourable external situation. In mid-September the compulsory legal reserve in respect of 
savings deposits with a term of more than 90 days was reduced from 42 % to 30%, and towards the 
end of the month the interest rates on fixed-term savings deposits were increased from 11% to 
13 % per year for deposits with a term of 90 to 180 days and from 11 % to 14 % per year for deposits 
with a term of over 180 days. The reduction in the compulsory legal reserves was designed to 
reduce the cost of financial intermediation and make up, at least partially, for the depressive effects 
of the drop in the net inflow of capital on the growth of the money supply and its upward pressure 
on interest rates for loans. The aim of the increase in the interest rates on deposits, for its part, was 
to reduce the outflow of private short-term domestic capital. 
(b) Trade 
(i) Exports of goods, FOB. In 1981, the current value of registered exports of goods FOB went 
down by almost 5%17 (see table 12). This unfavourable result mainly reflected the marked 
reduction in exports of timber, but it was also influenced by the substantial declines in external 
sales of cake and expellers and tobacco. In contrast, there were substantial increases in some 
branches. Thus, the current value of exports of livestock products rose by 50%, although it 
remained very depressed in comparison with its traditional levels; that of exports of cotton fibres 
grew by more fhan 22%, and external sales of soya beans recovered by 13% after the very sharp 
reduction registered the year before. 
In the depressed demand conditions prevailing on world markets in 1981, there was a 
deterioration in the prices of the great majority of basic commodities, among them the main 
Paraguayan export products. Thus, the international price of soya beans went downby 2.5%, that 
of soya oil fell by over 15%, and the prices of both cotton and timber went down by 9% (see 
table 13). Nevertheless, although this adverse evolution had a negative effect on the growth of 
total exports, the results for registered exports were most decisively influenced by the marked 
Table 12 
PARAGUAY: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB" 
Millions of dollars
 L i J Growth rates 
breakdown 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1970 1981 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Total 257 305 310 296 100.0 100.0 -7.9 18.8 1.7 -4.7 
Main traditional exports 86 92 106 78 69.9 26.6 -15.6 5.1 17.0 -26.6 
Livestock products 32 12 4 7 26.6 2.3 14.9 -62.9 -63.0 53.5 
Timber 20 42 66 36 20.3 12.3 2.2 7.6 57.1 -45.2 
Oils 25 29 26 29 14.0 9.8 -39.1 13-9 -9.1 10.8 
Tobacco 9 9 10 6 9.0 2.2 -32.3 -7.6 18.7 -36.3 
Main non-tradicional
 U6 m m m Wl 64J u -,0 „ . 1 Q 2 U5 
exports 
Cotton fibre 100 99 106 129 6.2 43.7 24.3 -1.4 7.3 22.2 
Oilseeds (soya beans) 38 79 42 48 - 16.1 -31.8 105.0 -46.5 12.9 
Feed-cake and expellers 8 12 22 14 3.9 4.9 -0.7 45.0 82.0 -35.1 
Other exports 25 23 34 27 20.0 8.7 -24.3 4.9 36.5 -22.4 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Does not include, adjustments for exports of goods to the ltaipii and Yaciretá binational bodies. 
17
 As well as non-registered exports of goods FOB, these statistics exclude adjustments in respect of the exports of the 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, (various issues) and International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1981. 
"United States, yellow, CIF, Rotterdam. 
The nominal prices were deflated by world export prices. 
CA11 origins, raw oil, FOB plant, Netherlands. 
Mexican middling grade, CIF Northen Europe. 
' Tropical, wholesale price United Kingdom. 
(11%) decline in the volume exported, which was connected with the unusually large rise in the 
free market exchange rate for the guaraní and the sharp deterioration in the effective official 
exchange rate, rather than with any shortage in the supply of exportable goods. The behaviour of 
the value of registered exports of goods FOB may also have been influenced by the reduction in the 
appraised value of several of the main export products which was decreed in October.18 
(ii) Imports of goods, FOB. In 1981 the current value of imports of goods FOB registered in the 
Central Bank was 2 % smaller than in 1980, after having increased rapidly over the last eight years 
(see table 14).19 This decline was due principally to the drop of 27% in imports of fuels and 
lubricants, but it was also influenced by the marked slackening in the growth rate of external 
purchases of consumer and capital goods. 
Outstanding among the factors responsible for this reversal were the transfer of a large 
number of import goods to the free exchange market in August and the slackening of the growth 
rate of economic activity during the second half of the year.20 Thus, the current value of registered 
imports grew by 18% as between the first half of 1981 and the first half of 1980, but fell by 15 % as 
between the second half of 1981 and the second half of 1980.21 
18
 If adjustments are made for the operations of the binational bodies, no variation is observed in the current value of 
exports of goods FOB between 1980 and 1981 (see table 15). 
19
 In addition to non-registered imports FOB and the FOB imports generated by Itaipú and Yacyretá, these statistics 
exclude imports made in connection with external loans and unilateral official transfer payments and imports connected 
with direct foreign investment. The latter types of imports are included, however, in the balance-of-payments statistics 
given in table 15. 
20Imports financed with foreign exchange obtained on the free exchange market do not figure among the imports 
registered by the Central Bank. 
21If the imports linked with foreign loans, unilateral official transfer payments and direct foreign investment are 
included, then instead of decreasing by 2% imports FOB increased by over 7% in 1981 (see table 15). 
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(iii) Services. Between 1980 and 1981 the current value of total exports of services increased 
by 6% (see table 16). Despite the relatively slow growth of merchandise trade, income in respect 
of transport and insurance increased by 45%. Income from interest, for its part, increased by 17%, 
due mainly to the rise in interest rates abroad, since the country's international reserves did not 
grow much. Income in respect of factor payments, which comes almost exclusively from Itaipú and 
Yacyretá, also grew, but much less (7% ) than the year before (47 %). Income in respect of travel, in 
contrast, went down by 11 %, due largely to the virtual disappearance of the important tourist flow 
from Argentina after the devaluations and decline of activity in that country. 
Imports of services, for their part, increased by almost 16%. The biggest rise was in interest 
payments, which grew by 32.5%. Remittances of profits abroad rose by almost 20%, outlays on 
transport and insurance increased by 18%, and tourism expenditure grew by 10%. 
(iv) The terms of trade. In 1981 the various terms-of-trade indexes showed slight 
improvements after having deteriorated for three years running. The terms-of-trade index for 
goods rose by 2.5 % after having gone down by over 29% between 1977 and 1980, while the terms 
of trade for goods and services rose by over 3% after a total decline of 20% in the previous three 
years (see table 16). As a result, the first index was similar in 1981 to the levels registered before 
the rise in oil prices, while the second stood at a slightly higher level than before the first oil crisis. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that in spite of the rise in oil prices on the one hand and the 
marked concentration of Paraguay's exports in basic commodities on the other, the country's terms 
of trade have been relatively favourable during the last decade. 
(c) The current account balances 
In 1981 the deficits on all the current account balances expanded considerably for the fourth 
consecutive year. Thus, the merchandise deficit grew by 18%, the trade deficit increased by 33%, 
and the current account deficit rose by 36% (see table 15). Between 1977 and 1981, these deficits 
increased respectively, as a proportion of the product, from 0.8% to4.3%, from 1.6% to4.5%, and 
Table 14 
PARAGUAY: IMPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Millions of dollars
 L i J Growth rates 
breakdown 





































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Chemical and pharmaceuticals, textiles and textile manufactures, writing paper, books magazines and brochures. 
Electric appliances and other articles. 
'Paper, cardboard and manufactures thereof, excluding the items listed under " ; miscellaneous items; tyres and tubes; 
base metals, iron and manufactures thereof; spare parts for cars and trucks. 















PARAGUAY: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services' 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services' 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current aacount 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance' 
Total variation in reserves' 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1970-1980: International monetary Fund Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of official 
data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Including adjustments for exports of goods and services to the ltaipú and Yaciretá binational bodies. 
'Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 
monetization or demonetization of gold, allocation or settlement of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to 
revaluation. 
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from 3.4% to 5.8%.22 The expansion of the overall current account deficit in this period is 
attributable mainly to the rapid growth of imports of goods and the stagnation of exports of goods 
in the last two years. The increase in net factor service payments, for its part, had less incidence.23 
(d) The capital account and the global balance of payments 
In 1981, the surplus on the capital account failed to increase for the first time since 1976. 
Indeed, although the surplus registered was very large, it was slightly below that of 1980 (see 
table 15 ). This slight drop, together with the considerable expansion in the current account deficit, 
meant a marked reduction in the global balance-of-payments surplus, and hence also in the growth 
of the gross international reserves. This, in turn, was an important factor in the abrupt slowing 
down of the growth of the money supply and the notable rise in interest rates. 
Table 16 
PARAGUAY: VALUE AND VOLUME OF EXPORTS AND 
IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
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Purchasing power of exports of 





















































































































































-4.4 12.7 50.0 7.8 1.0 -5.7 -4.3 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
22
 These balances include the terms-of-trade effect. 
23It should be recalled that the balance-of-payments statistics given in table 15 exclude non-registered trade and 
imports of goods and services by the binational bodies. 
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The reduction in the net inflow of capital in 1981 compared with the year before was 
influenced by the rise in international interest rates and the international, regional and domestic 
exchange instability, which encouraged the outflow of short-term domestic private capital and 
affected the domestic private demand for external credits. Moreover, there was a substantial 
reduction in the growth of the flows of capital from Itaipú and Yacyretá and a drop in 
disbursements of external capital for the public sector. 
Net imports of capital, which according to the registered figures increased from less than 
US$ 17 million in 1972 to over US$ 430 million in 198024 have played a key role in the present 
phase of growth of the Paraguayan economy, since they have contributed to the import capacity, 
the financing of domestic investment, and the growth of the means of payment. In 1980, for 
example, the net inflows on the capital account provided almost 39% of the gross total import 
capacity, and were equivalent to 21.5 % of gross domestic investment.25 Moreover, in the same year 
the variation in the net international reserves was equivalent to 149% of the increase in the M( 
money supply and 57% of the increase in M2 (Mj plus quasi-money).26 If it persisted, therefore, the 
decline in the growth rate of capital flows would raise new challenges to the economic policy, 
especially in the fields of monetary policy, external trade and energy.27 
(e) The external debt 
After having gone down slightly in 1980, the gross contracted external debt increased by over 
US$ 300 million in 1981, entirely because of the sharp increase in public sector indebtedness (see 
table 17). 28 In contrast, the gross disbursed external debt increased by US$ 88 million, which 
represented a drop of one-third in nominal terms compared with the 1980 increase. The net 
external debt, for its part, grew for the first time in five years because of the marked decline in the 
growth rate of the net foreign assets of the economy.29 In nominal terms, however, it was still 
below the 1975 figure, which not only evidences a remarkable performance in the regional context, 
but also in the context of the intensive economic growth which has taken place in the country 
during this period. As regards the public sector, the total net external debt doubled in 1981, but 
24In real terms, net imports of capital grew at an average annual rate of 33.5% between 1972 and 1980. 
"The gross total import capacity equals the exports of goods and services, plus net imports of capital. 
2<3The variation in the net international reserves is approximately equal to the balance on capital account less the 
balance on current account, plus the increase in short-term external liabilities. In 1980, the variation in the net 
international reserves was virtually equal to the variation in the gross international reserves. 
27The information available to date suggests that there will be stagnation, and perhaps even a decline, in the capital 
account surplus in the course of the coming years, because of the proximity of the last stages of construction of Itaipú and 
the extension by several years of the time schedule for the construction of Yacyretá, and as the income from the sale of 
energy from Itaipú to Brazil will not begin to come in until after the middle of the decade, a stagnation or even reduction of 
the total import capacity may be expected in the next few years. This could well mean an appreciable diminution in the 
growth rate of the economy unless compensatory measures are taken. Already in 1981 the decline in the net inflow of 
capital prevented growth of the money supply because of the further expansion in the current account deficit and the 
traditional monetary policy, which is designed rather to contain the inflationary effects of big balance-of-payments 
surpluses. 
28Of the unusually large increase of US$ 347 million in public sector external indebtedness in 1981,US$ 190 million, 
that is to say 55% of the total, was contracted by a single public enterprise, the National Cement Industry, to finance the 
remodelling and expansion of its installed capacity. Consequently, although obviously the growth of the external public 
debt in 1981 represented a quantitative change with respect to the rate of external indebtedness in previous years, it is not 
clear that this signifies a change in the traditional policy of external indebtedness, which has been characterized by very 
limited use of external resources to finance domestic investments, except incertain years such as 1981 when it was decided 
to carry out a large-scale project. 
29The net foreign assets are equal to the foreign assets (gross international reserves) less the short-term foreign 
liabilities. Consequently, the figures on the net external debt given in tables 17 and 18 show the total medium- and long-
term, public and State-guaranteed private (disbursed) external debt and the short-term external debt of the Central Bank, 
the National Development Bank and the commercial banks. 
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even so it did not reach the level of the nominal amounts registered in the early 1970s. The net 
external private indebtedness, for its part, went down for the second consecutive year. 
As regards the servicing of the external debt, this rose markedly between 1980 and 1981 from 
US$ 160 million to US$ 201 million, due mainly to the increase in interest payments. The net 
servicing of the external debt also grew appreciably during the year (see table 17).M) 
In real terms, the gross disbursed external debt grew between 1972 and 1981 at an average 
annual rate of 6%, if export prices are taken as the deflator, and at 6.6% per year if import prices 
are used as the deflator (see table 18). As a proportion of the gross domestic product,the gross 
dirbused external debt rose from 25% to almost 27% (at the official exchange rate) between 1971 
and 1976, but it subsequently went down steadily to less than 17% of the product in 1981.31 
The net external debt, for its part, went down markedly over the last few years, especially 
from the middle of the past decade and as a proportion of the product. Thus, between 1976 and 
1981 it went down by 55% at constant prices and dropped from 22% to 5% of the gross domestic 
product at the official exchange rate.32 In 1972 it represented more than 30% of the gross domestic 
product at the official exchange rate, and between that year and 1981 it went down by a total of 
Table 17 
P A R A G U A Y : I N D I C A T O R S O F E X T E R N A L I N D E B T E D N E S S 
(Millions of dollars) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19sT 
Gross external debt contracted" 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Gross external debt disbursed 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Net foreign assets 
Public sector 
Private sector^ 
Net external debt 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Gross external debt service 
Capital 
Interest 

































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Medium- and long-term public and State-guaranteed private debt; end-year balances. 
'Foreign assets of Central Bank less short-term foreign liabilities of Central Bank and National Development Bank. 
cForeign assets less short-term foreign liabilities of private commercial banks. 
Interest and capital paid, less interest received. 
30The net servicing of the external debt equals the gross servicing less the income in respect of interest received from 
the exterior. This income is generated by the gross international reserves deposited abroad. 
" In this year the gross disbursed external debt was equivalent to 22.6% of the product at the free market exchange 
rate or 14% at the parity exchange rate. In 1977 the figures were 29% and 19%, respectively (see table 18). 
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PARAGUAY: INDEXES AND RATIOS OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
Disbursed gross external debt" 
At current prices 
Deflated by export prices 
Deflated by import prices 
Disbursed net external debt 
At current prices 
Deflated by export prices 
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As a percentage of GDP 
Disbursed gross external debt 
At fixed exchange rate 
At floating exchange rate' 
At parity exchange rate 
Disbursed net external debt 
At fixed exchange rate 
At floating exchange ratec 
At parity exchange rate 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Medium- and long-term public and State-guaranteed private debt; end-year balances. 
By the Central Bank, at current prices. 
cOn the free market, at current prices. The free market was formally established as from 1973. 
Calculated by ECLA at constant prices. In order to deflate the external debt, the import price index was used. 
'Exports of goods and services, excluding income in respect of interest form abroad. 
Interest and principal paid, less interest received. 
58% in real terms. Consequently, in this period Paraguay was not only the country which grew 
most in Latin America, but also the country which contracted least debt.33 
As a percentage of exports of goods and services, in contrast, the gross servicing of the 
external debt rose considerably in recent years.34 Thus, between 1977, when it declined to a 
relatively low proportion, and 1981, it rose from over 15% to 36%, due mainly to the increase in 
"It is not desired to draw theoretical or practical conclusions by juxtaposing these two notable events, but rather to 
bring out the very special features of the evolution of the Paraguayan economy in recent years. In this respect, it is worth 
referring to the question of the changes which the debts in respect of Itaipú and Yacyretá could signify in the external 
indebtedness of Paraguay. From the point of view of the ownership of Itaipú and Yacyretá, the Government of Paraguay is 
responsible for 50% of the debts of the binational bodies. According to the treaties of Itaipú and Yacyretá, however, and in 
actual fact, the responsibility for contracting and guaranteeing the financing of the works has been assumed by the 
Governments of Brazil and Argentina, respectively. Moreover, the concrete effects of the servicing of this debt on the 
Paraguayan economy will depend on decisions which have not yet been taken regarding the use made of the electric power. 
One alternative for calculating the proportion of the debts in respect of Itaipú and Yacyretá which should be incorporated 
into the external debt of the country would be to work this out as a function of the percentages of the electric power which 
Paraguay decides to use itself, since this decision will determine the amount of foreign exchange which the economy will 
have to provide to service the debts of the binational bodies. 
34
 The figures for servicing exclude income in respect of interest payments received from abroad. 
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interest payments, but also to the notable growth of payments of principal and, in the last two 
years, to the stagnation of exports. The net servicing of the external debt hardly increased at all, 
however, between 1977 and 1980, the only substantial growth being registered in 1981. Even so, in 
the latter yeat it was still well below the gross servicing, and as a proportion of exports it was not 
very much higher than in 1972 (see table 18). 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices 
While inflation had slackened during 1980 from the unusually high rate to which it had risen 
in 1979, in 1981 its behaviour was rather erratic. In the early months of the year there was an 
abrupt and marked increase in the consumer price index, whose growth rate rose from a monthly 
variation of 0.3% in December to 5.2% and 4.9% in January and February, respectively. The 
variation over the previous 12 months, for its part, rose from 8.9% in December to 17.6% in 
February. Subsequently, however, there was a turnaround, since between February and July the 
level of prices actually dropped, and in the latter month the accumulated inflation over the last 12 
months was similar to that registered in December of the year before. This downward trend was 
reversed from August onwards, however, and in the last quarter of the year the accumulated 12 
months' inflation was similar to that registered in the early months of the year. Moreover, the total 
variation in the consumer price index in 1981 came to 15%, compared with 9% in 1980. In spite of 
this acceleration, however, the variation between the annual averages of the consumer price rises 
was a good deal less (13%) in 1981 than in 1980 (22.4%), due essentially to the pronounced 
slackening of inflation during the whole of the latter year with respect to 1979. 
The wholesale price index, for its part, registered an even more variable type of evolution, as 
well as registering a larger rise (19.6%) than the consumer price index. In contrast, the year before 
Table 19 
PARAGUAY: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 











































































































Source: Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Base year 1964. 
Base year 1972. 
cAt market prices. 
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the wholesale price index had even gone down by 2%. The variation between annual averages, for 
its part, rose from a little under 8% in 1980 to a little over 12% in 1981. Finally, it may be noted 
that the increase in the implicit price index of the gross domestic product was virtually the same in 
1981 as the year before (16.8% and 16.6% respectively) (see figure 3 and table 19). 
The evolution of the general level of prices was decisively influenced by the behaviour of food 
prices, which, after having gone down by almost 3% in 1980, increased by over 14% in 1981. In 
contrast, the miscellaneous expenses section, which largely reflects the variations in the prices of 
energy products, had a moderating influence in 1981 after having pushed up the general index in 
the previous two years. There was also a slackening in the rate of increase of clothing prices, but 
housing prices once again rose appreciably, as they have done in recent years. 
The resurgence of inflation displayed by the indexes, especially that of wholesale prices, is 
attributable mainly to the smaller output of foodstuffs for domestic consumption and the unusually 
large increase in the exchange rate. The backbone rate of inflation actually went down markedly in 
1981, after having speeded up in the previous three years, thanks to the sharp reduction in the 
growth rate of nominal wages. Similarly, in contrast with what had happened in previous years, 
the evolution of external prices and of the monetary aggregates had a moderating influence on the 
behaviour of domestic prices. 
After two years of abundant harvests, the production of food to supply the domestic market 
declined by almost 1 % in 1981. The smaller supply of food was especially noticeable in the months 
of January and February, when the index of food prices rose by 13%. This rise was the main 
determining factor in the increase of over 10% shown by the general consumer price index in 
these two months. In the following five months, food prices went down appreciably because of the 
recovery in domestic production and a bigger volume of imports, but from August onwards they 
again began to increase by close to 2% per month because of a new slackening in domestic 
production and the effect of the devaluation of the guaraní. The smaller production of food during 
the year was due to bad weather, since there was a drought in the first half of the year and frosts in 
> the second half. These frosts were the worst on record, except for those of 1975, according to the 
country's meteorological records, and seriously affected many crops. 
The exchange rate began a marked upward movement as from June 1981, after two decades of 
almost complete stability. The number of guaraníes per dollar on the free market increased by over 
19% between the end of the first half of the year and the end of the second half, reaching an 
average of 13% as between 1980 and 1981. This movement, together with the measures taken 
around the middle of the year which transferred a large number of imports from the official 
market, where the fixed exchange rate prevails, to the free market, gave rise to increases of over 
12% in the average exchange rate between the end of June and the end of December, and almost 
8% in terms of the averages between 1980 and 1981. 
With this rise, the declining trend observed in prices between February andjuly was reversed 
as from August, and between the latter month and December the level of prices rose by rather 
more than 6% (see figure 3). The increase in the exchange rate, for its part, was the result of the 
rise in international interest rates and the corresponding exchange instability on the international 
and regional markets. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the resurgence of inflation in the second 
half of the year was a good deal less than the amount of devaluation of the guaraní, even though the 
economy was in a situation of full employment. 
The backbone rate of inflation —that is to say, the growth rate of unit wage costs— not only 
stopped accelerating for the first time in four years, but even went down markedly between 1980 
and 1981, although its annual average variation was somewhat greater in 1981 than in 1980 (see 
table 20)." This new tendency, which was due entirely to the slowing down of nominal wage 
increases, since it is estimated that the growth rate of gross labour productivity also declined, 
"I t should be noted that the data backing up this assertion are based on variables which in some cases were estimated. 
See in this respect footnote (a) of table 20. 
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Figure 3 
PARAGUAY: SHORT-TERM EVOLUTION OF PRICES 
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Source: ECLÁ, on the basis of official data. 
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helped to neutralize to some extent the upward pressures on price levels. On the basis of partial 
data, it would appear that this effect was observed exclusively in the second half of the year 3<s 
The intensity of external inflation, as measured by the variation between annual averages for 
import prices, also slackened very appreciably, so that the rise registered in the domestic prices of 
imports was smaller than in the previous two years in spite of the increase in the exchange rate in 
1981. In previous years, in contrast, external inflation had been one of the main factors promoting 
domestic inflation. It may be noted that it consistently preceded backbone inflation since the early 
1970s up to the present, and exceeded it in the great majority of years in that period (see table 20). 
Finally, the evolution of the monetary variables joined that of wage costs and external prices 
as a factor moderating domestic inflation in 1981. Outstanding in this respect were the 
pronounced slackening in the growth rate of net foreign assets, the notable reduction in the 
monetary multiplier, and the virtual stagnation of the amount of money in the economy. Thus, the 
Table 20 
PARAGUAY: EVOLUTION OF SOME VARIABLES IN THE 
EXTERNAL, LABOUR AND MONETARY SECTORS 
(Index = 100) 
External sector 
External prices of imports 
Domestic prices of imports 
External prices of exports 




Gross labour productivity 
Nominal wages 





Net foreign assets 
Net domestic assets 
Domestic credit 
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Central government (net) 
Other public bodies 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"The labour force statistics were projected by CELADE. Those for employment were estimated on the basis of the 
employment surveys carried out in Greater Asunción by the Department of Statistics and Censuses of Paraguay. The 
index of wages is a weighted average of the wages for manual workers in Asunción and agricultural daily wages (less 
meals), provided by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Agriculture, respectively. 
Negative figures. 
The figures for other net domestic assets were negative throughout the period. 




PARAGUAY: SHORT-TERM EVOLUTION OF THE 
MAIN MONETARY AGGREGATES 
. Net foreign assets 
. Net domestic assets3 
Monetary base 
1
 Money supply 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aNet domestic assets were negative throughout the period (Le., domestic 
liabilities exceeded domestic assets). The signs indicate an increase in the neg-
ative position of the net domestic assets, and vice versa. 
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expansion of net foreign assets, which had risen to over 60% per year in 1977-1978, dropped from 
27.6% in 1980 to 5.4% in 1981. In only five months —from May to October 1981— the twelve-
monthly growth rate dropped violently from 22.3% to 3.9%. The effects of this slackening in the 
growth rate of the monetary base, however, were partially offset by the sharp drop in the deposits 
of the central government with the monetary authority, so that the magnitude of the decline in the 
growth rate of money issued, although very considerable, was a good deal less than it might have 
been. An unusually pronounced reduction in the monetary multiplier, however, which reflected a 
sharp increase in the reserves of the commercial banks, meant that the M[ money supply barely 
grew at all (see table 20 and figure 4). In previous years, the unceasing expansion of liquidity and 
more particularly of foreign assets was not only a key factor in the increase in production, but also 
in the performance of prices. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the stagnation of the 
nominal supply of money in 1981 did not have the effect of checking the growth of the product of 
inflation. Indeed, the velocity of money circulation showed an increase of 26 % in 1981. It should be 
added, however, that in the second half of the year there was a perceptible slackening in the growth 
rate of the product, while inflation became more pronounced because of the increase in the 
exchange rate. 
(b) Wages and salaries 
For the second consecutive year, both the wages paid to manual workers in Asunción and the 
minimum legal wages increased in real terms. Real agricultural daily wages, in contrast, again 
registered a deterioration (see table 21). 
With regard to the wages of workers in Asunción, the real increase in their general index was 
appreciable, since it was over 6%. With this rise, this index recovered from the decline suffered in 
1979, although even so the level reached was still 12% below that registered in 1970. Unlike what 
had happened in previous years, in 1981 the evolution of workers' wages in Asunción was 
relatively similar in the different sectors, except in the case of commerce, where, as in 1980, the rise 
in real terms was very pronounced. In the case of the other activities, the real improvement in 1981 
was between 5.7% (construction and transport, storage and communications) and 7.6% (other 
services). Despite the recoveries observed in the last two years in most activities, however, none of 
them reached even the level of real wages paid before the acceleration of the economic growth rate 
at the beginning of the previous decade. The sector which came closest to the level of real wages 
prevailing in 1970 was construction, and that which was furthest away from this was basic services. 
The legal minimum wages paid in Asunción and Puerto Stroessner increased by a little over 
4 % in real terms, after having grown by 8 % the previous year. Thanks to the progress made in the 
last two years, they have almost recovered the real level which they had in 1970. In the case of other 
cities and rural areas, the legal minimum wages in 1981 were about 4% behind their respective real 
levels of 1970.37 
Average agricultural day wages, for their part, showed a decline in real terms for the fourth 
consecutive year. Thus, the average agricultural day wage, without meals, went down by a little 
over 1 % in 1981 after having fallen by almost 11 % in 1980, by 4.6% in 1979, and by a little over 
3% in 1978. The agricultural day wages which include meals fell by 1.6% in 1981, by 8% in 1980, by 
close to 1 % in 1979, and by 6.6% in 1978.38 Altogether, the average agricultural day wage without 
meals went down by almost 19% in real terms between 1977 and 1981, while the day wage with 
meals fell by 15%. In the period 1972-1977, in contrast, when there was a big deterioration in the 
legal minimum wages and the wages paid to workers in Asunción, real daily wages in the 
agricultural sector rose by an unusually large amount. Thus, between 1972 and 1977 the average 
agricultural day wage (without meals) increased by no less than 44% in real terms.39 For this 
"In 1970, in turn, the real levels of the various legal minimum wages were about 9.5% less than in 1964, when the 
present consumer price index came into effect. 
,8The index for agricultural day wages which include meals only takes account of the cash portion of the wage. 
"Between 1970 and 1972 it had gone down by a little over 5%. 
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reason, despite their steady decline in recent years, and in contrast with the situation prevailing in 
Asunción, rural workers at the beginning of the 1980s were earning real wages which were 
appreciably higher than those paid at the beginning of the 1970s (see table 21). 
Outstanding among the factors which had the most direct influence on the evolution of real 
wages in 1981, as in previous years, were the dynamism of the increase in the demand for labour 
caused by the rate and structure of growth of the product, the Government's wage policy, and the 
intensity and variability of inflation. These factors directly and indirectly affected the evolution of 
Table 21 
PARAGUAY: EVOLUTION OF WAGES 
Index 1970 = 100 Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay, Department of Economic Studies; Ministry 
of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Marketing and Economics; and ministry of Justice and Labour, 
Department of Human Resources. 
"The nominal values were adjusted by the consumer price index. 
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real wages, while of course at the same time they themselves were conditioned by other factors 
such as the inflow of capital, the evolution of prices and interest rates abroad, and other 
government policies, both short-term (fiscal, monetary and exchange) and long-term (land 
settlement, investment). 
It is estimated that in 1981 the increase in employment once again very appreciably exceeded 
the expected growth rate of 3-3% in the labour force, since it is calculated that the number of jobs 
rose by 4.6% —virtually the same rate as the average rate registered during the period of 
accelerated growth of the economy. This pressure on the labour market, which reduced the rate of 
unemployment to only 2.3% of the labour force at the end of the first half of the year,40 together 
with an increase equivalent to 15% of the minimum wage decreed on 1 May,41 was reflected in an 
annual average rise of 20% for the third year running in the average nominal wage of workers in 
Asunción and an increase of 12% in the average nominal wage of agricultural workers. 
Moreover, although inflation persisted, the annual average variation in the consumer price 
index went down drastically from 22.4% in 1980 to 13% in 1981. In these circumstances, the new 
rise of 20% in the nominal average wage for manual workers in the capital meant a considerable 
improvement in their real situation. For agricultural workers, on the other hand, the reduction in 
the annual average rate of inflation was not sufficient to offset the slower rise in their nominal 
wages. 
An interesting feature is the significant deterioration in the real wages of manual workers in 
Asunción in the 1970s in spite of the outstanding dynamism of the economy. If this deterioration 
really took place and is not merely the result of outdated and biased statistics,42 it would appear to 
be attributable mainly to the resurgence, persistence and frequent acceleration of inflation and to 
the government wages policy. At all events, either because real wages dropped considerably or 
even if they rose a little, the contrast between their evolution and that of the economy is very 
marked. 
It is obvious that the deterioration in the real wages of manual workers in Asunción began 
because of inflation, which in turn was caused by external inflation. It is also obvious that 
subsequently the persistence, and especially the frequent acceleration, of inflation continued to 
erode the purchasing power of wages. It is worth noting that in seven of the nine years in the 
period 1971-1979 inflation accelerated, and in six of those seven years the real average wage 
40
 In Asunción, Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and the urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo. 
41The timing and amount of the readjustment are determined on the basis of the behaviour of the consumer price 
index. The legislation in force provides that the minimum wages can be readjusted when an increase of 10% has been built 
up in this index. The amounts of the official readjustments, which are binding in respect of all private sector wages and 
salaries, are calculated in guaraníes as a function of a percentage increase in the legal minimum wage. Thus, for example, a 
person earning twice the legal minimum wage existing before the readjustment in May was entitled to an increase 
equivalent to 7.5% of his wages. On this occasion, however, it was also decided that employers would be entitled, if they 
wished, to deduct from the readjustment any wage increases granted since the last compulsory readjustment in July 1980. 
42The consumer price index dates back to 1964. As is well known, the further one moves away from the base year, the 
greater is the extent to which composite indexes (such as those for consumer prices) distort the real value of the variable 
they are supposed to be measuring. This is because the variation, in this case of relative prices, induces consumers to change 
the composition of the goods and services on which they spend their budget, so that the "typical" (average) shopping 
basket for the base year (or in reality for the base month) ceases to represent the real pattern of expenditure in the 
economy. Moreover, the greater the variability of prices, the greater the distortions usually are. It is important to note that 
consumer price indexes consequently tend to overestimate inflation, because usually there is a tendency to consume less of 
the goods and services whose relative prices rise and more of the goods and services whose relative prices fall. These 
problems, which are inherent in composite indexes, make it advisable to change the base year frequently, especially when 
there is inflation. At all events, it seems very probable that the consumer price index used in Paraguay has overestimated, 
possibly to a considerable extent, the real inflation which has taken place in the country. Moreover, the index measuring 
manual workers' wages also has a very old base (1969). The structure of the economy has changed considerably in the last 13 
years, and as a result of this the composition behind the index has become less and less representative. 
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declined.43 The government wages policy, for its part, was used from the mid-1960s onwards as 
one of the tools of government anti-inflation policy.44 Thus, in the course of this period the 
percentage readjustments in the minimum wage were consistently less than the inflation as 
measured by the consumer price index.45 Moreover, there were three periods —two of them 
relatively long— when inflation of as much as 25% or more was accumulated before the 
Government granted an increase in the legal minimum wage and, ultimately, in the other private 
sector wages and salaries. Moreover, the method used under the readjustment policy had the result 
that the average readjustment was necessarily still less than inflation.46 
Since 1979, however, and especially in the last two years, there has been a change in wages 
policy. Thus, since January 1980 the readjustments in the minimum wage have exceeded the 
accumulated inflation, and since 1979 they have been more frequent than in the past.47 The 
practice of granting smaller readjustments for wages and salaries which are above the minimum 
has been maintained, however. In conjunction with the slackening of the rate of inflation, the new 
wages policy has favoured a partial recovery in real wages. 
Finally, it should be noted that although up to 1979 the government wages policy provided for 
average readjustments which were a good deal lower than the rate of inflation, the actual growth 
rate of wages was really very close to that of inflation, especially since 1973, which was when the 
rate of expansion of the economy began to accelerate. It seems clear in fact that, in contrast with 
what is sometimes asserted, it was precisely the extraordinary dynamism of the economy which 
offset the effects of inflation and of a restrictive wages policy on the real wages of workers, because 
this dynamism gave the latter, through the total elimination of unemployment, a degree of 
bargaining power which they would otherwise not have had.48 It is also important to bear in mind 
that, unlike the workers in Asunción, the mass of wage-earners have not suffered a deterioration in 
their real situation, since the functional distribution of income has not varied significantly in the 
last decade.49 
43
 The only year in which the acceleration of inflation was not accompanied by deterioration in real wages was 1978, 
when the rise in inflation was very slight. Likewise, the only year in the period 1969-1981 (for which data on the wages of 
manual workers in Asunción are available) when the deceleration in inflation was not accompanied by an increase in real 
wages was 1975, which was the year of smallest economic growth. 
44ln contrast, in its first ten years the Government followed a rather liberal wages policy. It is worth noting that with 
the readjustments granted, the legal minimum wage rose by no less than 95% in real terms between 1953 and 1964 
(between 1950 and 1953 the legal minimum wage had declined sharply (-28%) in real terms) (see the sources cited in 
table 21). 
4,ln May 1971 the minimum wage was readjusted by 10%. Between the last readjustment (April 1964) and this one, 
the consumer price index had registered inflation of 13%. In March 1973 the minimum wage was again increased by 10%, 
whereas the inflation registered in the previous two years and two months had been almost 25%. In October of that year, 
however, an additional readjustment of 14.8% was granted, although in the previous four months the cost of living had 
risen by only 0.6%. In May 1974 the minimum wage was increased by 20% although between October 1973 and that month 
the inflation had been almost 27%. In February 1978 a readjustment of 15% was granted, whereas inflation in three and a 
half years before had come to 29%. In 1979 there was a change in wages policy, since on average the two readjustments 
granted during the year were only a little below inflation. Moreover, the readjustments were made more frequently. 
""This is because the readjustments in wages and salaries over the legal minimum wage are proportionately less than 
the readjustments in the minimum wage. Moreover, the legal minimum wage is not in force for the public sector. 
"The readjustment in January 1980 came to 15.2% while inflation was 14.5%; thejuly 1980 readjustment was 15.1% 
while inflation was 8.2%, and thejuly 1981 increase was also 151%, while the rise in the consumer price index was 10.6%. 
It may be recalled, however, that it was decreed that increases granted since the last official readjustment could be deducted 
from the latest official increase. 
48
 At the same time, one should not overlook the links between the dynamism of the economy and inflation on the one 
hand, and the anti-inflation policy and inflation on the other. 
•"See Central Bank of Paraguay, Cuentas Nacionales. This means, of course, that some sectors or strata of the wage-
earners, such as agricultural workers and the professional groups, have obtained real improvements in the last decade. 
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5. Fiscal and monetary policies 
(a) Introduction 
The short-term fiscal and monetary policies for the year are to a large extent determined 
towards the end of the previous year through the general budget of expenditure of the nation and 
the monetary programme of the Central Bank. In the first case, expenditure is fixed and income 
and financing needs for the following year are projected both for the general government, which 
includes the central government, the municipalities and quasi-autonomous bodies, and for the 
public enterprises. In the second case, the evolution of net foreign assets and of the domestic 
demand for credit is estimated, and the desired variation in the net domestic assets of the Central 
Bank is programmed for the following calendar year. 
Although there is no formal co-ordination between these two processes,50 traditionally both 
have been carried out subject to the same basic restriction, which consists in the maintenance of a 
fixed exchange rate for the guaraní in terms of the dollar. This basic objective, of course, has 
imposed rather strict limitations as regards the size and frequency of deficit spending and the 
expansion of the monetary base. At the same time, the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies has 
also been strongly conditioned by the desire to keep the size of the State's operations in the 
economy down to a modest level, which has in practice meant keeping the growth of fiscal income 
below the growth of the product.5152 When the rate of expansion of the economy began to 
accelerate at the beginning of the last decade, however, the specific restrictions on the rate of 
growth of government expenditure and income and on the issue of money were markedly relaxed. 
Thus, in spite of the fact that the increase in total expenditure rose to an average of 8.9% in real 
terms and that there was no significant change in the tax structure between 1972 and 1981, the 
central government nevertheless registered global surpluses in most of these years.53 Indeed, at the 
end of 1979 the surplus accumulated by the central government amounted to the equivalent of 
36% of the expenditure carried out during that year and to 29% of the money supply in the 
economy. The monetary base, for its part, also expanded at an average annual rate of 8.9% in real 
terms in the period 1972-1981, while the M[ money supply expanded in real terms at an annual 
rate of 8% in spite of the immobilization of large financial resources by the Central Bank, 
including 100% of the surplus accumulated by the central government and as much as 42% of the 
domestic currency deposits in the commercial banks.54 
During most of this period, there were even difficulties in expanding expenditure at desired 
rate because of various shortcomings such as the severe shortage of administrative and 
professional personnel, which hindered the fulfilment of the public sector investment 
programmes. In recent years, however, the growth rate of expenditure by general government and 
50
 In working out its monetary programme, however, the Central Bank has before it projections of the financing needs 
of the public sector. 
"The relative size of the Paraguayan State presence in the economy is one of the smallest in Latin America. In 1981, 
for example, the (total) current expenditure and income of general government were equivalent to 14.1% and 11.3% 
respectively of the gross domestic product, compared with 14.5% and 11.8% respectively in 1972. Similarly, consolidated 
non-financial public sector expenditure and income in 1981 were equivalent to 16.6% and 12.2% respectively of the 
product, compared with 17.3% and 14.7% respectively in 1972 (see table 22). It may also be noted in this respect that 
Paraguay is one of the few countries where there is no personal income tax (a law to introduce such a tax was approved in 
1971, but subsequently its application was suspended and it has so far not been put into effect). 
"The fulfilment of the general targets as regards expenditure and income has been facilitated at the operational level 
by the use of a unified budgeting process for the public sector, which has made it possible to exercise quite strict control over 
the financial situation of the State in all its dimensions and, in particular, to avoid significant imbalances. 
"Total general government expenditure also grew by 8.9% per year in this period, while those of the public sector 
increased at the rate of 8.5% per year. 
54It is worth noting that since 1977 the net domestic assets of the Central Bank have become negative, while the 
monetary multiplier has consistently been below unity (see table 23). 
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Table 22 
PARAGUAY: OPERATIONS OF 1 HE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT AND CONSOLIDATED NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Technical Secretariat of the Ministry of Finance, the Public Sector Planning Division of 
the Technical Planning Secretariat, and the World Bank. 





the public sector together has risen to exceptionally high levels, while the growth of income has 
markedly slackened. Thus, between 1978 and 1981 total expenditure by the general government 
and the consolidated non-financial public sector increased by 16.2% and 12.1% per year 
respectively, in contrast with 5.5% and 6.8% in the period 1972-1978. In contrast, after having 
increased by 10.4% and 10.0% respectively between 1972 and 1978, the real income of general 
government and the consolidated public sector only grew by 2.8% and 3.6% in the following three 
years. The evolution of the monetary aggregates also showed a very notable change from 1978 
onwards. Thus, it may be noted that after having grown at real annual rates of 11.5% and 13.1% 
respectively between 1972 and 1978, the monetary base expanded by only 3.8% between 1978 and 
1981, while the real supply of money actually declined in those three years by 1.5% per year. 
Although these new trends were due largely to institutional and structural factors, such as the 
existence of a tax system which has been becoming increasingly inelastic and some organizational 
Table 23 






Net foreign assets 
Net domestic assets 
Net domestic credit 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis ofofficial data; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (various 
issues). 
"End-year balances. 
Each section adds up to 100%. . 
'They are discrepancies in the original data. 
The multipliers were calculated directly. The indirect calculations, through the ratios, do not always coincide with the 
direct calculations because the original data do not always work out exactly. 
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shortcomings in the planning and execution of public spending,55 they also reflected to a 
considerable extent, especially in the monetary field, the results of the prevailing situation and 
other special circumstances of 1981. 
Thus, on the one hand the recession and instability which were features of the international 
and regional markets adversely affected the development of economic activity and particularly of 
registered external trade, so that the growth of the public sector income weakened appreciably in 
nominal terms and even went down in real terms (the real increase in current general government 
income went down from 3.5% in 1980 to -0.2% in 1981).5<s Likewise, the adverse external 
situation had a good deal to do with the stagnation of the net foreign assets of the economy, and 
this in turn abruptly checked the growth of the monetary base and caused the real supply of money 
to fall by 14%. On the other hand, the simultaneous execution of a considerable number of large-
scale projects, such as the formation, of PETROPAR, a State petroleum company with private 
participation, and the projects for the modernization and expansion of the National 
Telecommunications Industry and the National Energy Administration meant an unusual and 
significant expansion in capital expenditure, which even exceeded the large increase budgeted for 
the year before. This, together with a likewise considerable unforeseen increase in current 
expenditure, gave rise to an expansion of no less than 26% in general government expenditure in 
real terms and growth of 27% for the public sector as a whole.57 
In view of the adverse evolution of external events and their repercussions on the domestic 
economy, the projection and forecasts made when formulating fiscal and monetary policy at the 
end of 1980 naturally became increasingly divorced from the actual conditions and needs of the 
economy, especially from the second half of the year onwards. In order to face up to this situation, 
the authorities made a number of changes in the tax system and in the decrees and laws governing 
the banking system which affect the evolution of the monetary aggregates and rates of interest. At 
the same time, the level of public expenditure was not only maintained but actually increased. 
This latter fact, together with the official readjustment of wages and salaries, compensated 
for the slackening of the growth in global demand and, because of the stagnation of public income 
and the possibility of financing the resulting deficit from the surpluses registered in previous 
years, partially offset the depressive effects of the sharp slackening in the growth rate of net 
foreign assets on the monetary base and money supply and its upward pressures on interest rates. 
In contrast, the adjustments made in the tax and monetary policies did not have very perceptible 
effects in 1981, either because they were implemented towards the end of the year or because they 
were of relatively marginal impact. At all events, the probable effects of the international recession 
on the dynamism of the economy had not yet shown themselves in their full magnitude in 1981. 
"These questions have been examined in detail by the World Bank in its latest report on the Paraguayan economy (see 
World Bank,Economic Memorandum on Paraguay, Washington, D.C., 1981). 
56
 It should be noted, however, that the magnitude of the decline which the growth rate of income has been suffering, 
despite the dynamism of the product, suggests that the principal problem lies in the inflexibility of the tax system: 
Gross domestic product 




"The formation of PETROPAR alone called for a capital contribution by the central government of 8781 million 
guaraníes, which represented 11% of total central government expenditure and almost 8% of total public sector 















(b) Fiscal policy 
The 1981 budget envisaged growth of a little under 18% in current central government 
income, which was a very similar figure to that of the year before, but in real terms the current 
income barely increased at all. As regards current expenditure, it was decided to increase this by a 
little over 22%, representing a very appreciable reduction with respect to the rate of 40% 
registered in 1980 (in real terms, current expenditure increased by 19-8% during the year). If the 
projection of income and the planned current expenditure had actually been fulfilled, this would 
have represented a slight improvement in the savings position of the central government, 
compared with the very considerable deficit registered the year before (see table 24). 
As it turned out, current income expanded a little less than had been expected, due essentially 
to smaller tax collection than had been foreseen. Thus, current income increased by almost 15%, 
while tax revenue grew by 13-5% instead of the projected figure of 19-4%. This difference was 
partly offset by the larger revenue from non-tax income, which increased by almost 24%. In real 
terms, current central government income went down by 1.7%, while tax revenue went down by 
2.7%. 
This poor performance primarily reflected the stagnation of nominal revenue from foreign 
trade taxes, which in turn was due mainly to the weak performance of registered foreign trade and, 
to a lesser extent, to the reductions in the appraised values and tax rates for some exports which 
were decreed in the second half of the year. The transfer of a large number of imports from official 
foreign exchange channels to the free market in August may also have had some influence in this. 
On the other hand, it may be noted that rather than being a consequence of the slackening in the 
growth rate of income, the reduction in real revenue may have been the result of a tax system 
which is no longer in keeping with the pattern of income generation prevailing in the economy.58 
Current expenditure, for its part, rose by 39%, which was a similar rate to that registered in 
1980 and virtually double what had been budgeted. This growth, which amounted to 19.4% in real 
terms, was mainly accounted for by consumption and transfers. The first of these increased by 
42%, compared with a scheduled rise of 23% and an actual increase of 41 % the year before, while 
transfers rose by 37% instead of the planned increase of 27.5% (36% the year before). This 
considerable further increase in central government consumption mainly reflected the growth of 
41 % in the wages and salaries account, although all categories showed very appreciable increases. 
The expansion of transfers, for its part, was due to a substantial increase in social payments to the 
private sector and transfers to the rest of the public sector (see table 24). 
As current income did not increase as much as has been estimated and current expenditure 
rose much more than had been programmed, the central government saving once again went 
down markedly by 54%, from the equivalent of 4.1% of the gross domestic product in 1979 to 
0.9% in 1981. 
After capital expenditure had registered an increase of 11% in nominal terms in 1980 
(equivalent to a decrease of 5% in real terms), the economic authorities planned to increase it by 
50 % in 1981. Ultimately, they did manage to increase total capital expenditure by the appreciable 
amount of 74%, which represented real growth of 49%. Capital formation, in contrast, was 
increased by only about half the planned amount. The notable increase in capital expenditure was 
mainly due to the formation of the PETROPAR enterprise in the field of the refining and marketing 
of petroleum and to an unexpected increase in the participation of the State in this enterprise. If 
the capital contribution made by the central government to PETROPAR is excluded, capital 
expenditure actually once again declined a little in real terms. 
"The level of central government income depends mainly on revenue from indirect taxes, and especially taxes on 
foreign trade. There is no personal income tax. Moreover, many taxes are specified in absolute amounts. In these 
circumstances, the sluggish growth of the "registered" external sector of the economy and the acceleration in inflation since 
the end of the last decade have meant a severe slackening in the growth rate of the central government's current income, 
despite the continuing dynamism of the economy as a whole in this period. Thus, between 1978 and 1981 current income, as 
a proportion of the gross domestic product, declined from 11.2% to 8.9%, and in the latter of these years it was smaller in 
relation to the product than in 1972 (see table 22). 
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Table 24 
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Source: Ministry of Finance of Paraguay, Technical Secretariat and Department of the Budget, and PublicSector Planning 
Division of the Technical Planning Secretariat. 
"Budgeted amounts. 
"Amounts actually registered (preliminary figures). 
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Altogether, central government expenditure increased by 49% in 1981 compared with 31% 
in 1980 and a budgeted figure of 30%. In real terms, fiscal expenditure grew by 28%, after having 
increased by a little under 12% the year before. 
The reduction of saving by virtually half which took place parallel with an increase in capital 
expenditure by three-quarters gave rise to the first substantial fiscal deficit for two decades. The 
global central government deficit came close to 20 million guaraníes and represented rather more 
than 33% of the Government's current income in 1981. A similar proportion had not been 
registered since the early 1960s. Only two years before the central government had had a budget 
surplus equivalent to 7% of its current income. Furthermore, this meant that the deficit 
contemplated in the budget was exceeded by 140%. Instead of generating inflationary pressures or 
requiring excessive appropriation of domestic credit, however, the deficit spending ultimately had 
essentially beneficial effects, because in the face of the unfavourable external situation it helped to 
keep up the growth rate of global demand, both directly and indirectly, since it partly made up for 
the depressive effects of the stagnation of net capital inflows on the growth of money issue and the 
money supply, somewhat moderating the rise in domestic interest rates. The reasons why the 
appearance of a fairly substantial fiscal deficit had markedly positive effects were on the one hand, 
the fact that the size of the deficit was still quite small in relation to the size of the economy ( 3 %), 
since the weight of central government operations in the global economy is still only modest, and 
on the other hand the fact that the surpluses accumulated in previous years enabled it to be 
financed without major contributions from the Central Bank or other domestic sources of credit. 
Thus, nearly 76% of the gap was covered with the Government's own resources accumulated in 
the past, and the domestic indebtedness mobilized to cover the central government's financing 
needs came to the equivalent of only 0.4% of the gross domestic product and 2.0% of domestic 
bank credit. In reality, almost all the domestic financing was provided by suppliers (see table 24). 
The consolidated non-financial public sector, for its part, registered an increase of 16% in its 
current income, while its current expenditure rose by a little over 37%, both figures being almost 
equal to those registered the year before. In real terms, current income went down by 0.5% and 
current expenditure grew by almost 18%, these figures likewise being very similar to those 
registered in 1980. 
As a result of these opposing trends, public sector saving once again went down in 1981, when 
it fell by 24.6% after having declined by almost 10% in 1980. This represented a reduction of 
around 35% in real terms compared with the 1980 level and 50% with respect to 1979. As a 
proportion of the product, it went down from 6.6% in 1979 to 2.7% in 1981. These results 
primarily reflected the evolution of the central government operations, since at current prices the 
saving of both the municipalities and the quasi-autonomous bodies increased between 1979 and 
1981, while that of the public enterprises was only slightly lower in 1981 than in 1979. The 
improvement in the savings position of the municipalities and the quasi-autonomous bodies was 
due partly, however, to bigger transfers from the central government (see table 25). 
Capital expenditure registered a noteworthy expansion of 63 %, which corresponds to growth 
of 40% in real terms. In previous years, in contrast, it had not been possible to fulfil the 
expenditure target of the public investment programme, and up to a certain point the great 
expansion registered in 1981 reflected the lag in expenditure in the past. To a greater extent, 
however, it was due to the big expenditure by the central government in making up the capital of 
PETROPAR. At all events, despite the upward leap registered in 1981 public investment was 
entirely consistent with the levels envisaged in the latest development plans and investment 
programmes for the sector (around 7% of the gross domestic product). 
Altogether, the expenditure of the consolidated non-financial public sector rose by over 47% 
at current prices and over 26% at constant prices in 1981, compared with 30% and 11.4% 
respectively the year before. The sharp rise in the growth rate of total expenditure primarily 
reflected the bigger central government current and capital expenditure, but its configuration was 
also affected by the marked increases in the current and capital expenditure of quasi-autonomous 
bodies and the capital expenditure of the public enterprises. 
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Table 25 
PARAGUAY: OPERATIONS OF THE CONSOLIDATED 
NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
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Source: Public Sector Planning Division of the Technical Planning Secretariat of Paraguay. 
"See table 20 above. 
Transfers from rest of public sector. 
'Transfers to rest of public sector. 
1
 For public enterprises, only the surplus on current operations is included. 
fDoes not include current expenditure of public enterprises. 
fNer of transfers. 
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Despite the stagnation of current income and the sharp acceleration in total expenditure of 
the central government in recent years, in 1979 and 1980 the savings, plus the capital income and 
depreciation funds of the public sector as a whole, were more than sufficient to finance real and 
financial investment. In 1981, however, the consolidated operations of the public sector turned in a 
deficit of 22.6 million guaraníes, equivalent to 28% of their current income and 22% of their total 
income. As a proportion of the product, the gap came to 3.4%, which was the biggest since 1975, 
when it amounted to 5.3%. The turnaround in the financial situation of the public sector in 1981 
was due mainly to the persistence of the gap between the evolution of income and of expenditure 
of the central government, but it was also influenced by a moderate weakening in the financial 
performance of the rest of the sector. At all events, as well as being relatively small in relation to 
the product and smaller still in relation to domestic demand, the financing of the deficit only 
required a minor contribution of credit from domestic sources, and most of this was provided by 
suppliers. Net disbursements of external credits covered 30% of the deficit, and the surpluses 
accumulated in previous years were used to finance the remaining 50% (see table 25). Although 
the deficit was easy to handle and had rather beneficial effects for the evolution of the economy in 
1981, however, if the recent trends in income and expenditure persist the deficit financing needs of 
the public sector are likely to grow considerably in coming years. 
Towards the middle of 1980, a gradual but growing lag in the collection of fiscal revenue 
began to be clearly visible. This, together with the speeding up in the growth rate of expenditure, 
led to a deficit on central government operations at the end of 1980, for the first time since 1976. 
During the first half of 1981 the growth rate of regular income remained, with slight fluctuations, 
at the same level to which it had declined during the previous half year, but from September 
onwards the downward trend again began to show itself more clearly. Since at the same time the 
growth rate of expenditure had been increasing almost throughout the whole year, the deficit grew 
bigger month after month, except in December (see figure 5). 
In view of the lag in income and the increase in the deficit, measures began to be applied, 
mostly at the end of the second half of 1981, to increase the yield of the tax system and keep down 
the growth rate of expenditure. The first measure, which was designed to increase tax income and 
was put into effect as from August, consisted of adding numerous goods to the list of imports 
subject to the Regional Trade Régime, under which a flat-rate tax of 15% is paid. Although this 
move meant reducing the rate of taxation, it was hoped that in many cases it would give rise to an 
increase in total revenue collection in respect of import duties, because the great majority of the 
products in question were not entering the country as registered trade and therefore did not pay 
any import duties at all. The other tax measures designed to increase fiscal revenue were taken in 
the last month of the year and included law 906, which modified the tax on the sale of goods 
considered to be of a luxury nature; law907, on stamped paper and stamps; law 920 on the fiscal 
regularization of goods, securities, credits and merchandise, and law 921 on soft drinks and beer. 
Law 906 increased the tax on the sale on a number of goods, such as photographic cameras, 
cookers, washing machines, television sets and jewellery, from 10% to 12%.59 Law 907 made 
various changes in the tax legislation on stamped paper and stamps which involved increases in 
the absolute values of such taxes, which are very small. Law 920, for its part, gave facilities for 
legalizing the situation of goods and assets on which the corresponding taxes had not been paid, by 
providing for the payment of a flat-rate tax that was lower than those normally applicable. Those 
goods and assets existing in the country as at 31 December 1981 can be brought under the 
provisions of this law, scheduled to be in force for four months from 1 January 1982. The only 
articles not subject to the provisions of this law were pharmaceutical goods. Under law 921, the 
taxes in absolute values on soft drinks and beer were replaced by ad valorem taxes calculated on the 
current values. In addition to these measures, various taxes on the sale of goods were unified, and 
the average rate was increased from 3% to 5 %. Finally, a special tax was introduced on the income 
of the PETROPAR enterprise. 
"This increase only affected imported goods, since domestically produced goods are subject to a sales tax of 5% 
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Figure 5 
PARAGUAY: SHORT-TERM EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE8 
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In addition to these reforms, the Government issued decrees 27866, placing a 4% tax on the 
revaluation of goods; 28104, raising the tax on the sale of fuels, and 29470 and 29471, which fix new 
reference prices for land and real estate in the country, for the effects of the payment of the land 
and real estate tax. 
According to the estimates of the Ministry of Finance, the new laws and decrees would 
probably generate some 8.5 million guaraníes in 1982, which would be equivalent to 16.3% of tax 
income and 14.4% of total central government income in 1981, or 1.3% of the gross domestic 
product in that year. These additional resources, together with the increases already projected in 
tax revenue, would mean growth of 33-5 % in central government tax collection in 1982, compared 
with growth of 13.5% in 1981 and 19% in 1980. If estimated non-tax income were added, the 
forecast would be for a rise of 38% in total current income, compared with increases of 15% and 
18% in 1981 and 1980, respectively. As at the same time it was expected that inflation in 1982 
would be less than in 1981, it was expected that the expansion in real terms would be still greater. 
As regards the growth in expenditure in 1982, efforts would be made to keep it to a 
considerably lower proportion than in recent years, Thus, the national budget for 1982 
programmed a 19-3% increase in total central government expenditure, compared with increases 
of 49% in 1981 and 31% in 1980. If the projections and plans regarding income and expenditure 
were to prove correct, this would mean reducing the global deficit from the figure of almost 
20 million guaraníes registered in 1981 to around 13 million guaraníes in 1982. 
For the rest of the public sector, no specific restrictions were contemplated in the expenditure 
plans, although smaller growth was envisaged in 1982 than in 1981. On the income side, the main 
initiative was the promulgation of law 881 which established a new tax régime for the 
Municipality of Asunción with a view to substantially expanding its tax base. 
(c) Monetary policy 
The monetary programme which the Central Bank established for 1982 scheduled an increase 
of close to 24% in the monetary base (see table 26).60 This expected growth rate, which would be 
less than the 27% observed in 1980, would be the result of a scheduled expansion of over 21 % in 
the Bank's net foreign assets and an increase of almost 15% in its net domestic liabilities. The 
growth in the net foreign assets was projected mainly on the basis of the expected behaviour of the 
balance-of-payments current account and the budgeted level of expenditure of the binational 
bodies. The scheduled growth, although very considerable, was nevertheless considerably lower 
than the rates registered in previous years. The scheduled increase in the net domestic liabilities of 
the Central Bank, for its part, which, as in the recent past, would reconcile the evolution of the 
monetary base with the domestic demand forecasts through the partial neutralization of the 
growth of net foreign assets, would be brought about partly through a sharp increase in capital and 
reserves, but would also require a considerable expansion in the "other" net liabilities, including 
the special deposits of the private sector with the issuing institution, since it was planned to 
provide 60% more credit to the economy than the year before and eliminate the prior import 
deposits. The larger supply of credit would be channelled almost entirely towards the private 
sector, and within it to the commercial banks. It was planned that the projected increase in the 
demand for credit by the quasi-autonomous bodies and public enterprises would be offset by a 
further surplus on the budgetary operations of the central government, which, as in previous years, 
would be immobilized in the national treasury account in the Central Bank. 
From the point of view of the uses made of the monetary base, which the monetary 
programme breaks down into currency outside banks and the legal reserves of the commercial 
banks on current account deposit in the Central Bank, it was planned that there would be growth of 
a little over 21% in bills and coins in circulation, with an increase of 26% in the deposits of 
commercial banks in the Central Bank. 
60
 Various adjustments have been made in the original presentation of the monetary programme of the Central Bank 
on the basis of the monetary accounting procedures used by the International Monetary Fund in its International Financial 
Statistics. 
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In its monetary planning, the Central Bank does not aim to control explicitly the growth rate 
of the money supply in the economy. Due to the relative stability shown by the marginal monetary 
multiplier in recent years, however, its objective as regards the monetary base implicitly involves a 
relatively narrow margin for the expansion of the money supply, or else has been established as a 
function of this. At all events, it may noted that the expansion foreseen for the monetary base in 
1981 would have been accompanied by growth of 22% to 26.5% in the case of M, and of 20.3% to 
28.6% in the case of M2, if the extreme values registered for the respective multipliers in the 
previous five years had been applied. 
Table 26 
P A R A G U A Y : M O N E T A R Y PROGRAMME" 
Billions of guaraníes Growth rates 
1980 Ï98Î 1980 Ï98Î 
1979 Pro- Pro- 1979 Pro- Pro-
gram- Actual gram- Actual gram- Actual gram- Actual 
med med med med 
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Public sector 
Central government (net) 
Credit 
Deposits 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
a
 Various adjustments, based on the monetary amounting used by the International Monetary Fund in its Internacional Financial Statistics, 
have been made ¡n the original layout of the monetary programme of the Central Bank, entitled "Desarrollo de activos netos del Banco 
Central de Paraguay" but there are still some differences between the values in this table and those given in tables whose source is the IMF. 
In the Central Bank. These figures include the Commercial Department of the National Development Bank. 
'Included in the "Other (net)" section. 
Including deposits. 
eNot programmed. 
Including the surplus reserves in foreign currency deposited in the Central Bank. 
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In contrast with the experience of recent years, most of the monetary aggregates in 1981 
showed wide divergences between the programmed performance and the actual results in the year. 
Firstly, the evolution of the key variable, net foreign assets, was completely different from what 
had been foreseen, since these grew by only 2.3%, whereas an increase of over 21% had been 
assumed. This unexpected result was due mainly to the big decline in the volume of registered 
exports of goods and services and the unforeseen stagnation of the net inflow on the balance-of-
payments capital account.61 Its depressive effect on the expansion of the monetary base, however, 
whose evolution had been closely linked with the balance-of-payments surplus in the past, was 
more than offset by a marked reduction in the net domestic liabilities of the Central Bank. In 
contrast with what had been programmed, these liabilities went down by 45% although an 
expansion of 15 % had been assumed for this monetary aggregate. As a result of this, the monetary 
base grew by more than 18%, which was relatively close to the goal of 23.6% (see table 26). 
The sharp reduction in the negative balance of the net domestic liabilities of the Central Bank 
was due mainly to the fact that throughout the second half of the year the central government used 
its assets with the monetary authority to finance a deficit which also rose to an unexpected size. 
Thus, the Government reduced its deposits in the Central Bank by around 12 million guaraníes, 
which was more than the total reduction in the net domestic liabilities of the Bank, whereas it had 
been expected that there would be a moderate expansion in these. 
On the side of the uses made of the monetary base, the results were likewise quite different 
from those programmed. Particularly noteworthy was the great divergence between the target and 
the actual result as regards currency outside banks, which instead of growing by over 21% only 
grew by 2%. The legal reserves and current account deposits of the commercial banks in the 
Central Bank, for their part, increased altogether by close to 34%, compared with the planned 
figure of 26%. These divergences were due to the marked unexpected stagnation of public demand 
for cash balances and the considerable rise in holdings of reserves by the commercial banks. 
Outstanding in this latter respect was the growth of 75% in the surplus reserves of banks. 
The non-bank public reduced its relative marginal preference for cash balances to such an 
extent that demand for these even fell, while the commercial banks spectacularly increased the 
marginal ratio between their holdings of reserves and deposits and especially the relation between 
their reserves and demand deposits, which rose from 1.4% in 1980 to 46.8% in 1981. These 
dramatic changes in the behaviour of the public and the commercial banks meant that in spite of 
the fairly ample expansion in the monetary base, the Ml money supply of the economy practically 
did not register any increase in 1981. In contrast, the expansion of 19-6% in theM2 money supply 
was scarcely below the planned lower limit, thanks to the increase of issue programmed for 1981 
and the evolution of the relevant multiplier in previous years. 
It seems clear that these changes in the behaviour of the public and the banks were due to the 
unusually sharp rise in interest rates, since this markedly discouraged both the holding of money 
and indebtedness, while at the same time signifying a great stimulus for the sale of assets in the 
financial system. Thus, the potential size of the gross expansion of credit by the Central Bank and 
the commercial banks in 1981 was almost 18%, and in actual fact gross credit grew by 15% (see 
tables 27 and 28).6263 If the loans made by the non-commercial department of the National 
Development Bank are added, then total gross credit increased by over 18% in 1981, and in 
relation to the gross domestic product the level of financing was not significantly less than the year 
before. At the same time, it would appear that no sector or activity in the economy suffered from 
any shortage of credit as compared with habitual levels of financing, except perhaps for export 
activities, whose procurement of credit declined by nearly 10%. Even in this case, however, it is not 
clear whether this was due to a restriction of supply or a decline in demand (see table 29). 
61
 See section 3 (a) of this chapter. 
62The potential expansion is defined as the effective increase in credit, plus the holding of reserves surplus to the 
prevailing legal reserve requirement. 
65Gross credit excludes the variation in the central government's deposits in the Central Bank, that is to say, it is equal 
to the credit to the central government, plus credit to other public bodies, plus credit to the private sector. 
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At all events, the expansive effects exerted on the M¡ money supply by the increase in gross 
credit by the Central Bank and the commercial banks and the sharp reduction ¡n central 
government deposits with the Central Bank were offset to the extent of 80% by the expansion in 
savings and term deposits. The remaining 20% was more than offset by the sharp rise in the 
capital and reserves of the Central Bank (see table 26 and 27). 
It is probable that the existence of an adequate supply of credit explains, at least partly, why 
the abrupt and severe restriction on the M{ money supply was not accompanied by a similar decline 
in the growth rate of economic activity or inflation. Indeed, in 1981 there was a substantial increase 
in the income velocity of circulation of money, which came to 9 compared with 7 the year before.64 
If the behaviour of quasi-money is taken into account, then the income velocity of money rose from 
3.9 to 5.8. 
The good performance turned in by the economy as regards real growth and the persistence of 
inflation constituted, at least up to thé second half of the year, powerful arguments against any 
major changes in monetary policy, despite the great divergence of the majority of the monetary 
aggregates, and especially the money supply, from the evolution foreseen either explicitly or 
implicitly in the monetary programme at the beginning of the year. Thus, only in July did the 
monetary authority participate in the decisions to modify some of the export and import duties. In 
the area of monetary policy proper, the first measures taken came into effect as from September, 
when it was decided to increase the interest rates on savings deposits in the commercial banks 
from 11% to 13% for terms of 90 to 180 days and from 11% to 14% for terms of over 180 days.65 
PARAGUAY: 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Current account deposits 
Factors of expansion 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
Public sector 
Central government (net) 
Credit 
Deposits 
Other public bodies 
Private sector 
Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (saving and time 
deposits) 
Long-term foreign borrowing 
Other items (net) 
Table 27 
MONETARY BALANCE 





























































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, vol. XXXV, NQ 7. 
64This ratio had been declining for several years past (see table 23). 
65The interest rates earned by savings deposits in the savings and loan system for housing were increased from 8% to 
10% for terms of 90 to 180 days and from 8% to 11 % for terms of more than 180 days. It should be noted that the liabilities 
and assets of the savings and loan system are subject to "monetary readjustment" fixed by the Central Bank. In 1980, this 
readjustment was 5%, that is to say, a good deal less than inflation (15%). Loans made by the Stock-raising Fund are also 




PARAGUAY: DESTINATION, ORIGIN AND FINANCING OF CREDIT 














Liabilities to private sector 
Money 
Quasi-money 
Other net liabilities 
Net foreign assets 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Long-term foreign borrowing 
Counterpart funds -0.2 . . . . . 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (various issues). 
"With credit from the Central Bank. 
Table 29 
PARAGUAY: DESTINATION OF CREDIT GRANTED TO THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY" 
Growth rates 
16.9 14.5 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of Central Bank of Paraguay, Boletín Estadístico (various issues). 
"Credits granted by the National Development Bank, the Stock-raising Fund and commercial banks. 





At the same time, the compulsory legal reserve was lowered from the very high figure of 42% to 
30% in respect of savings deposits with a term of over 90 days. Furthermore, imports of goods 
subject to the Regional Trade Régime were freed from the prior deposit requirement. 
These measures were not able to bring about any substantial effects in 1981, partly because of 
the time at which they were carried out and partly because they were relatively marginal in relation 
to the volume and effective rates of the operations of the financial system. Although a broad range 
of interest rates are formally fixed by the Central Bank, for example, there are a number of 
surcharges, discounts and premiums, depending on the circumstances, which mean that the 
interest rates on deposits and loans in the financial system are generally very different from those 
laid down by the Central Bank.66 
At all events, it is not easy to gauge whether, if there had been earlier and larger-scale changes 
in economic policy in general and monetary policy in particular, these might have meant bigger 
growth of the money supply in the economy. Indeed, it would seem correct to conclude that larger 
issue would have been reflected mainly and perhaps even exclusively in a further increase in the 
surplus reserves of the commercial banks, rather than in a larger amount of cash in the hands of the 
public, taking account of the prevailing interest rates. At any rate, as already noted, this was what 
happened in 1981. On the other hand, an appreciable reduction in interest rates, through a big 
reduction in the legal reserves, for example, might have meant a smaller net inflow of funds (due 
to a larger outflow rather than to a smaller inflow) of capital into the economy, or else an 
acceleration in inflation rather than any reactivation of the demand for balances in guaraníes. 
mainly because of the high interest rates prevailing in the international market and the full 
employment enjoyed by the country's labour force. 
On the other hand, if the slowing down of economic activity noted in the second half of 1981 
persists, a change in the growth rate of the means of payment would not only be more feasible but 
also more advisable, especially if external interest rates go down. 
66
 Law 561 on the Defence of the National Economy, of October 1958, prohibits the lending of money at interest rates 
over 12% per year. However, the Central Bank is authorized to permit the charging of annual commissions in addition to 
the legal maximum rate, as well as the payment of annual bonuses. In practice, the Central Bank has mainly directed its 
attention towards the interest rates charged under the Minimum Portfolio Régime, which was set up in March 1972 and 
which provides that commercial banks must assign at least 50% of their portfolio to finance industry (25%), agriculture 
(5%) and exports (20%). The maximum interest rate, including commission, authorized under this régime at the end of 
1981 was 14.5%. The maximum authorized annual interest rates on loans (interest rate, annual commission, servicing rate, 
servicing commission and monetary readjustment) for the financial system at the end of 1981 varied between 19% (for the 
50% of the portfolio of the commercial banks not subject to the Minimum Portfolio Régime and for long-term loans to 
industry and stock-raising by the National Development Bank) and 28% (for long-term loans by the Stock-raising Fund). 
There does not appear to be any systematic record of the evolution of the total interest rates really charged in the financial 
system, but it may be noted than an untitled and undated survey by the Superintendency of Banks revealed that the rates 
effectively charged varied from a minimum of 25% per year in one financial institution to a maximum of 61 % in another 
(on the same unspecified day in 1981). The average rate for that day was 48%. As regards the interest rates on deposits, the 
maximum authorized by the Central Bank at the end of 1981 was 14% per year for fixed-term savings deposits for a term of 
over 180 days. According to the survey already referred to, the minimum interest rate on deposits was 12% per year in one 
institution, while the maximum was 28% per year in another, the average being 21%. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981 the Government maintained the essential lines of the general policy applied since the 
middle of 1980, when it assumed power. This policy consisted of establishing a market economy 
within the framework of a democracy, thus marking a highly significant change with respect to 
what had occurred under the previous Government. 
In the economic sphere the policy was characterized by three main guiding principles: 
promotion of the participation of the domestic and foreign private sector, the gradual opening up 
of the economy, and the struggle against inflation. The first was reflected in the adoption of 
incentives for domestic and foreign private investment, in an attempt to bring about a gradual 
reduction in the importance of the public sector, the reduction of price controls, and a more 
realistic policy of interest rates. The process of adopting the legislation governing private 
activities was not concluded in 1981, however, and a law for the industrial sector was signally 
lacking. Nor was the gradual reduction of the public sector's participation achieved, since there was 
still a high deficit in 1981 (in spite of the balanced budget originally approved), due in part to the 
delay in the adjustment of some controlled prices, such as those of rice and gasoline. Finally, in 
1981 nominal interest rates rose considerably, with an increase from 30% to 50% in January, 
which for the first time in 11 years caused the passive interest rate to be positive in real terms 
towards the end of the year. This was reflected in a higher level of saving and of resources available 
for lending, which, combined with an improvement in the systems for the granting of medium-
and long-term credit, created additional facilities for borrowing by the private sector. 
The gradual opening up of the economy continued in 1981, although the most important 
measures were adopted mainly in connection with para-tariff instruments. The effects of the tariff 
reductions made in 1980, however, were still strongly felt in 1981. 
Finally, although the struggle against inflation was perhaps the primary objective of the 
Government's action, it did not meet with the hoped-for success. Although the growth rate of 
consumer prices declined in the course of the year, the final result (73%) was the second highest 
rate ever recorded, and in fact was only lower than that registered in 1978. The effective rate of 
inflation therefore far exceeded the target (40%) originally established for 1981. The main anti-
inflationary instruments used were the unfreezing of prices, negative growth in real terms in the 
Central Bank's primary issue, promotion of saving through higher interest rates, etc. 
The overall result with respect to the productive sphere was the continuation at a moderate 
rate (4% for the third consecutive year) of the recovery of the gross domestic product after the 
1976-1978 recession (see table 1 and figure 1). Consequently, the per capita product increased in 
1981, as in the two previous years, by about 1 %, regaining its 1977 value. Furthermore, despite the 
decrease in the growth rate of imports (which none the less remained high), total supply grew by 
6% in 1981, as it had done in 1980. On the demand side, the growth rate of exports was negative 
for the second year in succession (-9%) and that of final domestic demand decreased to 8%. It 
should be noted, however, that unlike what occurred almost throughout the 1970s (except for 1978 
and 1979) and in 1980, the dynamic element in final consumption expenditure was private 
spending, whose rate of expansion was 12 times that of public consumption. 
The construction sector, notwithstanding a considerable decrease in its growth rate in 1981, 
still ranked first among the sectors which contributed most to the total growth of the product. This 
was basically achieved thanks to the Government's activities in the construction of roads, 
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dwellings, etc. A striking feature, however, was the performance of the agricultural sector. Thus, 
owing to the end of a prolonged drought and to the effects of government policies, in 1981 the 
product of this sector grew by around 1 1 % , after a 6% drop in 1980. This growth rate for 
agriculture was the highest attained in the last three decades. The manufacturing sector, for its 
part, showed fairly moderate growth (2%), lower than that of the two preceding years. Finally, the 
mining sector suffered a decline of 4%. 
Although the value of exports of goods had increased steadily since 1972, with the sole 
exception of 1975, in 1981 it fell by 17%. There were considerable drops in the volumes exported 
and significant decreases in world prices. Indeed, the only important product whose export value 
rose in 1981 was zinc. 
Table 1 
PERU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 





Rate of unemployment 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'See table 18 for the month considered in each year. 
Percentages. 
edata for Metropolitan Lima. See table 9 for the month considered in each year. 
Total short- and long-term external debt, both public and private. 
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In contrast, the value of imports of goods increased by more than a quarter, for the third 
consecutive year, in 1981. This brought it to nearly two-and-a-half times the value recorded in 
1978, and was the result of the important foreign trade liberalization measures adopted in 1980, 
and on a lesser scale in 1981. The delay in adjusting the exchange rate for the sol and the increased 
value of the dollar, combined with the reactivation of domestic demand, were other factors 
influencing the above-mentioned result. 
In this way, the balance of trade in goods changed from a surplus of over US$ 800 million in 
1980 to a deficit of more than US$ 600 million in 1981. Added to this was a deficit in the balance of 
trade in non-financial services which in 1981 was five times greater than in 1980. Thus, the trade 
balance showed a deficit in 1981 for the first time since 1977. Mainly owing to this, the current 
account deficit multiplied 25-fold in 1981 to nearly US$ 1.9 billion (see table 1 and figure 1). 
Despite the substantial increase in long-term capital inflows, the basic balance changed from 
a surplus in 1980 to a large deficit in 1981. The final result, therefore, was a decrease of nearly 
US$ 600 million in the net international reserves, following the considerable increases in 1979 and 
1980. 
Real liquidity declined somehwat (-3%) in 1981, after growing rapidly in the two preceding 
years. This decrease helped to keep the inflation problem from becoming more acute. The real 
quantity of money dropped substantially, with a fall in both money outside banks and demand 
deposits. In contrast, quasi-money grew 5% in real terms thanks to the significant increase (32%) 
which took place in time and savings deposits in national currency as a result of the change in 
interest rates. At the same time, the process of "dollarization" of the economy was slowed down 
for the first time, with the fall of 19%, in real terms, in foreign currency deposits. 
As regards sources of liquidity, there was a sharp increase in domestic credit which was offset 
by the drop in net international reserves. The growth of credit to the private sector was especially 
rapid, since it increased by 14% in real terms, i.e., twice the rate of increase of credit to the public 
sector. 
The result of fiscal operations was very different from that foreseen in the 1981 budget, for 
although central government expenditure was reduced by a little over 5% in real terms, income 
declined by 15%. There were decreases in both current and capital expenditure, but expenditure 
both on wages and salaries and on gross public capital formation expanded. As regards public 
income, all tax revenue except that obtained from import taxes went down in real terms. 
Consequently, central government current saving practically disappeared, after two years in which 
it had shown a positive trend. Thus, the fiscal deficit more than doubled in nominal terms and 
attained a real growth of 23%. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
Total supply grew 6 % in 1981, thus completing three years of economic recovery (see table 2 ) 
during which the average annual growth rate of supply was 5.7%: very similar to the average 
annual rate for the years 1960-1975 (5.2%). In the period of economic recession (1976-1978) this 
rate had fallen to -1.2%. 
The main component of total supply, i.e., the gross domestic product, increased for the third 
consecutive year by close to 4%, after having fallen in 1977 and 1978. Thus, the Peruvian economy 
continued to overcome the recession experienced in those years and to approach the average 
annual growth rate of the gross domestic product registered during the fifteen years before the 
recession (4.9%)- The growth rate of imports, for its part, although declining significantly to 24%, 
remained at a high level in 1981 and imports represented 15% of the gross domestic product: a 
proportion which has increased steadily from close to 9% in 1978. The marked expansion of 
imports was due to the abnormally low level to which they had descended in 1978 as a result of the 
domestic recession (equivalent to their real value in 1965), the subsequent economic recovery, and 
the policy of trade liberalization. 
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Figure 1 
PERU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Gross domestic 
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1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. 
^Average annual rate in Metropolitan Lima. 
cPercentage variation from December to December. 
¿Millions of dollars. 
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As regards global demand, domestic final demand increased for the third consecutive year 
after having dropped by 2.5% annually in the period 1976-1978. The expansion in 1981 was due 
primarily to an 18% rise in gross fixed investment, although in spite of this, and of its growth of 
45% in 1980, its real value in 1981 was still below that attained in 1975. Consumption expenditure, 
too, increased for the third year in succession. Private expenditure was especially dynamic, 
increasing by 7% in 1981: a rate surpassed only by that recorded in 1970. The final consumption 
expenditure of the public sector, on the other hand, expanded by less than 1 % in 1981, after having 
risen by 13% in the previous year. It is interesting to note that between 1970 and 1981 public 
expenditure, as a percentage of total consumption expenditure, only rose from 14% to 16%, 
despite the importance given to the State in economic policy during the 1970s and the large fiscal 
deficits of the last few years. 
Finally, the value of exports of goods and services fell by 9% in 1981. The decrease in the 
export volume of all traditional export products except coffee, silver and zinc was one of the causes 
of this decline, together with the fall in world prices. 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
Following a 5 % drop in 1980, the product of the agricultural and fishery sector rose at an 
exceptionally high rate of close to 11% in 1981. Construction, as in 1980, was the most dynamic 
sector during the year, while the services sector also contributed to the growth of the gross 
domestic product at a rate above the average. The mining sector, however, showed a negative rate 
of growth, while the expansion of the manufacturing sector was below the average (see table 3). 
(i) The agricultural sector. The expansion of production in the agricultural sector in 1981 
(13%) represented a sharp contrast with the trend in 1980, when the growth rate was 
negative (-5 % ). It should be noted that agricultural production in the period 1974-1980 practically 
stagnated, whereas the growth obtained in 1981 was the highest recorded in the agricultural sector 
in the last three decades. 
The crop farming subsector's contribution to the agricultural sector's expansion was 
particularly important (see table 4). Its output grew by 14% in 1981, after a 10% drop in the 
preceding year. Various factors contributed to this. In the first place, 1981 saw the end of the acute 
drought which had affected Peruvian agriculture for a number of years. The flow of the rivers in 
the northern part of the country (the area most affected by the drought) increased by 46% in the 
first half of 1981 with respect to 1980, rising to a level only 5% less than the average flow in the 
period 1973-1976, which was considered normal. 
The end of the drought made it possible to increase the area sown, and in 1981 this exceeded 
one million hectares: a 14% increase over 1980. The area sown with potatoes increased by 20%, 
that sown with flour corn 18% and that used for cotton growing by 16%. Also as a result of the end 
of the drought, there was an improvement in crop yields per hectare in 1981, and in the period 
January-September, with respect to the same period of 1980, the yield per hectare of potatoes 
increased by 19%, that of soya beans by 20%, that of hard yellow maize by 15%, and so forth. 
The increase in agricultural production was also partly due to policy measures adopted by the 
Government. First of all, in April reductions were decreed in the tariffs applied to inputs and 
capital goods for agriculture. Secondly, the sector was given considerable credit support in 1981. 
Additional resources were granted to the Banco Agrario, and the Banco Central de Reserva opened 
two promotional credit lines to finance agricultural cropping projects and medium- and long-term 
investments. The commodities for which the major part of the credit was granted in the period 
January-September 1981 were rice (47%), cotton (17%) and potatoes (12%). It should also be 
noted that real credit to the agricultural sector grew by 18% between June and December 1980, and 
this too had a big influence on the better 1981 harvest. 
These factors were reflected in the consumption of fertilizers, which increased by 8.5% in 
1981 after having gone down at an average annual rate of nearly 6% between 1978 and 1980. Even 
so, however, fertilizer consumption remained 10% lower in 1981 than in 1977. 
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The most dynamic agricultural commodities in 1981 were rice, wheat and soya beans. 
Production of rice grew by nearly 70%, after dropping by 25% in 1980. Wheat production, for its 
part, expanded by more than 50% after having declined in the four previous years. Soya beans, 
although of little importance in crop farming output as a whole, were the most dynamic 
commodity between 1978 and 1981 since, after the growth rates of over 50% achieved in their 
production between 1978 and 1980, a fairly high rate of increase was maintained in 1981 (31%). 
Production of potatoes, which are the main agricultural commodity (14% of the total value of 
crop farming output) grew by 22%, after a decrease of 20% in 1980. In the period 1973-1979 the 
production of this crop virtually stagnated. 
Sugar cane was the only crop whose production decreased in 1981 (-6%). It had been 
declining since 1975, except in 1977 when it remained stationary. In 1981 the production of sugar 
cane was equal to only 60% of the 1973 output. This was partly due to the drought and the slow 
period of growth of the crop (15-18 months), which makes its recovery slower than that of other 
crops. The decline in output was also due to administrative and financial difficulties in the 
production units. 
Livestock-raising showed a growth rate of nearly 11%, after an increase of less than 3% in 
1980 and declines in 1978 and 1979 (see table 4). The most dynamic item was poultry meat, which 
grew by 27% in 1981 after the 21% increase registered the year before, thus bringing its 
production to more than twice the level of 1973. Output of beef rose by 8% in 1981, after declining 
in 1979 and 1980 and growing at fairly modest rates between 1975 and 1978. The only item 
showing a decrease was the production of mutton, which feel by 9% for the second year running. 
(ii) The fisheries sector. The value of fisheries production dropped in 1981 as it did in 1980 
but at twice the rate (-10%). This was due, first, to the greater scarcity of fisheries resources, partly 
owing to the excessive growth of the catch in previous years, which in turn has created problems of 
over-expansion of the industry. 
Table 2 
PERU: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic produc at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 




Exports of goods and services 
Millions of dollars 


















































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the National Institute of Statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 





PERU: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 




Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels 
Financial institutions, insurance, 
real estate and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and personal services 
Government services 
Less: Imputed commission of banks 
and financial institutions 
Plus: Import duties 
Millions of dollars 
at 1970 prices 
1979 1980 1981" 






































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the National Institute of Statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the total were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond exactly 
with the latter. 
Secondly, a policy of conservation of marine species was implemented in 1981. Close seasons 
were strictly imposed and considerable emphasis was placed on the regulations governing fishery 
activities. Trawl fishing was restricted and the areas of operation of factory-ships were limited so 
as to prevent competition with artisanal fishing. 
Thirdly, a number of factors made export activities less profitable, which also influenced the 
volume of the catch. The rate of devaluation was not sufficiently rapid, added to which was the 
increased value of the dollar; the reduction of export tax refunds; and, lastly, problems in 
connection with external demand owing to both the world recession and competition from other 
countries (Chile, Japan, etc.). 
The volume of the catch in 1981, as distinct from its real value, showed very little change (less 
than 1%), after decreasing by 26% in 1980 (see table 5). Between 1973 and 1979 the volume 
caught had risen by an average of 8% annually. The difference observed in 1981 between the 
evolution of the value of fisheries output mentioned above and its volume was mainly due to the 
performance of fishing for indirect human consumption, for although the volume rose by nearly 
6%, its value dropped by 5% as a result of the significant fall in the catch of species other than 
anchoveta. In the case of fishing for direct human consumption, the value of the catch fell by 12% 
in 1981, that is to say, a little more than the rate of decrease in the volume (-9%). 
The 6% increase in the tonnage extracted for indirect human consumption in 1981 was 
mainly due to a 70% increase in the catch of anchoveta, following a decrease of nearly 50% in the 
previous year. This counteracted the sharp fall in the catch of other species (-41 %), which occurred 
for the third consecutive year. 
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The 9% drop in the tonnage caught for direct human consumption interrupted its 
exceptional expansion in the period 1975-1980, during which it grew at an average of 27% 
annually. The 57% decline in the catch for freezing was particularly significant, contrasting with 
the expansion at an average annual rate of 20% between 1977 and 1980. The catch of fresh fish 
rose by 6%, as did that for the canning industry, although it should be noted that the latter had 
decreased by an average of 52% annually in the period 1978-1980. 
In 1981 important policy measures were adopted in the fisheries sector, such as those relating 
to fishing for the canning industry and for the supply of fresh fish. In the former case measures 
were taken to rationalize the existing excess installed capacity, especially by prohibiting the 
establishment of new canning plants or the expansion of those in existence. In the case of fresh 
fish, the Government began to take initial steps to promote investment in the fishing fleet and in 
fish processing installations with a view to expanding the supply of this product on the domestic 
market. At the same time, PESCAPERU, the public enterprise operating in the sector, will gradually 
cease to produce fish meal, which will be manufactured only from fish not suitable for direct 
human consumption and from residues; it will also launch a programme for the diversification of 
fisheries products. This enterprise plans to reduce its fish meal plants from 37 to 19 (in 1973, the 
date of the expropriations, they numbered 99). Finally, in 1981 the State monopoly (exercised by 
PESCAPERU) in the production and export of fish meal was abolished. 
(iii) The mining sector. The negative performance shown by the mining sector in 1980 was 
accentuated in 1981, with a drop of more than 4% in the value of its production. As regards the 
metal-mining subsector, various factors were responsible for the fall in its production. In the first 
place, the mining enterprises experienced financial problems as a result of the drop in world prices 
Table 4 
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production (1973 = 100) 
Crop farming 
Stock-raising 










































































































































































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
"Preliminary figures. 
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Source: Ministry of Fisheries. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Thousands of tons. 
of the main export minerals caused by the world recession and high interest rates. The declines in 
the prices of lead, silver and copper were especially severe. 
Secondly, labour disputes in the mining sector in 1981 had a highly negative effect on 
production levels. In the course of the year there were 156 disputes, i.e., 33 more than the year 
before, but the number of man/hours lost (nearly 6 million) was double the 1980 level. Thus, for 
example, the 40-day strike in the Southern Peru Copper Corporation in August and September 
caused production losses of US$ 65 million. 
Thirdly, there were production problems of a technical nature which were largely due to 
difficulties in connection with the supply of fuel to the principal mining centres because the access 
roads were blocked owing to damage by the floods in the early months of the year. Furthermore, in 
the case of copper there was a decrease in the grade of the ore extracted. 
Because of all these factors, the value of the production of the metal-mining sector contracted 
by 6% in 1981, after decreasing by 4 % in the previous year. This was due, in particular, to the 
decrease in the volume of copper output (see table 6), which fell for the second consecutive year, 
sinking to a level similar to that of 1977, although even so, copper production in 1981 was over 
50% more than in 1974. Nevertheless (mainly because of the expansion of petroleum output), the 
relative importance of copper production in total mining sector output dropped from 52 % in 1977 
to 4 3 % in 1981. 
The volume of lead production also decreased, though very slightly (-1%), after showing 
positive growth rates for several years. Production of iron ore expanded by 7 % in 1981 and that of 
silver by 5 % (see tableó). 
Petroleum output fell by a little over 1 % in 1981. Exceptionally high annual rates of 36% had 
been registered between 1977 and 1979, but already in 1980 the increase had sunk to only 2%.1 
(See table 6.) The drop in petroleum production in 1981 was due to a number of difficulties. First, 
there were setbacks in the secondary recovery activities of PETROPERU. Secondly, technical 
problems were encountered in the transport of crude, as difficulties arose in the northern branch of 
the oil pipeline and in river transport, the latter caused by a bigger fall than originally expected in 
the flow of the jungle rivers. 
'Owing to the importance of this item in total mining output, however, the decline it suffered in 1981 represented 8% 
of the total drop in the value of mining production. 
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As regards Government policy on the mining and petroleum sector, it should be noted that 
government efforts to promote the participation of the private sector, both national and foreign, 
were more pronounced. The General Mining Law was enacted in 1981, and the law on the 
petroleum sector had already been enacted in the last week of 1980. These both comprise a number 
of promotional measures and tax exemptions for investors in the sectors involved. As a result of 
the second of these laws, several contracts were signed in 1981 with foreign oil companies such as 
Superior Oil of the United States, and reinvestment by companies already established in Peru 
increased. In addition, the State monopoly over the external marketing of minerals was eliminated 
during the year and a progressive decrease in the 17.5% tax on mining exports began to be 
implemented. 
(iv) Manufacturing, The growth rate of the manufacturing sector in 1981 (a little over 2%) 
was lower than those attained in 1979 and 1980 (4% and 6%, respectively). Owing to these low 
rates of growth and the economic recession in the preceding years, manufacturing output in 1981 
was only 28% higher than in 1973. 
Certain factors related to the external trade policy were partly responsible for the lack of 
dynamism shown by the sector in 1981. In the first place, manufacturing suffered the effect of the 
opening up of trade, which permitted the entry into the country of a number of low-priced 
products, or products considered by the consumer to be of better quality. Particularly notable were 
the cases of textile products, automobiles, electronic products, toys, etc. At the same time the 
activities of industries providing other enterprises with inputs, such as those producing motor-
vehicle parts, decreased with the decline in the latter industries. Moreover, the decrease in tax 
incentives to export activities owing to the reduction or elimination of the CERTEX tax refund 
certificates generated negative effects since it reduced the rate of return of export activities, which 
were also affected by the increased overvaluation of the sol. 
Secondly, there were internal reasons also. Thus, there was a drop in the supply of certain raw 
materials such as fish, petroleum, sugar and minerals. Furthermore, in 1981 the rules governing 
the manufacturing sector and laying down its relative importance could not be clearly defined for 
want of a new law to regulate manufacturing activities. This situation of uncertainty was reflected 
in the drop in authorized investment in the sector in 1981 both in nominal terms (-7%) and in real 
terms (almost -50%). It should be noted, however, that in spite of the fact that some industries 
such as beverages and rubber were affected by labour disputes, on the whole these disputes were 
Table 6 
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less serious in 1981 than in the preceding year. Although the strikes in the sector increased from 
361 to 403, they involved 17% fewer workers, while the number of man/hours lost fell by more 
than 40%. 
Among the manufacturing subsectors the most rapid growth was shown by textiles, clothing 
and leather, followed by the metal products and machinery industry. The former expanded by 
nearly 8%, after falling by slightly less than 2 % in 1980. A great deal of this recovery is attributable 
to the textile subsector, which after a 5% drop in 1980 grew by nearly 10% in 1981. This 
expansion, obtained in spite of the policy of opening up trade and reducing export incentives, was 
largely due to the fact that in 1980 the output of textiles had fallen owing to a major strike. Thus, 
production in 1981 was still only 4% higher than in 1979. Output of footwear declined by over 
12%, after a rise of more than 17% in 1980, and production of this item in 1981 was 26% lower 
than in 1973 (see table 7). 
The metal products and machinery subsector expanded by 7% in 1981, thus pursuing the 
upward trend initiated with its 24% growth in 1980. The most dynamic item was transport 
equipment which, with a 20% rise in 1981, completed an increase of more than 100% between 
1978 and that year. Even so, because of considerable declines in production in previous years 
(especially 1977 and 1978), output in 1981 was still only equal to four-fifths of the 1973 figure. 
Electrical and non-electrical machinery for their part grew by 9% and 7%, respectively. 
Production only declined in the manufacture of metal products other than machinery (4%), after 
an increase of more than 19% in 1980. The four items mentioned above constitute Peru's capital 
goods industry. 
The subsectors in which production dropped in 1981 were paper and printing (by over 3%, 
mainly because of the fall in paper production) and the basic metal products industry, which 
likewise contracted by more than 3%, owing above all to problems in the supply of raw materials. 
The food, beverages and tobacco subsector remained practically stationary, largely as a result 
of the decrease in the production of sugar. The non-metallic minerals subsector also grew very 
little, owing especially to the 10% decline in the glass industry. 
(v) The construction sector. For the second year in succession, construction was the most 
dynamic sector of the economy, growing by 11% in 1981. This rate, however, represented a 
marked decrease with respect to the 19% obtained in 1980. A key factor contributing to this 
dynamism in 1981 was government investment expenditure, on both housing and roads. 
In 1981 the general index of sales of construction materials continued to increase for the third 
year running. The year marked significant increases in sales of non-metallic mineral products 
(25%) and basic iron and steel products (20%). Sales of cement grew by 6.3%, totalling 2.3 million 
tons (see table 8). 
(c) Evolution of employment and unemployment 
If June 1981 is compared with April 1980 it will be noted that the labour situation in 
Metropolitan Lima remained basically unchanged. Thus, in April 1980 adequately employed 
manpower constituted 66.9% of the economically active population, while in June 1981 the figure 
was only half a percentage point less (see table 9). This contrasted with the substantial 
improvements registered in 1979 and 1980, following the sharp fall in 1978. In the period July-
August of that year, those adequately employed numbered only 53% of the economically active 
population of Lima. 
There was a slight increase in underemployment from 26% to nearly 27% of the 
economically active population. This was entirely in terms of the number of hours worked, since 
underemployment as reflected in income problems declined in relative terms. Unemployment in 
Metropolitan Lima dropped from 7.1% in April 1980 to 6.8% in June 1981. 
At the national level, it is estimated that some 200 000 new jobs were created in 1981, about 
71 000 of which were in Metropolitan Lima. 
In 1981 the number of workers involved in strikes increased significantly (34%), but the 
number of man/hours lost rose by only 3%. The reasons for the strikes included the rise in the cost 
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of living and regional or local factors. Although the workers striking for these reasons represented 
only 2.7% of the total number involved in strikes in 1980, the percentage rose to 49 .1% in 1981. 
The number of workers striking because of the rise in the cost of living was over 20 times 
higher in 1981, owing in particular to the expectations which the new Government created with 
respect to the reduction of inflation in the course of the year, which did not materialize. The 
number of workers striking on account of regional or local factors, for their part, increased more 
than 40-fold. The main reason was the splitting-up of two provinces in the department of Loreto 
in order to create the new department of Ucayali. Another notable feature was the considerable 
decrease in the number of workers involved in strikes in connection with the establishment of 
wages and salaries in collective bargaining and the reinstatement of workers (25% and 4 5 % , 
respectively). 
Table 7 
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China and porcelain 
Glass 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic metal products 
Basic non-ferrous metal products 
Capital goods 
Metal products 
Machinery and equipment 
Electrical machinery and equipment 
Transport equipment 
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, and Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Tourism and integration. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Excluding fish meal. 
'Including fish meal. 
Industries mainly but not exclusively producing this type of goods. 
















































































































































































































































PERU: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
1978 1979 1980 1981" 
Index of volume of main 
construction materials 100.0 85.2 89.4 102.6 107.9 -14.8 4.9 14.8 5.2 
(1977 = 100) 
Domestic sales of some 
. , b 
construction materials 
Iron bars for building 125.1 123.0 138.8 140.3 208.2 -1.7 12.9 1.0 48.4 
Cement 1 925.6 1 772.8 1 834.8 2 168.7 2 305.3 -7.9 3.5 18.2 6.3 
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú and National Institute of Statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands of tons. 
3. The external sector 
After a highly favourable performance in 1979 and 1980, the balance of payments showed a 
sizeable deficit in 1981. The merchandise trade results were a decisive factor in this respect, with 
exports decreasing by US$ 680 million-as a result of a decline in both their volume and unit value 
(see table 10). In the case of imports, their value grew by nearly US$ 790 million as a result of 
increases in both their volume and unit value, thus generating a trade deficit for the first time since 
1977. Since at the same time the deficit on financial and non-financial services transactions rose by 
more than US$ 330 million, the current account balance was converted from a small deficit of 
about US$ 70 million in 1980 to a heavy negative balance of nearly US$ 1.9 billion in 1981. 
This deficit was largely financed with movements of long-term capital, which in 1981 
amounted to close on US$ 870 million, or nearly 90% more than the 1980 figure. The increase in 
petroleum investment in response to the incentives given and the greater dynamism of private 
activities in general considerably influenced this result. 
The rest of the deficit was financed by reducing the net international reserves to the level of 
about US$ 700 million in December 1981 : a fall of nearly US$ 600 million following the growth of 
US$ 750 million in 1980 and over US$ 1.1 billion in 1979. The decrease in 1981 was due in part to 
an advance payment of US$ 377 million made in April on the external debt, but in any case it was 
adversely affected by the performance of trade in goods and services. 
The external trade liberalization policy continued in 1981. In December of that year the 
average tariff stood at 32% after having been 69% in 1976,40% in 1979 and 34% in December 
1980. There were reductions in 1981 in the tariffs applicable to inputs and capital goods for the 
manufacturing, agricultural and transport sectors, and changes in para-tariff instruments. 
Furthermore, the rationalization of the system of tax refunds for non-traditional exports also 
continued during the year, eliminating them in some cases, improving their administration and 
lowering the rates. At the same time, the tax burden in respect of traditional exports was reduced. 
As regards foreign exchange policy, the programme of daily minidevaluations decreed by the 
Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (mainly in accordance with the purchasing power parity 
formula) continued. At the end of 1981 the exchange rate of the sol with respect to the dollar was 
507, having been 341 at the end of 1980 (i.e., a devaluation of 49% in the year). 
The minidevaluations programme, however, did not manage to prevent the continued 
overvaluation of the sol for the third consecutive year. In fact, examination of the index of the 
effective real exchange rate for exports2 shows that this rate dropped by 14% in 1981 after having 
2This index is calculated by taking into account the nominal exchange rate of the sol with respect to the currencies of 
the main countries to which Peru exports, their respective rates of inflation and Peru's own rate of inflation. The weighting 
used is the share of those countries in Peru's total exports. For a more detailed explanation of the methodology used, see the 
Statistical Appendix. 
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decreased by 5% and 6% respectively in 1979 and 1980 (see table 11 and figure 2). The increased 
overvaluation was especially significant in 1981 with respect to the European currencies (owing to 
their loss of value with respect to the dollar) and was rather less with respect to the Latin American 
currencies. The dollar and the Japanese yen came somewhere in between.3 
It should be noted, finally, that the devaluation process was not uniform throughout the year. 
It was most rapid between January and March when the rate of exchange rose by an average of 
5.2% per month, slower between April and July (a monthly average of 1.9%), and higher again 
between August and December (a monthly average of 3.5%). 
(a) Trade in goods 
(i) Exports. The value of exports of goods in 1981 was a little over US$ 32 billion, or 18% 
less than in 1980. It had grown steadily since 1972, with the exception of 1975. In general, all the 
important traditional export products (except zinc) and the non-traditional products as a whole 
experienced drops in their export value (see table 12). 
The decrease in the value of traditional exports was due both to considerable decreases in the 
volume exported and to significant drops in world prices as a result of the world recession, the 
prevailing high international interest rates and certain internal factors. On the basis of the volume 
exported in 1981, the fall in the prices of silver, copper, lead and gold alone meant a smaller inflow 
of foreign exchange of US$ 585 million. 
The traditional products in which the drop in the export value was primarily due to the 
decrease in volume were fish meal, iron ore and petroleum (see table 13). In the case of fish meal, 
certain factors such as the smaller catch due to the rationalization of the use of fisheries resources, 
the greater importance attached to fishing for direct domestic human consumption and some 
Table 9 
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Source: Ministry of Labour and National Institute of Statistics. Finance and Commerce. 












PERU: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade FOB/CIF 
Terms of trade FOB/CIF 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 

















































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, and International Monetary Fund, 




PERU: EVOLUTION OF INDEXES OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 





Index of effective real exchange 
rate for exports 
Index of effective real exchange 
rate for imports 




1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
Source: Statistical Appendix. 
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marketing problems caused a decrease of 31% in the volume exported (following a fall of nearly 
37% in 1980). Because of the 7% rise in the price of fish meal, the value of exports declined less 
than the volume (27 % ). As a result of this drop the share of fish meal in total exports continued to 
decline, sinking to only 4% in 1981, whereas in 1970, when fish meal was the country's main 
export product, its share amounted to 29%. This was essentially due to the decrease in the volume 
exported, since in 1981 this was only 15% of the 1970 volume. 
In 1981 the volume of petroleum and petroleum products exported fell for the second year in 
succession, this time twice as fast (-11%) as the year before. Among the most important reasons 
for this decline were the decrease in production because of technical difficulties, problems in the 
transport of crude through the eastern area of the country (both by pipeline and by river 
transport), and the rise in domestic demand. Moreover, after having increased steadily since 1976 
the price of petroleum dropped slightly (-2%) in 1981. The total result was a 13% decline in the 
export value to just under US$ 700 million. Even so, however, the export value in 1981 was three 
times that of 1977 and the share of petroleum and petroleum products in total exports rose from 
3% in the latter year to 22% in 1981. This constitutes a sharp change in the structure of Peru's 
exports, comparable only with the decrease in the relative importance of fisheries products. 
In the case of iron ore, the export value changed very little (2%), since the drop of 8% in the 
volume was compensated for by a rise in the sales price of over 7% for the second consecutive year. 
Cotton, coffee, copper and lead were the traditional products whose fall in export value was 
mainly due to the decrease in price (see table 13). In the case of copper, as in that of lead, this drop 
in price coincided with an equally significant decrease in the volume exported. Thus, owing to the 
lower grade of the ore mined and to serious labour disputes during the year, the volume of copper 
exported dropped by 7%, and this, together with the fall of 24% in its price, was responsible for 
the fact that income from copper exports went down by one-third in 1981 after rising steadily in 
the five preceding years. 
The commodity whose price fell most sharply was lead (-44%). Added to the 10% decrease in 
the volume exported, this caused the severe drop of 50% in export value, which sank to less than 
US$ 200 million. The prices of cotton and coffee, for their part, fell by 9% and 27% respectively. 
In the case of exports of refined silver, the value remained unchanged between 1980 and 1981 
as a result of highly significant changes in price and volume which cancelled each other out. On the 
one hand, the export volume increased by nearly 80%, although this was not due to a rise in 
domestic production (which went up by only 5%) but rather to the fact that the Banco Central de 
Reserva ceased to purchase silver. On the other hand, the price fell by more than 43% after four 
years of significant increase (80% in 1979 and 108% in 1980). Since the value of exports of refined 
silver was maintained, they represented 10% of total exports in 1981, whereas in 1973 they 
accounted for only 3%. 
Zinc was the only traditional commodity whose export value rose in 1981 (29%). This rise, 
which occurred for the third consecutive year, was the result of increases in both price and volume 
exported. 
Finally, exports of sugar dwindled to nothing in 1981; they had amounted to as much as 
US$ 270 million in 1975, but as from 1976 they declined steadily, mainly owing to production 
problems of a technical and administrative nature which were aggravated at the end of the period 
by the drought. 
Exports of non-traditional commodities fell to about US$ 700 million in 1981, i.e., 17% less 
than the value registered in 1980 and just a little more than the 1979 value.4 In view of the fact that 
the export value of traditional commodities decreased by a very similar amount (18%), however, 
the share of non-traditional exports in the total exported was much the same in 1981 as the year 
before (about 21%). Their share was only 3% in 1970 and has risen almost continuously since 
then. 
4It should be noted that the decrease in the export value of non-traditional commodities in 1981 is to some extent 
overestimated for various reasons such as the existence of fictitious exports, the erroneous classification of some items as 
non-traditional, and over-invoicing in some cases in 1980. 
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The decrease in non-traditional exports was due, first, to the fact that the price of goods was 
affected both by the increased value of the dollar on the international financial markets (which 
made Peru's exports less competitive) and by a certain delay in adjusting the exchange rate for the 
sol. Furthermore, in 1981 some changes were introduced in the system of export tax refund 
certificates (CERTEX) which had negative effects on non-traditional exports. Thus, CERTEX were 
completely eliminated in the case of some commodities (lead alloy, copper manufactures, gold and 
silver jewelery and trinkets, etc.) and were reduced in the case of others (canned fish, explosives). 
Moreover, the improved management of CERTEX was reflected in a stricter control of fictitious or 
over-invoiced exports. 
The recession affecting the main export markets (the United States and the European 
Economic Commmunity) also adversely affected non-traditional exports, resulting in decreased 
demand, protectionist measures and lower prices. The high interest rates on the national and 
international financial markets were another negative factor which drove up costs. 
Finally, some factors had a specially negative effect on specific products. Thus, the conflict 
with Ecuador particularly affected exports of cement; the decrease in the catch of fish brought 
down external sales of frozen fish; the internal reactivation of construction had some influence on 
the drop in exports of construction materials, etc. 
(ii) Imports. The value of imports of goods in 1981 totalled nearly US$ 3-9 billion, i.e., 26% 
more than in 1980. Since this increase followed the also very considerable increments registered in 
the previous two years, the value of imports was 140% higher in 1981 than in 1978 (see table 14). 
The main reasons for this growth were the delay in adjusting the exchange rate and the 
increased value of the dollar (which tended to make imports cheaper), the reactivation of domestic 
demand, and the continuation of the process of opening up trade. 
Imports of consumer goods rose for the third consecutive year at a very high rate (60%), 
although it was considerably lower than that registered in 1980 (164%). As a result, their value 
Table 12 
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Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Including silver content. 
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Value 43.6 53.3 52.2 179.8 645.7 791.5 692.0 
Volume' 4 069.0 4 742.0 4 104.0 13 775.0 23 570.0 22 427.0 19 915.0 
Price* 10.7 11.2 12.7 13.1 27.4 35.3 34.7 
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. 
"Value in millions of dollars, volume in thousands of tons and prices in dollars per ton, unless otherwise indicated. 
Preliminary figures. 
'Thousands of quintals. 
Dollars per quintal. 
'US cents per pound. 
Thousands of net legal tons. 
'Dollars per net legal ton. 
Thousands of troy ounces. 
'US cents per troy ounce. 
JThousands of barrels. 
Dollars per barrel. 
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came close to US$ 620 million in 1981 and was six times the figure registered only three years 
previously. At the same time, their share in total imports rose from 6% in 1978 to 16% in 1981. 
The exceptionally high rate of increase in imports of consumer goods in 1981 was the result of 
growth rates of 53% in purchases of foodstuffs (rice, Sugar, dairy products) and 64% in purchases 
of other consumer goods. 
Both the public and private sectors increased their imports of consumer goods by very 
significant percentages: the former by 46% and the latter by 117%. In the case of the public sector, 
this was mainly due to imports of foodstuffs (for example, imports of sugar rose by over 200%). In 
the case of the private sector, the increase was mainly the result of customs tariff liberalization. 
There were particularly large increases in imports of textiles, luxury articles and automobiles. 
Imported vehicles, for example, represented 55% of all the vehicles sold in the country in 1981, 
compared with only 29% in 1980. 
Imports of intermediate goods increased at the slowest pace in 1981, although it was by no 
means low (18%) and they amounted to nearly US$ 1.4 billion. Their share in total imports 
continued to decrease, however, sinking to 36% in 1981 (a similar proportion to that registered in 
1970). Thus, imports of intermediate goods dropped back to second place, following capital goods, 
after having been the most important import item between 1970 and 1980. In 1981, imported 
foodstuffs used as inputs (wheat, maize, sorghum, oil, dairy products) grew by a little less than 9% 
and other imported inputs by 21%. As in the case of imports of consumer goods, greater 
dynamism was shown by the private sector, which increased its imports of intermediate goods by 
24%, while the public sector did so by only 2%. 
Imports of capital goods surpassed US$ 1.5 billion in 1981 owing to their growth of over 
37%: a fairly high rate, although somewhat lower than the rates of 51% and 63% registered in 
1979 and 1980, respectively. As a result of this notable and sustained expansion, the value of 
imports of capital goods more than trebled in the course of the last three years, while their share in 
total imports rose from 29% in 1978 to 40% in 1981. The private sector was responsible for 65% 
of total imports of capital goods in 1981, a growth rate of 43 %. Those of the public sector grew by 
28%. 
The significant growth of imports of intermediate and capital goods by the private sector was 
mainly due to the continuation in 1981 of the process of recovery of domestic economic activity and 
the persistent policy of opening up trade, which led to the adoption of measures such as the 
reduction of tariffs on inputs and capital goods for industry (March), agriculture (April) and 
transport activities (September). In the case of the public sector, its imports of capital goods 
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Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Include adjustments, non-monetary gold, and other imports not elsewhere classified. 
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(iii) The terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports. Although in 1979 and 1980 the 
unit value of exports of goods increased at very high rates (50% and 30%, respectively), in 1981 it 
decreased by a little over 8%. This reflected the drop in the prices of nearly all the traditional 
export commodities. The unit value of imports of goods, for its part, rose by 3%, thus pursuing the 
rising trend observable throughout the 1970s and in 1980. Accordingly, after the considerable 
increases registered in 1979 and 1980 the terms of trade fell by 11% in 1981 to a level similar to 
that of 1979. 
Added to the drop in the unit value of exports of goods in 1981, there was a decrease in their 
volume (-10%) for the second consecutive year. Thus the purchasing power of exports declined by 
over 20% in 1981, after having fallen slightly in 1980 but doubled between 1976 and 1979. 
(b) The services trade and factor payments 
The outflow of foreign exchange for imports of non-financial services grew by nearly 40% in 
1981 to over US$ 1.1 billion. This amount was more than double that registered only two years 
before. Income under the heading of exports of these services rose by only 2% after increasing by 
one-quarter in 1980 (see table 15). In consequence, the trade deficit in non-financial services 
increased substantially to slightly over US$ 380 million in 1981: five times the deficit recorded in 
1980, which in its turn had contrasted with the small surplus achieved in 1979. 
The two main items of non-financial services (transport and insurance, and travel) 
deteriorated in 1981. The deficit under the heading of transport and insurance increased by 7 5 % in 
1981, amounting to almost six times that registered in 1979 (an increment which was partly 
associated with the exceptional expansion of imports of goods). In turn, the surplus in respect of 
travel decreased in 1981, after a period of five years in which it had increased steadily. This surplus, 
which had been only US$ 7 million in 1975 but in 1981 amounted to US$ 186 million, thus 
dropped to US$ 155 million in 1981. That year inflows practically remained unchanged, after a fall 
of 3% in the entry of foreign visitors into Peru. In contrast, outflows under the head of travel 
increased by one-third, owing partly to the fact that travel abroad by Peruvian citizens rose by 
15%. 
Net external payments for financial services experienced only a small change in 1981, with 
the deficit growing by 3% after a fall of nearly 12% in 1980. Payment of profits showed a 
considerable increase (24%) to over US$ 360 million. Net interest payments, for their part, 
decreased for the second year in succession (-8%) to a little less than US$ 500 million. This was 
achieved despite the rise in international interest rates in 1981, which meant additional financial 
pressure on the country's balance of payments in the amount of US$ 135 million. 
(c) The current account position and its financing 
After obtaining a surplus on current account of nearly US$ 500 million in 1979 and a small 
deficit of slightly over US$ 70 million in 1980, the current account closed in 1981 with an 
unprecedented negative balance of nearly US$ 1.9 billion. 
Most of this deficit was due to the substantial deficit generated by the balance of financial and 
non-financial services (over US$ 1.2 billion). The change from a small deficit in 1980 to an 
exceptionally large one in 1981, however, was mainly attributable to the reversal in the balance of 
trade in goods, which changed from a surplus of close on US$ 840 million in 1980 to a deficit of 
over US$ 630 million in 1981. Approximately 46% of the current account deficit was financed 
with net movements of long-term capital, the net inflow of which totalled about US$ 870 million 
in 1981, or nearly 90% more than in the previous year. This result was decisively influenced by 
direct investment, which, after decreasing by a little over 60% in 1980, multiplied ten-fold in 1981 
to US$ 280 million: the highest figure since 1975. As a result of the incentives granted to the 
petroleum sector, this registered the most dynamic growth in investment, which rose by 38% in 
1981 with respect to the amount invested in the previous year, totalling nearly US$ 420 million 
and constituting 82% of total investment. Furthermore, amortization payments in this sector 
were reduced by 54%. Thus, net direct petroleum investment rose by more than 300% between 
1980 and 1981. 
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Table 15 
PERU: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 

















































































































































































































































































Source: 1976-1979: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1980-1981: ECLA, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
cIn addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




Net loans to the private sector were also highly dynamic in 1981, reaching a total of over 
US$ 170 million, or almost three times the previous year's figure. Finally, official loans also 
increased, although their growth rate of 11 % was considerably lower than those of the other two 
components of long-term capital. 
The rest of the deficit on current account was financed with movements from the net 
international reserves, which dropped from over US$ 1.2 billion at the end of 1980 to a little over 
US$ 700 million in December 1981. This represented a fall of 46% (US$ 584 million), following 
the increases of over US$ 700 million in 1980 and more than US$ 1 billion in 1979-
Two-thirds of the decrease in international reserves, however, was due to an advance 
payment of US$ 377 million on the external debt in April. This payment was made to replace 
onerous loans by soft loans and to improve the country's external financial image. During the rest 
of the year, the net international reserves fluctuated around the value attained in April. 
(d) External indebtedness 
The evolution of Peru's external debt in the last two years has been very different from that of 
Latin America's indebtedness in general. Thus, while the latter grew at an average annual rate of 
21% between 1979 and 1981, Peru's external debt rose at an average annual rate of barely 3%, so 
that after having constituted 9% of Latin America's total external debt in 1975, it represented only 
4% of it in 1981. 
At the end of 1981 the value of Peru's total external debt amounted to nearly US$ 9.9 billion 
(5% higher than the figure registered at the end of 1980). The increases in the preceding years 
were even more moderate: 1% in 1979 and 3% in 1980 (see table 16). In contrast, the average 
annual growth rate during the period between the end of 1973 and the end of 1978 was more than 
15 %. This slackening in the rate of expansion caused a drop in the coefficient of the total external 
debt/gross domestic product, which, after rising from 0.49 in 1973 to 0.85 in 1978, decreased 
systematically in the following years until it returned to the value of 0.49 in 1981. 
As in 1980, the long-term external debt represented 86% of the total debt in 1981. It grew at a 
moderate rate (4%) although this was double the 1980 figure. The corresponding average rate for 
the period 1974-1978 had been 22 %. The public external debt was the most important component 
of the long-term external debt (76% of the total in 1981). Except in 1977, the growth rate of the 
public external debt steadily decreased from 46% in 1974 to 5% in 1980. In 1981, however, it rose 
to 7% and the public external debt totalled more than US$ 6.4 billion in that year. It should be 
noted that the relatively moderate growth rate was due in part to heavy amortization payments. 
These increased by 29% in 1981 and included the aforementioned advance payment of US$ 377 
million made in April. 
The coefficient of the public external debt with respect to the gross domestic product in 1981 
was equal to 0.32, which was less than in 1980 (0.35) but considerably more than in 1973 (when it 
was only 0.16). In 1981, the public external debt constituted 65% of the total external debt, 
compared with only 33% in 1973. 
In contrast with the foregoing, the long-term external debt of the private sector increased by 
13% in 1981 to over US$ 1.5 billion, thus more than doubling its 1980 growth rate. This rate is 
exceptionally high compared with the evolution of previous years, since it is similar to the total 
increase in the long-term external debt of the private sector over the whole period 1974-1980 
(14%, or an annual average of 2%). At the same time, this rate was for the first time in many years 
higher than the rate for the external public debt, except in 1980 when the two were practically 
equal. This considerable expansion, which was due to the private sector's recovery in certain areas, 
was mainly centered in the mining and manufacturing sectors and was used primarily to finance 
imports. 
The slow expansion of the private sector's long-term external debt in the years prior to 1981 
was responsible for the fact that although it constituted 27% of the total external debt in 1973, the 
proportion was only 16% in 1981. This situation, together with the aforementioned rapid growth 
of the external public debt, reflect on the one hand the greater importance assigned to the State's 
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economic activity during the 1970s, and on the other hand the various political and economic 
factors which restrained the private sector's momentum in that period. In 1981 and to some extent 
also during 1980 the situation tended to change and the private sector had more favourable 
conditions for its expansion. 
The short-term external debt both public and private, increased by 1 1 % in 1981, after 
decreasing in 1977, 1978 and 1979 and rising by 6% in 1980. As a result, at the end of 1981 it 
amounted to US$ 1.4 billion: i.e., lower than the 1973 figure. The short-term debt which 
represented 4 0 % of the total debt in 1973, thus accounted for only 14% of it in 1981. Since short-
term loans are associated primarily with external trade operations, of both private and public 
enterprises, their growth in 1981 to a certain extent reflected the greater dynamism of domestic 
economic activity. 
In 1981 there was also a notable change as regards the public sector's external borrowing, 
which increased by 2 3 % to nearly US$ 1.9 billion, following a decrease of 12% in 1980. Between 
that year and 1981 there was also a significant change in the composition of the sources of 
financing. Loans contracted with international banks rose by 135%, thus representing 47% of the 
total (compared with 25 % of the total in 1980). Those contracted with international agencies grew 
by 109%, going up from 15% of the total in 1980 to 26% in 1981. Suppliers provided 16% of the 
loans obtained in 1981, against 35% in 1980. Finally, there was a considerable decrease in the 
participation of official agencies and governments, which granted 20% of the loans obtained in 
1980 but only 4 % in 1981. The socialist countries contributed the balance (6% in 1980 and 7% in 
1981). 
Table 16 
PERU: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
Total external debt 
Long-term external debt 
Public sector 
Banco Central de 
Reserva del Perú 
Private sector 
Short-term public and 
private external debt 
Public external debt as a 
percentage of GPD 
Total external debt as a 
percentage of GDP 
Servicing of external public 
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16.3 34.4 47.9 42.2 35.1 32.1 
48.7 67.0 84.5 66.8 54.5 49.0 
38.9 35.8 38.7 23.3 33.9 53.2 
Percentages 
Credit contracted by 
financing sources 










































Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes long-term external public debt of the central government and public exterprises. 
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The increased share of loans obtained from international agencies should lead to a future 
improvement in the terms of the total debt, as also should the increase in borrowing from 
international banks, since it includes loans for US$ 377 million on more favourable conditions 
than loans for the same value which were paid off by means of the advance payment made in April. 
The decreased participation of official agencies and governments was due to the fact that only in 
May 1981 did the new Government of Peru present to the Advisory Group in Paris the programme 
of public investments for the period 1981-1985 which require external financing. 
The sectors receiving the largest proportions of the loans obtained in 1981 were defence 
(18% of the total), transport (17%), energy (15%) and agriculture and mining (14% each). 
Disbursements of external loans to the public sector in 1981 expanded by 33% to US$ 1.6 
billion: i.e., more than 8 times the level of disbursements in 1970. In line with the Government's 
interest in developing infrastructure works throughout the country, 66% of the total 
disbursements were destined for investment projects in 1981, compared with 45 % the year before. 
The energy and mining sector received 28% of the funds allocated to investment projects; 
agriculture, 25 % (mainly a contribution of US$ 100 million to the Banco Agrario), and transport 
and communications, 18% (mainly for road construction). It should also be noted that 9% of the 
disbursements were assigned to food imports. 
Servicing of the external public debt totalled a little over US$ 1.7 billion, or 20% more than in 
1980. Amortization payments amounted to nearly US$ 1.2 billion (a 27% increase) and interest 
payments to US$ 520 million (an increase of only 6%). The coefficient of external public debt 
servicing with respect to exports was 0.53 in 1981, against 0.37 in 1980 and 0.26 in 1979. It should 
be noted, however, that the service payments made in 1981 include the advance payment of 
US$ 377 million in April; if this were left out, the coefficient would be 0.41. The average interest 
rate paid by Peru in 1981 was 8%, resulting from the following rates: socialist countries: 4%; 
international agencies: 6%; official agencies and governments: 6%; suppliers: 9%; and private 
banks: 14%. 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices 
After moderate decreases in 1979 and 1980, the rate of inflation spurted again in 1981, when 
the December-December rise in the consumer price index was 73%: almost as much as the 
maximum recorded in 1978 (74%). Moreover, the variation between annual averages of the 
aforementioned index was 75%, the highest figure for the entire period for which statistics are 
available (see table 17). 
Inflation was uneven during 1981. In the first quarter the variation in consumer prices was 
nearly 25%, equivalent to an annual rate of 140%. This exceptional increase was due to the so-
called "unfreezing" of prices, that is to say, the adjustment of the prices of most of the controlled 
products. Over the period April-December 1981, however, the total variation in consumer prices 
was nearly 39%, equivalent to 55% annually. 
The items which experienced the highest rates of inflation in 1981 were furniture and 
household goods, health care and transport and communications, all of which showed December-
December variations equal to 80% or more. Clothing and footwear were the items least affected by 
inflation (50%), compared with 68% in the case of foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco. 
The variation in the wholesale price index from December to December was 66% in 1981. 
This rate, although much lower than the 96% registered in 1978, was higher than that of the two 
intervening years. This acceleration was mainly due to the variation in wholesale prices of 
domestic manufactured products, which doubled in 1981 to a rate of 82%. Wholesale prices of 
domestic agricultural commodities rose at a considerably lower rate than in 1980, whereas in the 
case of imported products the rise in wholesale prices in 1981 was 48% as against 42% the year 
before. 
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Apart from the aforementioned unfreezing of prices, a number of other factors contributed to 
the persistence of the inflationary process in 1981. On the one hand, the pressure of costs was 
considerable owing, inter alia, to the higher rate of devaluation, the increase in interest rates, and 
wage adjustments. Another factor was the substantial deficit, although a large part of it was 
financed by external and domestic borrowing. In the latter case, recourse was had to idle funds of 
the financial system. 
Among the factors which partly curbed the inflationary process were the fall in real terms of 
the Central Bank's primary issue and the increase in financial saving as a proportion of the gross 
domestic product. 
(b) Wages 
The real value of wages and salaries received by manual and non-manual workers in 
Metropolitan Lima showed a slight decrease in 1981, following a considerable improvement in 
1980 after several years of continuous decreases. This real value continued to average over 2 5 % 
less in 1981 than the 1973 figure. During the period of intense inflation experienced by Peru, 
which was accentuated from 1976 onwards, wages and salaries have not increased fast enough to 
counteract the loss of their purchasing power (see table 18). 
The situation of general government employees, however, was considerably worse. Although 
in 1979, unlike the private sector, general government wages and salaries showed positive growth, 
this became negative in both 1980 (-18%) and 1981 (-9%). Thus, at the end of 1981 the average 
basic remuneration paid by the general government was equal to only 38% of that paid in 
December 1973. 
As far as the income of the rural population, which is composed mainly of low-income groups, 
is concerned, it may be assumed that there was a substantial real improvement owing to the 
notable performance of the agricultural sector and the traditionally slow growth of the 
economically active population engaged in agriculture. 
In 1981 two important measures designed to maintain the real value of wages and salaries 
prevented them from deteriorating still more. Firstly, workers in the public and private sectors not 
subject to collective bargaining were granted quarterly increases in proportions similar to the 
expected variation in consumer prices. Secondly, it was decreed that collective agreements should 
contain wage adjustment clauses to replace the former cost-of-living adjustments decreed by the 
Government. 
Table 17 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
Consumer price index 
Food 





Consumer price index 
Food 





Source: National Institute of Statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. 






















































































PERU: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES"4 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198? 




Real wages and salaries 



























































































Source: National Institute of Statistics. 
"The salaries (employees) and wages (workers) correspond to the average wages and salaries paid by the private sector in 
Metropolitan Lima. In the case of the government, only average basic wages and salaries are considered. 
The data for wages and salaries are annual averages; those for general government are at December of each year. 
Preliminary figures. 
Soles per month. 
'Soles per day. 
-'index-. December 1973 = 100. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
In 1981 there was a small decrease in real terms in total liquidity (its nominal growth was 
70%), after two years of real positive growth (see table 19). This was partly the result of the 
authorities' effort to put into effect a restrictive monetary policy which would not generate 
inflationary pressures. This policy, as will be seen later, was compatible with a significant 
expansion of credit to the private sector owing to the fall in the net international reserves, the 
result being that the nominal growth of liquidity was wholly based on domestic sources. 
While the net international reserves decreased by 36% in nominal terms and the negative 
balance on other external operations increased by 76%, domestic credit grew by 114%. 
For the third consecutive year the growth rateof credit to the private sector(100%, or 14% in 
real terms) was higher than that of credit to the public sector (nearly 90%, or 7% in real terms). 
Thus, while in 1978 credit to the private sector was nearly 10% less than that to the public sector, 
in 1981 it was more than double it. The result obtained in this respect in 1981 was in keeping with 
the policy announced by the authorities aimed at giving an effective stimulus to private activities 
through credit and refraining from financing the government by inflationary means (although 
this latter objective was achieved only in the first half of the year). 
The rapid growth of credit to the private sector in 1981 was possible thanks to a number of 
measures adopted during the year which increased the quantity of available financial resources, 
such as reductions in the legal reserves in respect of deposits in national and foreign currency, the 
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elimination of compulsory deposits in national currency which were a requirement for all external 
financing, the establishment of certain credit lines managed by the Central Bank, and the abolition 
of the retention of part of the foreign exchange generated by exports. 
As regards the use made of total liquidity, 1981 witnessed the continuation of the trend 
towards reducing the share of money in total liquidity and, as its logical counterpart, increasing the 
share of quasi-money. In real terms, the quantity of money decreased (owing to a nominal growth 
of less than 50% during the year), after having grown in the two previous years, while the amount 
of quasi-money expanded for the third consecutive year thanks to its nominal growth of over 80%. 
As a result, money represented 34% of total liquidity and quasi-money 66%. The proportions in 
1977 were 52% and 48%, respectively. 
Furthermore, some restraint was placed in 1981 on the so-called "dollarization" process 
which consisted of the rapid growth of foreign currency deposits and hence of their share in total 
quasi-money. In real terms, the volume of these deposits in 1980 was 27 times the amount recorded 
only three years previously and in that year they constituted 44% of total quasi-money, while in 
1977 they had represented only 3%. In 1981, however, they fell by 19% in real terms, so that their 
share in quasi-money dropped to 34%. 
Table 19 
PERU: MONETARY BALANCE" 
Total liquidity 
Sources: 
Foreign assets (net) 
Other external operations (net) 










Bills and coin in circulation 
Demand deposits in national 
currency Quasi-money 
Time deposits in national 
currency Saving deposits in national 
currency 
Deposits in foreign currency 
Others'* 
Balance at year end 



























































































































































Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. 
"Data refer to national financial system. Exchange rate used (soles per dollar): 110 for 1977, 200 for 1978, 250 for 1979, 
330 for 1980 and 390 for 1981. 
Preliminary figures. 
'Include net credit to FONAPS; inter-system operations; capital, reserves, provisions and results; other net assets and 
liabilities; adjustment for revaluation. 
Include mortgage savings certificates; other securities; other mortgage papers; foreign exchange certificates; securities 
and bonds issued by the non-bank financial system; capital contributions, and technical life reserves. 
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Time and savings deposits in national currency rose significantly in 1981, increasing their 
share in quasi-money to 44%, after a decline in the previous three years. Together, these two types 
of deposits grew by one-third in real terms in 1981. 
The progressive "dollarization" of financial assets up to 1980 and its abrupt halt in 1981 were 
largely due to the evolution of the interest rates paid on national currency deposits. Up to 1980 
these were negative in real terms, which, combined with the continuous process of devaluation, 
made deposits in foreign currency more attractive. Nominal interest rates on deposits in national 
currency almost doubled in 1981, however, so that the real interest rate became positive in some 
periods of the year. At the same time, the process of devaluation lagged behind inflation, and this, 
added to the foregoing, caused many deposits kept in foreign currency to be converted into national 
currency deposits. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
The results obtained by the Government's economic action in 1981 were very different from 
what had originally been budgeted for the year. Thus, while fiscal income was 9% less than that 
budgeted, current expenditure was 9% higher, so that savings on current account were 94% less 
than the projected amount. Moreover, capital expenditure (excluding amortization payments) was 
48% higher than foreseen in the budget. 
These differences were due on the one hand to the speed with which the budget had to be 
prepared in 1980 owing to the change of government, and on the other hand to the adoption of 
some assumptions which were not fulfilled in practice regarding, for example, the adjustments of 
controlled prices, cuts in investment programmes, etc. 
Owing to the big decrease in current account savings and the increase in capital expenditure, 
the nominal fiscal deficit doubled in 1981, increasing by 23% in real terms. As a percentage of the 
gross domestic product it came to 9% in that year, compared with 7% in 1980. 
The large fiscal deficit arose for the following reasons. In the first place, after increasing in 
real terms in 1978,1979 and 1980, government income fell by 15% in 1981 (see table 20). The tax 
burden (revenue/gross domestic product), which had been 21 % in 1980, dropped to 18% in 1981. 
Taxes on imports were the only ones to show a real increase, which was due to their nominal 
growth of over 100% in 1981 (although this was less than the previous year's increase). A basic 
factor in this was the increased value of imports. Taxes on production and consumption were the 
second most dynamic items, since they expanded by two-thirds, which meant a small decrease in 
real terms. Revenue from income tax increased by only 2% in nominal terms to a little over 300 
billion soles, thus decreasing by 42% in real terms. This was due above all to a decline in the 
income of mining companies owing to the low world prices and problems in the production 
process such as labour disputes. Finally, taxes on exports fell both in nominal terms (6%) and in 
real terms, as a result of the lower value of traditional exports and the progressive elimination of 
the 17.5% tax levied on mining exports. 
Total expenditure, for its part, registered nominal growth of 66% (less than in 1980), so that 
for the second consecutive year expenditure grew more rapidly than income (see table 20), 
although this growth did not become positive in real terms. The proportion of the gross domestic 
product represented by total expenditure in 1981 was similar to that recorded in 1980 (27%). 
Current expenditure rose by 69% during the year. As a proportion of total expenditure, this 
item remained close to the 1980 level (66%). The item which expanded most in 1981 was 
expenditure on wages and salaries, which grew by 88%, thus increasing its share in total 
expenditure from 17% in 1980 to 20% in 1981 (it may be noted that its share was 30% in 1975). In 
real terms, the growth rate of public expenditure on wages and salaries was positive for the second 
year in succession, but the real total value of this expenditure in 1981 was equivalent to only 85% 
of the 1975 figure. 
Owing to the higher domestic and external interest rates, interest payments grew by 79% in 
nominal terms in 1981 (which meant a small real growth). Particularly notable was the growth of 
interest on the domestic debt (121%). The rest of government expenditure increased by 52%, 
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owing especially to a 7 8 % rise in expenditure on goods and services. Finally, public food subsidies 
amounted to 57 billion soles (equivalent to 0.7% of the gross domestic product), of which ECASA, 
the public rice-marketing enterprise, received 50 billion and ENCI, the public enterprise marketing 
wheat, oil, dairy products, maize, etc., received 7 billion. 
The result of all this was that after having increased during the two previous years, current 
government saving fell drastically in 1981 to a value equivalent to barely 0.2% of the gross 
domestic product, which enabled it to finance only 2 % of total capital expenditure. 
The nominal growth rate of capital expenditure in 1981 was lower than in the previous three 
years. Gross capital formation increased for the third year running at a nominal rate of over 90%. 
As a result, its real value was over 60% higher in 1981 than in 1975. This growth was mainly 
concentrated in three sectors: housing and construction, transport and communications, and food 
and agriculture. Amortization payments, for their part, increased in nominal terms by 59% in 
1981, a notable feature being the 114% rise in amortization of the domestic debt. 
Table 20 
PERU: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
1. Current income 
Tax revenue 
Income and property taxes 
Export taxes 
Import taxes 
Production and consumption 
taxes 
Non-tax revenue 
Less: refund certificates' 
2. Current expenditure 




Other current expenditure 
3. Saving on current account (1 -2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Gross capital formation 




5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 
7. Financing of deficit 
Domestic financing 
External financing 
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Including wage and salary discounts for pension funds. 
'Mainly tax refund certificates for export promotion. 
Current values in 













































































































































































































Fiscal policy during the year was characterized by important measures in the tax field which 
constituted in reality a far-reaching tax reform. This should make the tax system more efficient in 
the future by reducing the number of taxes, lowering the majority of the rates and creating a tax 
unit which will be linked to the rate of inflation. 
The most drastic changes occurred in the field of sales taxes, which were replaced by a value 
added tax covering both wholesale and retail sales. Imports and some services are included, but 
exports and certain goods such as basic foodstuffs, medicines and agricultural machinery, are 
exempt from payment of this tax, which is levied at the rate of 16%. Added to this is a selective tax 
on consumption at rates ranging between 10% and 116%, applicable to certain goods such as 
cigarettes, alcoholic beverages and soft drinks, automobiles, colour television receivers, etc. 





1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The efforts made in 1981 to contain public expenditure and bring down the fiscal deficit, to 
restrict imports and reduce the serious external imbalance, and to slow down the rate of increase in 
prices, in the means of payment and in the external debt met with significant success in several 
respects, but at the same time helped to curb the growth of economic activity, consumption and 
investment. 
The gross domestic product, which had increased by a little over 6% in 1980, grew in 1981 at a 
rate of only slightly over 3%, which in per capita terms was less than 1%, notwithstanding the 
satisfactory results obtained in such important activities as agriculture and mining. At the same 
time, however, gross income increased by slightly more than the product (approximately 4%), 
thanks to a further improvement —although much less than that registered in 1980— in the terms 
of trade (see table 1 and figure 1). 
In contrast with the scanty expansion of domestic demand and of important sectors of 
production, exports of goods and services rose by about 19% in current values and 9% in volume. 
Basically, this was the result of the favourable terms on which it proved possible to sell sugar and 
sugar products, in spite of the fall in the price of this commodity on the international markets. 
On the other hand, imports of goods and services fell by approximately 7%, which adversely 
affected the normal supply of consumer goods, raw materials and intermediate and capital goods. 
This occurred after two years of vigorous growth and was clearly in response to the measures 
adopted for the purpose. 
The opposing trends pursued by imports and exports in 1981 reduced the trade deficit by over 
half and the balance-of-payments current account deficit by 44%. Notwithstanding the 
considerably smaller net inflow of capital than in 1980, this permitted a further increase in the 
country's international reserves. 
During the year there was a gross capital inflow in the form of loans with a term of more than 
one year amounting to slightly over US$ 150 million, i.e., less than half the amount disbursed the 
year before and only equal to the amortization payments, so that the external debt at the end of 
1981 was the same as that accumulated one year earlier. 
The policy of containing public expenditure, which was so successfully implemented in 1980 
when the fiscal deficit dropped by 40%, showed results that were not so spectacular in 1981 — 
since they were not accompanied by such a high increase in income as that obtained in the previous 
year— but were nonetheless significant, as the deficit dropped once again, this time by 10%, so 
that as a proportion of total government expenditure it fell from 33% to 16% between 1979 and 
1981. In the latter year the contraction of expenditure mainly affected public investment. 
Somewhat in contrast with the slow movement of the different economic activities and 
variables in 1981, the means of payment increased from December to December by about 8%. 
Although this percentage was much higher than that recorded in 1980, it was still lower than the 
growth rate of the gross domestic product expressed in current values. Currency outside banks, 
however, which had scarcely changed in 1980, increased by 18% in 1981. 
The variation in domestic prices was more accentuated if measured betweem December 1980 
and December 1981, but if the variation between the annual averages of the index is considered it 
dropped to less than half (from nearly 17% to 7.5%). This slowing-down of the rate of inflation 
was connected on the one hand with the favourable results of agricultural production for domestic 
691 
consumption, and on the other hand with the insufficiency of money in circulation, which 
dampened demand. 
Apart from the efforts made during the year to counteract the unfavourable trends of some 
variables and to correct the fiscal and external deficits obstructing the inflow of foreign capital, a 
considerable proportion of the diminished investment was devoted to strengthening the basic 
infrastructure and expanding social services, primarily in rural areas. One-third of capital 
expenditure was assigned to agriculture. 
At the same time, priority continued to be given to investment designed to increase the 
capacity for the generation of electricity, mainly of coal-based thermal plants in the short term, and 
of hydroelectric plants over the longer term. 
Lastly, steps continued to be taken to promote the education and health sectors, which 
absorbed over 2 1 % of total government expenditure in 1981. It should be noted that per capita 
expenditure on health almost trebled over the last three years, and this has been reflected 
primarily in the improved health conditions of the rural population. Coverage of this population 
by health services was extended from 40% to 69% over the period in question. 
Table 1 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices' 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in net international reserves 
Total disbursed external debt 
1976 
;


























































































































Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
'The figures for 1976 and 1977 relate to the Santo Domingo index (1969 = 100). From 1978 onwards they relate to the 





2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
The fall from 5.6% to 3.4% in the growth rate of the gross domestic product in 1981 was 
accompanied by an appreciable contraction (12%) in the volume of imports of goods and services, 
so that total supply, which had registered increments of around 6% annually in the previous two 
years, showed an increase of less than 1% (see table 2). 
In contrast with what occurred in the case of imports, the volume of goods and services 
exported experienced a marked recovery after the sharp and substantial decline it had shown in 
1980, increasing by a little over 9%. This fact, as well as giving an impetus to the domestic product, 
meant that the domestic availability of goods and services in 1981 remained at virtually the same 
level as in the preceding year, with the consequent effects on investment and consumption. 
In the first place, gross investment fell by close to 7 % and gross capital formation, which had 
registered an increase of around 14% in 1979 and a little over 4% in 1980, grew by less than 3% in 
1981. 
The effects of the scanty increase in investment were especially evident in the case of public 
investment, which dropped by 8% as a result of the policy of containing public expenditure and the 
difficulties in connection with external financing. Private investment, on the other hand, grew by 
approximately 6%, which was associated with capital formation in machinery rather than in 
construction. 
Consumption expenditure registered only a slight increase —considerably below that of the 
previous year— and general government expenditure rose by less than 1%, in keeping with the 
austerity criteria applied. Furthermore, it is estimated that the growth of private consumption was 
substantially less than in 1980, likewise in accordance with the deterioration of the general 
economic situation. 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
Looking at the sectoral growth of the gross domestic product it is observed that the loss of 
impetus of economic activity in 1981 was most evident in basic services, and especially in other 
services. In particular, transport, storage and communications, which increased by a little over 3%, 
and commerce and financial activities, which grew by about 4% (both considerably lower figures 
than those registered in 1980), reflected the lack of dynamism of some production activities and 
the appreciable fall in the volume of imports of goods and services. At the same time, a sharp 
reduction was observed in the growth rates of the remaining services (see table 3). 
Contrary to the general declining trend of the economic growth rate, agricultural production 
attained an exceptional increase of approximately 7%, which represents a useful recovery from 
the erratic evolution of this activity in the previous four years, when it grew at a rate of 1.6% 
annually. In addition, mining output rose by slightly over 6%, after the severe fall it had 
experienced in the previous year and notwithstanding the further decrease in the production of 
bauxite, which has dropped by 30% since 1977. 
In contrast with the notable recovery of the primary production sectors, the growth rate of 
manufacturing fell to only 2% while construction, adversely affected by the lack of impetus from 
investment and the smaller domestic demand, remained practically at the previous year's level. 
(i) The agricultural sector. The favourable results obtained by agriculture for domestic 
consumption and livestock production, which rose 14%, and the increase in some export 
commodities (which, however, altogether grew by only 2%), placed the agricultural sector at the 
head of all productive activities with an increase in its product of close to 7%, contrasting with the 
drop registered in the preceding year and its slow growth since 1977. 
This performance was due on the one hand to the favourable weather conditions and on the 
other to the investments made in the two preceding years. At the same time, the support prices of 
some commodities for domestic consumption constituted an excellent incentive for raising 
production. Thus, during the year the producers' prices were raised for rice (16% for white rice and 
6% for unhulled rice), maize (9.4%) and black beans (9.4%). 
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Figure 1 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Gross domestic income3 
I 
Consumer prices" 





















_L l _L 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. 
^Percentage variation from December to December. 
cMillions of dollars. 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
In spite of the higher production of foodstuffs, there were increases in imports of rice, maize 
and oilseeds; on the other hand, exports of some other crops rose. The increased domestic supply 
contributed to the fact that the food component of the consumer price index rose very little during 
the year. 
Among the agricultural products for domestic consumption there was a 30% increase in the 
production of plantains (which represent about 1 1 % of the population's food consumption) 
thanks to a 2 2 % expansion of the area cultivated and a rise of 6% in yields. As a result, their price 
dropped 4 0 % (see table 4). 
Rice, with a considerable share (30%) of production for domestic consumption, maintained 
its slow growth (slightly over 2 %) of the last few years. In order to cover domestic demand for this 
grain and ensure adequate reserves for at least three months' consumption, it was necessary to 
increase imports by 2 3 % . 
There was also a rise of only about 3 % in the production of red beans, the producers' price of 
which did not vary much. This was offset, however, by a sizeable increase ( 14 % ) in the production 
of black beans, encouraged by higher prices. Domestic consumption of beans has shifted to the 
black variety, which has only been produced in the country since 1976, so it was not necessary to 
import the red variety in 1981 as had been done in preceding years. 
Production of maize, which is mostly for animal consumption and the animal food 
concentrates industry, grew by nearly 40%, thus reversing the declining trend of the past three 
years. This expansion was associated with a rise of over 9% in producers' prices, which was an 
incentive to a 32% extension of the cultivated area and an improvement of approximately 6% in 
yields. In spite of the significant increase in production, imports rose by 9 % with the object of 
building up reserves. 
Yuca, production of which reached a record of 230 000 tons in 1977 but subsequently dropped 
to 82 000 tons by 1980, registered an increase of nearly 50% in 1981. This was achieved thanks to 
an extension of 30% in the area under cultivation and an improvement of 1 3 % in yields, and 
Table 2 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 




Machinery and equipment 




Exports of goods and services 
Millions of dollars 








































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values, using price indexes calculated by ECLA for the purpose 
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brought about a sharp fall (32%) in prices. Other products such as pigeon peas, sweet potatoes and 
taro, considerable proportions of which are destined for the external market (36%, 15 % and 41 %, 
respectively), also registered significant production increases with consequent repercussions on 
exports and domestic prices. 
Among the export commodities, the sugar cane harvest —which had been going down since 
1977— experienced a slight recovery of a little over 2% thanks to the favourable rainfall and the 
elimination of the disease which had affected the cane fields in the previous year. Cocoa production 
rose by 11 % as a result of the efforts made to rehabilitate plantations affected by the 1979 storms, 
and this raised productivity by 12%. 
In contrast, output of coffee and to a lesser extent of tobacco showed decreases of about 9% 
and 1%, respectively. The coffee harvest was affected by the prolonged rainfall, which prevented 
the plants from flowering normally. Production of tobacco was attacked by blue mould which 
mainly damaged the seed-beds, causing a 5% decrease in the area cultivated. 
In livestock production, poultry output showed the biggest increase. Production of poultry 
meat, which has grown fast in the last few years, rose a further 35% in 1981, thus compensating 
for the shortage of pork caused by the outbreaks of African swine feever in the years 1978-1979. In 
the case of beef, although production grew by only 2%, exports increased (see table 4). 
Agricultural policy continued to be aimed primarily at stimulating production for domestic 
consumption; 85% of agricultural credit was used for this purpose, greater use was made of 
mechanization, the supply of inputs was improved and infrastructure works were carried out. The 
scope of these measures was limited, however, by the shortage of financial resources. 
With respect to agrarian reform, 25 settlements with a total area of over 13 000 hectares 
(comparing favourably with the 14 settlements totalling slightly over 10 500 hectares set up in 
1980) were established and provided with credit, services and technical assistance. Land under the 
agrarian reform system produces 9% of the country's agricultural output and nearly 20% of that 
destined for domestic consumption.1 
Table 3 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 







Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications * 
Other services 
Commerce and finance 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and personal services 
Government services 
Millions of dollars 



























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
'These settlements contributed approximately one-third of the total production of rice, 53% of that of taro, 24% of 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Percentage 
of total Growth rates 





















































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The growth rates have been calculated on the basis of real figures, not from the indexes. 
'Slaughtering. 
(ii) Mining. After the 15% contraction in mining output in 1980 owing to the pronounced 
drop in silver and ferronickel and, to a lesser degree in bauxite, growth of 7% was registered in 
1981 as a result of the increases of 10% in the production of gold and 2 5 % in the output of silver, 
which represent between them about two-thirds of mining production. This increase, in a year in 
which world prices suffered a considerable decline (25% for gold and over 50% for silver), was 
obtained from the Pueblo Viejo mine, which has been the property of the State since 1979- Not 
until July, when world prices reached their lowest ebb, did the Government suspend sales of both 
metals to await a recovery in prices, which showed a certain improvement in the last quarter of the 
year (see table 5). 
Ferronickel, the second most important product of the Dominican Republic's mining sector, 
showed signs of recovery with production rising by slightly over 9% after the 35% drop in 1980, 
when unfavourable market conditions halted production for five months. In 1981 there was a 
slight recovery (2%) in world prices of ferronickel, as well as a drop in the prices of petroleum-
derived fuels, which have a high incidence in the industry's production costs. 
On the other hand, production of bauxite fell by 18%, thus pursuing the declining trend 
initiated in the mid-1970s. Since 1974 the volume produced has decreased by two-thirds. 
Finally, exploration activities to locate coal deposits with commercial possibilities continued 
during the year. 
(iii) Manufacturing. The growth of approximately 5% annually registered in the 
manufacturing product in recent years fell to only 2% in 1981. This slow growth may be ascribed 
basically to the fact that in 1981 many manufacturing enterprises were affected by lack of credit and 
Index of agricultural 
production (1973 = 100) 
Crop farming 
For export 
For domestic consumption 
Stock-raising 




















the measures restricting imports. In the middle of the year the purchase of imported inputs with 
foreign exchange from the Central Bank was limited to 9 0 % of the annual purchases made in the 
two years 1979-1980. Imports exceeding that limit had to be effected with foreign exchange 
obtained on the open market at about 30% more than the official price. 
Manufacturing output was also influenced by the drop in public investment and the change in 
the orientation of economic policy which tended to favour primarily rural activities, so that urban 
construction and indirectly those industries producing construction materials were adversely 
affected. Thus, cement production fell by slightly over 5% and output of steel by 1%. 
Nevertheless, the sugar industry and the food and beverages industry in general, which represent 
more than 60% of total manufacturing output, displayed a fairly dynamic performance (see 
table 6). 
Table 5 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
1978 1979 1980 1981" 
Growth rates 






























 3 ^ g 2 4 fi 
production (1975 = 100) 






Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Based on the four principal metals, excluding the extraction of stone, sand and clay, exploitation of salt and production of 
gypsum and limestone. 
'Thousands of tons. 
Thousands of troy ounces. 
Table 6 
D O M I N I C A N REPUBLIC: SOME INDICATORS OF M A N U F A C T U R I N G PRODUCTION 































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Relates to the period January-September. The rates have been calculated with respect to the same period in 1980. 
'Thousands of tons. 
Millions of litres. 
'Millions of packets. 
Millions of 42.5 kg sacks. 
'Millions of quintals. 
''Millions of kWh. 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Area constructed 
(thousands of m2 
Total 
Production of some 
building materials 
(thousands of tons) 
Structural steel 
Cement 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Building permits. 
Independently of the conjunctural factors which affected manufacturing in 1981, its evolution 
over the medium term has shown a tendency towards a slower rate of growth, as though the factors 
underlying its dynamism had gradually lost their validity. From 1968, when the Industrial 
Incentives Law was promulgated, to 1975 manufacturing output grew at a rate of 10% annually, 
with all the favourable repercussions this implied for the economy. Although one factor in this 
evolution was the external demand for Dominican sugar, its real basis was import substitution in 
respect of final manufactured goods, which, however, always had a high content of imported raw 
materials and components. Between 1976 and 1981 the average growth rate of manufacturing 
production fell to only 4% annually. 
(iv) Construction. The level of construction activity remained practically unchanged in 1981 
with respect to the previous year. In 1980 it had shown significant growth of over 7%, partly as a 
result of the reconstruction projects and activities due to the damage caused by the storms of 
September 1979 and hurricane Allen in August 1980. 
Construction was particularly affected by the fall in investment, especially that of the public 
sector. The Government's financial restrictions made it necessary to postpone the initiation of 
new works and to concentrate the scarce available resources on projects already under way, above 
all those related to agriculture. 
Furthermore, housing construction (as measured by the building permits issued) suffered a 
drastic fall of 44% in 1981; in 1979 it had already decreased by 30%, and there had only been a 
slight recovery of 5% in 1980 (see table 7). 
3. The external sector 
During the three years 1978-1980 the external imbalance got worse. Between 1977 and 1980 
the current account deficit rose from US$ 130 to US$ 675 million, the latter amount representing 
more than half the total exports of goods and services. In 1981, however, the notable recovery of 
exports combined with a fall in imports permitted reductions of 60% in the trade deficit and over 
40% in the current account deficit, which thus returned to a level of US$ 380 million, similar to 
that registered two years before. 
Exports of goods rose by 24%, stimulated by the favourable prices at which Dominican sugar 
was sold (despite the drop in the price of this commodity on the world market) and by the increases 
in the volume of sales of coffee, tobacco and sugar, among other commodities. Indeed, not only did 
their volume increase by nearly 13% but their unit value also rose more than 9% (see table 8). 
Imports of goods, for their part, fell by just over 5% after their rapid expansion in the 
previous two years. While the volume of imported goods dropped by approximately 9% as the 
699 
Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1981" 
1979 1980 1981" 
1 438 1 048 1 099 613 -27.1 4.9 -44.2 
54 37 51 50 -30.6 36.9 -1.1 
867 886 1 015 960 2.2 14.5 -5.4 
result of a number of measures adopted with that end in view, the unit value of imports 
experienced a considerably smaller increase than in previous years, rising by less than 4%. This 
may be ascribed, in particular, to the relative stability of the price of crude petroleum, purchases of 
which amount to about one-third of total imports. 
The significant increase in the average sale price of sugar helped to offset the drop in the 
prices of other agricultural and mining commodities and to raise the index of the unit value of 
exports by slightly over 9%. This increase exceeded that of the unit value of imports, so that the 
terms of trade improved by about 6% during the year. 
At the same time the purchasing power of exports of goods rose 18% thanks to the 
combination of the improvement in the terms of trade with the 13% increase in the volume of 
exports, while the purchasing power of exports of goods and services rose by 14%. 
(a) Merchandise trade 
(i) Exports. The value of exports grew by close to 24%, as a result of the increases in both the 
volume of sales (13%) and the unit value (9%). This expansion was due essentially to the rise in 
the value of exports of sugar and its by-products (furfural and molasses), which together 
represented almost half the total external sales, and to a lesser extent to the rise in the export value 
of tobacco, since the remaining exports of any significance showed a decrease. For their part, non-
traditional exports fell and their relative importance in the total value of exports of goods dropped 
from 46% in 1980 —when they registered their maximum share— to 35% in the year under 
review (see table 9). 
As from the last few months of 1980 the price of sugar on the world market, which had risen 
to over 43 US cents per pound, began to fall and was less than 11 US cents in September 1981. 
Nonetheless, thanks to sales contracted before the decline in price or under preferential 
agreements, it was possible to place this commodity at an average price of close to 27 US cents. 
This situation was in sharp contrast with that of the previous year, when the unit value of the 
Dominican Republic's sugar barely exceeded 16 US cents, while the world market price was over 
28 cents. Added to the 65% increase in the average sales price was a 7% expansion in volume, so 
that the value of raw sugar exports in 1981 rose by close to 80%. The value of sales of furfural and 
molasses went up by 28% and 24%, respectively. 
Table 8 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981° 
Gr. 








Terms of trade 
Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Purchasing power of exports of goods
 1 7 g 4 1 4 g 6 m i m 4 1 9 5 4 
and services 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'including unclassified exports of minimal importance. 
'Including roasted coffee. 
Exports of leaf tobacco, which in 1980 had fallen considerably (37%), rose by nearly 90% in 
1981 once the marketing difficulties with the main European buyer had been overcome. This 
increase was basically due to the bigger volume exported which, as production had stagnated, was 
made possible by drawing on stocks. Prices for their part rose by about 7%. 
Coffee sales remained practically at the sale level as in 1980, when they had already fallen 
sharply to almost half their value. On the one hand, exports of roasted coffee (which represent 
approximately one-third of total sales) decreased by close to 50%, while sales of unroasted coffee 
rose by about 20% thanks to the bigger volume of sales (35%), since prices —in line with the 
trend of previous years— fell by 12%. Owing to the decline in the production of unroasted coffee, 
the increase in the volume exported meant a smaller supply for the manufacturing sector and a 
decrease in stocks. 
The value of exports of cocoa dropped (12%) for the third consecutive year since, although 
the volume sold increased by 35% with the rise in production, this was insufficient to offset the 
24% drop in prices. 
As regards minerals, the only increase was in exports of ferronickel (9%); exports of doré 
(gold and silver alloy) fell by 20% and those of bauxite (which had steadily been losing relative 
importance since 1978) by 15%. The rise in sales of ferronickel was due to increases in both 
volume and price; in contrast, the price of doré declined drastically and the volume of bauxite sales 
affected by lower production, dropped considerably. 
(ii) Imports. After growth of over 30% in each of the two previous years, in 1981 the value of 
imports of goods contracted by about 5%. This was due to their smaller volume (about 9% less), 
since prices rose by about 4%, although this was in any case much lower than the rate recorded in 
previous years (see table 8). 
The drop in external purchases was basically reflected in the smaller volume of imports of 
intermediate, capital and luxury goods rather than consumer goods, and was the result of the 
various measures adopted to reduce imports. It also involved changes in the structure of imports, 
as in spite of the rise in production of some essential foodstuffs, external purchases of these items 
increased. 
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Although only piecemeal information is available, everything seems to indicate that imports 
of foodstuffs continued to grow, although at a slower pace than in 1980, since the rise in the 
domestic supply of agricultural commodities enabled the volume of cereals and grains purchased 
abroad to be reduced compared with the previous year, when they had doubled. 
The value of purchases of petroleum and petroleum products rose 11 % and their share in the 
total value of imports increased from 30% to 35%. Imports of inputs, capital goods and durable 
consumer goods, for their part, were affected by the stagnation of construction and the moderate 
growth of manufacturing. 
A policy of containing imports was implemented during the year. Under one of the measures 
put into practice, the number of imported goods for which foreign exchange is not provided by 
banks and must therefore be purchased with foreign currency bought on the open market was 
increased. At the same time, quotas were established for the purchase of raw materials, while 
inputs of some goods, mainly automobiles, were banned. Added to these restrictions was the 
requirement already in force since 1980 for advance payment of letters of credit for imports. 
Although this policy obtained positive results by managing to reduce the external imbalance, 
it affected the evolution of the economy. Thus, the restrictions on external purchases of inputs, in 
an economy in which production of the manufacturing and construction sectors has a high import 
content, hindered its rate of activity. Furthermore, the larger proportion of imports paid for with 
foreign exchange obtained on the open market —at a rate 30% higher than the official exchange 
rate— had repercussions similar to those of a devaluation, with costs and prices rising but exports 
no cheaper. 
Added to the above situation were the Central Bank's delays in remitting foreign exchange 
abroad under the terms of letters of credit, which meant interest surcharges for importers, who 
had to transfer them to the prices of imported goods. 
At the same time, it should be noted that in spite of the increased demand for foreign 
exchange on the open market resulting from the measures adopted, the exchange rate rose by only 
2% compared with 3% in the previous year. 
(b) The services trade and factor payments 
In 1980 tourist income and expenditure for the first time showed a small positive balance in 
favour of the country. In 1981 this balance increased considerably to US$ 75 million in 
consequence of a drop in expenditure under the heading of travel abroad, because of the more 
expensive foreign exchange and the moderate growth rate of economic activity. 
Income from tourism rose 16%, i.e., less than in the two preceding years (35% and 40%); 
this is mainly explained by the reduction in the average length of stay (which fell from 8.1 to 7.3 
nights) of foreign visitors arriving by air whose expenditure represents nearly 80% of the 
country's inflows under the heading of tourism. On the other hand, the number of visitors rose 
13%, or considerably more than in 1980 (5%), notwithstanding the drop in the number of cruise-
ship visitors, which was however unimportant, since they tend to spend an average of only about 
US$ 20 in the country.2 
On the other hand, the number of Dominican nationals living abroad who visited the country 
increased significantly in 1981 (35,%), as also in the previous year (47 %), which meant an increase 
in income from US$ 28 to US$ 44 million. 
With the inauguration of two hotels, one in Higuez and the other in Santiago de los 
Caballeros, the hotel capacity was increased by close on 500 rooms to 4 200 rooms, 54% of them in 
the capital city. A passenger ship terminal was also inaugurated in Santo Domingo and is expected 
to help counteract the decline in visits by cruise-ships, which previously only called in at Puerto 
Plata. 
2In 1980, out of a total of 566 423 visitors, 53% were foreigners travelling by air, 32% were foreigners who arrived by 
sea, and 15% were Dominican nationals not resident in the country. 
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At the same time, efforts to promote the tourist complex on the north coast continued. 
INFRATUR, in charge of the Puerto Plata Project,3 received a Central Bank loan of US$ 21 million 
in 1974 with which it financed part of the construction of the basic infrastructure, including the 
improvement of the Puerto Plata airport, whose total cost will be US$ 46 million. In 1979 the 
World Bank granted a further loan of US$ 25 million destined mainly to finance credit lines for the 
construction of hotels. 
Remittances of profits and interest payments, which had represented a net outflow of some 
US$ 100 million in 1977, grew rapidly to nearly US$ 300 million in 1981. On the one hand, 
interest payments have almost quadrupled over this period in consequence of the increase in the 
external debt, added to which in the last year was the higher cost of the use of capital, while 
remittances of profits, for their part, rose from US$ 70 million in 1977 to US$ 180 million in 1981, 
despite the fact that in 1979 the State purchased the Pueblo Viejo gold and silver mine which was 
owned by a foreign company (see table 10).4 
Unrequited private transfer payments, consisting basically of remittances of funds by 
Dominicans living abroad to their families, grew by 3% in 1981. Up to 1978 these inflows were 
sufficient to offset external factor payments. 
(c) The current account position and its financing 
As a result of the appreciable increase ( 19 % ) in exports of goods and services in 1981 and the 
contraction of about 7% in imports of goods and services, an exceptionally large reduction of 58% 
was achieved in the trade deficit and, even taking into account the greater outflow under the 
heading of remittances of profits and net interest payments, there was a considerable drop in the 
current account deficit. The latter, which had surprisingly expanded from US$ 360 million to over 
US$ 670 million in 1980, fell to just under US¿ 380 million in 1981, which represents a more 
acceptable proportion (25%) of total exports than the 53% recorded in 1980 (see table 10). 
Net capital inflows, which had doubled in 1980, contracted by about 40% in 1981. On the one 
hand the inflow of long-term loans dropped from US$ 430 million to a little less than US$ 230 
million, while the net inflow of short-term capital fell 30%. On the other hand, the increase in 
outflows in the form of amortization payments was not very significant (7%) and the inflow of 
direct investment (US$ 87 million) was only slightly smaller than in the previous year. Thus the 
net inflow of short-term capital was only a little less than that of long-term capital, whereas a year 
before it had represented only 70% of the latter. 
In spite of the smaller entry of capital in 1981, it totalled more than the deficit on current 
account and left a surplus which raised the country's net international reserves by US$ 31 million. 
Noteworthy features in this movement of reserves were the decrease of US$ 29 million in 
liabilities with the International Monetary Fund (additional to the US$ 76 million reduction in the 
previous year); the US$ 22 million increased in foreign exchange reserves, and the US$ 14 million 
drop in gold reserves (see table 10). 
(d) External indebtedness 
Since the beginning of the 1970s consistent recourse has been had to external financing in 
order to expand the country's external purchasing power. Thus, the external debt with a term of 
more than one year amounted to US$ 1 560 million in September 1981, which is similar to the 
figure registered at the end of 1980 and slightly more than total exports in 1981 (see table 11). 
Of the total external debt, 75 % was contracted by the public sector; in contrast, the public 
sector's share in 1974 was only slightly higher than that of the private sector. In the first nine 
monthsof 1981 the amount of credit disbursed (US$ 154 million) was less than half that disbursed 
in the whole of 1980. 
'This project is divided into two stages. The first, Playa Dorada —which has higher priority— contemplates a capacity 
of J 290 rooms in cabanas, hotels, cabanas on golf courses, and apartments, and has been designed for mass tourism. The 
second, Playa Grande, with a capacity of 1 940 rooms, is designed for tourism by higher-income persons. 
4The Foreign Investment Law (1978) limits the transfer of profits abroad to 18% of the registered investment. 
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Table 10 
D O M I N I C A N REPUBLIC: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment 














Errors and omissions 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance^ 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 



































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1975-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of data 
from the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
cThe difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




Servicing of the debt, which in 1979 represented 28% of total exports of goods and services, 
fell in the following year to 21 %, thanks to the partial renegotiation of the debt, and it is assumed 
that this proportion did not change much in 1981. 
4. Prices and wages 
In 1981 the rate of increase in prices declined significantly, notwithstanding the possible 
effects of the slight devaluation of the currency. Thus, the rise in the consumer price index as 
measured between annual averages came close to 8%, which was only half the previous year's rate 
(17%) (see table 12). An attenuating factor in this was the bigger agricultural supply of products 
for domestic consumption. In the first half of the year this permitted the price index of food, 
beverages and tobacco to drop in absolute terms, while the annual average remained at the 1980 
level. In contrast, the rise in housing was almost three times that of the global index, and clothing 
and footwear grew at a similar rate. 
The slowing-down of the rise in prices was more pronounced in rural than in urban areas. In 
the former, the average increase was 4 % , and in the latter nearly 9%. This is basically explained by 
the considerable rise in the price of housing in the cities, owing to the rigidity of supply and a 
demand which is increasing with the pressure of migration from the countryside. 
Table 11 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Total external indebtedness 
Public debt 
Private debt 
Servicing of debt 
Amortization payments 
Interest payments 
Servicing of external debt, as a 
percentage of total exports 















































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"At September 1981. 
End-year balance of disbursed debt with a terms of over one year. 
Table 12 







1978 1979 1980 1981 
Variation December to December 
8.8 25.6 4.6 
11.2 33.8 -5.2 
Variation between annual averages 
7.1 9.2 16.8 





Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
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Minimum wages have not varied since the adjustment in the middle of 1979, which has meant 
a deterioration of 7% in real minimum wages in general and approximately 4% in agricultural 
wages.5 (See table 13.) 
Owing to the fact that the increases granted to agricultural workers in 1979 were larger than 
those recorded in wages in general, and considering also that prices have risen more in the cities 
than in rural areas, this means that real wages in agriculture have improved 7% between 1978 and 
1981, while wages in other activities have deteriorated by 9%. It should be noted, however, that the 
minimum wage level in agriculture was 15% below that of the global minimum wage. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
Monetary and financial policies were oriented during the year towards curbing the decrease in 
reserves and improving the Government's financial position. For this purpose, in addition to the 
measures put into effect in the middle of 1980, others were introduced with the object of 
controlling the money supply and bank credit. Thus, the compulsory prior deposit of 100% for 
imports of a group of goods was maintained and the list of products for which foreign exchange 
had to be purchased on the open market was extended; quotas were established for imports of raw 
materials and intermediate goods paid for with foreign exchange granted at the official exchange 
rate; and imports of some goods were banned. Added to this restrictive policy was the Central 
Bank's delay in providing the necessary foreign exchange, which meant that the cash deposited for 
opening letters of credit remained frozen for as much as three months or so. 
At the same time, the cost of capital rose with the increase in interest rates and the 
authorization to commercial banks to charge commissions. Banks were also required to comply 
strictly with the provisions relating to legal reserves, concerning which a certain flexibility had 
been observed in the previous two years. 
Bank credit expanded by 12%, compared with 21 % in the previous year. This increase was 
wholly absorbed by the public sector (financing destined for the private sector shrank by a little 
over 1%), which had to resort to a great extent to domestic sources of credit in view of the 
decreased inflow of external resources (see table 14). 
Table 13 











































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official figures. 
"Estimated minimum wages correspond to the average for each year. The last minimum wage adjustement was in June 
1979. 
'In June 1979 the minimum monthly wage was increased from 100 to 125 pesos. Wages lower than 300 pesos were 




D O M I N I C A N REPUBLIC: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) 


































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 
After increasing in the previous year by a little over 2%, the money supply expanded in 1981 
by 8% (slightly less than the growth rate of the gross domestic product expressed in current 
values) owing to the expansion of currency outside banks (18%), which contrasts with the 
stagnation noted in 1980. Demand deposits remained practically unchanged. 
As regards the factors of absorption, savings and time deposits rose by 14%, or twice the 1980 
rate. In the expansion of this variable an important part was played by the increasing number of 
financial intermediaries,6 which pay higher returns than those offered by the commercial banks 
and have thus expanded their participation in the procurement of savings. In contrast, long-term 
external loans, included in the section "other items", dropped sharply. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
During the year the Government continued to implement a policy of containing public 
expenditure and reducing the fiscal deficit, which it had already put into practice in 1980 after the 
fiscal deficit had more than trebled in 1979 (see table 15). 
In 1980 the policy of containing public expenditure considerably curbed the rate of outflows, 
which grew by only 6% while inflows rose by 29%. The budget deficit was thus reduced by 40% 
and its relative importance with respect to the gross domestic product at current values fell from 
6% in 1979 to only 3% in 1980. 
The fiscal deficit decreased once again in 1981, this time by 10%, thanks to the fact that the 
increase in current income (although not even 5 % ) was greater than the increase in expenditure 
(2%). 
As regards current income, tax revenue reduced its rate of growth from nearly 15% in 1980 to 
only 5%. This occurred in consequence of the smaller revenue (5% lower than in 1980) from taxes 
on foreign trade, which represent more than one-third of tax income and were affected by the 
contraction of imports. In particular, revenue from import duties decreased by more than 19%, a 
drop which was not offset by the simultaneous 48% rise in revenue from export taxes. In addition, 
the growth rate of direct taxes fell drastically from 36% to 3%, affected by a decline of nearly 32 
"•Including savings and loan associations, private finance companies and mortgage banks. 
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million pesos in taxes paid by the State mining company. Taxes on transactions involving goods 
and services, however, increased considerably (26% in 1981 and 14% in 1980) as a result of the 
additional 40 million pesos collected in taxes on fuels. 
Non-tax revenue assumed some importance in 1979 with the purchase of the Pueblo Viejo 
gold and silver mine by the State, but this revenue, which had multiplied six-fold in the two years 
1979-1980, rose by under 3 % in 1981, mainly owing to the drop in the prices of those metals on the 
world market, since in terms of volume their production and export grew at higher rates than in 
the preceding year. 
As regards government spending, currrent expenditure grew at a slower pace, with the 
increase in wages amounting this time to only 7% (after having risen substantially in 1979 and 
1980), while other current expenditure expanded at a rate of 5%. 
The policy of containing public spending had a particularly marked effect on capital 
expenditure, which went down for the second consecutive year (-5% in 1980 and -8% in 1981 ). As 
distinct from what occurred in 1980, however, real investment and capital transfers, which had 
increased that year, fell by 6% and 17% respectively in 1981. In contrast, amortization payments 
on the debt rose by 32%, after being reduced to half in the previous year. 
Considerable efforts were made in the course of the year to improve the collection of taxes. 
For this purpose, a data-processing centre and a national register of taxpayers were extablished. 
Other projects, such as the introduction of the value added tax and another tax on urban real estate, 
had not yet been approved by the Legislature by the end of the year. 
In spite of the financial difficulties faced during 1981 and the fall in real investment and 
capital transfers, efforts were made to press on as far as possible with the three-year investment 
programme aimed especially at supporting agricultural, energy, and transport and 
communications projects, as well as others of a social character. 
Table 15 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Other 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other expenditure 
3. Saving on current account ( 1 - 2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
Capital transfers 
Other expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 



























































































































































1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Since Independence in 1975, the real gross domestic product (GDP) at factor cost rose at an 
average annual rate of approximately 7% up to 1980, partly due to the continued Dutch aid — 
approximately 165 million guilders1 granted to Suriname every year, from 1975 onwards. In 1981, 
however, the GDP had a negative real growth of 9-3% as a consequence of a marked fall in the 
mining, agricultural and manufacturing sectors, as well as a reduction in the services area 
(government, finance and banking and transport and communications) (see table 1). 
Since Independence in 1975, some 75 000 migrants (net) have left the country, but total 
population increased at a rate of 1.5% during the period 1975-1981. In 1981, however, emigration 
was the lowest in many years, reflecting government policy of attracting expatriates back to the 
country. The new Government has shown increased interest in social issues and planning efforts 
are underway to increase the country's self-reliance. 
With respect to the trade balance, the deficit reached US$ 137 million in 1981 and reflects a 
third year of fast-growing imports (up by 13%) in contrast with slack exports (down by 8.0%). 
Wage evolution in the public sector, which is the principal employer in the country (43% of 
the working force comes under the government budget), shows an increase in real wages during 
the last two years which has more than compensated for inflation. Inflation, on the other hand, has 
slowed from apeak 14.9% in the annual variation of the consumer price index during 1979, to 9% 
in 1981. 
During the last few years, external indebtedness has increased from some US$ 11 million in 
1975-1977 to more than US$ 28 million in the period 1978-1980. Efforts are being made to 
diversify the sources of foreign credit and in 1981 there was a reduction of the external debt to 
US$ 22 million. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Growth of the main sectors 
(i) Agriculture. The agricultural product (at factor cost in 1973 prices) fell slightly in 1980 
and more sharply in 1981, reflecting smaller sugar and oil palm crops. Thus the contribution of the 
sector to total GDP fell from 8.8% in 1979 to 7.6% in 1981 (see table 2). 
In recent years there has been a shifting of land use, with reductions in the areas planted with 
bananas, coffee, cocoa, peanuts and citrus and increases in the areas for palm oil and rice. The 
increase in total planted area is mainly explained by increased rice production on a large-scale, fully 
mechanized basis. Sugar production has decreased for several years due to falling yields, and there 
was also a notable decrease in coffee and cocoa production in 1981 (see tables 3 and 4). It is 
interesting to note that whereas in 1975, according to figures provided by the Planning Bureau and 
the Ministry of Agriculture, some 42% of the cultivated area was considered to be under 
large-scale farming, this type of farming represented almost 65% of the cultivated land in 1980. 
According to the 1980 Census, this sector employs about 12% of the labour force and provides 
17.7% of the jobs. According to official figures the sector offers 17 200 jobs but only 10 032 
•The rate of exchange in 1981 was 1.785 Suriname guilders per US dollar. 
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persons are normally employed on the land; the balance is covered in part by temporary migrants 
from the Caribbean region (mainly Guyana).2 
Agriculture continues to suffer because of high labour costs and a scarcity of workers. The 
Government is trying to step up research in order to secure the necessary adjustments in technical 
aspects of production. The promotion of middle-sized farms and co-operatives has been carried 
out for some time. Enhanced agricultural extension services, storage and marketing facilities are 
seen as necessary in the case of oil crops (other than palm oil), fruits, root crops and vegetables: i.e., 
in production not geared primarily to the export market. 
The livestock subsector has remained stagnant for some time, and only an increase in the 
production of goat and sheep meat was noted in the 1978-1979 period. (See again table 3). 
Rice, shrimps, bananas and palm oil are the most important export products, representing 
some 15.5 % of total exports. Exports of shrimps have gained momentum since 1973, and in 1977 
their value exceeded rice exports. Since then, however, the catch has decreased by almost 15% 
annually and only price increases have kept the export value growing albeit very slowly. Forestry 
Table 1 
SURINAME: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981° 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at factor cost 
(millions of Suriname guilders at 1973 prices) 
Population (thousands) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(Suriname guilders at 1973 prices) 
Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product (real growth) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(real growth) 
Current value of exports of goods 
Current value of imports of goods 
Consumer prices 
December-December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government ' 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
External sector 
Trade balance 
Balance on current account 
Variation in net international reserves 
External debt 
.
































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of oficial data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Average at end of December of each year. 
'From 1979 onwards this refers to current expenditure. 
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SURINAME: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture and fisheries 
forestry and wood industry 




Gas, water and electricity 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 






































































































































































Source: Data supplied to CEPAL by the Bureau of Statistics, Suriname. 
"Estimates by the National Planning Bureau. 
has been developed for a number of years and better linkages between timber production (which 
grew by 7.7% in 1975-1980 and was the most dynamic area of the economy in 1981) and processing 
are being established. Particle board, plywood and other wood-derived products are coming into 
increasing production. 
A new emphasis is placed on the processing of agricultural products in the present planning 
exercise. For this purpose, the Government envisages assuring producers that it will follow a 
pricing policy which balances costs of production with international prices. The following actions 
are part of the proposed sectoral programme for 1982-1986:3 (a) establishment of a national rice 
export institute; (b) establishment of a national vegetable export institute; (c) development of 
vegetable and fruit processing both for the domestic and export markets; (d) guaranteed prices for 
a number of selected products; (e) regulation of the shrimp and fish industry as regards the 
number of trawlers, license obligation, fuel compensation and catches. A levy on the export of 
shrimp is being studied; (f) extension of beef and pork processing and affiliation to a central 
wholesale agency that will be responsible for the purchase of animals for slaughter and the sale of 
meat; (g) measures to promote the further processing of products based on palm oil. 
In 1981 an Agricultural Census was carried out, thus improving the information available for 
decision-makers and providing more insight into the structure of land tenancy and composition of 
production. 
(ii) Mining. In 1981 the mining and bauxite sector accounted for 16% of the GDP (at factor 
cost) and 80% of exports, as well as 18% of government revenue, although in 1980 it employed 
only 6.5% of the work force. Due to this, the short- and medium-term outlook for the economy 
» Ministry of Agriculture, A nimal husbandry, Fishery and Forestry, "A Proposal for an Agricultural Sector Programme 
1982-1986", Paramaribo, November 1981. 
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Table 3 
SURINAME: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agriculture 



















Number of heads of livestock 
Cattle 
Pigs 
Goats and sheep 
Other 
Poultry6 









Milk production (fresh milk 
delivered to central market) 





























































































































































































































































Source: Agrarisch-Statistische gegevens, 1970-1979, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of Suriname.June 
1981; Graadmeter van de Surinaamse Skonomie, (Basisgegevens over producktie, arbeidsplaatsen, lonen en 
prijzen), Bureau of Statistics, Suriname; and updated figures for 1980 from the same sources. 




'Thousands of litres. 
M981 production of fresh milk amounted to 4 400 000 litres. 
'Local fishing activity. 
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SURINAME 
and its external position are critically linked to this sector. In 1980-1981 the bauxite subsector was 
plagued by falls in both volume produced and in prices, and the index of mining production shows 
a decrease of 15% in 1981 following a 6% increase in 1980. The last few years have shown a 
relative tendency towards increased processing of bauxite: between 1978 and 1980 production of 
alumina and aluminium increased more rapidly than exports of bauxite, and in 1981 the decrease 
in exports of bauxite exceeded the fall in production of these derivatives (see table 5). 
Bauxite mining started after the First World War when SURALCO (a subsidiary of the 
Aluminium Company of America - ALCOA) opened the first mine, at Moengo. Output was vastly 
expanded during the Second World War, when a second mine was opened at Paraman and a 
subsidiary of Shell of the Netherlands initiated exploitation of the Onverdacht deposits. By the 
mid- 1950s production had reached 3.4 million tons (about a quarter of total world production), and 
it continued to increase to a peak 7.2 million tons in 1974. At the end of 1974 the Suriname 
Government took a similar action as the one taken by Jamaica, the other Caribbean producer of 
bauxite, and introduced a levy on production which amounted to 6% of the realized price of 
aluminium,4 but later, because of concern at the large production drop that had occurred since the 
introduction of the levy, the Government agreed in 1979 to lower it to about 3.1-3-3% of the 
international aluminium price. 
The sector is still dominated by the two subsidiaries of transnational corporations. Processing 
of bauxite on a large scale began in the mid-1960s with the completion of a hydroelectric power 
plant at Afobakka and the construction of an aluminium smelter and alumina plant under a 
government joint venture agreement (the Brokopondo Agreement of 1958). By the early 1970s 
output of processed products had reached about 57 000 tons of aluminium, 1 300 million tons of 
alumina and 300 000 tons of calcined bauxite. About 10% of the bauxite processed is calcined and 
90% goes for alumina production. Nearly 10% of the alumina is further processed into 
aluminium. 
Table 4 
SURINAME: AGRICULTURAL AREA UNDER CULTIVATION 
(PLANTED AREA) 

































































































































































Source: Data supplied to CEPAL by the Ministry of Finance. 
"Preliminary figures. 
4
 United States listed producer price for 99.5 % ingots, at New York, assuming an average conversion factor of 4.1 tons. 
However, since the companies were allowed to credit income taxes paid against the gross levy and because of discounts in 
respect of deposits with higher production costs, the actual net levy amounted to 60-80% of the gross levy or about 4% of 
the realized price. 
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Despite occasional upsurges, since 1974 production has generally not recovered the peak 
level. Since the introduction of the bauxite levy coincided with a drop in world demand for 
aluminium that has continued under the present world recession, the companies (particularly 
those which are members of the International Bauxite Association (IBA)) have cut production in 
Suriname as well as in other countries. 
Prior to the introduction of the levy, the sector contributed 15 % of total government revenue, 
primarily in the form of income taxes. The levy's correlation to the world market price for 
aluminium has been a factor influencing the rate of growth of production and the Government's 
revenue. Thus, in 1975 net levy payments amounted to 126.2 million guilders or about 40% of 
current government revenue, and during 1976 and 1977 net levy receipts still remained at 65-70 
million guilders as aluminium price increases offset declines in production, while further increases 
in price in 1978 caused receipts to rise to 103.6 million guilders, representing nearly a quarter of 
current revenue. Since then, however, stagnating production and a decline in 1981 have brought 
the contribution down to about one-fifth of total revenue. 
The relatively high costs of the industry in Suriname have made production less competitive 
than that of other countries. The potential for an expansion of bauxite sector output lies in the 
exploitation of the Bakhuis deposits in Western Suriname. In order to seek a viable solution to the 
development of these deposits the Goverment formed a commission with the mining companies, 
and a report issued in 1980 concluded that two main alternatives were considered feasible: (a) the 
establishment of a small bauxite mine in Western Suriname (430 000 tons) and the establishment 
of a new calcinated refractory bauxite plant to supplement present production facilities in Eastern 
Suriname. This would result in doubling total calcined bauxite output; or (b) the establishment of a 
larger bauxite mine (2 million tons per year) and a calcinated refractory plant as well as the 
expansion of the existing alumina plant by about 50% to process about 1.5 million tons of Western 
Suriname bauxite. The construction of a new alumina plant in Western Suriname, as envisaged in 
the Government's current Development Plan, was discarded in 1980 due to the higher costs of 
building a new plant vis-à-vis expanding existing facilities. Energy costs and the need to build new 
hydroelectric plants to serve a much larger processing plant further increase these costs. 
Table 5 
SURINAME: INDICATOR OF MINING PRODUCTION 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981° Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1981° 
Index of mining
 9gQ m Q 9 g l m Q g 8 ( ) g 2 ? 4 6 Q 4 






























































































Source: Bureau of Statistics, Suriname, and data supplied to CEPAL by the Planning Bureau. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands of tons. 




SURINAME: GROSS DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY 
AND OIL PRODUCTS, 1975-1981 
























































































































Source: Energy Planning Unit, Planning Bureau. 
"Preliminary figures. 
(iii) Energy. The energy production sector, along with gas, water and other public utilities, 
has been expanding at an average annual rate of almost 6% since 1975. Approximately 90% of 
Surinâmes present electric capacity belongs to the two private aluminium companies. Roughly 
half of this capacity is provided by the 189 MW Afobakka hydroelectric plant constructed 15 years 
ago. Under the concession agreement the company must deliver a portion of the plants output 
each year to the Government, which in turn sells it to the electricity company (Energie Bedrijven 
Surinam - EBS). This electricity, plus diesel-generated energy, services the Paramaribo area, where 
roughly half the country's population lives. 
Peak demand in Paramaribo has been estimated at 39 MW (excluding that of the industrial 
self-producers). As much as 41 % of this demand can be covered by hydroelectricity, the remainder 
being supplied by a 32 MW diesel plant. In 1975-1981,22% of the gross domestic consumption of 
energy was supplied by the Afobakka plant—most of it for aluminium production (see table 6). 
Other primary sources of energy (firewood, animal, plant and charcoal) have remained stagnant 
over the last few years. Energy consumption has been growing at the rate of almost 5 % and since 
1975 one of the country's sectoral development objectives has been to cover all of this new demand 
with hydropower and, as far as possible, to cover also the needs now being filled by industrial 
captive thermal generation. This objective was given greater urgency by the increases in the price 
of crude petroleum: while the volume of oil imports grew by 4.2% per annum in the period 
1975-1980, their cost increased by 24% per annum. A seven-man Energy Commission was 
appointed in 1979, and the new Government of Suriname set up an interdisciplinary Energy 
Group which has endorsed the Commission's recommendations. The Multi-annual Development 
Plan, which was re-examined by the new Government in 1980 and is now being further analysed, 
included two big hydroelectric projects in Western Suriname. 
The uncertainty surrounding the extent of future mining activity in the Bakhuis region has 
inclined the Government to develop hydropower to satisfy the projected industrial demand in a 
first phase. Eventual further exploitation of the country's hydroelectric potential for the produc-
tion of aluminium is a second objective for the sector. Even if it is decided not to expand the present 
aluminium production capacity in the Eastern region, the possibility still exists of substituting fuel 
now used for steam generation. In addition, it might be possible to sell electricity to Guyana while 
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that country is developing its hydropower potential. The transmission line required could still 
serve to interconnect the two countries once Guyana begins its own hydropower generation. 
(iv) Manufacturing. In 1981 the industrial sector accounted for 7.4% of the GDP at factor cost 
(1973 prices) : a severe setback compared with 1980, when it provided 12 % of the GDP. This sector, 
which is mainly oriented towards the internal market, had been one of the more dynamic areas of 
the economy in the period 1975-1980, along with construction and financial services, but its 
employment-generating capacity has been very limited: while 10.7% of the work force was in this 
sector in 1975, only 8.4% worked in manufacturing in 1980. 
In the period 1974-1980 it was the area of agro-products and processed foods that was the 
most dynamic, the leading activities being butter production followed by wheat flour production, 
both of which are heavily dependent on imported inputs, as are cattle fodder and animal feeds, soft 
drinks, cigarettes and shoes. Sugar production fell in this period, recovering somewhat in 1981 but 
remaining well below the 1974 production level. The same trend was seen in alcohol and molasses 
production, which is also dependent on the historically declining cane production yields (see 
table 7). 
Production based on local raw materials, such as processed wood products, cardboard boxes 
and crude palm oil, have not gained momentum in recent years. Moreover, the setback experienced 
in 1981 by manufacturing, coupled with the smaller mining activity, adversely affected commerce 
and services too, so that transport and financial services also declined. 
Table 7 
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Source: Bureau of Statistics and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Tons. 









SURINAME: AVAILABLE JOBS AND ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE 























































Source: Volkstelling, 1980, (Census, 1980), Bureau of the Census; Planning Bureau; and Ministry of Finance. 
" A positive figure indicates that the posts exceed the number of persons economically active in the sector; a negative figure 
indicates that the number of economically active persons is greater than the available posts. 
(v) Public sector activities. Government services grew at a steady pace of 3-7 % annually from 
1975 to 1980, due in part to the continued development aid from the Netherlands, together with 
the availability of savings on the current account during the 1978-1980 period. Revenue from 
direct and indirect taxes grew at a rate of 18% in the 1975-1980 period. Thus, the Government has 
remained the largest employer in the economy, offering about 40% of the jobs in the country, and 
in years of poor performance like 1981 it acts as a buffer for the whole economy. 
In 1981 the Government faced a deficit on the current account which was mainly due to a 71 % 
increase in purchases of goods and services and a 19% increase in wages and salaries. Subsidies and 
transfers diminished during the year, contrary to the 1975-1980 trend of dramatic increases in 
government expenditures (see table 16 below). 
Capital account or development activities continued, with the major construction efforts and 
public health initiatives being financed by Netherlands aid. The recurrent problem of the country's 
capacity to absorb these investments has affected the pace of project implementation. 
(b) Developments in employment 
The lack of manpower at most skill levels and a shortage of technical and managerial staff are 
probably the most important constraints which Suriname now faces. Table 8 shows, on the basis of 
data from the 1980 Population Census, how the total number of work posts in most sectors 
outnumbers the economically active population. This should not be confused, however, with 
absence of unemployment. 
In past years, emigration has been particularly heavy among the educated and the skilled, thus 
presenting the country with the above-mentioned shortage. According to the same census figures 
(see table 9), however, there are nevertheless a significant number of persons looking for work — 
some 17% with respect to the economically active population. They are mainly in very young age 
categories— 29.6% of those looking for work are between the ages of 12 and 19, while those 
looking for work in the 12-24 age group represent 11% of the work force in the 12-59 age group, 
and most of them have a low level of administrative and technical skills. 
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3. The external sector 
In 1981, for the first time in many years, Suriname faced a deficit on its merchandise trade, 
reflecting the faster growth of imports than exports for the third consecutive year. Due to the fall 
in bauxite sales, exports went down by 7.9% (see table 10). In contrast, before 1980 the surplus on 
the merchandise trade partly offset the deficits on services, which had not reached such a high level 
since 1977. 
The fast growth of imports during 1980 and 1981 must reflect the rise in consumer goods 
purchases, which in 1975-1979 represented more than 20% of total imports. The latest year for 
which figures are available (1979) shows that purchases of capital goods represent only 14.4% 
while in the case of intermediate goods the price increases of fuels and oil upset their composition. 
Thus, in 1975, 35% of intermediate goods imports were fuels and more than 60% were raw 
materials, while in 1979, 57% were fuels and 36% were raw materials. 
The direction of trade has not varied appreciably over the last few years. The main markets 
for both imports and exports continue to be the United States and the Netherlands (supplying 
44% of total imports in 1979 and buying 48% of total exports). Nevertheless, there has been a 
slight decrease in these traditional markets' importance in favour of new markets.5 In the case of 
exports, sales to Japan —mainly shrimps— have increased from 2% to 6.8% of total sales, and 
business with European countries which are not members of the EEC has increased from 1 % to 
3.6% of total exports. Imports from other Caribbean countries (mainly in the CAR1C0M area) have 
increased from 20% to 24% of total purchases made between 1975 and 1979. 
Deficits have been recorded in respect of the services trade and factor payments for several 
years. In 1981 total services costs were slightly under the 1980 figure and 1981 shows a positive 
balance in net payments of profits and interest on foreign capital for the first time since 1975, with 
interest received offsetting the remittances of profits and payments of interest (see table 11). 
Suriname is a net receiver of unrequited private transfers from migrants now living abroad, 
and although these represent only 2-3% of total current account receipts, they are important 
sources of income for a large number of low-income families. The current account registered a 
deficit of US$ 119 million in 1981: more than double the previous year's result. However, the 
Table 9 
SURINAME: ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION AND PERSONS 
LOOKING FOR WORK, BY AGE GROUPS IN 1980 
Economically active population 
Age group Number of 
persons 
Looking for work 
Age group Number of 
persons 
12 - 14 
15 - 59 
6 0 - 6 4 
65 -69 















4 0 - 4 4 
4 5 - 4 9 













Source: Bureau of the Census (Bureau Vijfde Algemene Volkstelling), quoted by the Ministry of Finance. 





SURIN AME: EXPORTS OF GOODS 
Total 




Agriculture and fishing 
Rice 
Bananas/Plantains 
Shrimps and fish 











Wood and wood processing 7 
Others 













































































































capital account movements, mainly the continued Netherlands aid, prevented a negative balance 
on the total account. In 1981, there was additionally a significant amount of net direct capital 
investment, representing about 25% of the capital account, and as a result the global balances 
showed a surplus of US$ 9 million. 
The unit value of exports increased by 10.4% during the year, while that of imports rose by 
6.2%. Thus, the terms of trade index improved from 93.7 in 1980 to 99.5 in 1981 (1970=100). 
However, since the export volume decreased drastically by 16.5%, the purchasing power of 
exports of goods index declined to 105.8 as compared with 123.6 in the previous year (see 
table 12) 
Suriname's external debt situation is extremely favourable, as is reflected by a positive balance 
in the global account since 1978. At the time of Independence in 1975, the Netherlands cancelled 
all outstanding debts, and since then public investment has been largely financed by Netherlands 
Grant Aid.6 
4. Prices and wages 
In 1981 the rate of inflation, as measured by the retail price index, fell for the second 
year in succession and amounted to 9%, which was relatively low compared to the two-digit 
figures registered in the years 1979 and 1980 (see table 13). The effect of receding world prices 
—especially those of basic foods that are imported— served more than strict controls to restrain 
the upward variation of the index. In the case of food and beverages, the rise was only 3.5% in 
1981, the biggest increases being in the prices of clothing and potatoes (19.2%), followed by 
housing and furnishing costs. 
Wage and salary increases, especially in the case of the public sector, which is the principal 
employer, more than offset inflation in 1981 and compensated for the loss in real wages 
experienced in 1979 (see table 14). 
6The Netherlands Aid Agreement of 1975 provided for about Nfl. 3.1 billion in grants over the period 1976-
1985/1990, of which about Nfl. 2.5 billion remained undisbursed at the end of 1980. 
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Table 11 
SURINAME: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance" 
Total variation in reserves" 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 










































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1975-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook (magnetic tape, March 1982); 1981: 
CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
° Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
cThe difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 





SURINAME: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 








Terms of trade FOB/CIF 
Terms of trade FOB/CIF 
Purchasing power of exports 
of goods 
Purchasing power of exports 










































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Table 13 
SURINAME: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Weighting 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Consumer price index - all items 
Variation December to December 
9.4 14.6 4.1 10.9 15.7 10.9 
Variation between annual averages 
7.5 
Consumer price index - all items 
Food and beverages 
Housing and furnishings 










































Source: Prijsindexcijfers van de Gezinsconsumptie (Consumer Price Index), Bureau of Statistics. 
Table 14 
SURINAME: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
(Index 1975 = 100) 





























Source: Data supplied to CEPAL by the Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 15 
SURINAME: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 
Foreign assets (net) 
Domestic credit 
Claims on government 
Claims on the private sector 
Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money 
Long-term deposits and 
foreign borrowing 
Capital and reserves 
Other items (net) 




































































































Source: Central Bank of Suriname. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Includes short-term claims on the Government and government investment on domestic capital market minus short 
term liabilities due to development co-operation. 
'Includes short-term claims on the Government (net), claims on the private sector and investment on domestic capital 
market, minus short-term liabilities due to development co-operation. 
Tahle 16 




Bauxite levy (net) 
Profits from central hank 
Other non-tax revenue 
Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Subsidies and transfers 
Interest 
Goods and services 
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In the private sector, wage costs per employee are estimated to have nearly tripled over the 
period 1973-1980, and in a number of sectors, particularly plantation agriculture, construction and 
domestic services, employers have resorted to hiring foreign workers (particularly from Guyana, 
as noted earlier) in order to overcome shortages of unskilled labour. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
After the restrictive monetary policy followed in 1980 (money increased by only 7.6% during 
the year and the factors of expansion were mainly foreign assets, while domestic credit expanded 
slowly and, in contrast, savings and time deposits grew by more than 28%, withdrawing about 50 
million Suriname guilders from circulation), the money supply expanded at the rate of 22% in 
1981. Domestic credit grew by 28.7%, while the growth of quasi-money (savings and time 
deposits) was 37% (see table 15). 
Commercial bank credit went primarily to trading and commercial activities (including 
building loans). Among the productive sectors (which received less than 40% of such credit), the 
principal recipients were agricultural and mining activities. Resources available for construction 
and forestry actually decreased in the year, reflecting the slackening of activity in these areas. 
The international reserves situation remains favourable, with the foreign exchange available 
in the Central Bank at the end of 1981 representing more than 4 months of imports at this year's 
level. 
Since Independence, the fiscal deficits have amounted to a total of approximately 660 million 
Suriname guilders between 1976 and 1980 (see table 16). These deficits have been financed mainly 
through Netherlands aid totalling 672 million guilders. In 1981 grants received amounted to 169 
million guilders. The present financing plan for the public investment programme during 
1981 -1987 envisages the disbursement of all the remaining Netherlands grants, plus total external 
borrowing requirements of about 970 million guilders. Of these, about two-thirds would be on 
commercial terms, to be contracted largely in the latter part of the period (1984-1986), after the 
concessional contributions have been fully disbursed. 
The prospect of an increasing resource gap and a sharp rise in debt service levels beyond the 
availability of concessional aid under present conditions should be borne in mind. The possibility 
that this may happen under the present circumstances of reduced bauxite output and ris ing energy 
costs underscores the need to raise the long-term overall export growth rate; to take early steps to 
increase rapidly domestic savings to avoid undue reliance on external funds, which will probably be 




TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Because of the pervasive influence of petroleum on the Trinidadian economy, the energy 
crisis and the subsequent oil price hikes to which it gave rise accounted for Trinidad's vigorous 
growth throughout the 1970s. The petroleum sector alone directly accounts for 36% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) in Trinidad. Moreover, its indirect impact —especially via government 
revenues and expenditure— is likewise impressive, for the bulk of government revenues are made 
up of taxes on petroleum or petroleum-dependent activities, and government revenues in turn are 
equal to 40% of GDP. Hence, the evolution of the Trinidadian economy is largely governed by the 
growth of petroleum output and/or prices. 
The substantial economic growth experienced over the last few years, influenced mainly by 
the sharp increase in oil prices in 1979, slowed down considerably in 1981. Preliminary estimates 
reveal that the gross domestic product, at current prices, grew by only 11% in 1981 after increases 
of 24% and 21 % in 1980 and 1979 respectively. Real growth of output was thus of the order of 
minus 2 1/2% once the 14% increase in the general price level is taken into account (see table 1). 
Yet, because of higher petroleum prices the terms of trade were nevertheless fairly favourable to 
Trinidad and Tobago (of the order of 5 %), so that real income may not have declined significantly 
between 1980 and 1981. 
The reduction in the physical output of petroleum during the year was due to various factors, 
including lower world demand for crude and refined petroleum and the closure of some wells in 
favour of gas conservation. These contributed to the 4% fall in earnings accruing to the petroleum 
sector, but increased earnings in the non-oil sectors, especially construction and services, more 
than compensated for this decline. Thus, what little growth in output did take place in 1981 was 
due to the spending of petroleum-derived income in non-petroleum sectors of the economy. 
Inflation abated somewhat in 1981, decelerating to 14%, due in large part to the lower rate of 
imported inflation resulting from the revaluation of the US dollar, and to a somewhat less 
expansive monetary policy. 
Thanks to the strength of petroleum revenues, both the fiscal and foreign reserve situation of 
the country was quite solid. Indeed, the surplus on the balance of payments in 1981 alone was 
sufficiently large to cover all of Trinidad's outstanding foreign debt. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(i) Agriculture. No single sector of the economy has been so severely hurt by the energy crisis 
as agriculture. From the onset of the oil price hike in 1972 through 1980, agricultural output 
declined by close to 50%, notwithstanding the resources the government increasingly dedicated to 
this sector (these almost trebled in real terms between 1975 and 1980, and in the latter year 
government resources to agriculture almost equalled the value of the whole of agricultural 
production). The oil bonanza has of course made food imports relatively cheap, given the 
combination of a fixed exchange rate since 1975 and domestic inflation substantially above that of 
the country's major trade partners. Then, too, the attraction of relatively high-paying jobs for 
easier work in the city has accelerated urban migration and made suitable agricultural labour hard 
to find, pressuring agricultural wage costs upward. Had agricultural productivity increased 
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substantially, the problem would have been manageable. Instead, however, agricultural 
productivity has been stagnant. Hence agriculture's role in the economy has been eroding sharply, 
falling to well under 3% of GDP in 1981 (see table 2). 
In the face of such past trends, agricultural output in 1981 —mixed and spotty as was its 
performance— showed something of a reversal. The current value of agricultural production grew 
almost 23%, well above the -2%, 4% and 2% growth in 1978,1979 and 1980 respectively. To be 
sure, this growth was low, if not negative, in real terms (it was anywhere between -6% and +5% 
according to the deflator used). ' Be that as it may, it represented a reversal of the sharp declines the 
sector had previously been experiencing, with real output falling by close to 10% in each of the last 
three years (1977-1980) 
Table 1 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at factor costs 
(millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (thousands of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Terms of trade 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer price index 
December-December 
Annual averages variation 
Money supply 
Rate of unemployment 
Current revenue of government 
Total expenditure of government 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in net international reserves 
External debt 





































































































Source: CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
1
 If the growth in the current value of agricultural production (22.6%) is deflated by the rise in the food component of 
the consumer price index (16.6%), then real growth is 5%. On the other hand, since the food prices index is a mix of 
imported and domestic prices, and imported prices rose only 3%, it can be argued that the price of domestic food 
production must have risen by around 30% to yield a cost of living rise (imported plus local food produce) of 16.6%. In view 
of the existence of price controls and food subsidies, this latter argument is not, strictly speaking correct, but it nevertheless 
establishes an upper limit on the rise in prices of domestic produce, and so a lower limit on real growth, 
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TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Table 2 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 




Manufacturing (excluding petroleum) 
Construction 
Basic services 
Electricity and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Commerce, restaurants and hotels 
Finance insurance and 
real estate 
Government 
Education and culture and 
community services 
Personal services 
Millions of current 





































































































































Source: CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
This reversal in 1981 was led by important spurts in cocoa and coffee production, but it was 
braked by the continued decline in sugar production. All in all, then, 1981 showed mixed trends, 
but nevertheless marked a reversal in the decline of overall output. 
The sharpest setback was suffered by sugar, the economy's principal non-petroleum export. 
Cane production fell 13% in 1981 (see table 3), while sugar production dropped even more (17%). 
This disappointing result was explained by the decline in the price of sugar in world markets, 
combined with low levels of productivity and rising production costs. 
The continued high incidence of unplanned cane fires, poor crop management and unusually 
heavy rainfall during the harvesting season caused an acute drop in the sucrose content of the sugar 
cane, resulting in poor-quality cane. Harvesting of the crop was made difficult by the heavy rains 
and muddy terrain. These factors had a severe effect on the amount of sugar extracted from each 
ton of cane, accelerating the decline of the past few years. Sugar factories continued to operate well 
below capacity due to poor pre-harvesting preparations and factory down time, the latter due to 
the lack of spare parts on the one hand and the uneven movement of the cane from field to factory 
on the other. In addition, operation was adversely affected by sporadic work stoppages occasioned 
by insufficient notice to workers about changes in harvesting operations during the inclement 
weather and also by conflicting interpretations of negotiated agreements between management 
and labour. Further, the general lack of information as to the future of the sugar industry has 
caused some degree of apathy and generated a lack of motivation to work, as evidenced by the high 
incidence of absenteeism during the harvesting period, both in the fields and the factories. 
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Cocoa production, which had been on the decline over the last decade, showed a rapid 
turnaround in 1981, when output more than doubled, virtually recovering its 1975 level. This 
increased production can be attributed to the revival of the cocoa industry through the National 
Rehabilitation Programme, which introduced a system of guaranteed prices for the crop. Almost 
60% of cocoa bean production was exported in 1981, the volume of cocoa exports thereby 
increasing by over one-third. Estimates for 1981 suggest that coffee production grew over 55% 
during the year, thereby reversing the declining trend of the last six years and enabling output to 
approach its previous peak, registered in 1975. This subsector also benefitted from the National 
Rehabilitation Programme. Exports of coffee were expected to be much improved in 1981, with 
preliminary estimates indicating a two-thirds increase in their volume. The substantial increase in 
the output of both cocoa and coffee can be partially attributed to the heavy rains experienced early 
in the year. 
Data for the first six months of 1981 indicate a 35% decline in citrus production as against the 
corresponding period in 1980. Crop diseases, poor estate management, labour shortages and the 
use of large parcels of citrus lands for housing have contributed to the fall in production. Moreover, 
local producers continue to face the effects of the importation of large quantities of concentrated 
juice from other Caribbean Community countries, mainly Belize. 
With regard to other crops, such as tobacco, copra and vegetables, it is believed that these 
suffered setbacks in production in 1981 due to poor local demand, crop diseases, reduction of 
acreage under cultivation and labour shortages. Because of poor drainage, there was severe 
flooding in most agricultural areas throughout the year, resulting in massive crop losses and 
making necessary the importation of vegetables. An ineffective agricultural marketing system, 
together with an inefficient transport system, has hindered the production of perishable and 
seasonal crops. Moreover, production of these crops was reduced as farmers responded negatively 
to what they considered unsatisfactory levels of guaranteed prices. Another factor in the decline in 
agricultural production was the withdrawal of prime land from agriculture and its use for housing 
Table 3 




























































































TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Table 4 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: LOCAL CRUDE PETROLEUM EXPORTS AND 
LOCALLY REFINED CRUDE, 1975-1981 





































































Source: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago: Review of the Economy, 1981 and Quarterly Economic Bulletin, March 
1982. 
developments, new industrial activities and the construction of roads. Although the Government 
has increased its agricultural subsidy programme and introduced specific programmes aimed at 
developing agriculture, many infrastructural prerequisites (roads, electricity, irrigation, etc.) are 
not fully satisfied. 
As regards the livestock sector, half-year estimates indicate a mixed performance in this sub-
sector. Whereas there were improved production levels for pork and mutton, beef and veal 
production declined somewhat, while poultry output held steady. Major factors affecting the meat 
industry have been the difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies of feed and also the high costs of 
the available supplies. 
(ii) Petroleum. Petroleum is the dominant sector of the economy accounting for 36% of the 
gross domestic product, over 90% of exports, and the bulk of government revenue. The 
Trinidadian economy is thus to a large extent governed by the behaviour of this single activity 
(along with refining). In 1981 the value of overall petroleum output declined by a little over 4% in 
nominal terms (see table 2). Inasmuch as the prices of petroleum and its derivatives rose by almost 
14%, this implies that the volume of output must have fallen by almost 18%. Crude oil production 
has been on the decline since 1978, when it reached its peak production of 13.3 million cubic 
metres. Preliminary estimates suggest that production in 1981 was 12% less than 1980 (see 
table 4), largely due to the introduction of gas conservation measures in fields producing associated 
gass off the East Coast, to the maturing of existing wells and to the closure of wells of the East 
Coast to avoid the flaring of associated gas. Indications are that marine wells continued to account 
for the greater part of domestic production, despite their decline in output since 1978. Land 
production, on the other hand, has remained stable over the last few years, thanks to the fiscal 
incentives granted to producers, the drilling of new wells and the adoption of secondary recovery 
techniques. Local crude petroleum exports have been declining, reflecting the pattern of domestic 
production. In 1980, just over 7.3 million cubic metres (59% of domestic production) was 
exported, whereas in 1981 6.0 million cubic metres (56% of local crude production) was exported, 
some 18% less than in 1980. 
Trinidad not only produces crude petroleum but also refines it. Indeed, heretofore it refined 
more than it produced, processing substantial amounts of imported crude in its own refineries. 
These are designed, however, for heavy oils, whereas national output of crude is largely of a lighter 
variety. Consequently, much of national output is exported as crude to be processed abroad, while 
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at the same time substantial amounts of heavy crude are imported to be processed in Trinidad's 
refineries and then re-exported. Nevertheless, on a net basis up to now Trinidad has still refined 
more than it has produced. 
Over the last five years, throughput at the refineries has been on the decline, and this trend 
continued into 1981, when throughput was estimated to have declined some 19% below the 1980 
level (see table 5). This again resulted in significant excess refinery capacity (estimated at 45% in 
1980). This overall decline in refinery throughput is due to the substantial reduction in the amount 
of imported crude processed under agreement and the declining supply of spot imported crude. 
Imports of crude oil fell to 6.1 million cubic metres in 1981, down 27% from 1980. Thus, for 
the first time in the industry's history, the level of crude imports was virtually equalled by that of 
exports, so that Trinidad is no longer refining more than it produces (see table 6). Should this 
tendency continue, it will become more a producer than a processer of petroleum. 
The sharp decline in the refining of crude in Trinidad is due to the shift away from heavy 
crude to the more profitable light crude, for which Trinidad's refineries are not designed. Added to 
this, US tax legislation has made it more profitable for US-owned companies to have their crude 
processed in the United States and dependencies rather than elsewhere. Further, the deep 
recession in the United States and a system of fuel-switching, together with the decline in 
international demand for petroleum products, have resulted in local refineries having a large 
amount of excess capacity. 
Production of natural gas reached a record level in 1980. However, preliminary estimates 
suggest that output for 1981 was marginally lower due to government conservation measures. 
Approximately half of total gas production is used as fuel or processed gas, mainly by the 
refineries, the Electricity Commission and a few energy-intensive industries. It is expected that the 
conservation measures introduced early in 1981 will help to reduce the proportion of gas flared. To 
this end some wells of the East and North Coast areas were capped to avoid the flaring of high-
pressure associated gas. This has resulted in lower oil production from these wells. 
In April 1981, Parliament promulgated the Petroleum Taxes (1980) Act. This revised the 
taxation system for petroleum companies in keeping with international principles. One of the 
provisions involves the use of actual or realized prices in the computing of taxable income, rather 
than the tax reference prices. There were also other production incentives. 
Table 5 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: REFINERY THROUGHPUT, OUTPUT AND EXPORTS 
OF REFINED PRODUCTS 








































































Source: Ministry of Energy and Energy-Based Industries. 
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Table 6 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
(Millions of barrels/cubicmetres) 
























































Source: Ministry of Energy and Energy-Based Indus ties. 
In 1981 the Government presented a White Paper on natural gas, establishing the Natural 
Gas Corporation as the sole purchaser or distributor. It also indicated that the country's proven 
reserves were now 10.6 TCF (trillion cubic feet), while estimated local reserves were 17.9 TCF. 
(iii) Manufacturing. Industrial output (exclusive of oil and sugar) fell 4 1/2% in 1981 (see 
table 7). This was the first such decline since 1972, and contrasts sharply with the strong growth of 
the past five years, which was never less than 6% in any year and averaged 10% per year over the 
period. As a result the share of manufacturing in the gross domestic product fell below 6% in 1981. 
Activity in the beverages and tobacco sector declined some 5% in 1981 after recording growth 
of 18% in 1980. This downturn was mainly due to the closure of one tobacco company and the low 
level of domestic supply of raw tobacco and non-alcoholic beverages. 
Output in the textiles, knitted garments and footwear subsector declined by an estimated 21% 
after the 9% growth rate of 1981. This reduction in output can be attributed to labour disputes in 
the textile and footwear industries, which reduced the number of man-hours available for 
production, to the increased importation of garments, and to the closure of some firms. After two 
years of rising production levels, output in the wood and related products sector fell by 26%. 
The 20% decline in production in the chemical and non-metallic products sector was due to 
the low levels of production of fertilizers, of glass and plastic components for construction, and of 
petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals. The lower fertilizer output (some 19% below the 1980 level) 
was due to industrial unrest, to the unreliable supply of natural gas, and to numerous interruptions 
in the supply of electricity and water. 
In the assembly-type manufacturing subsector growth decelerated to 2%. The production of 
motor vehicles rose 13% in 1981 (see table 8), thus making up for a good part of the 22% decline 
in 1980, but the production of household appliances fell considerably in 1981: by 46% in the case of 
refrigerators, and by 35% in that of gas cookers. Finally, production of television sets and radios 
rose marginally in 1981 (by 4% and 3% respectively). 
(iv) Construction. Construction, which accounts for nearly 10% of the GDP, continued to be 
the most dynamic activity of the economy in 1981, its growth being estimated at 13% (in real 
terms). The performance of this sector was governed by the growth of both the disposable income 
of consumers and investment by producers, each of these being a clear reflection of the increased 
income generated by the petroleum industry after the 1979 price hikes. This continued dynamism 
is all the more impressive given the fact that in 1981 there continued to be bottlenecks due to 
shortages of both materials and skilled building craftsmen. 
During the year, there was an inadequate supply of most building materials which was 
worsened by the fall in domestic production of cement and of bricks and blocks (by 25 % and 18% 
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Table 7 
T R I N I D A D A N D TOBAGO: INDICATORS OF M A N U F A C T U R I N G PRODUCTION 
(1977 = 100) 
Index of manufacturing production - Total 
Food processing 
Drink and tobacco 
Textiles, knitted goods and footwear 
Printing, publishing and paper converters 
Wood and related products 
Chemical and non-metallic products 

























































Source: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Vol. VII, N°3, March 1982 
"Preliminary figures. 
Excluding oil and sugar. 
Table 8 
T R I N I D A D A N D TOBAGO: O U T P U T OF SELECTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
Sugar 
Rumc 
Beer and stout 
Cigarettes 
Edible oil 
































































































































Source: Quarterly Economic Report. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands of tons. 
'Thousands of proof gallons. 




Millions of units. 
'Thousands of units. 
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respectively). In order to meet the shortfall in production, imports rose substantially, reaching 
almost 2/3 of total consumption of cement in 1981. Since bricks and blocks are more costly to 
import than cement, some construction firms adopted the precast system of building to speed up 
delivery of housing projects. Even so, the block-making industry suffered under-utilization of 
plant capacity because of the insufficient supply of key inputs such as cement, sand and gravel. 
The National Housing Authority continues to be the main source of funds for low-income 
and emergency housing. Despite the Government's goal of building 6 500 houses a year, public 
funds for housing fell by 17% in nominal terms, and less than 3 000 houses were scheduled for 
completion in 1982. 
3. The external sector 
Provisional balance-of-payments estimates indicate a surplus of almost US$ 800 million 
dollars on trade in goods and services: a 20% increase over 1980 (see table 9). 
The value of exports fell off 2% in 1981, after a near 50% increase in 1980. This was the first 
such decline since before 1970, and it affected both petroleum and non-petroleum-related exports, 
traditional as well as non-traditional exports (see table 10). As for imports, tighter monetary 
controls by the Central Bank are thought to be responsible for their even sharper decline in 1981, 
by nearly 8%: again the first such decline since before 1970. 
Because the unit price of exports rose almost 14%, whereas that of imports grew only 3%, the 
terms of trade for goods rose over 9% (see table 11), while the terms of trade for goods and 
services improved almost 5% during 1981. This improvement was due to the residual increase in 
petroleum prices on world markets and the relatively slow growth of import prices in US dollars, 
given the revaluation of the dollar. 
Overall trade with CARICOM countries was estimated at nearly TT$ 280 million in 1981 —an 
increase of 6% over 1980. This was the result of the 14% increase in imports, since exports to this 
area grew by only 1% in 1981. It was nevertheless estimated that Trinidad and Tobago would 
record a favourable trade balance with the CARICOM market of about TT$ 42 million (23% lower 
than the 1980 surplus). 
The surplus on current account grew 47% with respect to 1980, reaching almost US$ 640 
million. This increase was due to the strong trade surplus, plus the continued growth in interest 
payments received by Trinidad on its overseas investments and holdings of foreign reserves. 
These receipts equalled almost 70% of the interest and factor payments made by Trinidad in 1981. 
Net movements on the capital account seem to have been negligible in 1981 —well below 
1980's US$ 200 million— so that the balance-of-payments surplus declined 12%, although still 
permitting a US$ 550 million rise in the reserves. It is worth pointing out that this increase in the 
reserves was by itself 30% larger than all of Trinidad's foreign debt. The overall foreign reserves at 
the end of 1981 stood close to US$ 3 200 million: the equivalent of 18 months of imports and of 
the order of 50% of the gross domestic product. This means, for example, that were Trinidad to 
receive 5% real interest on its reserves, its national income would grow annually by roughly 
2 1/2% because of interest payments alone. 
The Government of Trinidad and Tobago continued its policy of giving financial assistance^ 
CARICOM countries, providing balance-of-payments support, and making available loans for 
development purposes and the purchasing of Bonds and Treasury bills. These funds have been 
issued (over the past two years) mainly through the "Facility for Financing Oil, Fertilizer and 
Asphalt Purchases by CARICOM from Trinidad and Tobago" (commonly called the CARICOM Oil 
Facility) and the Caribbean Aid Council. The CARICOM Oil Facility finances the increases in cost of 
the commodities it covers over the prices prevailing at the base rate of 1 January 1979 by making 
concessionary loans with a 15-year maturity. These amounted to close to TT$ 60 million in 1980 
and close to TT$ 10 million in 1981, more than 98% of which has gone to Guyana. 
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Table 9 
T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O : B A L A N C E O F P A Y M E N T S 
(Millions of US dollars) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services0 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services" 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balancec 
Total variation in reserves^ 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 











































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1975-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook 1981: CEPAL, on the basis of official 
data. 
"Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
1
 The difference between total Variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 
monetization or demonetization of gold, allocation or settlement of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to 
revaluation. 
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Table 10 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: SELECTED EXPORTS OF GOODS 
Total domestic exports 






Main non-traditional exports 
Petrochemicals 
Fertilizers and ammonia 
Cocoa beans 
Coffee beans 






































































































Source: Central Statistical Office, Quarterly Economic Report, October-December 1979, and data supplied to CEPAL. 
"January-June 1981 with respect to same period of 1980. 
Crude and partly refined petroleum. 
'Refined and unrefined sugar. 
Because of the relatively low base at 1975 the value for 1979 yields an enormous growth rate of 750 per cent. 
Table 11 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 








Terms of trade 
In 
Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 



























































213.8 222.5 215.7 265.8 340.7 320.1 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
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4. Prices and wages 
(a) Prices 
The rate of inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index, abated somewhat in 1981, 
when prices rose by a little over 14%, compared with inflation rates of 15% and 18% in 1979 and 
1980 respectively. Nevertheless, inflation continued to be a source of concern within the economy. 
The persistent inflationary situation in the industrialized countries, the increased cost of imported 
goods, the poor performance of local activities, the lack of growth in labour productivity and the 
impact of increased government expenditure were among factors contributing to the rise in the 
general price level. The deceleration compared with 1980 was due to tighter monetary control and 
very especially to the lower rate of imported inflation. Moreover, the impact of inflation was 
cushioned by a policy of price controls and the continuation of the subsidy programme. 
The most significant deceleration in the rate of price rises in 1981 was observed in the 
Transportation section of the index, where the rates of increase measured in 1979, 1980 and 1981 
were 27, 24 and 1 1 % respectively (see table 12). Price controls on foodstuffs accounted to some 
extent for the observed decline in the rate of price rises in the Food and Drink and Tobacco 
sections. The Food section, which carries 33% of the weight of the index, registered a near 17% 
price increase —some 3 % below the rate of the previous year. A general decline in the rate of price 
increases in all the sections with the exception of clothing was noted. 
(b) Wages 
During the year, wage negotiations for over 52 000 public servants were concluded, with a 
60%) wage increase being agreed on for a three-year period commencing 1981. No payments of the 
Table 12 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(September 1975 = 100) 
1977 1978 1979 
Total 
Percentage variation December to December 































































































Source: Trinidad and Tobago Gazette (Extraordinary) Vol. 21, NQ 32, 3 February 1982 and data supplied from Central 
Statistical Office. 
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new salary increases will be made until 1982, however. As may be observed from table 13, the 
overall level of nominal wages and salaries grew by almost 19% in 1981, implying an increase of 
close to 4% in real terms, the fourth consecutive year in which real wages grew significantly. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
(a) Monetary developments 
During 1981 the Monetary Authority's demand management policies, together with the 
general slowdown of the economy, resulted in relatively slow growth of liquidity in the economy: 
M[ rose 16%, M2 grew 23%, and both together increased just under 21% (see table 14). This, 
together with the revaluation of the US dollar, helped to slow the rate of inflation. 
Table 13 




























Wages and salaries 
Nominal 
Real 
Source: Data supplied CEPAL by Central Statistical Office, Trinidad and Tobago. 
"Data are in respect of average of May/November. 
''May 1981. 
rMay 1981 with respect to May 1980. 
Table 14 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 
Foreign assets (net) 









Balance at end of year in mill 














































































































Source: Monthly Statistical Digest, May 1982, Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago. 
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Throughout the year, the government continued its policy of selective credit, limiting new 
credit to individuals for non- business purposes and at the same time increasing the marginal 
reserve requirement of commercial banks. An additional 15% of all new deposits (making a total 
of 20%) was required to be placed with the Central Bank in order to dampen the rate of monetary 
growth. Consequently, at the end of 1981 commercial bank reserves deposited with the Central 
Bank had risen 26% over the 1980 level. 
In other measures adopted to curb the growth of monetary resources, the government 
allowed some TT$ 20 million of Barbados Government Bonds to be offered on the domestic 
market and at the same time sought to raise TT$ 17 million in local Treasury bills (tax free bonds) 
during 1981. Additionally, in August 1981 the Caribbean Development Bank issued TT$ 10 
million in bonds on the local market. 
A further development in the financial system was the promulgation of the Unit Trust 
Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago Act in October 1981, aimed at offering small investors wide 
participation in the securities market. Also in October 1981 came the promulgation of the 
Securities Industries Act and the opening of the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange for business. 
The opening of this Exchange resulted in a sharp rise in the number of transactions for public 
company shares in 1981. 
Table 15 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
AND EXPENDITURE 
(TT$ 1.000 million) 
Recurrent revenue 
Tax revenue of which: 
Income tax 
Royalties 
Customs and excise 
Purchase tax 
Other 
Total recurrent revenue 
Recurrent expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
poods and services 
Transfer to persons 
Transfer to local authorities 
and others 
Interest on the public debt 
Subsidies 
Unemployment fund 





























































































































































































Source: Monthly Statistical Digest, May 1982, Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago. 
"Small base yields sizeable increase (48 100.0). 
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(b) Fiscal developments 
Though the government's direct contribution to the gross domestic product is estimated at 
only 8%, total government revenue in 1981 amounted to close toTT$ 6 650 million, or about 40% 
of GDP (see table 15). This, of course, reflects the importance of petroleum in the economy and in 
fiscal revenues. The government recycles these funds back into the economy, either by capital 
expenditure (50% of government expenditures) or by income transfers and subsidies to 
individuals and local authorities (together, 21% of government expenditures). Thus, by far the 
smallest part of government spending (20%) is accounted for by recurrent expenditure on wages 
and salaries to provide traditional government services. 
In 1981 the rate of expansion of fiscal expenditure and revenues decelerated sharply from the 
previous year's strong growth, to 15 % and 8% respectively, reflecting the much slower increase in 
petroleum prices. Nonetheless, a small fiscal surplus was generated. Revenue from corporation 
taxes rose 14%, down from 77% in 1980. This was the result of a revised tax policy on oil 
companies as well as a consequence of the downturn in industrial activity in 1981. Revenue from 
personal income tax grew some 24%, despite the introduction of tax relief, because of the upward 
creep of tax brackets due to inflation. Nevertheless, on the expenditure side the central 
government's total expenditure rose only about 15%, well below the previous two years' growth 
rates. Whereas recurrent expenditure rose by 21% capital expenditure grew by a moderate 9%. 
Wages and salaries accounted for some 40% of recurrent expenditure, with transfers to local 
authorities and others taking up 39% of the same account. The financing of these expenditures 
was met by government borrowing on the local and foreign markets, thereby raising the public 





1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1981 the flagging dynamism of economic activity observed the year before became even 
more marked, and the gross domestic product, whose growth rate had gone down noticeably in 
1980 compared with the previous two years, actually went down in absolute terms by a little under 
1%: something which had not happened since 1972. This slight reduction in the product was 
accompanied by a further deterioration in the terms of trade, leading to a drop of 1.5 % in the gross 
domestic income (see table 1 and figure 1). 
Very varied factors contributed to the virtual stagnation of the global product, but it was those 
connected with the external sector which predominated. Although exports of goods and services 
continued to increase at a high rate of the order of 12%, this was well below the growth rates 
registered in the previous two years, partly because of the difficulties encountered in trade 
exchanges with Argentina and also because of the loss of competitiveness of exports and the 
reversal of tourist flows. At the same time, total imports went down by close to 5% (by 11% in 
terms of volume), in vivid contrast with their rapid rise in recent years. 
Commerce, manufacturing and construction were the activities most affected by the 
deterioration in the economic situation, and their products went down by between 2% and 4%. 
Agricultural production showed practically no change, while transport, storage and 
communications registered a slight decline. The downward trend in economic activity began in the 
second half of 1981 and became more accentuated in the last quarter of the year. Thus, in the 
second half of the year manufacturing production and construction went down by around 7% and 
5%, respectively. 
In the area of domestic demand, which went down by close to 4% as a result of the declines in 
the global product and the volume of imports, together with the bigger volume of exports, the 
biggest impact was on gross domestic investment, which went down by 18%. Capital formation 
(machinery and equipment) dropped by 26%, while construction (especially that carried out by the 
private sector) declined by approximately 5%. Consumption expenditure also showed a reduction, 
but it was only slight. 
The state of recession into which the economy sank during 1981 was accompanied by a 
slackening of inflationary pressures. The variation between the annual averages of consumer 
prices was virtually halved, while the growth rate of prices as measured between December and 
December went down by one-third. The expansion of the means of payment, for its part, went 
down by a much larger amount (from 51% to 13%). 
The priority objective of economic policy continued to be the reduction and control of 
inflation. The advance fixing of the exchange rate and the maintenance of pronounced trade 
openness to the exterior have been the basic tools of this policy. Against this background, the 
Central Bank has played a neutral role, notwithstanding the slight deficits registered by the 
government operations. 
Real wages registered an improvement of 7.5%, which is quite significant because this is the 
first time that such an improvement has occurred, at least since 1975, since when real wages had 
deteriorated by one-third. Together with this recovery of wages, the unemployment rate also 
continued to go down in 1981, when it fell to 6.7%, compared with a rate of close to 12% of the 
economically active population for Montevideo in 1974. In the second half of the year, however, 
there was a slight deterioration and the rate went up to 7.5%. 
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As regards economic and financial relations with the exterior, the increase of over 12% in 
exports of goods and services and the decline in imports caused the trade deficit to be virtually 
halved and the balance-of-payments current account deficit to be reduced from US$ 716 million to 
US$427 million between 1980 and 1981. Rather than reflecting the increase of 15% in 
merchandise exports (half the growth rate of the previous year), these results were due to the 
extraordinary drop in imports of goods, which went down by 12% in value and approximately 
20% in volume. 
Side by side with the decline in the current account deficit, there was an abrupt drop from 
US$ 810 million dollars to US$ 460 million in the net inflow of capital, which had increased 
enormously in 1980, but even so this inflow came to more than the current account deficit and 
Table 1 
URUGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981" 
. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
(millions of dollars at 1970 prices) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salariesc 
Rate of unemployment 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government' 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 
Variation in international reserves 



























































14.2 4.3 29.7 6.1 55.1 42.5 

































































-106 -57 -306 -618 -329 
-172 -133 -363 -716 -427 
159 131 154 177 35 
1 320 1 240 1 682 2 153 3 129 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect (goods and services). 
' Variation of average nominal wage between annual averages. 





made it possible to increase the country's international reserves by US$ 35 million: the sixth 
consecutive increase in these holdings. 
Finally, at the end of 1981 the total external debt came toUS$ 3130 million, 45% higher than 
it had been one year before. 
2. Evolution of the main sectors 
(a) Total supply and demand 
In 1981 there was a reduction of a little over 2% in the total supply of goods and services, 
which had grown at the rate of 5.3% per year in the period 1972-1980. The smaller availability of 
goods and services during the year was caused both by the slight decline in the gross domestic 
product and by the drop of 11% in the volume of imports of goods and services. As at the same 
time the volume of total exports registered an increase of a little over 11%, the domestic 
availability of real resources went down by 3.7%, in contrast with the increases of 14% and 5% 
registered in 1979 and 1980 (see table 2). 
The drop in domestic demand was reflected in a sharp decline in gross domestic 
investment (-18%), thus interrupting the marked upward trend shown by capital accumulation 
from the early 1970s onwards (12.5% per year over the period 1972-1980; 27% in 1979 and 13.5% 
in 1980). Gross fixed investment, for its part, registered a somewhat smaller decline of close to 
14%, particularly noteworthy being the sharp drop (-26%) shown by capital formation in 
machinery and equipment. Investment in construction, for its part, went down by 5 %. The data on 
private investment in construction include investment in permanent crops and plantations, which 
have shown a pronounced downward trend since 1980 because of the loss of profitability of 
agriculture. 
As regards the other major component of demand —consumption— the available estimates 
indicate that this registered a slight decline in 1981, attributable exclusively to lower private sector 
consumption, since general government consumption expenditure increased by around 5 % in real 
terms. 
(b) Evolution of the sectoral product 
During the period 1973-1977, the gross domestic product rose at a rate of 3-5% per year, In 
the following two years, the rate rose to 8.3%, but in 1980 it fell back to 3-7% and in 1981 —for the 
first time in the last nine years— there was actually a decline of a little under 1 % in the level of 
economic activity. 
Among the causes of this recession, which became more marked in the second half of the year, 
were the following: 
- The smaller domestic demand due to the higher interest rates in real terms, which affected 
private expenditure, especially on durable goods and on the gross formation of fixed capital and 
stocks. 
- Smaller income from tourism and, in contrast, a big increase in spending by Uruguayan 
tourists abroad. 
- A shift of demand for certain manufactures (tyres, textiles, cotton, household electrical 
appliances, motor vehicles, etc.) to imported products, to the detriment of domestic industry. 
- Loss of competitiveness by Uruguayan exports, reflected particularly in the drop in exports 
to Argentina after the devaluation measures taken in the second quarter of the year in the latter 
country. 
- Smaller external demand due to the recessive situation in the industrial countries and the 
increase in protectionist measures in many of them, including Latin American countries. 
- The drop in construction activity due to a contraction in the demand for real estate, 
especially by Argentine citizens. 
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Figure 1 
URUGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data 
^Annual growth rate. 
^Annual average rate for Montevideo. 
cFirst half of year. 
¿August 1974 - February 1975. 
Percentage variation, December - December. 
^Millions of dollars. 
URUGUAY 
The biggest drops were in commerce (-3.7%), manufacturing (-3.2%) and construction 
(-2.4%). Agricultural production showed a slight decline, as did transport, storage and 
communications activities. Electricity, gas and water services, for their part, registered a lower 
growth rate than the year before, but the other services (except for commerce) increased by 2.5% 
(see table 3). 
(i) Agriculture. Agricultural production went down by 1.2% in 1981, after having grown by 
5% and 11% in the previous two years. According to the preliminary information available, this 
decline was confined entirely to crop farming production, since livestock-raising showed a slight 
increase of less than 1% (see table 4). 
During the year there were increases in the production of rice (15%), maize (52%), grain 
sorghum (136%) and wine grapes (76%). Thanks to the increases in yield, rice has been the only 
major crop which has shown a steady upward trend in the last three years. In contrast, although a 
larger area was sown with maize and high yields of around 1.3 tons per hectare were maintained, 
production of this crop was only 5% more than three years before. 
On the other hand, important crops such as wheat, linseed, sunflowers and sugar beet 
registered significant declines. Thus, in the case of wheat, which had shown a notable increase of 
around 150% the year before (thus recovering much of the production lost in 1978), the 1981 
output was 29% down as a result of a reduction in the area sown. Linseed, too, which had more 
than doubled production in 1980, went down by 67%, due mainly to a reduction in the area sown 
and to a lesser extent to smaller yields: factors which also explain its irregular performance over 
the last three years. The decline in the production of sunflower seed (which has gone down by 37% 
since 1978) also continued during the year. Finally, output of sugar beet, which had partly 
recovered the previous year from the decline suffered in 1978 and 1979, also went down (-31%). 
Cattle production, measured in terms of live weight, showed a drop of 5 %, although there was 
a substantial increase (24%) in terms of the number of animals slaughtered, while total stocks 
showed a slight rise of 2% to approximately 11.4 million head. 
Table 2 
URUGUAY: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Domestic demand 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 




Exports of goods and services 
Millions of dollars 
























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values using price indexes calculated by ECLA for the purpose. 
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The increases registered in previous years in the sheep and poultry sectors also continued in 
1981. Mutton production increased by 13% and that of wool by 6%, while poultry production grew 
by 19%, so that it has almost doubled over the last three years, although egg production only rose 
by 2 % in the year. 
(ii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing output, which had grown at the rate of 7% per year during 
the five-year period 1975-1979, slackened to a growth rate of only 2.6% in 1980, and in 1981 it 
suffered a decline of 3.2% (see table 5). 
The performance of export-oriented industries was different from that of the sectors 
producing primarily for the domestic market. While the latter suffered a decline in their activity, 
the industries exporting three-quarters or more of their total sales increased their output by 11 %, 
thus improving on their 1980 growth rate of 5 % (see table 6). 
The changes in the economic situation of Argentina had unfavourable repercussions on the 
activities of certain export industries and those producing goods primarily for sale to tourists. The 
industries producing for the domestic market, for their part, were affected mainly by the 
contraction in domestic demand and in private construction, as well as by the persistence of high 
interest rates. 
The foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco sector expanded by around 10%. The meat-packing 
industry, in particular, registered a notable increase of 2 1 % due to the expansion in livestock 
slaughtering. There were also considerable rises in the milling of rice to satisfy the sustained 
external demand (20%) and in the production of canned fruit and vegetables (72%). 
The other industries, in contrast, mostly suffered significant declines in output. Thus, the 
rubber industry contracted by 2 5 % as a result of the strong competition from imported tyres. 
Paper and cardboard production went down by 15 % due to the decline in exports to Argentina and 
the bigger competition from imported goods. Likewise, there was an 11 % drop in the output of 
footwear and clothing because of the decline in external sales and the reduction of stocks on the 
part of intermediaries. 
Table 3 
URUGUAY: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 






Electricity, gas and water 





Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
' Including mining and quarrying. 










































































































URUGUAY: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultura] production 
(1961 = 100) 
Crop farming 
Stock-raising 








Indicators of stock-raising production 
Number of cattle (millions of head) 
Number of cattle slaughtered 
(millions of head) 
Cattle production (millions 
of tons live weight) 
Wool output (thousands of tons) 
Poultry production (thousands of tons) 



































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Including plantations and permanent pastures. 
cCrop year. 
d
 At 30 June of each year. 
There was also a 6% decline in the output of chemical industries and a 36% drop in that of the 
motor industry, because of the contraction of the domestic market. 
(iii) Construction. Another of the sectors most seriously affected by the recession was 
construction, the decline being particularly evident in private construction and especially that in 
and around Punta del Este. This Uruguayan resort area is very sensitive to changes in the attitudes 
of Argentine real estate investors and also depends on the current economic situation in Argentina 
and Uruguay. 
The high real interest rates prevailing during the year were another important factor which 
discouraged demand for housing. 
The National Housing Plan kept up its level of activity at both the private and public levels, 
but some slackening of activity was observed in the works carried out by the Ministry of Transport 
and Public Works and the construction work on the Palmar and Salto Grande hydroelectric power 
stations, because the latter projects are now in their final stages. 
3. The external sector 
(a) Merchandise trade 
Despite the problems of prices and markets faced by several of the country's main export 
products during the year, exports registered a significant increase of the order of 15%, although 
this was only half that recorded the year before. This increase was due entirely to an expansion in 
the volume exported, since the prices showed practically no change (-0.2%) (see table 7). 
747 
Imports of goods, for their part, showed an appreciable decline of 12 % for the first time since 
1972. In the two-year period 1979-1980, in contrast, they had increased by 130%. The drop in the 
volume of imports was a good deal larger (of the order of 20%) and had sharp repercussions on 
economic activity. 
The opposing trends followed by exports and imports during the year caused a 60% drop in 
the merchandise trade deficit and also contributed to the 40% reduction in the balance-of-
payments current account deficit. 
On the other hand, the fact that the unit values of exports remained virtually unchanged whÜe 
there was an increase of 11 % of the prices of imports caused a deterioration of 10% in the terms of 
trade, following the 1 1 % deterioration which had taken place in 1980. In spite of this, however, 
the purchasing power of exports of goods increased by close to 7% because of the greater volume 
exported, while the purchasing power of exports of goods and services rose somewhat less (4.5%). 
Table 5 
URUGUAY: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 





Footwear and clothing 
Paper and paper products 
















































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'includes leather clothing. 
'Does not include mining and quarrying. 
Table 6 
URUGUAY: VARIATION OF PRODUCTION BY INDUSTRIES ACCORDING 
TO PERCENTAGE OF OUTPUT EXPORTED IN 1980 
Percentage of sales 
















0 and 25 
25 and 100 
25 and 50 
50 and 75 
75 and 100 




URUGUAY: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports 



















































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
(i) Exports. The increases of exports by 34% in 1980 and 15% in 1981 were due to the 
considerable expansion of sales of traditional export products in these two years (by 87% and 
23%, respectively). 
Outstanding among the traditional export products was meat, sales of which increased by 
42% in 1981. This appreciable increase, which came on top of a still larger one (73%) registered 
the year before, caused the value of these exports to rise from around US$ 100 million in 1979 to 
close to US$ 250 million in 1981, so that meat once again became the main export product. 
Exports of wool, in contrast, which had doubled in 1980, grew by only 10% in 1981. In both cases, 
the increases in the volumes exported were still greater: the volume of beef exports increased by 
51% to approximately 168 000 tons of carcass meat, while that of wool rose by 16% to the 
equivalent of some 87 000 tons of greasy wool. At the same time, however, the price of these 
products dropped by 6% and 5%, respectively (see table 8). 
As in 1980, the growth rate of non-traditional exports continued to decline during the year. 
Thus, after the value of these exports had trebled between 1975 and 1979, its growth rate fell from 
31% per year to 14% in 1980 and a little over 9% in 1981. 
In 1981 there was a continued increase in exports of rice, fishery products, plastics, rubber 
manufactures and chemical products. Particularly noteworthy was the expansion of sales of rice 
(70%), the value of which came to more than three times that registered in 1977, rising to over 
US$ 100 million and making this product the second most important non-traditional export. 
Although the growth rate of fishery products ( 19% ) was less than in the previous two years, it was 
still sufficient to bring their sales up to six times the 1977 level. Plastics and rubber manufactures, 
for their part, grew by 25 %, and although exports of chemicals and related goods increased by only 
7%, they nevertheless amounted to double the level of three years before. 
Apart from textile manufactures, which only grew 3% (although even so their value more 
than doubled between 1977 and 1981), the other non-traditional exports registered significant 
declines. Special mention may be made in this respect of exports of leather and leather 
manufactures, which went down by 4% ; sales of minerals, ceramics and glass, which went down by 
28%, and a considerable number of other products, several of which had grown at quite a high rate 
up to 1980 but abruptly declined in 1981 as a resultof their lack of profitability, which discouraged 
their production, or else the closing of external markets through the application of protectionist 
measures (see table 8). 
749 
Finally, mention should be made of the importance which has been acquired by "other non-
traditional exports", the value of which now amounts to over US$ 150 million and has increased 
4.5 times since 1977. 
(ii) Imports.Although the value of total imports of goods went down by 12% in 1981, imports 
of consumer goods, whose relative weight in total imports rose from 3% to 15% between 1975 
and 1981, grew by 40% in the latter year. There was a particularly striking increase of almost 
100% in imports of consumer durables, which amounted to over US$ 160 million. 
In contrast, for the first time since 1976 imports of raw materials and intermediate goods 
went down (by close to 9%). This decline took place even though purchases of petroleum and fuels 
continued to increase during the year, albeit at a lower rate than in previous years (11%). The 
value of these imports of hydrocarbons came to a little over US$ 500 million, or almost one-third 
of total imports (see table 9). 
Imports of capital goods also suffered a sharp contraction (-17%), thus interrupting the 
tendency observed over the previous five years, during which the value of these imports increased 
almost five-fold. 
The decline in imports in terms of volume was a good deal greater, due to the lower level of 
activity of the economy, especially in manufacturing and construction. 
(b) The balance-of-payments position and its financing 
The appreciable reduction in the merchandise trade deficit already mentioned above, when 
added to the services deficit of US$ 74 million, gave a total trade deficit of almost US$ 3 30 million, 
or almost half that registered in 1980 (see table 10). 
Table 8 
URUGUAY: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 









Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 
Minerals, ceramics and glass 
Products of the chemical and 
related industries 
Plastic materials and 
rubber products 




Paper, paperboard and 
product thereof 
Iron, steel, machinery and 
electrical equipment 
Miscellaneous 


















































































































































































URUGUAY: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
Consumer goods 
Raw materials and 
intermediate goods 
Petroleum and fuels 
Others 
Capital goods 
Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Over the last two years, net payments of profits and interest have stayed at around US$ 100 
million. Thus, the current account deficit went down from over US$ 716 million in 1980 to 
US$ 427 million in 1981, i.e., by 40%. The current account imbalance, which amounted to the 
equivalent of 47% of exports of goods and services in 1980, was equal to only one-quarter of these 
in 1981. 
During the year, there was a net inflow of capital of approximately US$ 460 million, that is to 
say, US$ 350 million less than in 1980, but even so this was enough to cover the current account 
deficit and increase reserves by around US$ 35 million. The international reserves have increased 
without interruption since 1976, although the increase registered in 1981 was the lowest since that 
date, the average annual rise in the five-year period 1976-1980 being US$ 177 million (see 
table 10). 
(c) Evolution of the real exchange rate 
As in 1980, the monetary authorities continued during the year under consideration to fix the 
exchange rate for the next six months in advance through a publicly circulated table. 
The nominal exchange rate with respect to the dollar rose by approximately 19% in 1981 
from an average of 9.16 new pesos per dollar the year before to a rate of 10.87 new pesos per dollar. 
In contrast, there was a drop in the exchange rate with respect to other currencies, among them 
those of several European countries with which Uruguay maintains active trade relations, which 
lost value with respect to the dollar in the last year. 
The increase in domestic prices (34% in consumer prices and 23% in wholesale prices), 
which was higher than in most of Uruguay's trading partners, and the marked appreciation of the 
United States dollar with respect to the currencies of almost all the Western European countries 
led to a decline of the order of 5 % in theeffective real exchange rate for exports in 1981, while that 
for imports remained practically unchanged (see table 11 and figure 2).1 
In the period 1978-1981, the real exchange rate for exports went down by 29%, that is to say, 
the Uruguayan peso was revalued to this extent with respect to the currencies of the countries to 
which its exports are sold, thus causing them to lose competitiveness. The real exchange rate for 
imports, for its part, went down by around 10% in the same period, making them cheaper and 
encouraging their expansion. 
Through the policy of announcing the exchange rate and rate of devaluation in advance, it was 
thought that better conditions would be created for facilitating the entry of capital, thus tending to 
1




1978 1979 1980 
757 1 206 1 680 
42 79 178 
610 954 1 227 
210 290 455 
400 664 772 
106 174 276 
Percentage 
breakdown 




















1979 1980 1981" 
59.3 39.3 -4.8 
89.4 126.2 39.8 
56.4 28.7 -8.5 
38.4 56.9 10.6 
61.3 19.6 -19.7 
64.0 58.2 -17.0 
Table 10 
URUGUAY: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 





























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1975-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of official 
data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
' In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
The difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




reduce domestic interest rates. As in 1980, however, this objective was only partially achieved 
because of the uncertainty existing as regards the possibility of maintaining this policy, and 
consequently considerable differences persisted between domestic and external rates of interest 
because of risk premiums. 
(d) External indebtedness 
The rapid increase in total external indebtedness continued in 1981 for the third consecutive 
year. Thus, after having remained stable at around US$ 1200 million between 1976 and 1978, 
indebtedness expanded by 74% in the two-year period 1979-1980 and rose a further 45% in 1981 
to over US$ 3100 million (see table 12). 
The biggest growth (51%) was registered in the financial sector, and particularly in the 
private commercial banks, whose indebtedness rose from US$ 752 million to US$ 1237 million. 
In the other sectors, the debt increased by 41 %. The external public debt rose by 30% to slightly 
over US$ 1500 million, while that of the private sector almost doubled to nearly US$ 430 million. 
The disbursements made by the public sector mainly went to finance the Palmar hydroelectric 
project. 
Despite the significant increase in the external debt in 1981, its servicing only rose by 13% to 
US$ 300 million. In 1980 it had increased by 64% and its magnitude as a percentage of exports of 
goods and services rose from 14% to 18%: a proportion which was maintained in 1981. 
Nevertheless, these figures are a good deal lower than those registered in earlier years, when, for 
example, debt servicing came to represent 38% of total exports in .1978. 
4. Prices, wages and employment 
(a) Evolution of prices 
During 1981 the slackening in the rate of inflation, which had already been observed in 1980, 
became more marked. The consumer price index, which had increased by as much as 83% in 1979 
(December-December), grew by only 43 % in 1980 and by only a little over 29% in 1981. Indeed, in 
the last quarter of the latter year the growth rate of prices sank to only 16% per year. This steady 
Table 11 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 










































Source: Statistical Appendix. 
"These indexes were calculated on the basis of the sum of the real exchange rate indexes with respect to the various foreign 
currencies, weighted by the share of these currencies in Uruguay's total exports or imports (as appropriate). See the 
Statistical Appendix at the end of Part Two of this Survey. 
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Figure 2 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE INDEXES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(1980= 100) 
150 










1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
Source: Statistical Appendix. 
URUGUAY 
Table 12 
URUGUAY: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Total external debt 
Public and State-guaranteed 
private debt 
Private debt not guaranteed 
by the State 
External debt servicing 
Capital 
Interest 
External debt servicing as a percentage 









































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 13 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 



































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay and Statistics and Census Office. 
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Figure 3 
URUGUAY: TWELVE-MONTHLY VARIATIONS IN DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Wholesale price index 
(domestic products) \ 
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decline in the levels of inflation took place against a background of free prices, since only a very 
small group of goods continued to be subject to price controls (see table 13 and figure 3). 
Since 1979, the economic policy has tried to do away with excessive inflationary expectations 
by the advance announcement of the exchange rate, and greater openness of the economy to the 
exterior has been promoted with a view to expanding the supply of goods. In line with this 
criterion, the importation of goods which compete with domestic production has continued to be 
facilitated, and further steps have been taken to eliminate redundant protection. All this has 
undoubtedly helped to reduce inflationary pressures, but in 1981, and especially in the last quarter 
of the year, its effects have included not only a moderate evolution of the consumer price index, but 
also a decline in demand, as already noted in section 2 of this article. 
All the major components of the consumer price index increased less than the general 
average, except for housing which rose by 43%. The main reason for the latter phenomenon is 
that the official regulations governing rents permit their annual adjustment through a special 
index, the Readjustable Rent Unit (URA), which is calculated in line with the evolution of wages in 
previous periods. Wages, like prices, have tended to grow less rapidly with time, that is to say, they 
increased more rapidly in the immediate past. With a view to correcting the resultant distortion in 
rents, efforts have been made to establish a ceiling, based on the latest variations in consumer 
prices. 
Clothing was the item which registered the smallest price increase (19%)), this being 
explained both by the decline in demand and by the smaller inflow of tourists from Argentina. 
The index of food prices rose by 25% in 1981. The wholesale prices of crop farming products 
increased by 14% during the year, while those of livestock products went down by almost 3% (see 
table 13). 
As in the previous year, the wholesale prices of domestic products increased much less than 
the consumer prices, and furthermore, their growth rate went down much more rapidly than that 
of consumer prices during the year (see figure 3). These differences are to be explained by the 
different weightings of tradeable and non-tradeable goods in the two indicators. The greater 
weight of products of agricultural origin is particularly noteworthy in the case of the wholesale 
price index. 
(b) Wages and salaries 
In 1981 the general index of nominal average wages increased by close to 44%. The rise in 
public sector wages was practically the same as in the private sector (43% and 45%). Due also to 
the smaller variation between the annual averages of domestic prices, the increase in real wages for 
wage-earners as a whole thus came to 7.5%, which is the first real increase in general wages in the 
Table 14 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF WAGES 










































Source: Statistics and Census Office. 
"Calculated on the basis of the minimum increases decreed by the Government up to October 1980 and the wages actually 
paid thereafter. 
Deflated by the consumer price index. 
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last five years. In the case of public sector wages, the rise was a little over 7 %, representing a total 
improvement of over 13% in the last two years, but this percentage was still not enough to make 
good the deterioration of 20% suffered in the previous three years. Moreover, although real wages 
in the private sector rose by almost 8%, their level was still 23 % below that prevailing in 1976 (see 
table 14). 
(c) Employment 
In 1981, and especially in the first half of the year, employment levels continued to improve, 
as had been taking place since 1977, despite the rapid slackening of economic activity in 1980 and 
its virtual decline in 1981. The unemployment rate in Montevideo, which had reached a peak of 
12.8% in 1976, gradually went down to 6.7% in 1981, although in the second half of the year it rose 
again to 7.5% as a result of the increase in the rate of participation (see table 15). 
Table 15 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN MONTEVIDEO 
Rate of unemployment 
Unemployment rate, excluding 

































Source: Statistics and Census Office. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policies 
(a) Monetary policy 
As in previous years, the basic objective of the monetary authorities was to reduce the 
domestic rate of inflation to a level comparable with that of international prices. The exchange 
rate continued to be considered as the most suitable instrument for this purpose. 
Under the policy line followed, the essential idea is that in a small, open economy like that of 
Uruguay with a fixed exchange rate, there is a direct causal relationship between prices and money. 
Consequently, the amount of money is determined endogenously. The ruling assumption is that 
any discrepancy between the supply and demand of money should be settled at the balance-of-
payments level. The surplus money is directed to the goods market or the financial market. In the 
first of these cases (on the basis that redundant protection has now been practically completely 
eliminated), then the international settlement of the prices of tradeable goods comes into 
operation and excess demand is eliminated through the trade deficit. 
In the second case, the demand for foreign exchange generates a deficit on the capital account. 
In both cases, the money returns to the Central Bank. 
The exchange rate instrument continued to be handled through a system of advance 
announcements of the rate, with a time horizon of six months. The authorities continued to reject 
the use of traditional-type policy instruments for monetary control because they considered that 
this would only help to generate distortions in the financial market, without any certainty that the 
liquidity of the economy would actually be controlled. Thus, two years earlier the authorities began 
to abandon the system of legal bank reserve requirements and open market operations. 
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Rediscounting to the private banks had also already ceased to be used as an instrument. From the 
foregoing, it may be inferred that the Central Bank played a completely neutral role as regards the 
creation of the monetary base. 
The monetary liabilities of the monetary authority grew by 4.4%, essentially because of an 
increase of 21% in the net internationalreserves, since the net domestic credit of the Central Bank 
went down appreciably (-185 million pesos in 1980 and -1 502 million in 1981). It should be noted, 
however, that credit to the public sector grew by 75% because of a substantial contribution to the 
National Treasury. 
The Mt money supply grew by 12.5%, which represented a decline both in real terms and in 
relation with previous years (66%, 89% and 51% respectively in the previous three years) (see 
table 16). 
Table 16 
URUGUAY: MONETARY BALANCE 
(Billions of pesos) 
Money 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 





Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and time deposits) 
Deposits in foreign currency 
Other items (net) 















































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 17 







































Source: ECLA, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
Most frequent normal rates at end of months indicated in the five most representative banking institutions in respect of 
fixed-term transactions for up to six months in national currency. 
Variation in consumer price index over past twelve months. 
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Savings and time deposits in national and foreign currency, for their part, grew by 32% and 
80% respectively. This may be attributed to the sharp rise in real terms in interest rates on 
deposits in both national and foreign currency, since because of the rises in domestic prices of the 
order of 30%, interest rates on deposits reached levels of 46% for deposits in national currency 
and 15% for those in foreign currency (both as an annual average for terms of up to six months), 
with an average rate of devaluation during the year of almost 19%. Table 17 shows the rapid 
increase registered by real interest rates on loans as from December 1980. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
The Treasury accounts turned in a small deficit of 117 million pesos in 1981, which did not 
amount to even 1% of total expenditure. Central government income totalled almost 21300 
million pesos, while total expenditure came to close on 21 400 million (18 800 million pesos of 
Table 18 
URUGUAY: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Millions of pesos Growth rates 
Current income 
Internal taxes 









Less: Documents received 
Adjustments' 
Taxes on foreing trade 
Other income 
Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Contributions and assistance to 
the social security system 
Purchase of goods and services 
Other current expenditure' 
Saving on current account ( 1 - 2 ) 
Investments 
Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
Fiscal deficit or surplus ( 1 - 5 ) 
Financing 
Net credit by Central Bank/BPOC 



































































































































































































Source: Contaduría General de la Nación. The figures for the internal tax components come from the Tax Department. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Discrepancy between treasury information and tax office information. 
' Including transfer payments, interest payments on the public debt and affected income. 
Including external financing of the PALMAR Joint Commission in the amount of 134 million pesos. 
'Including variations in Treasury position and uncleared checks. 
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current expenditure and 2 600 million of investment). This imbalance, which occurred after two 
years of surpluses, was due to an increase of 44% in total expenditure, making it slightly larger 
than income (see table 18). 
In 1981, the growth rates of both current government income and current and capital 
expenditure slowed down markedly compared with 1980 and 1979, if only current income and 
expenditure are taken into account. The slackening of economic activity and of the growth rate of 
imports helped to check a larger expansion in income. Among tax revenue, the most important 
items were the value added tax (41%), the tax on fuels (10%), income and wealth taxes (17%) and 
duties on external trade (18%). All of these had much lower growth rates in 1981 than in previous 
years, the biggest decline being in revenue from income tax and taxes on external transactions. The 
tax burden with respect to the gross domestic product increased from 13% to close to 15% 
between 1979 and 1980, and in 1981 it rose to slightly over 15% (see table 18). 
Expenditure in connection with current operations and investments increased slightly faster 
than current income, so that although current saving continued to expand, it went down as a 
percentage of expenditure. Since 1979, this proportion has gone down from 14% to 11.4%. 
Among government consumption expenditure, wages and salaries increased by 47% and 
purchases of goods and non-personal services rose by 53%, the latter being the highest growth 
rate of all the components of expenditure. Transfers to social security bodies, which totalled 
approximately 4 900 million pesos, also continued to have considerable weight. Since early 1980, 
various reductions have been made in the workers' and employers' social security contributions, as 
part of a new policy to finance the social security system aimed at replacing its direct financing with 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Against the background of a world economy which evolved more unfavourably than in 
previous years, the government continued to apply during 1981 the economic policies put into 
effect since 1979, although this time important changes were made in public investment 
expenditure, the granting of subsidies and interest rate policy. 
As will be recalled, the Government originally formulated these policies with the aim of 
correcting the structural distortions caused, in addition to all the problems typical of a situation of 
underdevelopment, by the boom in petroleum income since 1974. In defining the policies, account 
was taken of the particularly significant role played by the State in the economic process in 
Venezuela and also the limitations faced in the sphere of public administration in meeting the 
demands posed by the handling of abundant financial resources and the increased responsibilities 
devolving on the public sector in the productive field. 
It was also considered that the big investments made by the State in order to exploit new 
mineral and energy resources, to expand the industrial production capacity and to adapt and 
amplify the systems providing basic services and social assistance had taken the form of highly 
capital-intensive advanced-technology projects, and this process, despite its implicit features of 
modernization, had given rise to fresh structural distortions in the production system. Thus, on the 
one hand, national industry was not fitted to satisfy the demand for high-technology capital goods, 
tools and equipment raised by these investments. Consequently, despite the rapidity with which 
the industrial sector had expanded, it continued to be devoted primarily to the provision of 
traditional consumer goods, raw materials and equipment whose manufacture did not involve 
complex technology. At the same time, it was considered that the type of investments made were 
not compatible with the need to give immediate employment to an active population which was 
growing very strongly and whose expansion in the cities was further increased by vigorous 
migration from rural to urban areas and the arrival of considerable groups of workers from 
neighbouring countries. Furthermore, because of the nature of the technologies used in the 
conception and execution of these investments, it had been necessary to resort to foreign technical 
assistance in order to carry out the technical feasibility studies, design and engineering work, 
installation and starting-up of the investment projects, without this having significantly promoted 
national development in these fields. 
On the other hand, as the extraordinary abundance of revenue generated by the oil price boom 
was rapidly transferred to the population through public current and investment expenditure, this 
gave rise to an enormous increase in monetary liquidity which greatly favoured the appearance of 
inflationary pressures. In order to control the inflationary process, strict price controls-were 
established, substantial subsidies were given to domestic producers (and in some cases also to 
importers), and the supply of goods was increased through heavy purchases abroad. Largely 
because of the extraordinary expansion in the latter, the merchandise trade balance suffered a 
striking turnaround from a surplus of US$ 7 200 million in 1974 to a deficit of US$ 2100 million in 
1978. 
These policies introduced fresh distortions into the domestic public and private production 
and distribution systems. Private industrial and agricultural enterprises were in many cases 
compelled to seek profitability on the basis of subsidies, customs exemptions and tariff protection, 
since in the short term they could not compensate for the rise in the cost of their primary inputs 
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and factors by increasing their productivity or the prices of their products, many of which were 
subject to control. The State enterprises, too, had to face this same situation of costs and prices 
which, together with their investment needs, made them have greater recourse to the use of credit, 
thus bringing about an appreciable increase in the domestic and external public debt. 
In order to control inflationary tendencies and put public and private enterprises in a 
situation where they could achieve greater economic efficiency and expand their production 
capacity, the Government designed a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, to be put into effect in 
the two-year period 1979-1980. This made it possible to bring down the growth rate of the means 
of payment from 25 % in 1977 and 21 % in 1978 to less than 7% in 1979 and less than 14% in 1980. 
At the fiscal level, physical investment expenditure was reduced from an average of 6100 million 
bolívares in the two-year period 1977-1978 to less than 4000 million in the following two years. 
Furthermore, and as central support measures for these policies, steps were also taken to make 
prices more realistic and reduce tariffs. Thus, price controls and production subsidies were 
eliminated in the case of a large number of goods, the levels of a substantial proportion of the tariff 
categories were lowered, most of the customs exemptions were cancelled, and except in special 
cases the requirement for prior import licenses was also eliminated. At the same time, some 
subsidies to production and trade were suspended. 
As might be expected, the application of these measures led to a marked slackening in the 
growth rate of economic activity. Thus, after having increased at an average rate of 7.5% in 1976 
and 1977 and risen by 3% in 1978, the gross domestic product stagnated almost completely in 1979 
and actually went down slightly in 1980. Although in 1979 and 1980 the December-December 
variation in consumer prices remained close to 20%, it proved possible to reverse the balance-of-
payments current account situation, which, thanks to the fresh rises in the international price of 
petroleum and the containment of imports, went from a deficit of US$ 5 500 million in 1978 to a 
surplus of almost US$ 4300 million in 1980. As from 1979 it also proved possible to reverse the 
downward trend followed by the international reserves in the period 1977-1978 (see table 1). 
Generally speaking, similar tendencies persisted in 1981. Thus, the level of real activity of the 
economy more or less stagnated, for as a result of the application of the stabilization policy, the 
incidence of exogenous factors connected with the situation of the world petroleum market and the 
high interest rates on international markets, and the excessive rain which severely affected the 
agricultural sector, the gross domestic product rose by less than 1 %. Consequently, the per capita 
product declined for the fourth consecutive year and stood 10% lower than in 1977. The virtual 
stagnation of economic activity also led to a slight increase in the rate of unemployment. On the 
other hand, it proved possible in the course of the year to reduce inflationary pressures, to bring 
down the growth rate of the means of payment and to secure a very marked reduction in the fiscal 
deficit. At the same time, a considerable balance-of-payments current account surplus was 
achieved for the third consecutive year, the international reserves grew significantly, and the 
external debt was kept at a similar level to that reached in 1980 (see table 1 and figure 1). 
As in 1980, negative influences which contributed to the very slow evolution of the gross 
domestic product were the reduction in petroleum activity, the declines for the third year running 
in construction and commerce, and (in the last year) the drop in mining activity. The product of the 
other economic activities increased by around 2% on average, although manufacturing production 
grew more slowly than in the last decade. 
Even though in 1981 there was a marked reduction in the growth rate of the value of exports 
of goods and services, while the value of imports went down only slightly, the trade balance 
nervertheless generated a substantial surplus of over US$ 3 700 million. After more than doubling 
in the previous two years, the value of petroleum exports rose by only 4% in 1981 but nevertheless 
exceeded US$ 19 billion for the first time. This increase was due entirely to the rise of around 12% 
in the sale price of petroleum, since the physical volume of exports of crude stagnated, and that of 
petroleum products went down by over 20%. On the other hand, sales of iron ore and aluminium 
totalled US$ 580 million, registering increases of 14% and 4%, respectively. Imports of goods and 
services, for their part, came to US$ 17200 million, 9.5% more than in 1980. 
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As a result of the trade surplus and the net income received from interest, the balance-of-
payments current account closed with a surplus of almost US$ 4100 million. Thanks to this, the 
international reserves rose by over US$ 2 500 million in spite of the outflow of capital brought 
about by the high interest rates prevailing in external financial centres. 
In contrast with 1980, when the monetary base rose by almost 8% and the means of pay ment 
expanded by close to 14%, in 1981 the latter grew by only 7% although the monetary base rose by 
16%. The very intense expansion shown for the third year running by time deposits, however, led 
to an increase of 20% in monetary liquidity. A decisive factor behind this increase in time deposits 
was the policy adopted by the monetary authorities in August of freeing domestic interest rates. 
Table 1 
VENEZUELA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicator 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (billions of 1970 dollars) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1970 dollars) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Curent value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer prices' 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages and salaries 



















Current income of government -3.9 
Total expenditure of government 9.6 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of government 26.4'1 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Balance on current account 















Millions of dollars 
2 245 442 
2 201 476 
2 671 73 















































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
c
 Cost-of-living index for the Caracas metropolitan area. 
Average monthly family income. 
'First half of year with respect to same period in 1980. 
Percentage. 
"First half of year. 
Surplus. 
'Disbursed external public debt (excluding the floating debt). 
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Figure 1 
VENEZUELA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A Gross domestic income3 
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/ \ 
























_L J_ _L _L 
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. 
^Average annual rate for whole country. 
cFirst half of year. 
^Percentage variation, December - December. 
^Millions of dollars. 
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In the area of fiscal policy, after the big efforts made in the period 1978-1979 to contain the 
increase in public spending, in 1981 the growth rate of current spending speeded up once again, 
while capital expenditure was 31% greater than the year before and more than double average 
investment expenditure in the period 1977-1979. Despite this increase in expenditure, however, 
the fiscal deficit was 87% lower than that registered in 1980 and represented only a little over 1 % 
of total central government spending, thanks to the 56% increase in fiscal revenue from the 
petroleum sector. 
In 1981 the authorities continued to make efforts to limit, control and order the process of 
public indebtedness. These efforts were reflected in the Organic Law on Public Credit, which 
—except for some explicitly specified special cases— prohibits short-term indebtedness 
operations on the part of public bodies. This law also ordered the reconversion of the short-term 
debt contracted by public bodies and empowered the Government, to this end, to carry out public 
credit operations in the amount of 55 700 million bolívares in order to pay off commitments 
contracted by such bodies before 30 June 1981 with financial institutions, contractors and 
suppliers. The Government was also authorized to carry out other public credit operations in the 
amount of 5 500 million bolívares in order to pay off similar commitments contracted by the bodies 
in question between the above-mentioned date and 31 December 1983. 
With the same purpose of bringing some order into the process of public indebtedness, a 
Committee for the Financial Co-ordination of State Credit Transactions was set up and made 
responsible for centralizing the contracting of credits, standardizing the procedures, terms and 
documentation of the loans, and thus achieving greater access and better treatment on financial 
markets. 
In the more general field of global economic policies, and after a process of participation, 
dialogue and consultation between the technical and political levels, the Sixth National Five-Year 
Plan, made up of a global plan and twelve sectoral plans, was put into effect. For the first time, this 
plan also includes a national regional development and territorial planning strategy comprising 
nine regional plans. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
In 1981 the total supply of goods and services continued to stagnate at the low level registered 
the year before, which was almost 5% below that of 1978. This poor performance was due to the 
fact that the very slight increase in the gross domestic product was almost completely cancelled out 
by a further, although somewhat smaller, drop in the volume of imports. As a result, the import 
coefficient went down for the third consecutive year. Because of its extraordinary rise in the period 
1974-1978, however, when the volume of imports greatly increased, this coefficient was still very 
high (32%) and was almost double that registered 10 years before (see table 2). 
Among the different components of demand, the volume of exports of goods and services 
went down for the second year running by around 8%, thus continuing the downward trend of the 
volume of exports which began in 1971 and was interrupted only in 1973 and in the two-year 
period 1978-1979. 
Domestic demand, for its part, rose by less than 1% after having sharply declined in 1979 and 
suffered a further slight decline in 1980. Although no figures on the evolution of its individual 
components are available, both consumption and investment probably virtually stagnated in 1981, 
for personal consumption must have been affected by the 1 % reduction in per capita income, and 
especially by the still greater drop in wages and salaries, while the increase in the investment 
expenditure of State enterprises and general government1 was probably cancelled out by the drop 
in private sector capital formation. 
'The current value of these investments rose from 27100 million bolívares in 1980 to 33 100 million in 1981, while the 
value of real general government investment rose from almost 4400 million bolívares to close to 6800 million. 
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(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
In 1981 the total production of goods once again went down because of the declines in 
petroleum production, mining and construction and the lower growth rates registered by 
manufacturing and agriculture. In contrast, basic services expanded at a similar rate to 1980, while 
the product of other services recovered from the slight drop suffered that year (see table 3). 
(i) The petroleum sector. In 1981 there was a continuation of the systematic decline suffered 
by the petroleum industry since 1974, which was only interrupted in 1979, when the sector grew 
by almost 9%. Production of crude went down by 3% to 770 million barrels, which is 37% below 
the 1974 production and equivalent to average production of 2108 000 barrels per day (see table 4). 
This reduction was partly due to government policy aimed at conserving this non-renewable 
resource, but it was more directly linked with the commitments entered into by Venezuela within 
OPEC to support the latter's efforts to keep up hydrocarbon prices. OPEC policy in this respect is of 
course based on the appraisal of energy demand and utilization trends in the world economy. 
In this connection, it is estimated that in 1981 there was a drop of 0.5% in world energy 
consumption and that, within this, the biggest drop was in the consumption of hydrocarbons, 
whereas other energy sources such as coal and nuclear energy gained ground. An important role in 
this was played by the greater efficiency achieved in the highly industrialized countries in the use of 
fuels —a process which has been intensely stimulated since 1974 by the oil price rises and the 
successive reductions in the supply of hydrocarbons— and the development of alternative energy 
sources. 
In 1981 world oil consumption came to 598 million barrels per day, representing a decline of 
3.7% from the figure of 62.1 million barrels registered in 1980. A reduction in consumption was 
observed in all countries of the world except the OPEC countries themselves, whose domestic 
demand for hydrocarbons increased by 11.5%. In the United States and Canada the drop was 
around 5%, and the decline was even greater in Japan (-6%), the United Kingdom (-7%) and 
Table 2 
VENEZUELA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
























































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
The figures for imports and exports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars 
at current prices, which were converted to constant 1970 values by using prices indexes calculated by ECLA for this 
purpose. 




VENEZUELA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Millions of dollars Percentage
 r- , 
. imn u ji Growth rates 
at 1970 prices breadkown 
1979 1980 1981" 1971 1981" 1979 1980 1981" 
Gross domestic product6 19 103 18 873 18 987 100.0 100.0 0.9 -1.2 0.6 
Goods 7 322 7 120 7 056 44.4 36.7 1.9 -2.8 -0.9 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1 301 1 341 1 346 7.5 7.0 3.7 3.1 0.4 
Petroleum 1 709 1 580 1 514 19.6 7.9 6.2 -7.5 -4.2 
Extraction 1 371 1 264 1 226 15.9 6.4 8.7 -8.0 -3.0 
Refining 338 316 288 3.7 1.5 -2.8 -6.5 -8.9 
Mining (excluding petroleum) 167 170 165 1.4 0.9 7.9 1.6 -2.7 
Manufacturing 2 714 2 817 2 853 11.4 14.8 5.1 3.8 1.3 
Construction 1 431 1 212 1 178 4.5 6.1 -9.7 -15.3 -2.8 
Basic services 3 008 3 071 3 134 12.9 16.3 -2.1 2.1 2.1 
Electricity, gas and water 484 559 595 1.8 3.1 12.2 15.6 6.5 
Transport, storage and communication 2 524 2 512 2 539 11.1 13.2 -4.4 -0.5 1.1 
Other services 9 059 8 945 9 054 42.7 47.0 0.4 -1.3 1.2 
Wholesale and retail commerce,
 2 m i m i m UQ 8 J _5 3 . 1 5 5 _e>1 
restaurants and hotels 
Financial institutions, insurance,
 2 m 2 m 2 m n J iyQ _62 u 2Q 
real estate and business services 
Community, social and personal services 4 555 4 733 4 884 19.0 25.3 7.3 3.9 3.2 
Source: 1970-1978: ECLA, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela; 1979-1981: ECLA, on the 
basis of figures given in the Address by the President of Venezuela to the Congress of the Republic, March 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the former does not correspond 
exactly with the latter. 
above all in the Federal Republic of Germany ( -10% ) and France ( -11 % ). In the group of countries 
belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) the decline 
was 6.2%, while in the group of non-oil-exporting developing countries the reduction came to 
4.2%. In contrast, the socialist countries increased their consumption by 0.8%. In absolute terms, 
these reductions represented a decline of 2.3 million barrels per day in the consumption of the 
industrialized countries and 0.4 million barrels per day in that of the non-oil-exporting developing 
countries. 
World production of crude, for its part, went down by 5.9% to an average of 58.3 million 
barrels per day, that is to say, 3.7 million less than the year before. The biggest effort to bring down 
production was made by the member countries of OPEC, which produced 22.4 million barrels per 
day, or 4.5 million less than in 1981. This effort was partly offset, however, by an increase of 
0.8 million barrels per day in the production of non-OPEC countries. Among the OPEC countries, 
the main reductions were in Iran (-12%), Algeria (-27%) and Nigeria (-31%), while in Indonesia 
and Ecuador there were slight increases. Among the countries which are not members of OPEC, the 
biggest increases were in Mexico, which increased its production by 21 % to 2.6 million barrels per 
day and the United Kingdom, which increased its production of North Sea oil by 10% to 
1.8 million barrels per day. 
Thus, while estimated consumption came to 59-8 million barrels per day, production 
amounted to only 58.3 million. During the year, however, there was apparently a reduction in oil 
imports as a result of the increased production of some countries which are not members of OPEC 
and the running down of stocks. This advantageous situation for the importing countries helped to 
weaken international oil prices, so that at its conference in May OPEC decided to maintain its base 
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prices and recommend a reduction of 10% in production. As the pressures nevertheless continued, 
however, at its October meeting the Organization managed to unify the price of crude at US$ 34 
per barrel and proposed that this figure should be maintained until the end of 1982. This decision 
meant an increase of US$ 2 per barrel for Saudi Arabian and Nigerian crude and US$ 1 for that of 
Indonesia, but represented drops of US$ 2.50 per barrel for the crude produced by Iran, Kuwait, 
Libya and Algeria and a drop of US$ 1 for that produced by Venezuela. Subsequently, in December 
1981, a new meeting of OPEC agreed on price reductions of between 20 and 70 US cents per barrel 
for certain types of crude. Even so, it is estimated that the effective sale prices of petroleum from 
the OPEC countries were between 12% and 15% higher than the year before. Nevertheless, this 
increase was well below that of 37% registered in 1980 and the rise of 89% attained in 1979. 
In spite of the contraction in the international market, Venezuela managed to increase its 
exports of crude slightly to a volume of 473.5 million barrels. 
At the same time, in pursuance of the policy guidelines designed to conserve its dwindling 
reserves of light and medium crude, Venezuela managed to increase the proportion of heavy 
crudes in its total sales from 43% in 1980 to 50% in 1981. Another positive result of the oil 
marketing policy was the progress made as regards the diversification of clients and markets and 
the efforts made to maintain Venezuela's position in traditional markets and increase its sales in 
Table 4 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of information contained in the Address by the President of Venezuela to the Congress of the 
Republic, March 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Including grease and propane. 
'Excluding grease and propane. 
Billions of barrels. 




the European Economic Community. Exports of refined petroleum products, however, went down 
by 20%, causing a decline of 9% in domestic refining activity. 
Domestic consumption of refined products, for its part, increased by 5%, which was a much 
lower rate than that of the previous three years (see table 4). At the same time, the downward 
trend in the share of gasoline in this consumption continued. This share has gone down from 52 % 
in 1979 to 49% in 1980 and 47% in 1981 as a result of the measures taken to moderate gasoline 
consumption and control illegal exports to other markets (which appear statistically as domestic 
consumption). Total energy consumption increased by 4.6%, which is likewise less than the 
figures for the last three years. Within this consumption, energy from the use of hydrocarbons 
continued to predominate, amounting to 56% of the total, while gas represented 33% and 
electricity 10%. 
Despite the downward trends in the production, refining and export of crude and refined 
products, petroleum activity nevertheless generated total income of 85 220 million bolívares, or 
8% more than in 1980. This income came from exports worth almost US$ 19100 million and 
domestic sales at subsidized prices which amounted to US$ 725 million. After deducting operating 
costs, petroleum activity gave a surplus of close to 73900 million bolívares (6% more than in 
1980), of which 59600 million bolívares went to the government as fiscal contributions (8% more 
than the year before) and 14230 million were retained by the petroleum enterprise itself. 
Development of the production and technological aspects of petroleum activity continued to 
receive priority attention. Thus, investment expenditure in the oil industry came to 13600 million 
bolívares, representing a considerable increase (39%) over the year before. Of this sum, 2 700 
million was spent on prospecting, 6450 million on extraction and development, 2600 million on 
refining, 1170 million on the oil tanker fleet, 305 million on development of the domestic market, 
275 million on the modernization of management, and 140 million on the development and 
expansion of the petrochemicals industry. In addition, research was intensified through the 
Venezuelan Petroleum Technology Institute (INTEVEP) on heavy and extra-heavy crudes, recovery 
and gas technology. 
In the field of prospecting, activity was centered on the search for new reserves of light and 
medium crudes (especially in the Lake Maracaibo area),2 prospecting for gas deposits, and the 
continuation of appraisal activities in the Orinoco oil belt. In pursuance of these objectives, 18 000 
kilometers of seismic lines were carried out, of which 8200 kilometers corresponded to the 
Orinoco basin, and 336 exploratory wells were completed, 242 of them in the Orinoco area. A total 
of 885 development and extraction wells were completed, of which 799 proved to be productive, 
together with two others which produced gas, while 67 were abandoned and the remainder were 
turned over to other uses. As a result of these activities, 270 million barrels were added to the 
proven oil reserves and 58 300 million cubic metres to the gas reserves, which stood at year end at 
1320700 million cubic metres. 
As in the previous year, the prices policy applied by the Government consisted of carefully 
following the evolution of prices at the international level and fully implementing the agreements 
adopted within OPEC. The prices fixed as from January 1981 were kept in force until 1 November 
when, in compliance with an OPEC agreement, Venezuela reduced its prices by between one and 
two and a half dollars per barrel, depending on quality. Even so, the realized price, or effective sale 
price, averaged US$ 29.71, representing a relative increase of a little over 12% over. 1980, 
although this increase was admittedly much less than the rise of almost 50% registered in the 
latter year. The export value, or price imputed by the Government for fiscal purposes, for its part, 
was set at an average of US$ 38.21, 17% more than the year before (see table 5). As a result, fiscal 
income in respect of petroleum came to almost 71 billion bolívares, representing a relatively larger 
increase than that of the total income generated by the sector. 
2
 One of the objectives of petroleum policy is to arrive at a proportion between reserves and production which will give 
a minimum time horizon of 15 years for light and medium crudes. 
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(ii) Mining. In 1981 the non-petroleum gross mining product went down by 3%, thus 
continuing the downward trend followed since 1975, which was only interrupted in 1979. The 
1981 result was due to smaller extraction activity in iron ore and diamonds, which was not offset by 
the considerable increase in gold production. 
Iron ore mining came to 15.6 million tons, 3% less than the year before (see table 4). Sales of 
ore increased by 4% to 15.3 million tons, however, due to the larger external demand, since 
domestic demand remained unchanged. 
In 1981 extraction of diamonds fell from the figure of 665770 metric carats registered the 
year before to 500000 carats. 
Gold production, in contrast, came to 570 kilogrammes, representing an increase of 32% over 
the year before. The State enterprise MINERVEN produced 42% of this total. This enterprise ran 
into numerous technical and equipment procurement problems, however, in operating the gold 
ore processing plant completed in 1980 at a cost of 400 million bolívares, which has an ore 
processing capacity of 252000 tons. Thanks to changes in the design and processes made towards 
the end of the year, however, the plant considerably improved its production of fine gold. 
(iii) Agriculture. In 1981 the agricultural product increased by a little over 1 %, i.e., less than 
one-third of the rates achieved in the previous two years. This result was decisively influenced by 
the drop of 3.2% in the crop farming product, and, to a lesser extent, the decline of over 9% in 
fishery activity and the slow growth of beef and pork production (see table 6). 
Crop farming activity was seriously affected by the abnormal rainfall, which was 58% higher 
than the average for the period 1961-1980. This affected the preparation of the ground for the 
winter sowing, as well as harvesting, transport and storage operations for the summer crops. 
Other factors which adversely affected crop farming development were the stagnation in real 
terms of the financing granted by the public sector and the elimination of some important 
subsidies, especially those for fertilizers and maize. All this led to considerable declines in the 
production of fibres and oilseeds (-21 %) , vegetables (-16%), pulses (-14%), and roots and tubers 
(-3.5%). 
The increase of almost 2% registered in the production of cereals, for its part, was due 
exclusively to the further considerable increase in rice production, largely explained by the increase 
in the area cultivated.3 Maize production, in contrast, went down by 67000 tons, while the area 
Table 5 













Source: ECLA, on the basis of the Address by the President of Venezuela to the Congress of the Republic, March 1981. 
"Average of reference price and export value. 
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VENEZUELA: VALUE A N D VOLUME OF AGRICULTURAL P R O D U C T I O N 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of statistics contained in the Address by the President of Venezuela to the Congress of the 
Republic, March 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Induing agricultural construction. 
'Millions of litres. 
Thousands of head. 
'Millions of units. 
cultivated was reduced by 81000 hectares. There were also small declines in the area planted with 
sorghum and in the harvest of this crop. Among oilseeds, the production of peanuts and sesame 
went down, while that of coconuts stagnated because of the lack of stimulus caused by the low 
support price fixed for this crop. In contrast, and partly in order to offset the adverse effects of the 
climatic conditions and the costs of imports due to the elimination of subsidies, the minimum 
guaranteed prices were raised for white maize (29%), yellow maize (14%), rice (14%), sorghum 
(27%), peanuts (22%) and cotton (46%). 
773 
The increase of 5% registered by the livestock sector was due mainly to the results of poultry 
farming and, to a lesser extent, milk production. In 1981, as in the previous year, difficulties were 
experienced in the timely delivery of feed concentrates, which were even more urgent this time, 
since the weather conditions had reduced the availability of natural pastures. 
The smaller output of agricultural products gave rise to imbalances with respect to domestic 
demand which were first of all reflected in an average rise of almost 20% in the prices of such 
products: a much larger rise than that registered for the other domestic goods. This resulted in turn 
in increases of 14% in controlled prices and a much larger average increase of 33% in the prices of 
goods not subject to control. 
In view of this situation, the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (CMA) took rapid action to 
keep the domestic market supplied by directly acquiring abroad 1.4 million tons of agricultural 
products costing 1760 million bolívares. These goods consisted mainly of maize, sorghum, soya 
and powdered milk. In addition, the CMA imported over a million tons of agricultural products 
worth 2 700 million bolívares through third parties. 
In 1981 it was once again necessary to grant economic and consumption subsidies totalling 
almost 3700 million bolívares, of which 1040 million (325 million more than in 1980) went on 
feed concentrates, 1020 million on sugar, 630 million on milk (70 million less than the year 
before), 370 million on maize flour and 320 million on coffee. During the year, however, the 
Government eliminated the subsidies granted the year before to fertilizers (640 million), edible 
oils (210 million), maize (1300 million) and rice (100 million). 
In order to stimulate the sector, and in view of the emergency created by the heavy rains, some 
measures were taken to make the patterns of financing more functional, together with legal 
measures regarding private bank loans to the sector. In this connection, while State loans to 
finance working capital in these activities remained practically unchanged at 2600 million 
bolívares, those granted to finance fixed capital were increased by 200 million bolívares to 1200 
million. The private banks, for their part, increased their loans to agricultural activities from 
11600 to 13200 million bolívares. The National Agricultural Insurance Corporation 
(AGROSEGURO), whose objective is to ensure crops against all natural risks and livestock against 
death from illness or accident4 began operations in 1981. Finally, during the year measures were 
taken to increase the operating efficiency of enterprises connected with the sector such as the CMA, 
and it was decided that VENFERCA, whose distribution of fertilizers went down from 554000 tons 
to 405 000 tons between 1980 and 1981, should cease operations on the last day of the year and 
transfer its functions to a subsidiary of Petroquímica de Venezuela (PEQUIVEN). 
(iv) Manufacturing. The increase of 1.3% in the gross manufacturing product achieved in 
1981 was in line with the trend already observed in 1980. As in that year and the one before it, it 
was the public enterprises which gave the greatest dynamism to the sector as a whole, even though 
their growth rate dropped from 4% in 1980 to only 1.8% in 1981. The overall result was 
influenced, on the one hand, by the declines in the output of Siderúrgica del Orinoco (SIDOR), 
Industria Venezolana de Aluminio (VENALUM) and PEQUIVEN, and on the other hand, the 
increases registered by Aluminio del Çaroni (ALCASA) and NITROVEN. Private industrial activity, 
for its part, which had grown by only 0.8% in 1980, stagnated completely in 1981. 
Among the traditional industrial activities, there was an increase in the product of the 
beverages, tobacco, wood and cork industries; the production of foodstuffs and footwear remained 
unchanged, and there were drops of 3% in clothing and 20% in the manufacture of furniture and 
fittings. Among the branches of industry producing raw materials and intermediate goods, the 
most significant increase (14%) was in paper and pulp production, while the rubber, non-metallic 
minerals and basic metals industries registered moderate increases and chemical products and 
plastics suffered considerable declines. 
In contrast, the product of engineering industries as a whole increased by 4%, and among 
them only the product of the non-electrical machinery branch suffered a sharp decline (-17%). 
••In order to gain greater experience gradually, AGROSEGURO*s activities were limited to certain areas, crops and 
types of animals. 
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Among the main manufactures, production of automobiles, pig-iron, sugar and above all 
sulphuric acid suffered very marked drops, while aluminium production declined by 4%. There 
were, however, slight increases in the production of steel and paper and cardboard, and bigger 
increases in the output of urea, fertilizers, ammonia and commercial vehicles (see table 7). 
The policy followed with regard to the industrial sector during 1981 represented a 
continuation of the basic patterns adopted since 1979, although there were changes of emphasis on 
some aspects. On the one hand, measures continued with a view to the further application of the 
policy of realistic prices, but their effect on price rises at the producer level was not as great as in 
1980, and there were even some declines in prices.5 Despite this policy, however, controlled prices 
were maintained for products considered to be of prime necessity, such as prepared foods for 
children, and maximum retail prices were fixed for over 1350 pharmaceutical products. 
Furthermore, in the case of goods and services not classed as products of prime necessity, it was 
made compulsory to inform the Ministry of Development one month in advance about any 
proposed change in sale prices. 
Table 7 
VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING 





























































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Thousands of units. 
cOf interconnected system. 
Thousands of kW. 
'Millions of kWh. 
'Thus, the average increase in price of all industrial goods at the producer level was 10.4%, whereas in 1980 it had 
been 19.4%. The following are the price variations by industrial groupings, with the 1980 percentages in brackets: 
foodstuffs 13% (22%); textiles, clothing and leather 8% (17%); wood, cork and furniture 7% (22%); paper, printing and 
publishing 3% (21%); chemical substances derived from petroleum or coal, rubber and plastics 21% (15%); metal 
products, machinery and equipment 14% (8%); basic metals industries -7% (38%), and other manufacturing 
industries -2% (63%). 
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As regards credit support, the commercial banks only increased their loans to the industrial 
sector by 6%, but the State financial institutions expanded their credits by over 85%. These 
institutions made loans to private industrial enterprises amounting to almost 3 billion bolívares, 
the increase in credits for the development of the capital goods industry being particularly 
noteworthy, since these increased from 170 million bolívares in 1980 to 570 million in 1981. This 
increase was directed mainly to the industries producing transport equipment and machinery. The 
expansion in the credits granted by public sector financial bodies to the State industrial enterprises 
was even greater, amounting to 4260 million bolívares, over 12 times the figure of 350 million 
given in 1980. This enormous increase consisted mainly of a capital contribution of over 3 billion 
bolívares to Siderúrgica del Orinoco (S1DOR) and a contribution of over 1200 million bolívares to 
finance the expansion of the aluminium industry. 
In order to strengthen future industrial growth, special measures were also taken to promote 
technological development and the capital goods industry. 
In the first of these areas, the basic objective of government policy is to raise national 
technological capacity through a suitable transfer of technology from the exterior and the 
promotion of technical innovations. This policy was put into practice through a set of measures in 
the areas of standardization and quality control, productivity and industrial property, with the 
Technical Innovation Promotion Fund (F1NTEC) being set up as the body to provide credits and 
risk capital for the adaptation of new technologies. In the field of standardization, almost 300 
standards were analysed and 171 were given official application after studying over 100 
international standards. Finally, in the field of quality control an appraisal was made of over 300 
enterprises in the foodstuffs, motor vehicles, metal products and machinery, and other branches. 
The policy for the development of the capital goods industry, for its part, is based on the 
analysis of demand for these goods by the petroleum and petroleum products, petrochemicals, iron 
and steel, aluminium, electricity, transport and construction branches. To this end, the National 
Council for the Development of the Capital Goods Industry was set up in 1980 and in 1981 it 
studied and secured the approval of a decree designed to guide and develop these industries 
through financial, fiscal and tariff incentives. It also prepared a list of 147 types of capital goods 
considered to be of priority importance (including 18 priority types required by the petroleum 
branch) and carried out a sample census among enterprises producing capital goods, as well as 
formulating programmes for the training of specialized personnel in the metal manufactures and 
machinery branches. 
In addition, through the use of tariffs, import quotas and price adjustments, the Government 
continued to give support to the development of agro-industries (especially those connected with 
the production of oils and fats and the processing of cereals, food and tomatoes) and of the leather 
tanning and footwear industries. 
In the motor industry, the minimum number of each new model that must be produced was 
raised in order to rationalize production, the manufacture of economy vehicles was initiated by the 
Ford, General Motors, Renault and Fábrica Industrial de Automotores de Venezuela factories, the 
minimum content of parts and components of domestic origin was raised, and the Motor Industry 
Research and Development Centre was set up to further the development of the motor industry 
and the associated engineering industries and to promote the training of specialized staff. 
The steel output of the State enterprise SIDOR came to 1.8 million tons, which was slightly 
more than the year before. In these activities, appreciable increases in productivity were achieved 
in the pipe, bar and wire plants, and in the open-hearth furnaces. The sales of this enterprise 
amounted to 1865000 tons of products worth almost 3850 million bolívares. Of this total, 
1465000 tons went to the domestic market and 400000 tons were exported (33% more than in 
1980). Despite these increases, however, the enterprise closed the year with net losses of close to 
2200 million bolívares, a significant influence in this result being the high finance charges. SIDOR 
continued with its investment plan, however, and disbursed 650 million bolívares during the year, 
so that its total accumulated investments came to 14450 million bolívares. 
The differing performance of the VENALUM and ALCASA enterprises resulted in an overall 
decline of 4% in the aluminium industry. In VENALUM, far from achieving the target of producing 
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268000 tons of aluminium in 1981 (25% more than in 1980), only a little over 200000 tons was 
actually produced, as a result of technical problems.6 Since sales also went down, 6000 tons of 
stocks were built up. At the same time, mainly as a result of the drop in the international price of 
aluminium, the profits of the firm dropped from 215 million bolívares in 1980 to only 65 million in 
1981. The situation in ALCASA was different, however, since in 1981 its output was slightly greater 
than that of the year before (see table 7). This enterprise too, however, suffered a considerable 
deterioration in its financial results, since it turned in a loss of 68 million bolívares after having 
generated profits totalling 11 million the year before. 
In contrast with what happened in the aluminium industry, considerable advances were made 
in 1981 in the petrochemicals industry. Thus, the production of the El Tablazo and Morón 
complexes came to 973 000 tons (5 % more than the year before), while exports of petrochemical 
products were almost 50% greater than in 1980. Furthermore, in 1981 the financial situation of 
the enterprise continued to improve, as it had done the year before. 
Sugar production, for its part, came to a little over 260000 tons, which represented a 
considerable reduction (-22%) compared with the previous harvest. The State consortium 
Centrales-Azucareros (CENAZUCAR) produced 139000 tons of sugar (a decline of 16%), while the 
volume of sugar cane milled in its plants amounted to 2.3 million tons (a decline of 11 % compared 
with the year before).These figures suggest that the unfavourable weather conditions already 
referred to not only affected the cultivation of sugar cane but also reduced its sucrose content. 
With the aim of properly satisfying domestic demand, which is estimated at 700000 tons, 
CENAZUCAR worked out and co-ordinated a programme of imports of this product. Furthermore, 
as part of the Colombian-Venezuelan integration project entitled Agroindustrias Zulia-Ureña 
C.A., it was agreed to set up in the River Zulia area, in Colombian territory, a sugar mill purchased 
in the Bahamas whose dismantling, transport and installation will take 24 months. 
(v) Construction. In spite of a decline of 2.8% in the construction product and the existence of 
complex financial problems affecting this activity, some recovery was made in 1981 from the 
severe decline suffered in 1979 and 1980, when the product of the sector fell by 10% and 15% 
respectively. 
This result was achieved thanks to the recovery of public sector construction activity, which, 
after going down by 20% the year before, grew by 15% in 1981 and generated almost two-thirds of 
the total construction product. This greater activity was stimulated by a new spurt in public 
investments on projects designed to increase the installed capacity for electric power generation, 
expand the transport and communications system, increase the coverage of the sewerage system 
and expand the provision of other sanitation works. It was also favoured by a 19% increase in 
public sector spending on housing construction, which thus rose to 3 400 million bolívares and 
permitted the construction of almost 28550 urban dwellings and a little over 13100 rural ones. 
In contrast, the deterioration of private construction activity was further aggravated, since it 
contracted by 24% in 1981 after having gone down by 11 % the year before. The sharp decline in 
the activity of this sector was once again connected with the conditions which have been prevailing 
for several years now in the real estate market because of the rising costs of dwellings and the 
inadequacy of family income to satisfy the ever-increasing demands posed by their acquisition 
through mortgage credits. This inadequacy was further aggravated in 1981 through the 
accentuation of the upward trend in interest rates. Thus, whereas in the three-year period 1976-
1978 the interest rates charged in Caracas by mortgage banks and savings and loan institutions 
averaged 10.4% and 9.3%, respectively, in the next two years these averages rose to 11.4% and 
11%, and in the last three months of 1981 they shot up to 17.1% and 16.9%. Private sector 
construction was also affected by the drop in demand for construction work caused by the decline in 
investments by private businessmen in the productive sectors. 
The decline in the effective demand for housing led, in turn, to a rise in the stock of finished 
dwellings to 27 500 units at the end of the first half of the year (5 500 more than at the same date 
6Of the 720 reduction cells, it was only possible to operate 498. 
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the previous year) and, according to conservative estimates, to 35 000 at the end of the year. This 
smaller demand caused a decline of around 16% in housing prices at the constructor level 
compared with the figures prevailing ¡n 1980, when housing prices showed relative stagnation. 
In order to deal with this situation, the Government adopted a number of measures which 
included on the one hand the expansion of the programme of subsidies in respect of the interest 
costs on loans for the acquisition of lower-priced housing and, on the other, assistance to the 
mortgage banks through the Urban Development Fund, the simplification of the regulations 
regarding mortgage banking and the extension to a maximum of 30 years of the repayment period 
for housing loans. 
(vi) Electric power. During 1981 the total installed capacity was increased by almost 1100 
MkW to 8900 MkW, while gross total generation came to nearly 35 300 million kWh, 
representing a relative increase of 5.5% over the previous year. The interconnected installed 
capacity, for its part, increased by nearly 690 MkW during the year to a little over 8400 MkW, 
while consumption exceeded 34400 million kWh, 10.5% more than the year before (see table 7). 
Of the total installed capacity, 76% belongs to the State and the remainder to the private 
sector, while of the 34.5 million kWh generated in 1981 almost 44% was hydroelectric power 
while the remaining 56% came from thermal power stations. Rather more than 80% of the 
energy generated was produced by the public sector, within which the Compañía Anónima de 
Administración y Fomento Eléctrico produced 32%, the Compañía Electrificación del Caroní.C.A. 
(EDELCA) generated almost 52%, and the remainder came from other State power stations such as 
Energía Eléctrica de Barquisimeto, Plantas Eléctricas del Carora and Electricidad del Perijá. 
With the aim of continuing the intensive development of the electricity sector achieved in the 
last 10 years,7 and in accordance with the guidelines of the Sixth National Plan, in 1981 the Law on 
the Financing of the Public Investment Programme in the National Electricity Sector was adopted. 
This law empowers the Executive to carry out credit operations of up to 16400 million bolívares in 
order to finance projects for the expansion of installed capacity and the extension of transmission 
and distribution lines which cannot be financed from the enterprises' own resources or from 
further capital contributions by the State financial institutions for the development of these 
programmes. 
(c) Employment and unemployment 
During the first half of 1981 —theiatest period for which statistical data are available— the 
tendency apparently was towards the continuation of the employment situation existing in the 
same period of the previous year. Thus, according to the household surveys carried out by the 
Oficina Central de Estadística e Informática (OCEI), the average rate of unemployment during the 
first six months of 1981 was 6.3%, that is to say, practically the same as the6.2% registered in the 
equivalent period of 1980, which was higher than any of the rates measured in the previous three 
years (see table 8). 
It is likely, however, that this very slight rise in the rate of unemployment underestimates the 
actual deterioration in the employment situation, for according to the same survey total 
employment seems to have increased by almost 3 % between the first half of 1980 and that of 1981. 
This increase was mainly concentrated in financial activities (8.6%) and transport and 
communications (7.5 % ), while the expansion of employment in the goods-producing sectors was 
very slow (1.1%), as in the previous two years. As the output of agriculture and manufacturing 
grew even more slowly in 1981 and construction activity actually declined, however, the growth 
rates of employment seem to have given rise to slight declines in the productivity of labour. In view 
of the considerably faster increase of employment than of the product, the reduction in 
productivity must have been quite marked in transport, commerce and financial activities (see 
tables 3 and 8). 
'Between 1972 and 1981, the installed capacity increased by a factor of 3.4, the number of subscribers rose from 
1.4 million to 2.46 million, and the number of users rose from 3.2 to 8.4 million persons. The latter figure meant that in 
that year the electricity services covered 57% of the total population of the country. 
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Moreover, in order for the rate of unemployment to have remained almost unchanged, the 
labour force would have had to increase at a rate practically equal to that of employment, that is to 
say, by 3%, and in order for this to occur it would have been necessary, in turn, for a significant 
proportion of the persons of working age to have ceased looking for employment. 
At all events, the evolution of employment was accompanied by a decline in real terms in 
average family income. Thus, between the first halves of 1980 and 1981 this income rose by a little 
over 11%, but over the same period of time consumer prices increased by 18.3%, so that the 
purchasing power of family income went down by 6%. 
3. The external sector 
(a) External trade 
(i) Exports of goods. During 1981, the value of exports of goods rose by 4%, which was a 
much smaller increase than those registered in the previous two years, when the total amount 
more than doubled (see table 9). As in 1980, the rise in the value of exports was achieved in spite of 
a decline in their physical volume, thanks to the higher prices obtained on the world market for 
petroleum (which increased by 12%) and iron ore (which went up by 9%). 
Altogether, exports of petroleum and petroleum products totalled almost US$ 19100 million 
and thus increased by 4.3%, after having grown by 56% in 1979 and 35% in 1980. This marked 
reduction in their growth rate was due to the smaller demand for hydrocarbons on the world 
Table 8 
VENEZUELA: EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
Total employment 
Product ion of goods 
Agriculture 




Electricity, gas and water 





Rate of unemployment 
Gross rate of participation 
Average monthly family income 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of data compiled by the Oficina Central de Estadística e Informática (OCEI), contained in the 
publication entitled Encuesta de hogares. 
•"First half of 1981. 
'First half of 1981, with respect to the same period of 1980. 
'First half of 1981, with respect to the second half of 1980. 
Population aged 15 and over, as a percentage of total population. 
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4.7 5.4 5.9 6.3 
57.5 58.0 58.2 58.1 
Bolívares 
2 613 3 000 3 602 3 878 17.3 14.8 20.0 11.1 4.4 
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market, to the restrictions deliberately imposed by the authorities on petroleum production in 
order to conserve the reserves of light and medium crude, and in particular, to the much smaller 
rise registered in 1981 in the sale price of Venezuelan crude (see table 5). Nevertheless, as is 
traditional, sales of hydrocarbons once again accounted for over 95 % of the total value of sales of 
goods abroad in 1981. 
Among the other main export products, sales of iron ore, which had stagnated in 1979 but 
which increased by 7 % in 1980, doubled their growth rate in 1981. In contrast, exports of 
aluminium grew by less than 4 % after having increased by a factor of 17 between 1978 and 1980 
(see table 9). This modest increase in sales of aluminium occurred in spite of the fact that 
VENALUM increased its volume of exports from 150000 to 170000 tons, while ALCASA increased its 
sales.abroad from 53000 tons to 69330 tons. This expansion of 18% in the physical amount 
exported was largely neutralized, however, by the decline in the international price of aluminium. 
Among non-traditional exports, those of iron and steel products attained a volume of 400000 
tons (33% more than the year before) and a value of US$ 94 million (35% more than in 1980). 
The expansion in sales of petrochemical products (ammonia, urea and ethylene) was even greater, 
since their total value of US$ 95 million represented an increase of 49%. Altogether, however, 
exports of products other than petroleum, iron ore and aluminium went down by 6%. 
Table 9 
VENEZUELA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Millions of dollars Percentage breakdown Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1981" 1970 1981" 1979 1980 1981° 
Total 


















































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 10 
VENEZUELA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
and services 




































































213.8 206.0 201.4 181.7 257.5 299.4 282.0 




With the aim of promoting exports, on the one hand efforts were made to determine the 
exportable supply (a process which culminated in the production of a Directory of Exportable 
Products, listing the 445 enterprises producing such goods), while on the other hand efforts were 
made to stimulate awareness of the need to export among businessmen, especially in the industrial 
sector. In addition, the Government organized a number of exhibitions in Arab countries and the 
Caribbean, with the participation of almost 100 potential export enterprises from the branches 
producing chemicals, metal products and machinery, plastics, electrical goods, foodstuffs and 
intermediate goods for the oil industry. 
In addition, the Export Financing Fund (FINEXPO) established agreements with 135 
commercial banking establishments to take care of pre-shipment and post-shipment operations. 
Although the direct and indirect credits granted by this institution went down from 737 million 
bolívares in 1980 to 436 million in 1981, this decline was due exclusively to the fact that in 1980 a 
loan of 430 million bolívares was granted to Panama to finance a suspension bridge over the Canal, 
to be installed by Venezuelan constructors and manufacturers. Of the total direct credits granted by 
FINEXPO, 105 million bolívares went to the metal products and machinery industry, 32 million to 
the construction industry, 18 million to the chemical industry, while the rest went to finance 
exports by the plastics, agricultural products, fishery and other industries. The credits granted by 
FINEXPO through the national commercial banking system, for their part, amounted to 190 million 
bolívares, which was supplemented by an equivalent sum added by the banks. Most of this total of 
380 million bolívares was used to support exports by the aluminium, iron and steel (steel ingots, 
steel plates and bars, seamed tubes) and ammonia and urea industries. 
As part of its export promotion policy, FINEXPO signed letters of intent for a total of 1540 
million bolívares in respect of the export of metal bridges to Suriname and Guatemala, metal 
structures to the United States, Mexico and Saudi Arabia, buses to Costa Rica and Honduras, water 
pipelines to Chile, and telephone apparatus, aluminium cables and bars, transformers, trucks, 
motor parts and boilers to Colombia. 
Finally, another important type of support given to exporters was the system of export credit 
guarantees, which insured sales for a total value of 525 million bolívares through the issue of 
almost 800 insurance policies. 
(ii) Imports of goods. After going down in 1979 and then increasing 13%in 1980, the value of 
imports of goods rose by a little over 9% in 1981 to the record total of almost US$ 12 380 million 
(see table 10). Of this sum, imports by the public sector accounted for rather more than US$ 3 700 
million (an increase of 33% over the year before), while those of the private sector increased by 
7% to almost US$ 8650 million. 
The bigger purchases abroad by the public sector were due to the requirements of the 
investment projects being carried out in the petroleum, aluminium and iron and steel industries. 
They were also affected by the purchases of agricultural products which it was necessary to make in 
order to compensate for the drop in domestic production caused by the hard winter. Thus, the 
Agricultural Marketing Corporation directly acquired 1.4 million tons of agricultural products 
worth over US$ 410 million and consisting mainly of maize, sorghum, soya and powdered milk, 
while through private sector intermediaries it imported another million tons of products worth 
almost US$ 630 million. The total agricultural imports made by this body thus came to US$ 1040 
million, 47% more than in 1980. In addition to these purchases, the Corporation also acquired 
abroad 14100 tons of meat worth US$ 74 million, of which 8 600 tons costing US$ 35 million came 
from Colombia. 
During the year, the authorities continued their policy aimed at reducing tariff levels, 
liberalizing imports and doing away with tariff exemptions except in special cases. In addition, the 
"buy Venezuelan" decree was put into effect, whereby it was sought to promote import 
substitution. With this aim in mind, measures were taken to achieve the effective centralization of 
information on public sector demand so as to channel the corresponding purchases to domestic 
producers. With the same objective, it was made compulsory to break down projects for new 
investments or for the expansion of existing plants into smaller components, and an updated 
register of suppliers of goods and services of domestic origin was prepared. 
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(b) The balance of payments 
In 1980, the value of exports of goods came to nearly US$ 20100 million and that of imports 
to almost US$ 12400 million, so that the merchandise transactions with the exterior gave a 
surplus of US$ 7 700 million, i.e., slightly less than that registered in 1980. The services account, as 
is traditional, turned in a substantial deficit of almost US$ 4 billion, thus exceeding that of the year 
before by almost 14%. The main cause of this larger deficit was the expansion of purchases of 
services abroad by over US$ 400 million, while exports of services suffered a slight decline (see 
table 11). 
Net payments of profits and interest, in contrast, generated a surplus which was considerably 
bigger than that of the year before. Thanks to the big investments abroad, income from interest 
amounted to US$ 3 780 million, 58% more than in 1980 and almost four times the value of non-
petroleum exports in 1981.8' Payments of profits and interest to the exterior, for their part, 
increased by 57% to a little over US$ 3 billion. Of the total interest paid, US$ 420 million was due 
to servicing of the public debt and a little over US$ 1 billion to servicing payments on the private 
sector debt. 
Finally, unilateral private transactions turned in a deficit of US$ 420 million dollars (similar 
to the year before), due mainly to the remittances made by foreigners working in Venezuela. 
As a result of the above transactions, a current account surplus of slightly over US$ 4 billion 
was achieved for the third consecutive year. 
Although during the first nine months of the year the interest rate differentials were clearly 
favourable to the exterior, in 1981 there was a considerable reduction in the net outflow of capital, 
which had exceeded US$ 4 300 million the year before. 
As a result of this and of the substantial surplus achieved on current operations, the 
international reserves rose by rather more than US$ 2 500 million to slightly over US$ 11400 
million at the end of the year. Of this total, a little over US$ 8600 million belonged to the Central 
Bank, US$ 2450 million to the Venezuelan Investment Fund, and the rest to the commercial banks 
(see table 12). If we add to this total the short-term deposits (estimated at US$ 8695 million) 
which Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. maintains abroad, then the total foreign assets of the country 
came to US$ 20100 million: sufficient to cover imports of goods and services for 14 months. 
(c) External indebtedness 
During 1981, the public sector sold securities worth a total of US$ 968 million abroad, but at 
the same time it made amortization and settlement payments of the order of US$ 890 million, so 
that the net increase in the external public debt was only US$ 77 million, which contrasted sharply 
with the much greater increases registered each year since 1975. Thus, the total disbursed external 
debt at the end of the year came to a little over US$ 9700 million (see table 13). 
Of this total, over US$6540 million corresponds to direct indebtedness assumed by the 
nation with the authorization of the National Congress and US$ 1290 million to similarly 
authorized debts contracted by the quasi-autonomous bodies with or without the guarantee of the 
State, either by procuring credit or by selling securities and bonds issued by them. As regards its 
maturity structure, 69% of the external debt matures before 1987,30% matures in the five-year 
period 1987-1992 and only 1% has a term of over 10 years. 
The scanty indebtedness entered into in 1981 was due on the one hand to the fact: that there 
was some delay in the process of granting authorization to contract external debts, and on the 
other to the fact that the interest rates prevailing abroad not only curbed the process of 
indebtedness but even induced State enterprises to repatriate short-term capital to finance their 
investment needs. In the future, however, it can be expected that there will be greater indebtedness 
by virtue of the power which the Congress of the Republic granted to the Government through the 
Organic Law on Public Credit to carry out credit operations of up to 61200 million bolívares. 
8Of this sum, the Central Bank received US$ 880 million; the Investment Fund, USI 524 million; Petróleos de 
Venezuela, US$ 1277 million, and private investors, US$ 1095 million. 
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Table 11 
VENEZUELA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
VENEZUELA 
(Millions of dollars) 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Services 








Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on current account 



















Errors and omissions (net) 
Balance on capital account 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(minus sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 





























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1976-1980: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; 1981: ECLA, on the basis of official 
data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Services also include other official and private transactions, but not profits and interest. 
cIn addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans granted and other assets and 
liabilities. 
dThe difference between total variation in reserves of opposite sign and the global balance represents counterpart items: 




During 1981 there was a noteworthy and sustained slackening in the rate of inflation. Thus, 
the December-December variation in the consumer price index for the metropolitan area of 
Caracas came to 10.8%, which was only a little over half the rates registered in 1979 and 1980. 
Wholesale prices showed a similar but less marked evolution (see table 14 and figure 2). Despite 
the marked slackening in the inflationary process, however, the variations between the annual 
averages of the consumer price index and the wholesale price index, while lower than those 
registered in 1980, were still above those corresponding to 1979-
The aggregate consumer price index for the main cities of the country likewise showed a 
December-December growth rate of 11%, well below the rates of 20% and 19% registered in 
1979 and 1980, respectively. Of its individual components, those which increased most were 
household expenditures (14.2%) and food (13%), while the "miscellaneous expenditures" group 
rose by 8.8% and the "clothing and footwear" group increased by less than 1% after having 
registered very considerable rises of 33% and 39% in the previous two years. The turnaround in 
the trend displayed by this latter component was even more marked in the metropolitan area of 
Caracas, where the average prices for clothing and footwear, which had risen at rates of over 40% 
in both 1979 and 1980, actually went down slightly in absolute terms in 1981 (see table 14). 
The relatively sharp rise in household expenditures was due largely to the increases in 
telephone and electricity charges decreed in March and May, respectively, and in the higher rents 
for housing. 
Table 12 
VENEZUELA: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(Millions of dollars) 




































Source: ECLA, on the basis of statistics from the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
Table 13 
VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Disbursed external public debt 
Servicing of the debt 
Capital 
Interest 
Servicing of the debt as a percentage of 
exports of goods and services 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data and Ministry of Finance, Memoria, 1981. 
"Preliminary figures. 


































The rise in the food component, for its part, reflected the quite substantial changes which 
took place in the supply of agricultural products in the course of the year. Thus, as may be seen 
from figure 2, the downward trend followed since mid-1980 by the growth rate of food prices was 
almost completely interrupted during the first nine months of 1981, although it resumed 
vigorously during the last quarter. This evolution was due essentially to the unfavourable weather 
conditions prevailing during the second half of the year, which played a major part in considerably 
reducing the harvests and also upsetting the operations of the transport, assembly and storage 
system for agricultural products, all of which encouraged speculative practices in the distribution 
system. The marked reduction in the upward movement of this component in the last quarter of 
the year, for its part, was due to the entry onto the market of the bigger supplies brought in by the 
Agricultural Marketing Corporation and the harvesting of bigger crops of quick-growing seasonal 
products such as vegetables. 
The virtual stabilization of prices of clothing and footwear was the result of three main 
causes. First of these was the weakening of demand for these products, attributable to the decline in 
per capita income and real wages; the second was the diversion of part of this demand tawards 
products of imported origin, and the third was the decision taken by the Government in April to 
declare many of the products in this group articles of prime necessity, subject to a compulsory 10% 
reduction in their retail prices. 
The incidence of the slow growth of personal income on the rate of inflation was also 
reflected in the relative differences in the price rises of various groups of consumer goods. As was 
to be expected, the rises were much greater in the case of non-durable consumer goods (the annual 
average variation of which was 12% higher than the variation in the total consumer price index), 
while they were more moderate in the case of semi-durable consumer goods (the increase in which 
was 11 % below the average), and above all in the case of consumer durables (which went up 39% 
less than the total index). 
The influence of the price fixing policy, for its part, was reflected in the fact that the prices of 
products subject to control rose by less than 6% in the course of the year, whereas those of products 
whose prices are determined by supply and demand rose by almost 14%. 
Table 14 

























































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
"In the Caracas metropolitan area. 
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Figure 2 
VENEZUELA: TWELVE-MONTHLY VARIATIONS IN DOMESTIC PRICES3 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
Consumer price index for Caracas metropolitan area. 
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5. Monetary and fiscal policies 
(a) Monetary evolution and polines 
During 1981, the monetary base grew by 16%: more than double the rate of the previous year. 
The main factors in this expansion were the very considerable increase in absolute terms in the net 
international reserves of the Central Bank and the high relative growth rate of the loans, 
investments and advances granted by it to the different sectors of economic activity (see table 15). 
Despite the acceleration in the growth rate of the monetary base, the means of payment 
increased at a much slower pace in 1981 than the previous year. Indeed, their growth of 7 % was the 
lowest registered since 1976 except for the slightly lower figure recorded in 1979. As quasi-money 
kept up the vigorous growth rate displayed in the previous two years, however, monetary liquidity 
increased by 20%, that is to say, only slightly more slowly than in 1980 (see table 16). 
From the point of view of monetary policy, the most fundamental change in 1981 was that 
made in the management of interest rates. 
Thus, since January 1979 the interest rate policy had been used as a means of discouraging the 
outflow of short-term capital to the exterior. To this end, the monetary authorities sought to 
follow closely the trends observed in international financial markets in fixing the interest rate 
ceilings. Since between that date and the end of 1980 the situation as regards interest rates abroad 
was very changeable, the monetary authorities had to act quickly, and during 1980 they altered the 
interest ceilings on five occasions. 
At the beginning of March 1981 the Central Bank of Venezuela reduced interest rates, and 
from tjien on they were not changed again, in spite of the upward trend observed in this variable 
on international financial markets. In contrast with the policy applied in 1979 and 1980, this 
naturally favoured the outflow of short-term capital, and this process contributed to the objective 
of sterilizing monetary liquidity for anti-inflationary purposes. 
Although the outflow of capital during the first eight months of the year was very large, the 
average level of the international reserves in this period was approximately 36500 million 
bolívares, which was only 1.4% below that existing at the end of 1980. In spite of this, the average 
level of the monetary base over the same period was 21 % less than at the end of 1980. This 
noteworthy decline was due mainly to the fiscal policy of increasing the Government's deposits in 
the Central Bank. Thus, during the period January-August these amounted on average to 53% 
more than the deposits which the Government maintained in the Central Bank at the end of the 
previous year. 
Table 15 
VENEZUELA: ORIGIN OF THE MONETARY BASE 
Factors of expansion 
Net international reserves 
Government securities 
Rediscounts and advances 
Loans and investment of other assets 
Factors of contraction 
National Treasury 
Other Government deposits 
Venezuelan investment fund and 
other special deposits 
Paid-up capital and reserves 
Monetary base ( 1 - 2 ) 
End-year balance in 










































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of statistics from the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. 
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As in the course of this period the gap between domestic and external interest rates grew 
rapidly and steadily wider (see table 17), however, savings and time deposits grew very slowly. In 
these circumstances, the monetary authorities decided to replace the discretionary management of 
interest rates by a system of floating rates freely determined in the financial market. Central Bank 
control over interest rates was subordinated from then on to the influence exercised through the 
traditional open market operations. As this decision coincided with a period in which high interest 
Hki {^ vailed áhroácl, doiMic1 mmk fates Mè « t o M y . This, áü well ë p M i n g 
savings by making them more remunerative in real terms, made bank credit more expensive, and 
this process was further promoted by the fact that at the same time the Central Bank increased its 
rediscount rate to 14%. 
Table 16 
VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF THE MEANS OF PAYMENT 
Demand deposits 
Currency outaidc baaKa 
Total means of payment (M,) 
Savings deposits 
Time deposits and others 
Total quasi-money 
Monetary liquidity (M2) 
Mortgage bonds 



















































































Source: ECLA, on che basis of statistics compiled by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
Note: M2 = M, + quasi-money. M, = M2 + mortgage bonds. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 17 
VENEZUELA: DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN DOMESTIC A N D 

































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of statistics compiled by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Official commercial bank rate for loans and discounts, less the prime rate on the United States market. 
Official commercial bank rate for loans and discounts, less LIBOR. 
'Agreed domestic rate for fixed-term deposits, less rate for 90-day Certificates of Deposit in United States. 




VENEZUELA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




Indirect and other income 
Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Economic subsidies 
Other current expenditure 




Other capital expenditure 
Transfers 
Refinancing operations 





























































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
(b) Fiscal policy 
In 1981 current central government expenditure grew by 37%, which was more than twice 
the growth rate registered in 1980. This increase originated in the enormous expansion in the 
amount of subsidies and the policy of providing support for public education services and the 
running of public, regional and quasi-autonomous bodies, and it took place in spite of the much 
more moderate increase registered in 1981 in expenditure on wages and salaries. Thus, subsidies 
(mainly to agriculture and agro-industries) increased more than fivefold, transfers to persons grew 
by 37 %, those to universities and other institutes of higher education rose by 20%, and those made 
to public, regional and quasi-autonomous bodies were 2 5 % greater than in 1980. Expenditure on 
wages and salaries, however, rose by only 15%, which was only a little over half the growth rate 
registered in 1980 (see table 18). 
Capital expenditure, for its part, which had more than doubled the year before, increased by a 
little over 30% in 1981. As in the previous year, its most dynamic component was financial 
investment, which, after having increased fourfold in 1980, rose by 67% in 1981 because of the 
bigger petroleum revenue, a certain proportion of which has to be transferred by the State to the 
Venezuelan Investment Fund.9 During the year there was also a sharp (55%) increase in real 
government investment on construction and projects. Because of the severe drop which this 
investment had suffered in 1979 when the stabilization policy was put into effect, however, its 
absolute level was only a little higher than that already achieved in 1978. On the other hand, 
servicing of the public debt, which had doubled in the previous two years, remained almost 
constant in 1981. 
'This fund received over 80% of the central government's financial investments in 1981. 
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Total central government expenditure, which had remained almost constant between 1977 
and 1978 but which had gone up substantially in 1979, thus registered a further considerable 
increase of close to 30% in 1981. 
Current central government income, for its part, increased even faster (48%), mainly because 
of the extraordinary growth of 56% in the resources coming from the petroleum sector. Among 
these contributions, those corresponding to taxes on petroleum income exceeded 63 200 million 
bolívares and were thus 67 % higher than in 1980. This result was due to the decision t aken by the 
Government at the end of 1980 to raise the export values of petroleum by 64% with retroactive 
effect to 1 January (see table 5). This measure considerably raised the income tax obligations of the 
petroleum sector payable in 1981. In contrast, non-tax revenue from hydrocarbons came to 7600 
million bolívares, which was only 3% more than the year before. 
Current non-petroleum fiscal income, for its part, came to 21700 million bolívares. This 
represented an increase of 25 %, due mainly to the increase of 41 % in revenue from direct taxes. 
Despite the more rapid expansion of current income than of total expenditure.the fiscal year 
ended with a deficit of a little over 1300 million bolívares. However, this was substantially less 
than the deficit of almost 10 200 million registered in 1980, and was totally financed with external 





A. METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
ITCNBi 
IPBÍ 
1. Indexes have been calculated for the effective real exchange rates for exports and imports. 
2. In order to calculate the real exchange rate index for exports, the following formula was used: 
n
 y 
2 (ITCRB¡ • W * ) 






 2 xBj 
j=i 
where B corresponds to the country under analysis.1 
ITCNgj is an index of the exchange rate between the currency of country B and that of 
country i; for example, number of units of the currency of country B per US dollar, 
number of units of currency of country B per deutschmark, etc. 
IPBj is an index representing the relationship between the price index of country B and 
the price index of country i, i.e., an index of the relative inflation as between country 
B and country i. 
ITCR3: corresponds to an index of the exchange rate between the currency of country B and 
that of country i, deflated by an index of the relative inflation as between country B 
and country i. 
Xgj are the exports of country B to country i. 
m 
2 X3: represents the total exports of country B. 
j=l 
n are the countries which constitute the main markets for the exports of country B. 
m is the total number of countries to which country B exports. 
•Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay or 
Venezuela. 
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3. In order to calculate the effective real exchange rate index for imports, the following formula 
was used: 





ITCRBi = — i p ¡ -
and 
MBi 
W M = ~ 
Bi X MB: 
j=l 
where ITCNB¡, IPBj and ITCRBj correspond exactly with the definition given in section 2 
above and 
MBj are the imports of country B from country i. 
m 
X MB: represents the total imports of country B. 
j=l 
n are the main countries providing imports to country B. 
m is the total number of countries from which country B imports. 
4. In order to obtain the series of indexes for the nominal exchange rate, the supplement on 
exchange rates prepared by the International Monetary Fund2 was used. This source provides 
series on the exchange rate between the currency of the country under analysis and the US 
dollar, as well as series on the exchange rate between the currencies of the other countries 
with which the country under analysis trades and the US dollar. Using these series, it was 
possible to calculate exchange rates between the currency of the country under analysis and 
the currencies of the other countries. 
5. The price index used for each country was normally the wholesale price index. When this 
index was not available, the consumer price index was used. In the case of the oil-exporting 
countries —but only for the purpose of calculating the effective real exchange rate for 
imports— the respective price index for petroleum exports was used. The basic data on prices 
were obtained from the International Monetary Fund.3 
6. The weightings used to calculate the effective real exchange rate indexes for exports or 
imports correspond to the average participation of each of the countries in question in the 
exports or imports of the country under analysis in the period 1975-1979.4 The basic 
information was obtained from the International Monetary Fund.5 
international Monetary Fund, Supplement on Exchange Rates, Supplement Series No. 1, 1981, pp. 16-17. 
'IMF, International Financial Statistics yearbook, 1981, and Vol. XXV, March, April and May 1982. 
''The remainder (the "other countries" category) were projected pro rata on the basis of the countries considered in 
this calculation. 
'IMF, Directions of Trade yearbook, 1981. 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
7. AU the series have as their base 1980=100. Although the selection of the base year is arbitrary, 
in any case the evolution of all the series is quite independent of the base year chosen. 
8. To sum up, in order to calculate the effective real exchange rate indexes as a function of the 
geographical composition of exports or imports, the following procedure was used, 
illustrated here with the data for Peru: 
(a) Preparation of series on the evolution of the nominal exchange rates: Peruvian soles per 
unit of currency of the 14 countries which are Peru's main trading partners (see table A). 
(b) Calculation of series on the evolution of the nominal exchange rate indexes: Peruvian 
soles per unit of currency of the 14 countries which are Peru's main trading partners (see 
table B). 
(c) Computation of series on the evolution of the relative price indexes for Peru with respect 
to the 14 countries which are its main trading partners (see table C). 
(d) Preparation of series on the evolution of the real exchange rate indexes. These series 
were obtained by dividing the series on the nominal exchange rate indexes (table B) by the 
series on the relative price indexes (table C) and are given in table D. 
(e) Calculation of Peru's exports to 9 countries or its imports from 12 countries, as 
percentages of its total exports and imports, respectively (see table E). 
(f) Calculation of the effective real exchange rate indexes for exports or imports. To this end, 
the weightings of exports or imports from table E were multiplied by the real exchange rate 
indexes from table D. The results thus obtained were added together to give the effective real 
exchange rate indexes for exports or imports (see table F). 
9. Finally, it should be noted that in the case of the remaining countries, for reasons of space, the 
information corresponding to tables A, B andC has been omitted and only that from tables D, 
E and F is given, which are in these cases denominated 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
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B. STATISTICAL SERIES 
C. FIGURES 




ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES" 























































































































































































"Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Argentina, 




ARGENTINA: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1975-1979) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 








































Only those countries whose exports of imports average 2.0% or more of the value of Argentina's total exports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 were considered. 
Table 3 
ARGENTINA. EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES 










































"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. 
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Table 1 
BOLIVIA: EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES" 







































































































































































Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Bolivia, the 




BOLIVIA: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1975-1979) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 





































"Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 2.0% or more of the value of Bolivia's total exports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 were considered. 
Table 3 
BOLIVIA: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 










































"these indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. 
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Table 1 
BRAZIL: EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES" 






















































































































































































































































































































"Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Brazil, the 
general price index (domestic availability) was used. This is a weighted average of the wholesale price index (60%), the 




BRAZIL: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1975-1979) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 
































































"Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 1.5% or more of the value of Brazil's total exports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 were considered (excluding Poland and the Soviet Union). 
Amount below 1.5%. 
Table 3 
BRAZIL: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 










































"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
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COLOMBIA: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN T R A D I N G PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1974-1978) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 

















































"Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 2.5% or more of the value of Colombia's total exports or 
imports over the period 1974-1978 were considered. 
'Amount below 2.5%. 
Table 3 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
INDEXES FOR EXPORTS A N D IMPORTS" 
( 1 9 8 0 = 100) 
Annual and 






























































"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. 
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Table 1A 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES" 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































"Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Costa Rica, 
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COSTA RICA: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 


















Exports to each country 
as a percentage of total 

















Imports from each country 
as a percentage of total 

















Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 2.5% or more of the value of Costa Rica's total exports or 
imports over the period 1975-1979 were considered. 




COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE NOMINAL AND REAL 
EXCHANGE RATES INDEXES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 

























































































































































































"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings ofexports or imports (table 2) by the nominal exchange rate 
indexes. The products are added together to give the effective nominal exchange rate indexes. 
These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings ofexports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1A). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. In calculating these 
indexes for Costa Rica, the wholesale price index was used. 
c




CHILE: EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES" 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































"Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Chile, the 




CHILE: EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES" 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































"Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Chile, the 
following price indexes were used: 1971-1973 - corrected consumer price index of J. Yáñez; 1974-1978 - corrected 




CHILE: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 


















Exports to each country 
as a percentage of total 
















Imports from each country 
as a percentage of total 

















"Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 2.5% or more of the value of Chile's total exports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 considered. 




CHILE: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 

































































































































"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1 A). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. In calculating these 
indexes for Chile, the wholesale price index for domestic products was used. 
A procedure similar to that described in footnot ° was employed,,except that the calculations were based on table 1B and 
the following prices indexes: 1971-1973 - corrected consumer price index of J. YáÜ£r, 1974-1978 - corrected consumer 
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ECUADOR: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1975-1979) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 
exports of Ecuador imports of Ecuador 
United States 40.0 36.7 
Canada 1.7 2.0 
Japan 1.3 14.6 
Federal Republic of Germany 3.9 8.8 
Italy 1.8 4.5 
Netherlands 2.4 1.1 
Chile 6.7 1.5 
Colombia 4.2 3.0 
Panama 10.6 0.2 
Peru 5.5 2.0 
Others 31.9 25.6 
Total 10O0 HXU) 
"Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 2.0% or more of the value of Ecuador's total exports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 were considered. 
Table 3 
ECUADOR: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES 
FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS" 
(1980 = 100) 
A n n u a l
 Exports Imports 
averages r r 
1970 134.6 121.8 
1971 137.3 119.0 
1972 132.1 118.6 
1973 131.1 122.9 
1974 120.7 117.1 
1975 111.5 109.0 
1976 105.2 102.4 
1977 99.0 98.0 
1978 96.2 98.9 
1979 99.2 100.2 
1980 100.0 100.0 
1981 92.4 89.6 
"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
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JAMAICA: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1975-1979) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 
exports of Jamaica imports of Jamaica 
United States 39.8 35.7 
Canada 6.8 5.3 
Japan b 3.0 
Federal Republic of Germany b 2.6 
Norway 9.0 b 
United Kingdom 21.0 10.6 
Netherlands Antilles b 6.6 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.4 3.4 
Venezuela t 15.7 
Others 20.0 17.1 
Total 10O0 10O0 
" Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 2.5 % or more of the value of Jamaica's total exports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 were considered. 
Amount under 2.5%. 
Table 3 
JAMAICA: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE INDEXES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(1980 = 100) 
Annual and Effective nominal exchange rate index for: Effective real exchange rate index for: 
quarterly 
averages Exports" Imports" Exports Imports 
45.7 90.1 92.0 
45.2 89.4 90.1 
45.2 89.3 89.9 
51.6 94.5 95.2 
51.0 89.0 89.6 
50.5 84.4 84.8 
49.3 79.1 80.7 
5° ' 92.3 94.6 
8i 101.4 104.0 
98.z 106.9 107.6 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
97.8 92.9 96.0 
99.8 96.1 97.2 
98.1 94.8 97.5 
96.1 90.0 94.8 
963 908 947 
" These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the nominal exchange rate 
indexes. The products are added together to give the effective nominal exchange rate indexes. 



































MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES" 





























































































































































































































































"Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Mexico, the 




MEXICO: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1976-1980) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 
exports of Mexico imports of Mexico 
United States 65.5 63.5 
Canada 1.1 2.0 
Japan 3.5 6.0 
Federal Republic of Germany 2.0 6.0 
Spain 4.6 1.8 
France 1.2 3.0 
Italy 1.1 2.0 
Switzerland i 1.3 
United Kingdom t 2.4 
Israel 2.8 ¿> 
Brazil 2.5 2.1 
Venezuela 1.1 ¿> 
Others 14.6 9.9 
Total HMU) m o 
"Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 1 % or more of the value of Mexico's total exports or imports 
over the period 1976-1980 were considered. 
Table 3 
MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
INDEXES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS" 
(1980 = 100) 
Annual and 
quarterly Exports Imports 
averages 
1970 106.8 103.9 
1971 106.5 104.2 
1972 109-5 108.0 
1973 108.3 107.4 
1974 105.4 103.4 
1975 103.9 102.5 
1976 109.4 107.6 
1977 120.7 119.2 
1978 114.1 114.8 
1979 109.1 109.1 
1980 100.0 100.0 
1981 91.4 90.2 
I 94.7 94.0 
II 92.6 91.2 
III 90.7 88.9 
IV 88_5 87.4 
"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. 
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Table 1A 
PARAGUAY: EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES" * 
(1980 = 100) 


































































































































































































"Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Paraguay, the 
wholesale price index was used. 
Prepared on the basis of and exchange rate of 126 guaraníes per US dollar for the entire period. 
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Table 2 
PARAGUAY: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1975-1979) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 
exports of Paraguay imports of Paraguay 
United States 9.8 11.5 
Japan 5.4 7.4 
Federal Republic of Germany 13.0 8.1 
France 3.4 t 
Italy 4.0
 b 
Netherlands 13.1 t 
United Kingdom 4.9 7.2 
Switzerland 8.2 t 
Argentina 14.9 17.4 
Brazil 6.9 20.6 
Uruguay 3.7 3.4 
Algeria * 11.1 
Others 12.7 13.3 
Total 10^0 100£ 
"Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 2.5% or more of the value of Paraguay's total exports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 were considered. 
Table 3 
PARAGUAY: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
INDEXES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 






















































































"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1 A). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. These indexes were 
prepared ort the basis of the official exchange rate of 126 guaraníes per US dollar. 
These indexes correspond to a weighted average of the real exchange rate indexes for Paraguay with respect to Argentina, 
Brazil, the United States, Japan, Italy, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, calculated on the basis of their 
relative shares in non-registered trade flows with this country. In calculating these indexes, the floating free market 
exchange rate was used (table IB). 
'Corresponds to a weighted average of columns ( 1 ) and (2) on the basis of the effective share of the main trading partners 
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PERU: EVOLUTION OF NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES 
(1980 = 100) 
Annual Peruvian soles per: 
averages US Canadian Japanese Deutsch- Belgian French Italian 



















































































































































































































PERU: EVOLUTION OF RELATIVE PRICE INDEXES"'' 
(1980 = 100) 
» ! Peruvian wholesale price index divided by price indexes of: 
averages US Canada Japon Germany Belgium France Italy 

















































































































































































































"Wholesale price index = WPI; consumer price index = CPI. 
'The data on the WPI for Peru were supplied by the National Statistical Institute of that country. 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Table E 
PERU: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average 1975-1979) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 
exports of Peru imports of Peru 
United States 31.3 31.7 
Canada ¡, 3.0 
Japan 12.5 8.5 
Federal Republic of Germany 5.9 8.7 
Belgium 2.8 » 
France ¡, 2.9 
Italy 3.7 25 
Netherlands 2.6 2.9 
United Kingdom 3.6 3.5 
Argentina ¡, 2.5 
Brazil 3.0 3.3 
Chile 2.5 * 
Ecuador j, 5.2 
Venezuela * 4.7 
Others 32.1 20.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
"Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 2.5% or more of the value of Peru's total exports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 were considered. Excludes China and Poland. 
b
 Value less than 2.5%. 
Table F 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
INDEXES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS" 
(1980 = 100) 
A n n u a l
 Exports Imports 
averages r 
1970 727 73.9 
1971 71.2 71.9 
1972 73.9 74.2 
1973 79.2 78.9 
1974 82.7 81.5 
1975 76.6 76.1 
1976 80.7 81.5 
1977 90.4 90.3 
1978 113.1 112.8 
1979 106.9 107.3 
1980 100.0 100.0 
1981 86A 67.0 
"Theses indexes obtained by multiplying the weighting of exports or imports given in table E by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table D). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate index¿s. 
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Table 1 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES" 
(1980 = 100) 






























































































































































































































"Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Uruguay, the 




URUGUAY: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1975-1979) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 
exports of Uruguay imports of Uruguay 
United States 
Japan 














































"Only those countries whose exports or imports average 2.5% or more of the value of Uruguay's totalexports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 were considered. 
Amount below 2.5%. 
Table 3 
URUGUAY: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 










































"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table I). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. 
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Table 1 








































































(1980 = = 100) 


















































































































































"Corresponds to the quotient of the nominal exchange rate indexes divided by the relative price indexes. For Venezuela, 




VENEZUELA: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE, BY MAIN TRADING PARTNERS" 
(Average for the period 1975-1979) 
Exports to each country Imports from each country 
Country as a percentage of total as a percentage of total 
exports of Venezuela imports of Venezuela 
United States 39.4 43.5 
Canada 11.6 3.3 
Japan /, 9.2 
Federal Republic of Germany t 9.2 
Spain b 2.9 
France b 2.8 
Italy 2.0 5.2 
United Kingdom 2.2 3.2 
Netherlands Antilles 21.4 t 
Brazil t 2.3 
Others 23.4 18.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
"Only those countries whose exports or imports averaged 2% or more of the value of Venezuela's total exports or imports 
over the period 1975-1979 were considered. 
Table 3 
VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
INDEXES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS" 
(1980 = 100) 
Annual and 
quarterly Exports Imports 
averages 
Î97Ô 116.2 105.0 
1971 118.2 107.3 
1972 119.4 110.0 
1973 120.3 116.9 
1974 121.0 117.2 
1975 117.1 112.0 
1976 114.5 107.6 
1977 107.0 103.0 
1978 106.7 106.9 
1979 107.8 108.8 
1980 100.0 100.0 
1981 94.9 89.6 
I 98.3 95.5 
II 95.6 90.3 
III 92.2 85.3 
IV 93ij 87.6 
"These indexes were obtained by multiplying the weightings of exports or imports (table 2) by the real exchange rate 
indexes (table 1). The products are added together to give the effective real exchange rate indexes. 
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Figure 1 
EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE INDEXES FOR EXPORTS 
ARGENTINA3 (1980 = 10°) COSTA RICA3 
80 81 80 81 
Source: Table 3 of the section corresponding to each country. 
^Calculated on the basis of the wholesale price index. 




EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE INDEXES FOR EXPORTS 










Deflated by wholesale' 













1970 80 81 
Source: Table 3 of the section corresponding to each country. 
Calculated on the basis of the wholesale price index. 
^Calculated on the basis of the corrected consumer price indexes prepared 
by J. Yáñez (1971-1973) and R. Cortázar and J. Marshall (1974-1978), and 
the consumer price index of the National Statistical Institute (INE)( 1979-1981). 
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Figure 3 
EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE INDEXES FOR EXPORTS 








\ On basis of floating _ 
\ \free exchange rate 
\ M " 
\ y^/v^T"** 
On basis of official \ -
exchange rate \ 
• t i i i i i i i n 
1970 75 
URUGUAY13 
80 81 1970 75 
VENEZUELA15 
80 81 
1970 80 81 1970 
Source: Table 3 of the section corresponding to each country (table F in the case 
of Peía). 
^Calculated on the basis of the wholesale price index. 
^Calculated on the basis of the wholesale price index for domestic products. 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Figure 4 
EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE INDEXES FOR IMPORTS 
(1980 = 100) 
ARGENTINA3 COSTA RICAa 
1970 80 81 80 81 
BRAZILb COLOMBIA2 
1970 80 81 
Source: Table 3 of the section corresponding to each country. 
¿•Calculated on the basis of the wholesale price index. 
^Calculated on the basis of the general price index (domestic availability). 
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Figure 5 
EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE INDEXES FOR IMPORTS 
BOLIVIA3 (1980 = 100) CHILE 
Deflated by wholesale 





_ \ \ 
\ / 
- \ / 
corrected consumer 
price index'' 
' I I I 
1970 75 80 81 
ECUADOR3 
1970 










1970 75 80 81 1970 75 
Source: Table 3 of the section corresponding to each country. 
^Calculated on the basis of the wholesale price index. 
^Calculated on the basis of the corrected consumer price indexes prepared 
by J. Yáñez (1971-1973) and R. Cortázar and J. Marshall (1974-1978), and 
the consumer price index of the National Statistical Institute (INE) (1979-1981). 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Figure 6 
EVOLUTION OF EFFECTIVE REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE INDEXES FOR IMPORTS 
(1980 = 100) 
PARAGUAY3 PERUb 
I I I I I ' I I I I I 
1970 80 81 80 81 
Source: Table 3 of the section corresponding to each country (table F 
in the case of Peru). 
aCalculated on the basis of the wholesale price index. 
^Calculated on the basis of the wholesale price index for domestic products. 
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